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Abstract 
Terence Hutchison's 193 8 essay has been variously interpreted as introducing 
positivism, ultra-empiricism, and Popperian falsificationism into economics. Given 
Popper's well known anti-positivist stance, this state of affairs may seem puzzling. It 
might be presumed either that contradictions of some kind are involved in 
Hutchison's position, or that Popper's stance is not so far removed from logical 
positivism after all. In this thesis the latter option is adopted and Popper and logical 
positivism is viewed as part of a wider 'logical reconstructionist' pre-Quinean 
philosophy of science. Yet this move may not, and should not, resolve all disquietude 
on the part of the reader. For, to the extent that Hutchison adopted those aspects of 
Popper which clashed with logical positivism, there is an inherent contradiction 
between the view that Hutchison introduced positivism and the view that he 
introduced Popper into economics. 
This provides us with the springboard we need for our thesis. For the contradiction is 
resolved once these views are recognised as turning Hutchison into a straw man. In 
the weak version of our thesis we argue that there has been· an overemphasis on the 
positivist and Popperian elements in Hutchison's essay and a neglect of the extent to 
which it is concerned with economic methodology. In the strong version of our thesis 
we argue that Hutchison's essay is best viewed as a modem restatement of the 
inductivist-empirical-historical, as opposed to the deductivist-apriorist-formalist, 
approach in the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. In this restatement 
Hutchison draws on various elements of positivism and Popper to support a position 
that arises out of, and is specific to, the concerns of economic methodology, rather 
than to promote any particular philosophy of science in economics. 
Survey chapters on the philosophy of science with special emphasis on logical 
positivism, and on aspects of the history of economic methodology, enable us to 
evaluate the nature of Hutchison's essay and to substantiate our thesis. Thereafter we 
highlight the shortcomings of the traditional interpretations of Hutchison's essay 
pointing to how these have limited Hutchison's influence in economics. 
Key terms: Terence Hutchison, economic methodology, philosophy of science; 
empiricism, logical positivism, Popper, inductivism, hypothetico-deductivism, 
methodenstreit, historical method, institutional approach. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Dow (1997: 80) has distinguished between an old guard and a new guard in today's 
mainstream methodology. The old guard (Hutchison, 1938; Blaug, 1980) views the 
role of methodology as prescriptive, ie formulating rules for good scientific practice, 
especially the rule of submitting theories to empirical tests. The new guard 
(McCloskey, 1983) views the role of methodology as descriptive, ie as describing the 
rhetoric of how economists actually persuade each other. McCloskey showed how 
this practice differed from, what she termed, the official positivist methodology, so 
implying the latter redundant in practical terms. Dow (1997) also distinguishes 
between explicitly methodological writings and the methodology implicit in 
mainstream, or neoclassical, economics. This latter, she argues, is difficult to identify 
due to the belief of its practitioners tl}at" it has virtually no significance for the practice 
of economics (Hahn, 1992). Lawson ( 1994) argues that this belief results from the 
view that, provided the theory predicts successfully, no further methodological 
discussion is required. This, he argues, implies an underlying positivist methodology. 
Boland (1991) also identifies the methodology implicit in neoclassical economics as 
positivist, although McCloskey (1983) disagrees. 1 
Hutchison (1938) is generally regarded as having introduced positivism, 
ultraempiricism and Popperian falsificationism into economics (Knight, 1940; 
Machlup, 1955; Klappholz and Agassi, 1959; Rosenberg, 1976; Blaug, 1980; 
Caldwell, 1982; Coats, 1983; Hausman, 1992).2 Given that Dow lists Hutchison 
(1938) as sole representative of the old guard mainstream methodology until 1980, 
and to the extent that Boland and Lawson are correct in their view that mainstream 
economists are simply unaware of the influence of positivism, it appears that we could 
1 While in this first paragraph there is a balanced usage of both genders, for most of this thesis 
there is a preponderance of the male pronoun. This simply reflects the character of the historical 
period under discussion and should not be viewed as any modem-day gender insensitivity. 
2 The term positivism has come to be used in such a vague sense, and positivism bashing has 
become so widespread, that it is difficult to ascribe any sort of definite meaning to· the term other 
than that it generally involves an attempt to attach some sort of pejorative meaning to the views so 
labeled (cf Hutchison, 1992: 49). In Chapter One we attempt to form a clearer idea of one form of 
positivism, logical positivism. 
conclude that the influence of Hutchison (1938) on economics must have been 
comparable (at least in some way) to that ofKeynes (1936) on economics. Yet the 
extent to which this is the case is far from clear. While some of the reasons. will 
emerge in the course of the thesis, there are some immediately obvious factors. 
One reason is that it may be a case of comparing apples with pears: the one involves 
the question of influence between two different levels of debate, while the other 
concerns the same level of debate, namely that between different economists 
theorising about economic relations. Another reason is that Hutchison largely left off 
active intervention in economic methodology until the late 1970s, devoting himself to 
the history of economic thought. Yet another reason arises from the phenomenal 
success of Friedman's (1953). This essay appears to have been more influential on 
practising economists than on economic methodologists. It was widely interpreted as 
contending that economists could simply bypass the issue of the realism of 
assumptions, provided the predictions of their theories met with empirical success. 
Of course, citing Friedman's (1953) does not explain the previous fifteen years' 
apparent lack of influence. Where Friedman (1953) was applauded for setting out the 
methodology of positive economics, Hutchison's (1938) introduction of 'positivism' 
was roundly condemned by one of the leading economists of the time Knight (1940). 
Even in the 1950s it was once again rejected as ultraempiricism by Machlup (1955) ' 
who, at the same time, championed Friedman's introduction of positivism (Machlup, 
1956: 485). This paradox is partly resolved to the extent that one accepts Boland's 
( 1979) characterisation of Friedman as mainly instrumentalist, and Latsis' s ( 197 6) 
appraisal of (both Friedman and) Machlup as conventionalistic, defences of orthodox 
theory against falsificationism.3 Yet puzzles remain. The rejection by Knight and 
3 There appear to be at least two very different senses in which the tenn 'conventionalist' is used. 
Latsis (1976) and Boland (1979) appear to use it in the sense in which Popper denounced 
instrumentalist and conventionalist attempts to both avoid the problem of induction and defend 
some particular dogma in the face of his fallibilist view of scientific knowledge. This contrasts with 
the widespread use of conventionalism in the philosophy of science (Poincare, logical positivism, 
Popper himself- eg his rationality principle) to denote an anti-realist rather than a realist 
interpretation of concepts and (unobservable) terms in scientific theories extending to even 
scientific theories and laws themselves. For postmodernists it is only by convention that science 
itself is regarded as having any greater claim to knowledge than astrology: they are no more than 
two different conversations. 
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Machlup, contrasts with the seeming acceptance of Hutchison's views by the vast 
majority of practising economists. While Dow's distinction between economic 
methodology and the methodology implicit in mainstream economics needs to ·be 
taken into account, this widespread acceptance implies (as Dow has argued above) 
that Hutchison represented mainstream methodology. Yet Knight's and Machlup's 
reactions imply Hutchison (1938) was attacking orthodoxy. 
Clearly the story of Hutchison's role in economic methodology is more complicated 
than that presented by Dow (1997). While this is partly due to the necessarily broad-
brushed account of the field with which she is concerned, it is also partly due to the 
extent to which she subscribes to the consensus view of Hutchison (1938) as 
representing mainstream methodology and introducing positivism to economics. In 
this thesis we set out to challenge this consensus view in terms of both a weak and a 
strong version. In the weak version we argue that the positivist aspect of Hutchison 
(1938) has been overemphasised, while the extent to which it represents the concerns 
of economic methodology rather than any particular philosophy of science, has been 
overlooked. Just as Hutchison draws extensively on logical positivism, so his essay 
arises out of the on-going methodological concerns of leading economists in the 
history of economics eg Ricardo, Malthus, Senior and Cairnes amongst others. On 
the very first page of his essay he refers to Kaufmann, Mackenroth, Morgenstern, 
Myrdal and Robbins as participants in the then current discussions on methodological 
issues - he might have included Knight - all of whom feature significantly 
throughout his essay. In his first chapter, in which he proposes his Principle of 
Testability, all of his references are to writers concerned with economic methodology 
except for two. There is one reference to Carnap, another to Russell. The writer to 
whom he refers most of all in this first chapter is Schumpeter. 
While we aim to defend this weak version of our thesis, we attempt on occasion to 
defend a strong version. The strong version is that Hutchison's essay is best viewed · 
as another round of the long-standing methodenstreit in economics (between an 
inductive, empirical and historical approach and a deductive, a priori and formalist 
approach) rather than the introduction of positivism into economics. Hutchison's call 
is for a more inductive, empirical and historical approach in economics. Logical 
positivism, as the then latest version of empiricism, is used to support this call. 
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Although Hutchison draws extensively on logical positivist ideas, he tends to have 
more sympathy with the inductive, rather than the hypothetico-deductive, elements 
within logical positivism. And he indicates sympathy with 'the classic advocate of 
induction' when he refers to Bacon's dictum that wise questioning is only the half of 
knowledge (1938: 35-6). And he also refers (in Hart, 2002) to Bacon's distinction 
between light-bringing and fruit-producing. This accords with Hutchison's emphasis 
on economics as a discipline producing practical policy results. 
Given this background, and having approvingly cited Hogben for one of his chapter 
six mottoes (1938: 160), it seems reasonable to infer that he would approve of 
Hogben's (1938: 26) citing of another of Bacon's dictums: 'It cannot be that axioms 
established by argumentation can suffice for the discovery of new works, since the 
subtlety of nature is greater many times over than the subtlety of argument'. Hogben 
goes on to protest against the view that 'exercises in draughtsmanship displayed in 
books on economics record the results of real measurements, as do curves in books on 
physics or biology' (ibid). With reference to Hicks (1932), Hogben comments: 
A curve which tells us the relation of resistance to heat exhibits a series of 
points each based on a Wheatstone bridge observation of the conductivity of a 
real piece of metal and a reading obtained from a reliable and tangible 
thermometer. The corresponding measurements of the employers' concession 
and the trade union resistance curves exist in the brain of Dr. Hicks (1938: 27). 
Likewise, Hutchison's essay does not promote Popperian falsificationism in so far as 
his concern is more with empirically testing theories, than with specifically falsifying 
theories so as to avoid the problem of induction. (However, his essay certainly 
reflects Popper's fallibilistic view of science.) Hutchison's essay is grounded in, and 
emerges from, issues specific to the methodology of economics. It is this, rather than 
some ahistorical attempt to import a philosophy of science into economics. 
Yet this strong thesis should not be pressed too far. Hutchison's essay shows a 
detailed knowledge of both the then latest philosophy of science, logical positivism, 
as well as earlier philosophy of science. Indeed, in drawing so extensively on the 
philosophy of science Hutchison appears to have set the norm for the methodology of 
economics from 1938 until the emergence of the new guard in the 1980s. This would 
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seem to reflect an enormous influence on the methodology of economics and accounts 
for Dow's (1997) listing· of Hutchison (1938) as representative of mainstream 
methodology, ie methodology based on developments of logical positivism.4 While 
there is truth in this view, Dow tends to underemphasize the methodenstreit in 
economics and does not even mention Robbins (1932, 1935). 
It is true that she refers to the long-standing tension between empiricists or positivists 
and deductivists (Dow, 1997: 75). However, drawing on Caldwell (1982), she 
contends that the 1950s development of logical positivism did not 'necessarily entail 
any tension between empiricism and deductivism'. While this may be true of the 
situation in the 1950s, we argue in Chapter One that, from as early as the 1920s, a 
tension between an inductivist and a hypothetico-deductivist approach to scientific 
procedure characterised logical positivism. In line with our strong thesis we argue 
that the methodenstreit continued in economics with Hutchison (1938) replying on 
behalf of the inductivist camp to Robbins's (1932, 1935) statement on behalf of the 
deductivist camp. In drawing on logical positivism, Hutchison emphasised the 
inductivist aspects. Yet powerful factors led to the dominance of the hypothetico-
deductivist approach in economics. 
The inductivist approach as represented by the development of the full cost pricing 
principle, together with the theory of imperfect competition, proved threatening to the 
orthodox marginalist theory of the firm. This provoked the first powerful factor: 
Friedman's famous irrelevance-of-assumptions thesis in his (1953) instrumentalist 
defence of orthodoxy. Machlup .skilfully presented Friedman's thesis as fully in line 
with the hypothetico-deductive version of logical positivism as outlined by 
Braithwaite (1953), so seemingly legitimising the old deductivist tendency to ignore 
the empirical realism of assumptions. Another powerful factor leading to the 
dominance of deductivism was the lack of experimental evidence in economics and 
the difficulty of empirical testing (Dow, 1997: 75). This, together with the problem of 
induction made Popperian falsificationism (which also drew on the hypothetico-
deductive procedure so by-passing the problem of the realism of assumptions) seem 
4 The extent to which Hutchison's essay influenced the practice of economics is a different issue 
and is dealt with on pages 149-54. 
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increasingly attractive to many economists. In terms of both the hypothetico-
deductive version of logical positivism and Popperian falsificationism: 
Methodology, therefore, guides theory construction only insofar as that 
construction facilitates empirical testing. · Free rein has thus been given to 
deductivists to develop theory according to an internal agenda, with only token 
reference to empirical testing of the end results (Dow, 1997: 75). 
While Dow links Hutchison, as representative of mainstream methodology, to this 
widespread deductivism, such a scenario clashes head on with the strong version of 
our thesis. This interprets Hutchison as emphasising the virtues of the inductivist 
approach in economics in 1938. While we will be substantiating this view of his 1938 
essay during the course of this thesis (especially in Chapter Three), it is interesting to 
note that Hutchison's more recent writings appear to support such an interpretation. 
While Hutchison's first sustained return to methodological matters occurred in the 
late 1970s, it was only in 1992 that he delivered his first extensive criticism of 
~~-. . . . . 
orthodox methodology after that of 1938 (Hutchison, 1992). Drawing on Ward 
(1972), a book which he says he wished he had read eighteen years earlier (1992: 16), 
he endorses Ward's view that a methodological revolution more significant than the 
Keynesian revolution has occurred in postwar economics (1992: 17). This is the 
'formalist revolution' (Hutchison, 2000, ch 9; cf Dow, 1998). Hutchison interprets its 
roots as being in the deductivist tradition following Robinson (1932, 1933) and 
Robbins (1932, 1935). Formalism prizes the development of the form, or technique, 
of the research method used, rather than the substance of the research itself. It has led 
to the development of increasingly sophisticated mathematical models and techniques 
of econometric modelling. Provided due conformity has been paid to these formalist 
procedures, further thought about the extent to which the analysis can be applied to 
the reality, eg taking into account the prevailing institutional and historical 
circumstances, does not even arise. This, of course, clashes head on with Hutchison's 
inductivism and his emphasis on taking account of the historical and institutional 
circumstances surrounding the research topic or problem. 
Many factors may account for the development of formalism. Among these appear to 
be the postwar departmentalisation, professionalisation and internationalisation of 
economics (Hutchison, 1996, especially sections 5, 6, and 7). Hutchison (1992: 55) 
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dismisses Colander's (1990: 189-91) linking of formalism to positivism, since he 
interprets formalism as the polar opposite of positivism. While we concur with 
Hutchison (1998) that the roots of formalism are to be found in the ultra-deductivism 
of the Ricardo-Senior-Caimes-Robbins tradition, it seems possible that the particular 
development of hypothetico-deductivist logical positivism within economics may 
have encouraged the growth of formalism. For instance, Ward (1972: 179) refers to 
'the "positivist-formalist" who limits economics to those parts that can be formalised 
into the mathematical-statistical framework that is the positivist norm'. He points out 
that most inter-war economists conducted verbal rather than mathematical analysis. 
Those with a rationalistic bias steered clear of empirical facts, while the applied 
economist followed an historical approach (Ward, 1972: 40-44). The postwar period 
has seen a revolution which has swept this rationalist-historical mix aside and ushered 
in a mathematical-statistical one. 
The contemporary theorist is not only well-grounded in mathematics, but finds 
it the natural medium for expressing his professional ideas: the proof has 
replaced the argument. The well-regarded applied economist still knows his 
field of application, but his orientation is no longer historical. Instead, he seeks 
ways of formulating hypotheses which have the twin properties of being related 
to interesting modem theory and of being capable of statistical test. His aim is 
not so much to build a picture of events and their causes from historical 
documents as it is to test hypotheses of theoretical interest by using statistical 
tools and a pool of discovered or generated 'empirical' numbers (Ward, 1972: 
41). 
This passage from Ward enables us to form a clearer idea of the inductive, empirical 
and historical method that Hutchison supports. Hutchison (1988) traces, what he 
terms, the 'historical-institutional' approach to the eighteenth century Scottish 
Enlightenment and 'brilliant triumvirate' of Hume, Steuart and Smith. These ideas 
were next developed by the German historical school. . While the rejection of 
Schmoller' s support for the Prussian government as well as his academic empire-
building is understandable, there has been a case of throwing the baby out with the 
bath water. There was no need, Hutchison argues, for the corresponding 'widespread 
rejection' of the 'vital role' of the historical and institutional factors in political 
economy. 
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Hutchison (1953) traces the historical school in England back to Ingram's (1878) and 
Leslie's (1879, 1879a) criticisms of classical political economy and earlier. He 
documents the influence of both the English and German historical schools on 
Marshall. Hutchison (1992: 125-6) has drawn attention to the extent to which 
Marshall was far closer to the historical method than many had realised until Coase's 
( 197 5) revealing article on the subject. Yet Marshall's dislike for methodological 
controversy and perhaps his over-sensitivity to Cunningham's (1892) criticism, led 
him to paper over the cracks of the long-standing divide between the deductivists and 
the inductive-historical school. Furthermore, Keynes's ( 1891) methodological treatise 
leaned more towards the deductivists than the inductivists. Hutchison's support for 
the historical method is clearly evident in his 1938 essay where he draws on Leslie's 
(1879a) in emphasising the importance of taking account of uncertainty when he 
exposes, in his chapter four, the extent to which the deductivist approach relies on the 
assumption of perfect expectations (1938: 89). Elsewhere he draws on Schmoller and 
Jones (1938: 59, 119). 
However, just as it is wrong to interpret Hutchison (1938) as espousing no more than 
logical positivism, so it would be wrong to view him as espousing no more than the 
historical school's ideas. His methodology also draws on the classical empiricism of 
Hume, Locke and Berkeley. Hutchison (1953a) shows how Berkeley's approach to 
economic problems eschewed the deductivist approach. Concerning Berkeley's 
programme to relieve the unemployment in Ireland in the 1730s, Hutchison comments 
approvingly: 
Although the result is consistent and well-knit, Berkeley's programme is i:ather 
built upwards out of particular practical proposals suggested by the closely-
observed problems around him, than deduced downwards from a set of 
formulae or generalisations .... Such analytical generalisations as Berkeley uses 
are thrown out ad hoc, the practical problem shaping and determining the 'tools 
of thought', as economists call them, rather than the other way round 
(Hutchison, 1953a: 53, 73). 
Quinton (1993) distinguishes classical empiricism from two other forms of 
empiricism. The forms of empiricism are distinguished with regard to differences 
concerning the status of a priori concepts and propositions. He distinguishes two 
main types of a priori concept. First, there are the formal concepts of mathematics 
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and logic, eg, 'not', 'and'. Second, there are Kant's categorial concepts, 'categories' 
which the mind imposes upon experience, eg, 'substance', 'cause'. There are many 
kinds of a priori propositions, eg, definitional truisms and tautologies, logicaLand 
mathematical statements, and metaphysical claims. The strongest type of empiricism 
denies the truth of both a priori concepts and propositions. The second, or 'classical 
kind, denies the truth of categorial concepts, but accepts that formal concepts and 
propositions are a priori true. However, these pertain only to the relations between 
ideas, ie, to the conventional meanings given to words, not to matters of fact about the 
world. There are thus no 'synthetic a priori' propositions in Kant's sense. The 
weakest form of empiricism neither restricts a priori concepts to being only formal, 
nor to being only analytic. Consequently, unlike classical empiricism, there can be 
substantively informative propositions about the world that are nevertheless not 
empirical. Nevertheless, most concepts and propositions in this view remain 
empirical. Given their view that knowledge stems from experience, all empiricists 
stress the importance of inductive reasoning. We argue in this thesis that, to the 
extent that Hutchison (1938) draws on empiricism it is the second, or classical, form 
of empiricism that is more fundamental to his methodology than- the logical positivism 
of the Vienna Circle. 
Indeed recent revisions of the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle emphasise it as a 
synthesis of rationalism and empiricism involving 'a heterogeneous pluralism of 
views with regard to ethics, realism and verificationism versus falsificationism' 
(Stadler, 1998: 608). One of the bigger divides within logical positivism is 
represented in the protocol sentence debate of 1930-34 which we discuss as an 
appendix to Chapter One. Essentially this involved a split between Schlick who held 
to a phenomenalist empiricism and a correspondence theory of truth (and in this way 
closer to classical empiricism), and Carnap and Neurath who held to a physicalist 
empiricism and a coherence theory of truth which involved conventionalist (non-
empirical) choices for empiricism itself (Friedman, 1998: 793). Carnap had originally 
sided with Schlick, but Neurath won him over in the course of the debate. 
While Hutchison quotes from both the early and later Carnap, it appears that he is 
more influenced by Schlick, as we will see in Chapter Three. Rather than these 
philosophical debates, what was important about logical positivism for Hutchison is 
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the way in which it incorporated logic and mathematics· (as a priori analytic 
knowledge) into an empiricist account of science. Apart from classical empiricism, it 
is the clear need for a vital role to be accorded to mathematics that distinguishes 
Hutchison's methodology from the historical method (as well as from the verbal 
formalism of the deductivists of the early twentieth century, ie Robbins and Mises). 
This explains Hutchison's choice of a passage from Pareto (1935) as the general 
motto for his entire book (1938: v). In the passage Pareto berates purely literary 
economists as 'numberless unfortunates' and praises the extent to which mathematical 
economics leads to some idea of the interdependencies amongst economic 
phenomena. Hutchison looks to economists such as Jevons, Marshall, Pareto and 
Schumpeter as symbolising the appropriate mix of deductive mathematical analysis 
and inductive historical investigation needed to deal with the particular subject matter 
of economics. 
So far we have not considered the relationship between Hutchison's and Popper's 
methodology, apart from noting that Hutchison introduced Popperian falsificationism 
into economics and that his methodology is in accord with Popperian fallibilism. 
However, the methodologies differ in at least two areas. First, where Popper adopts 
the hypothetico-deductive accounts of scientific procedure, Hutchison's methodology 
is more sceptical towards hypothetico-deductivism and emphasises the extent to 
which inductivism-:SM is useful in economics. 5 
In this connection, it should be insisted that, as regards economics and the social 
sciences, the rejection or neglect of induction by strict hypothetical deductivists 
(like Popper and Hayek) also tends towards obscuranticism by insisting on 
excluding a method not used in physics, even when the material of economics 
requires induction if the aims and problems of the subject are to be tackled 
(Hutchison, 1992: 57). 
Second, for Popper, prediction in economics must be based on laws. Hutchison 
disagrees and says that only 'trends . . . expressed in empirical or historical 
generalisations of less than universal validity, restricted by local and temporal limits' 
can be used in economics for purposes of prediction (1977: 19-21). 
5 Inductivism-SM is explained in Chapter One. 
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Both these characteristics of Popper's methodology are common also to the 
hypothetico-deductive version of logical positivism which developed into what Losee 
(1980, ch 12) describes as the 'logical reconstructionist' philosophy of science, 
perhaps best described in Nagel ( 1961 ). It understood the language of science to 
consist of a hierarchy of language levels with high-level statements referring to 
unobservables and low-level ones to observables (Braithwaite, 1953). Hempel and 
Oppenheim (1948) stressed the deductive nature of explanation which, in their 
account, involved a logical symmetry between explanation and prediction. 
The fundamental requirement of both Popper and the logical reconstructionist 
philosophy of science for good scientific practice is that theories be subjected to 
objective empirical tests, whether these involved verification, confirmation or 
falsification. The objectiveness of the empirical tests derives from the view that the 
results of these tests are theory independent. However, in the late 1950s this logical 
reconstructivist position came under sustained criticism. The view that facts were 
theory-laden became increasingly emphasised and doubts were expressed about 
Hempel and Oppenheim's symmetry thesis. Amongst the more important critics were 
Quine (1951), Toulmin (1953), Hanson (1958), Feyerabend (1958), Polyani (1958) 
and Kuhn (1962). 
* * * 
In this introduction we have set out the project of this thesis and have attempted to 
provide some of the background against which to view Hutchison's 193 8 essay. In 
order to assess the nature and influence of this contribution we will be concerned with 
a rational reconstruction of Hutchison's 1938 contribution to economic methodology, 
but will also attempt to take account of the intellectual climate of the 1930s (~f Torr, 
2001). Given the need to make the thesis manageable, we decided to consider 
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Hutchison's influence only up to 1963.6 This seemed a good cut-off date for three 
reasons. First, his 1938 essay comprises his only real methodological work (except 
for responses to criticisms of it) until Hutchison (1964). Up to 1963 it is thus only 
this work that can a~count for his influence on economic methodology. Second, 1963 
is the year that Lipsey's best-selling textbook, An Introduction to Positive Economics, 
was first published. To.the extent that Hutchison (1938) represents the introduction of 
positivism into economics - and we argue that this needs to be severely qualified -
Lipsey's manifesto would seem to represent its final acceptance into mainstream 
economics. Third, it avoids having to take fully into account the extent to which 
Hutchison's methodological views changed and developed, and are still developing, 
during his long career. Hence, while we take account of certain revisions to his 1938 
views that he made in the preface to the 1960 edition of his 1938 work, these are not 
especially relevant to our thesis. As it happens, we would contend that Hutchison's 
fundamental views remain much the same today as in 1938, but this topic falls outside 
the scope of this thesis. 
Since Hutchison's essay has been mainly characterised as introducing positivism to 
economics, the main task of Chapter One will be to clarify the meaning of this term. 
We attempt to do this by examining in a fair amount of detail one particular form of 
positivism, logical positivism, since it is this form that is extensively cited in 
Hutchison's essay. We limit ourselves to discussing those aspects of logical 
positivism which are relevant to economics and the social sciences, rather than 
attempting a comprehensive account since this is best left to philosophers of science. 
Armed with this knowledge, we will be in a position to judge at least something of the 
extent to which the key ideas and propositions in Hutchison's methodology are drawn 
from this position. Hutchison refers not only to the writings of the Vienna Circle, but 
_ more widely to philosophers of science before the logical positivist era of the 1920s 
6 The outstanding assessment of Hutchison's methodology is Coats (1983). Coats (1983) formed 
much of the platform on which I started to develop this thesis so that I now no longer know ifl first 
read of a certain idea or distinction related to Hutchison in Coats or not. Thus while I accord 
specific acknowledgement ofCoats's appraisal at various points in the thesis, I can do little more 
than to acknowledge the enormous overall influence of his analysis on this thesis. (Coats appends a 
valuable bibliography of Hutchison's writings (1983: 265-70).) In more general terms, Caldwell 
(1982) likewise has exerted a fundamental influence. More than any other single text, it served to 
introduce me to the philosophy of science, the methodology of economics, and in particular to 
Hutchison's methodological contributions. 
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and 1930s. We therefore also examine such interventions for two .reasons. Where 
they influenced the writers of the Vienna Circle this will aid our understanding of 
logical positivism. Where this was not the case, we will be able to form some idea of 
the extent to which Hutchison drew on a philosophy of science wider than that of 
logical positivism. 
In Chapter Two we are back on home ground after our foray into the philosophy of 
science. Nevertheless, we limit our objective to looking at those aspects of the history 
of economic methodology that are relevant to a clearer understanding of the long-
standing dispute between two competing approaches to investigating the subject 
matter of economics. The one emphasises the importance of inductivist methods and 
the other the importance of deductivist methods. Given that this is a theme dear to 
Hutchison, and explicitly brought out in Hutchison (1998), we need to guard against 
viewing the history of economic methodology too much through his eyes. In order to 
do this, as well as to gain a more detailed account of economic methodology in the 
period leading up to Hutchison's essay in 1938, we examine the methodological 
writings of three of the leading economists of the period, and indeed of the century: 
Robbins, JM Keynes and Knight. Given that it often helps in understanding a view to 
understand that to which it is opposed, a knowledge of Robbins's methodology should 
aid us when we tum to examine Hutchison's essay. Equipped with the knowledge 
gained about the history of economic methodology in Chapter Two, we are in some 
position to judge the extent to which Hutchison draws on, and is responding to, the 
topics and concerns of economic methodology rather than those of the philosophy of 
science. 
We tum in Chapter Three to Hutchison's 1938 essay itself. We deal with it chapter 
by chapter examining it in terms of headings chosen by Hutchison. By withholding 
our own categories of interpretation it is hoped that it increases the chances of 
discovering what Hutchison himself regarded as important in his essay. Our main 
concern will be with the extent to which Hutchison is influenced by the issues and 
debates that arise out of economic methodology, as opposed to the extent to which his. 
essay reflects an attempt to introduce the categories and propositions of logical 
positivism into economics. While Hutchison cites extensively from both the 
methodology of economics and the philosophy of science, the problem is to decide 
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which gives rise to the themes that are central to his essay. In terms of the weak 
version of our thesis, the main point that we hope to bring out in this chapter is the 
extent to which Hutchison's essay is the result of a wide-ranging examination of the 
methodology of economics, a point that has so far been overlooked. Instead his essay 
is conventionally viewed as an application of logical positivism to economics. 
We now examine the way in which Hutchison's essay has been interpreted and, 
correspondingly, the way in which it has influenced the methodology of economics. 
In Chapter Four we focus on the immediate response to Hutchison's essay as reflected 
in the various journal reviews. These mostly highlight the positivist nature of 
Hutchison's essay, so starting what became the traditional way of viewing his 
intervention. By far the most important response to Hutchison (1938) was Knight's 
(1940) polemical review. Given that at the time Knight was about the most senior 
economist in the world and Hutchison only in his twenties and beginning his career in 
economics, the ferocity of Knight's response is puzzling. Although Knight made it 
clear he was attacking positivism in general rather than only Hutchison's essay, this 
still did not prevent the brunt of his criticism falling on Hutchison (1938). While 
positivism certainly was an issue, we suggest that the ferocity of his intervention is 
only fully explained in terms the methodenstreit in economics. Knight is defending 
the deductivist approach to economic analysis against a new and, seemingly backed 
by the latest philosophy of science, more threatening version of the inductivist 
approach to the investigation of economic problems. What Knight saw as being 
threatenea was the dominance of the deductivist approach which, importantly, 
traditionally represented the official methodology of orthodox economics. Both 
Knight (and later Machlup) appear to have interpreted Hutchison's intervention as 
threatening not only the authority of the deductivist approach, but more especially, 
that of orthodox economics ~tself. Yet, Hutchison in 1938, we maintain, was not 
concerned with attacking mainstream economics per se. He only wanted it to follow 
what he saw as the procedure best suited to the subject matter and most likely to be 
'fruit-producing'. To this end, he was championing the claims of the less influential 
inductivist approach while drawing attention to the limitations of the deductivist 
approach. 
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In Chapter Five we tum to Machlup's (1955) response to Hutchison (1938). The 
obvious question that arises is why Machlup took so long to respond to Hutchison's 
intervention. The answer has to do with the fact that Machlup dealt with Hutchison's 
essay as only one part of a wide-ranging defence of the orthodox theory of the firm. 
Machlup appears to have viewed his intervention in 1955 as an effort to further 
support Friedman's (1953) attempt to mount a methodological defence of the 
neoclassical theory of the firm which had been under sustained criticism throughout 
the 1940s from adherents of both the monopolistically competitive, and the full cost 
pricing, theories of the firm. We argue that, whereas Friedman's defence of 
orthodoxy followed mainly empiricist lines (ending up in instrumentalism), 
Machlup's defence of orthodoxy followed in the deductivist tradition (ending up in 
conventionalism). In seeking to deal effectively with criticism of the realism of 
assumptions (unlike Friedman who adopted instrumentalism) Machlup sought to 
portray such criticism as either methodologically naive or extreme. Given 
Hutchison's criticism of the basic postulates of economic theory, he forced Hutchison 
(1938), Procrustean-like, to fit into this pre-conceived scheme. Hutchison was cast as 
philosophically . well informed, but as representative of an extreme fringe of 
methodological opinion. Any potential critic of the realism of assumptions thus 
thought twice about being labelled an ultra-empiricist. Machlup thereby stunted the 
development of the inductivist tradition in economic methodology. 
We end by examining in Chapter Six Klappholz and Agassi's interpretation of 
Hutchison's 1938 intervention. While they acknowledge Hutchison's great 
achievement as the introduction into economics of Popper's falsifiability criterion, 
they criticise Hutchison for not going far enough in the adoption of Popper's ideas in 
his methodology. We argue that Klappholz and Agassi (1959) represents an extreme 
interpretation of Popper's approach to scientific procedure. We have seen earlier in 
this introduction how Hutchison differs from Popper. This is mainly because 
Hutchison pursues a more inductivist approach than Popper. While we have argued 
that it is largely incorrect to view Hutchison's essay as an attempt to apply the ideas 
of logical positivism to economics, we argue that in the case of Klappholz and Agassi 
it is correct to view their intervention in 1959 as an attempt to apply (Popperian) ideas 
in the philosophy of science to economics. They were over ambitious in their attempt 
and tried to apply Popperian ideas too widely. By contrast, Hutchison in 1938 saw 
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that Popper's ideas applied to economics only in a more limited way. As with 
Machlup, Klappholz and Agassi 's intervention had an unfortunate consequence in that 
Archibald and Lipsey were guided by Klappholz and Agassi rather than Hutchison. 
Hutchison's methodology was sadly ignored and Lipsey (1963) was led into adopting 
a methodological position that could not be sustained. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND HUTCHISON'S INTERVENTION 
In line with Knight's well known (1940) appraisal of Hutchison's 1938 intervention 
and other early reviews (Stonier, 1939; Whittaker, 1940), Hutchison (1938) has 
generally been regarded as espousing a positivist methodology. Although Machlup 
described Hutchison's position as ultra-empiricist, for him this is synonymous with 
positivism (Machlup, 1978: 486). In the introductory chapter of his influential 
microeconomics text, Ferguson (1969: 7) reproduces Machlup's characterisation in 
the form of a diagram with ultra-empiricism, represented by Hutchison, diametrically 
opposed to extreme a priorism. Others who interpret Hutchison as positivist include 
Caldwell (1984: 3) and McCloskey (1986: 39). 
In Chapter Three we demonstrate that, in arriving at his philosophical and 
methodological position in 1938, Hutchison drew on a wide range of writings in the 
methodology of economics and the philosophy of science which was by no means 
limited to positivism. As far as the philosophy of science is concerned, while it is true 
that he cited many of the Vienna Circle writings, he referred also to Kant (1790), Mill 
(1843), Jevons (1874), Poincare (1905), Einstein (1921), Wittgenstein (1922), Russell 
(1927), Ramsey (1931) and Popper (1934). Indeed, in reply to Knight (1940), 
Hutchison ( 1941) saw himself as drawing on the wider British empiricist tradition of 
Locke, Berkeley and Hume, and not simply on the Vienna Circle. Consequently in 
Chapter One we will aim towards an understanding of the philosophy of science 
somewhat wider than that of the Vienna Circle in order to encompass this aspect of 
Hutchison's 1938 tract. But the main focus of Chapter One will be directed towards 
acquiring an understanding of logical positivism so that we can judge (in Chapter 
Three) the extent to which Hutchison actually draws on logical positivism and 
therefore the extent to which portrayals of Hutchison as positivist or ultra-empiricist 
are accurate. 
Consequently, in the following sections, we do not attempt the ambitious task of a full 
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philosophical appraisal of logical positivism and other positions, but instead limit 
ourselves to drawing out those aspects of the philosophy of science (particularly 
logical positivism) which help towards a more informed understanding of the 
methodology of Hutchison (1938). In line with this aim it will help to describe 
developments in two major areas which led up to the writings of the Vienna Circle: 
nineteenth century attempts to make philosophical sense of startling developments in 
the natural sciences, and the revolution in logic. 
1.1 The revolution in science: the response of Mach and Poincare 
Partly due to the successes of natural science in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, the empiricism of Locke became more extreme in the later formulations by 
Berkeley and Hume (Lacey, 1995). Kant sought to rectify this imbalance by 
attempting a rationalist-empiricist synthesis. In his 1781 Critique of Pure Reason he 
argued that knowledge of the world could not be gained purely by reason alone. 
Likewise, it could not be gained from experience alone. Empiricists were wrong to 
view the objects of experience as existing independently of us. Rather it is only by 
reason that sense experience comes to be ordered and classified (in terms of twelve 
categories) so as to be coherently perceived. The order of nature does not exist 
independently in nature, but is imposed by the structures of our understanding. To 
Hume's two kinds of knowledge, relations of ideas and matters of fact, Kant therefore 
added a third: knowledge in the form of synthetic a priori statements. These could be 
known to be true independently of experience and yet they could give us new 
knowledge about the world. Among Kant's examples were mathematical statements 
such as the equation 7 + 5 = 12 and metaphysical statements such as 'Every event 
must have a cause'. For Kant, Newton's physics typified synthetic a priori knowledge 
in that it was based upon Euclidean geometry. 
In the nineteenth century three major developments arose to challenge Kant's 
assertion of synthetic a priori knowledge: the rise of non-Euclidean geometry ( eg that 
of Gauss, Bolyai, Lobachevskii, Riemann and Klein); the formulation of the 
conservation of energy and general thermodynamics; and the start of scientific 
physiology and psychology (Friedman, 1998: 790). In their efforts to make 
philosophical sense of these changes, two scientists exerted a significant influence on 
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the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle: Mach and Poincare. 
Mach's radical empiricism 
Mach reacted to the interpretation of the conservation of energy (by Helmholtz) in 
atomistic terms, ie invplving (metaphysical) elements which were not immediately 
perceptible. He developed a radically empiricist philosophy which was closely 
related to the work of A venarius. A venarius rejected the idea of a dualism between 
the physical and mental worlds and sought to replace this with a single 'pure 
experience'. He also made use of Ockham's razor to argue that it is legitimate to 
recognise only those things shown to us by experience: his famous principle of 
economy. 'Science is experience economically ordered, and its real content does not 
go beyond experience' (Kolakowski, 1972: 137). 
To these ideas Mach brought sensationalist and phenomenalist theories of experience 
and knowledge. Here he argued in line with J S Mill (1843) who viewed physical 
objects as being no more than 'permanent possibilities of sensation'. For example, a 
stone consists of nothing more than a collection of various sensory qualities such as 
hardness, colour and mass. For Mach, 'these sensations are not in themselves illusory 
or deceptive, but, on the contrary, they are all that we know of reality' (Joergensen, 
1951: 8). There is no underlying substance that has these properties or causes these 
properties. If the perceptible qualities were stripped away precisely nothing would 
remain. Scientific theories are therefore confined to the world of experience. 
Likewise any concept of causation, involving the noumena or ultimate entities of 
some ontological reality, was rejected. Causation was to be understood in Humean 
terms as describing no more than some regular connection, or constant conjunction, of 
phenomena. 
Mach's theory of knowledge is biologically oriented. Just as the conditioned reflexes 
of animals arose as responses to their environment, so do the relationships of science. 
The only difference is that those of science are better organised, thanks to the 
development of human speech. Science simply constitutes a development of this 
process. 'Any assumption that the human conceptual system contains something 
more than the sense experiences from which it derives is completely unfounded: it is 
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merely more effectively organized' (Kolakowski, 1972: 147). A~cording to Mach 
(1911: 49): 
In the investigations of nature, we have to deal only with knowledge of the 
connexion of appearances with one another. What we represent to ourselves 
behind the appearances exists only in our understanding, and has for us only the 
value of a memoria technica or formula, whose form, because it is arbitrary and 
irrelevant, varies very easily with the standpoint of our culture. 
Mach also presented an instrumentalist view of scientific theories. At every stage of 
science knowledge is only provisional. It constitutes an essentially practical response 
to the solution of everyday problems, rather than any universal and eternally valid 
form of knowledge. Its generalisations are nothing more than contingent truths which 
may be confirmed or falsified by experience. This led Mach (1883) to revise 
Newtonian mechanics along phenomenalist lines, criticising metaphysical speculation 
about motions in absolute space and time as meaningless. Likewise he refused to 
ascribe any real existence to theoretical terms such as electric charges and atomic 
particles. Quinton (1982: 184) describes Mach as 'the chief philosophical stimulus 
for Einstein's great enterprises'. He goes on to point out his influence on Russell and 
contends that Mach's theory of experience ranks alongside Russell's logic as 
indispensable forerunners of logical positivism. However, Wolters has argued that 
Mach 'does not foreshadow the observation-theory dichotomy of logical empiricism, 
because he already emphasizes the theory-ladenness of observation' (2000: 254) (cf 
Mach, 1976: 120 [1905]). 
Poincare 's 'conventionalism' 
Poincare responded to the rise of non-Euclidean geometries, in particular their 
implications for the status of geometrical propositions. According to Kant, Euclidean 
geometry represented a set of synthetic a priori statements. Poincare (1902: 48) 
argued that if this were so, it would not have been possible to imagine the various 
post-Kantian non-Euclidean geometries that arose. Geometrical propositions thus 
cannot be synthetic a priori statements. He went on to reject the empiricist 
interpretation of geometry as an empirical theory of actual space. He pointed out that 
geometry has to do with exact truths while empirical evidence is only inexact. 
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The geometrical axioms are therefore neither synthetic a priori intuitions nor 
experimental facts. They are conventions. . . . What, then, are we to think of 
the question: Is Euclidean geometry true? It has no meaning. We might as well 
ask if the metric system is true, and if the old weights and measures are false; .. 
One geometry cannot be more true than another; it can only be more 
convenient (Poincare, 1902: 50). 
Since Poincare believed Euclidean geometry is the most convenient, he claimed it 
would never be given up. He supported this Claim by arguing along similar lines to 
his contemporary Duh em. Poincare argued, that to test Euclidean geometry, we need 
to make assumptions in addition to the axioms of Euclidean geometry. For example, 
we need to assume a light ray travels in a straight line. If a geometry is not in 
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agreement with experience, Poincare argued that, rather than give up the geometry, 
some auxiliary assumption will be modified. This argument developed into the 
Duhem-Quine thesis (related to the problems arising with Popper's falsificationism): 
'Since all testing must be carried out on sets of linked hypotheses, it is a matter of 
choice which of these hypotheses we regard as having gained support as a result of 
testing' (Stewart, 1979: 224). 
Poincare (1902: Ch VI) next turns to the laws of classical mechanics. He argues, 
using the same-procedure as for Euclidean geometry, that these laws are neither a 
priori nor experimental truths but only disguised definitions, or conventions, which, 
because they are the simplest will never be given up in the face of empirical 
refutation~ Gillies (1993: 92) points out that contrary to these claims, the 
development of relativistic mechanics did in fact lead to the abandonment of the view 
that Newtonian mechanics holds exactly in all circumstances. As 'one of the principal 
initiators of the twentieth-century revolution in physics', Gillies (1993: 93) points out 
that Poincare was all too aware of such implications. This led him to radically revise 
his ideas of 1902. 
The about-tum is documented in his 1905 work The Value of Science to which 
Hutchison (1938: 36, 51, 82, 129) refers. Here he gives up his 1902 view that the 
laws of Newtonian mechanics were conventions which would never be given up in 
the face of empirical refutation. This about-tum was largely as a result of 
' experiments carried out by Walter Kaufmann in 1902-3. The results of these 
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experiments implied the falsity of Lavoisier's principle which in tum implied the 
falsity of Newton's laws. 
Gillies (1993: 95), having described how Poincare abandoned his view of the 
conventionalist nature of the laws ofNewtoni~ mechanics, proceeds to point out that 
later in his 1902 Science and Hypothesis Poincare regarded most of the remaining 
laws of science as 'genuinely empirical laws founded on induction from observation 
and experiment'. Even with respect to Newton's laws of motion he had maintained 
that they served not only as conventions but also as empirical generalisations. 
Initially laws are employed solely as experimental generalisations as, for example, a 
relation between terms A and B. Noting that this relation holds only approximately, a 
term C might be introduced which, by definition, has the relation to A which is 
expressed by the. law. The original law now consists of two parts: an experimental 
law that states a relation between B and C, and an a priori principle which holds 
exactly between A and C and is a convention. 
But this is not to say that the choice of definition is arbitrary. Poincare [1905] 
insisted that the introduction of conventions into physical theory is justified only 
if it proves fruitful in subsequent research. . . . Thus it would be incorrect to 
attribute to Poincare the view that general scientific laws are nothing but 
conventions which define fundamental scientific concepts (Losee, 1980: 169). 
This agrees with Harre's (1967) interpretation of Poincare as espousmg a 
commodisme different from the · more popular doctrine called conventionalism. 
Poincare's commodisme is that, in a certain sense, theories are linguistic conventions. 
Geometry is a way of representing spatial facts rather than a particular set of spatial 
facts: 
Choosing between Reimann and Euclid is like choosing between different 
projections for-making a map of the world. According to the choice, the map 
will be different, but the continents are the same and bear the same relations to 
one another (Harre, 1967: 292). 
According to Harre, in contrast to Poincare's commodisme, conventionalism 
maintains that 'not only is the language of science arrived at by convention but so are 
the facts which that language is used to express. The laws of nature are not truths but 
mere conventions' (ibid). 
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In repudiating this development of his opinions, Poincare worked out his own 
position in more detail. The extreme conventionalist view implied that it did 
not matter which conventions were adopted; any one would be as good as any 
other. Of course, Poincare was quick to point out, in science some conventions 
are better than others because some recipes are successful and others are not. 
There must be an empirical criterion which distinguishes good science from 
bad. The nature of this empirical criterion can be approached by noticing that 
although the facts which are ultimate criteria of truth may be the same, there are 
a great many ways of expressing them. A scientific fact differs from a 'crude' 
fact, according to Poincare, in the same way that a statement in German differs 
from a· statement in French. The iaws of nature are, as it were, the rules of 
synonymy of the scientific language; but they can nevertheless be revised, for 
they depend upon concordances of fact. Should the concordance fail, scientific 
language would contain an ambiguity and would have to be revised. 'In sum, 
all the scientist creates in a fact is the language in which he enunciates it" 
(Harre, 1967: 293) 
The above quotation from Harre ends with a sentence from Poincare. This same 
sentence is also cited by Hutchison (1938: 36). Here is a (small) example of the 
extent to which Hutchison was familiar with the work of Poincare, a fact which makes 
it clear that Hutchison was far from being a naYve inductivist or ultraempiricist. It 
also serves as a good example of the extent to which Hutchison reached outside the 
writings of the Vienna Circle in formulating his 1938 tract. More broadly speaking, 
the attempts by Mach and Poincare to make sense of the developments in natural 
science and mathematics exerted a decisive influence on the members of the Vienna 
Circle. For example, both Reichenbach and Carnap substituted Poincare's concept of 
convention for the Kantian notion of the a priori (Friedman, 1998: 791). 
1.2 The revolution in logic: Russell and Wittgenstein 
Apart from developments in the natural sciences, the logical positivists were also 
significantly influenced by the revolution in logic. Kant had interpreted mathematical 
axioms as examples of synthetic a priori knowledge. Mill had declared them to be 
empirical generalisations. In terms of the logicism of Frege and Russell, since they 
could be subsumed within a system of logic, they expressed merely analytic truths. 
Carnap studied under Frege and, according to Friedman (1998: 792), Carnap (1928) 
was 'inspired by Russell's conception of "logic as the essence of philosophy" to 
reconceive philosophy itself on the model of the logicist construction of arithmetic ... 
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by developing a "rational reconstruction" of empirical knowledge'. Likewise 
Wittgenstein (1922) interpreted the propositions of logic as entirely tautological or 
empty of empirical content. We now take a closer look at these developments in logic 
and the foundations of mathematics by examining the contributions of Russell and 
Wittgenstein. 
Russell's analytical philosophy 
Russell's early training in mathematics exposed him to Mill's empiricist account of 
mathematical knowledge (Gillies, 1993: 11). Dissatisfied with this view, Russell 
(1897) attempted a Kantian explanation of the foundations of mathematics. However, 
this was found to conflict with the geometry in Einstein's relativity theory. After this 
he turned to Hegel for a time until, under the influence of Moore, he abandoned this 
position. Russell now turned to a variety of Platonic realism (Quinton, 1971: 4 ). Re-
thinking the foundations of mathematics, he was impressed with how Frege 'showed 
in detail how arithmetic can be deduced from pure logic, without the need of any fresh 
ideas or axioms, thus disproving Kant's assertion that '7 + 5 = 12' is synthetic' 
(Russell, 1924: 32). However, in tenhs of Platonic realism, terms such as point and 
number can only be meaningfully used if they refer to some real entity. Russell soon 
realised that the result would be an absurdly large number of problematic entities. 
This led him to further work on logic. He made a breakthrough after meeting the 
Italian mathematician, Peano, at a conference in Paris in July 1900. That October he 
sat down to write the first draft of the Principles of Mathematics (completed by the 
end of that year) in which he argued that 'all pure mathematics follows from purely 
logical premises and uses only concepts definable in logical terms' (Russell, quoted in 
Magee, 1971: 145). 'To sustain the thesis [of logicism], Russell needed to refashion 
logic, and for this he enlisted the co-operation of his old tutor, Whitehead' (Ayer, 
1972: 16). This resulted in Principia Mathematica (1910-13), a detailed defence of 
the logicist thesis of the Principles (1903). 
Russell's importance as a philosopher stems from his application of the discoveries he 
made in formal logic to the analysis of knowledge claims made in ordinary language. 
The chief characteristic of symbolic or mathematical logic is that the focus of 
attention is shifted away from the Aristotelian concentration on relations between 
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terms to a focus on propositions and relations between propositions. The power of 
focussing on relations between propositions is exemplified in his theory of 
descriptions. According to Russell (1905), to be meaningful a statement had to be 
capable of being either true or false. However, in ordinary language, some sentences 
( eg about Kings of France) could not be said to be true or false (because it does not 
refer: there is no such a thing as the King of France). Russell applied symbolic logic 
to show that, when analysed, their truth or falsity became apparent. The theory of 
descriptions provided a powerful new technique of analysis. 
Until Wittgenstein arrived in Cambridge in 1912, Russell had been mainly concerned 
with a philosophical defence of mathematics by eliminating invalid logic and 
unnecessary or metaphysical assumptions. Wittgenstein, using Russell's own logic, 
convinced Russell that the propositions of mathematics did not refer to universals in 
some Platonic realm of reality, but were instead nothing more than tautologies, purely 
conceptual truths. Russell's reaction to this demonstration led his interest to change 
from a defence of mathematics to a justification of science (Quinton, 1982: 278). 
After his rejection of Kant and Hegel, Russell adhered to some form of empiricism for 
the rest of his life (Gillies, 1993: 11 ). His notion of analysis arose from the empiricist 
tradition, eg Mill had defined 'cause' as 'invariable unconditional antecedent' 
(Hampshire, 1971: 21). According to Hager (2000: 408), Russell's method of 
philosophical analysis 'proceeds backwards from a given body of knowledge (the 
'results') to its premises . . . (it is) a nonempirical intellectual discovery of 
propositions and concepts from which could be fashioned premises for the basic data 
with which the analysis had begun'. 
The old logic put thought in fetters, while the new logic gives it wings. It has, 
in my opinion, introduced the same kind of advance into philosophy as Galileo 
introduced into physics, making it possible to see what kinds of problems may 
be capable of solution, and what kinds must be abandoned as beyond human 
powers (Russell, 1914, quoted in Joergensen, 1951: 13 ). 
Analysis enables science to expand to incorporate what was once philosophy. Russell 
is clear that the main source of knowledge advance. is science, not philosophy. 
'Whatever can be known, can be known by means of science ... philosophers who 
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make logical analysis the main business of philosophy ... refuse to believe that there 
is some 'higher' way of knowing, by which we can discover truths hidden from 
science and the intellect' (Russell, 1946: 788-9). 
In a series of lectures in 1912, later published as Philosophy of Logical Atomism 
(1918), Russell prese11ted a theory of meaning, knowledge and reality. For Russell, 
the process of analysis of the conditions necessary to give an ordinary sentence a 
definite meaning, finally terminates on a bedrock of elementary or atomic 
propositions which are unanalysable and upon which all our knowledge rests. The 
terms of these atomic propositions stand for distinct elements in our experience, the 
data of immediate experience, or 'sense data'. These 'logical atoms' constitute the 
facts of reality. They are not knowledge claims that need to be justified by an 
inference (Hampshire, 1971: 21 ). He calls the process of discovering the atoms 
'logical analysis'. 
Accm:ding to Warnock (1971: 132), Russell held firm to his conviction that ordinary 
beliefs about the world are largely mistaken and that the aim of philosophy is to 
achieve understanding of the world. To do this required that natural languages be 
replaced with one which has a technical terminology which allows for greater 
precision than ordinary language (which Russell said incorporated the metaphysics of 
the Stone Age). Wittgenstein carried this project forward in developing the doctrine 
of logical atomism in the Tractatus. 
The purest atomistic vision concerning facts is provided in Wittgenstein's 
Tractatus, and is the view that all facts, or all basic facts, are atomic, and every 
atomic fact independent of every other (Sainsbury, 1995: 63-4). 
Wittgenstein's theory of language 
Russell's Principles had argued that mathematics was based on logic. Wittgenstein 
asked on what logic is based. To answer this question he developed a theory of 
language which showed up the nature of logical necessity - about what it is that 
makes some propositions necessarily true. 
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According to the Tractatus, the world is the 'totality of facts' (1..1). 1 These exist 
independently from us and from our language. They can be broken down via analysis 
- into atomic facts. Unlike Russell, who identified these with sense data, Wittgenstein 
doesn't say what these facts are - only that they cannot be analysed into simpler 
facts. In language, the counterpart to these atomic facts are atomic propositions 
which are 'laid against reality like a ruler' (2.1512).2 These are literally pictures of 
atomic facts~ 
Logic is like the scaffolding of the world. The world has to take shape around it. 
Logic is like a map or space of all possibilities, 'of everything that could conceivably 
be the case, and must therefore show us the limits of everything that can conceivably 
be (thought and) said. So in plotting the map of logic one is making manifest both the 
limits of (thought and) language and the limits of all possible worlds' (Magee, 1971: 
35). Logic reveals the structure of language, and at one remove, the structure of the 
world. This is because 'the two structures are the same, like a man and his shadow'. 
The theory that language mirrors the structure of the world is a theory about 
possibilities. Language reflects all the possibilities that can be said. Wittgenstein 
distinguishes between logical and factual propositions. He draws from Frege the 
notion that a factua~ proposition must say something absolutely definite, or positive. 
It is true or false with no third alternative. Since a factual proposition such as 'It is 
raining' has this definite sense, it follows that it rules out the negative case, ie, it is not 
raining. The logical disjuncture 'It is raining or it is not raining' must then be true: it 
covers the whole field of possibilities, every state of affairs. 'Logically necessary 
propositions are a kind of by-product of the ordinary use of propositions to state facts' 
(Pears, 1996: 687). They represent limiting cases of the essential nature of factual 
propositions. Since they cannot rule out anything about the world they are without 
the 'definite sense' of a factual proposition. It is in this sense that Wittgenstein refers 
to the propositions of logic and mathematics as tautologies: they are analytic 
statements which cannot tell us anything new about the world. 
1 All references throughout this thesis to Wittgenstein's Tractatus are to the 1922 edition except 
where otherwise noted. 
2 The reference here is to the 1961 revised edition of Wittgenstein's Tractatus -see bibliography. 
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The view that factual propositions are the only meaningful proposi!ions arises from 
Wittgenstein's thesis that language is fundamentally about the describing of fact. 
Upon reading a newspaper report of how, in a court of law, models had been used to 
represent the scene of a road accident, Wittgenstein was supposed to have exclaimed 
'This is how language works!' (Quinton, in Magee, 1978: 79). This theory of how 
language works is often known as the picture theory of meaning. Sentences don't 
look like pictures, but if they are to have any meaning, they must be capable of being 
analysed into simpler propositions which literally are pictures. Wittgenstein thought 
of words as names of things or objects. In a factual proposition, the arrangement of 
names in the proposition corresponds to a possible arrangement of objects in the 
world. If that arrangement is indeed actualised in the world, then the proposition is 
true. If it is not, the proposition is false. If the names in the proposition are arranged 
in a way in which it is not possible for objects in the world to be arranged, then the 
proposition is meaningless. Propositions can either be meaningful in which case they 
are either true or false, or they can be meaningless (Magee, 1978: 81 ). 
According to Wittgenstein, if language is to be meaningful it must be concerned with 
describing the factual world. But much of what we say about the world, in 
metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics and religion, does not appear to have anything 
whatever to do with facts. This would seem to imply that philosophical propositions 
attempting to describe the essential natures of things or the metaphysical structure of 
the world are to be condemned as outside the bounds of sense, or senseless. 
Most propositions and questions, that have been written about philosophical 
matters, are not false, but senseless. We cannot, therefore, answer questions of 
this kind at all, but only state their senselessness. Most questions and 
propositions of the philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand 
the logic of our language. (They are of the same kind as the question whether 
the Good is more or less identical than the Beautiful.) And so it is not to be 
wondered at that the deepest problems are really no problems (Tractatus 4.003). 
Wittgenstein (1922: 27 and 29) expressed his belief that, in the Tractatus, he had 
'finally solved' the problems of philosophy. Traditional philosophy which tried to 
construct general systems about the world as a whole was misguided. Instead he 
argued, the method of philosophy should be that of analysis. 
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Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences ... The object of philosophy is the 
logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a theory but an activity. A 
philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. The result of 
philosophy is not a number of 'philosophical propositions,' but to make 
propositions clear (Tractatus 4.1111, 4.112). 
The Tractatus convinced members of the Vienna Circle that it was possible to draw a 
definite boundary around factual discourse and so a definite boundary around the 
enterprise of science. Whereas Wittgenstein had applied the method of analysis to 
philosophy, they set to work to apply it to factual, empirical propositions about the 
physical world to determine what was science and what was metaphysics. 
It was the logicism of Russell and Wittgenstein that led the logical posit~vists to 
distinguish their kind of empiricism from earlier kinds. In particular, the emphasis on 
logical explication led to the view that 'the cognitive content of science can be fully 
and best expressed by identifying the formal structure of its theories; and that the 
epistemic evaluation of science requires reference only to the formal relation between 
data and hypothesis' (Kincaid, 1998: 560). 
1.3 The revolution in philosophy: logical positivism 
In August 1929 three members of the Vienna Circle set out the views of the Circle in 
the form of a pamphlet (Hahn et al, 1929). Dedicated to Schlick (born 1882) and 
written by Neurath (born 1882), it was edited by Hahn and Carnap (born 1891). The 
following month, in an effort to reach out to similarly oriented movements and 'a 
wider public', they published it on the occasion of the First Conference on 
Epistemology held in Prague, organised by the Ernst Mach Society and the Society 
for Empirical Philosophy (Berlin). In 1930 a further attempt to disseminate its ideas 
received a major breakthrough when Carnap, together with Reichenbach (born 1891) 
of the like-minded Berlin society, founded and edited the journal Erkenntnis. These 
views became known as logical positivism, a term first used in articles by Kaila and 
Petzall, two Nordic sympathisers, around 1930 (Mautner, 1999: 438) and by Feigl and 
Blumberg (1931). Ayer (1936) introduced logical positivism to the English-speaking 
world. For our purposes we will take the writings of Schlick, Neurath and Carnap as 
primarily representative of lo~ical positivism. If we had to have chosen one further 
29 
representative it would have been Reichenbach. He and Carnap had met already in 
1923 and it was he who introduced Carnap to Schlick (Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, 1999). 
The aim of the pamphlet was to openly profess a new 'scientific conception of the 
world'. The ultimate goal was that of a unified science. The counterpart of this 
admiration for science was the radical rejection of all philosophy as it had 
traditionally been practised up until then. 
Hanfling ( 1981: 31) points out that for a long time a lack of progress in philosophy 
had been noticed. The old questions (and old answers to them) kept being discussed 
again and again. By contrast, since the rise of modem science in the seventeenth 
century, 'science, using empirical methods, has been astonishingly successful in 
providing answers'. 
In the light of this state of affairs logical positivists rejected the claim of philosophy to 
yield substantial knowledge about the world. Instead traditional philosophy should be 
seen as a futile attempt to answer the unanswerable questions of metaphysics 
regarding the ultimate nature of reality. Henceforth the discovery of substantive 
propositions about the world was to be the exclusive task of science. The new role for 
philosophy was to be drastically revised. Instead of masquerading as the superior or 
equal of science it was to be the servant, or as Ayer (1978: 97) more politely p'ut it the 
'handmaiden', of science. Both Schlick (1925) and Wittgenstein (1922) regarded the 
task of philosophy as limited to the clarification of basic concepts as stated in both 
ordinary and scientific language (White, 1999a: 592). 
Friedman (1998: 791) has argued that Einstein's special and general theories of 
relativity 'directly stimulated Schlick, Reichenbach and Carnap to initiate a parallel 
revolution in philosophy'. Likewise Suppe (1977: 7) has cautioned at exaggerating 
the anti-metaphysical origins of logical positivism and emphasized the extent to 
which the Vienna and Berlin groups were scientists or scientists turned philosophers. 
He argues logical positivism stemmed from an attempt to interpret the then recent 
revolutionary developments in physics (cf Gillies, 1993: 20). 
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Following Mach, the subject matter of scientific theories is phenomenal 
regularities; but theories characterize these reguiarities in terms of theoretical 
terms. Following Poincare, these theoretical terms ... could be mathematical .. 
. (and) are nothing other than conventions used to refer to phenomena, in the 
sense that any assertion made using them could be made in phenomenal 
language as well ... (Therefore) ... the laws of a theory ... could be expressed 
mathematically . . . (and) are nothing other than conventions for expressing 
certain relations holding between phenomena (Suppe, 1977: 11). 
Here we see that Suppe views the logical positivists as disregarding Poincare' s 
commodisme (which maintained that only the language of science is arrived at by 
convention) and instead interpreting his doctrine as maintaining that scientific laws do 
not express empirical truths about the world, but are mere conventions. We will 
return to conventionalism in section 1.3.5. At this stage Stadler's (1998: 608) point 
appears relevant: he maintains that, 'contrary to its popular reputation, a 
heterogeneous pluralism of views was in fact characteristic of the Vienna Circle' (for 
example, with regard to ethics, realism, and verificationism). 
When Russell's (1903) contention that mathematics can be reduced to logic is 
incorporated into the synthesis of Mach's and Poincare's views we have, what Suppe 
(1977: 12) labels, following Putnam (1962), the original version of the positivist 
'Received View' on theories. He notes that its earliest published form appears to be 
that of Carnap (1923). The original version was concerned with solving the problem 
of metaphysical notions in s9ience, ie, theoretical entities such as mass and force. 
With the publication of Wittgenstein's (1922) its scope was extended to language in 
general: the verification theory of meaning stated that all cognitively significant 
statements about the world must be empirically verifiable. 
We shall now set out five features of logical positivism that appear relevant to the 
methodology of Hutchison: 
1.3.1 An empiricist theory of knowledge 
Logical positivism is to be understood as an empiricist theory of knowledge: 
knowledge claims about the world are to be justified by an appeal to experience. It is 
a positive theory in that it attempts explanations only in terms of experience - 'it 
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calls on one set of observations to explain another set, but never goes outside the 
observational framework' (Caws, 1965: 318). The main emphasis therefore falls on 
the verification of propositions in terms of experience. In logical positivism 
verification is connected with meaning: the verifiability principle of meaning. This 
principle gave the logical positivists a powerful tool to separate science from 
metaphysics, the criterion of verifiability (Hanfling, 1981: 31 ff). It is this criterion of 
verifiability which is the focus of section 1.3.1. Statements which were verifiable 
were deemed meaningful and therefore admissable to the project of science. 
Statements which were unverifiable were deemed meaningless and defined as 
metaphysics. Popper (1934), referred to by Neurath as the 'official opposition', 
adopted an alternative view. He substituted falsifiability for verifiability. 
Falsifiability acted only as a criterion whereby to demarcate science from non-
science, not as a criterion of meaning. While this did not categorically rule out 
metaphysical entities from science, it still facilitated the empirical testing central to 
empiricism. 
Kolakowski (1972: 10) has pointed out that, strictly speaking, positivism is not a 
theory of knowledge but merely a set of rules which express a 'normative attitude' 
about how we are to use terms such as 'knowledge' or 'science'. In following these 
rules, it limits itself strictly to the positive facts of experience. This is why Ayer 
(1959: 10) refers to Hume's polemical final paragraph of his 1748 Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding (1975: 165) - in which he consigns everything 
other than 'quantity or number' and 'matter of fact and existence' to the flames - as 
'an excellent statement of the logical positivist' s position'. 
Logical positivism differed from previous positivisms in its use of the new symbolic 
logic that had recently become available. Where previous logic, dating from _Aristotle 
had centred on concepts, the new logic focussed on the logical analysis of 
propositions. Where Wittgenstein had applied logical analysis to philosophy, the 
logical positivists sought to apply it to empirical science. Logical positivism also 
differed from previous positivisms in arguing that, not only knowledge, but in 
addition even the meaning of statements, is wholly constituted by experience. They 
proposed that they could demonstrate this by using the method of analysis (Hanfling, 
1981: 44). 
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We will be concerned with the verification principle in so far as it gave the logical 
positivists a tool whereby to separate out metaphysics (as well as aesthetics, ethics 
and value judgements, and pseudo-science) from science. We will be concerned to 
point out that metaphysics is not knowledge, rather than that it is meaningless. In the 
next section we will ~e concerned with the verification principle as a theory of 
meaning. Having dismissed metaphysics as meaningless, the logical positivists were 
obliged to point out what was meaningful. In both sections the process of verification 
is given by the method of logical analysis. Indeed, Hanfling (1981: 44) describes 
logical analysis as their 'general approach'. 
While the logical positivists belong to the empiricist theory of knowledge tradition, 
they brought to it a special concern with meaning. According to Han:fling (1981 : 7), 
the question of knowledge became secondary to that· of meaning. Whatever the case, 
he shows that the two questions are intimately connected. To ask how I know that 
something is· the case I must first of all understand what that something means. 
Alternatively, to understand what something means involves understanding in what 
way, if any, I could come to know it. 
The logical positivists of the Vienna Circle are popularly known by the verifiability 
principle of meaning. According to Carnap (1959: 146 [1957]), it was Wittgenstein 
who first formulated the principle. Arising out of the special relationship between 
Wittgenstein and Schlick, it was published for the first time by Waismann (1930-31). 
It is often stated in the following form: 'The meaning of a proposition is the method 
of its verification' (Hanfling, 1981: 7). Schlick (1959: 97 [1932-3a]) phrased it 
slightly differently as 'The meaning of a proposition is identical with its verification'. 
Ayer (1959: 13) states it as : 'the meaning of a proposition is its method of 
verification'. The principle thus moves from the general proposition (that to 
understand the meaning of something involves understanding the way in which we 
come to know it) to a stricter proposition: the meaning of something is nothing other 
than the way in which we come to know it. The verifiability principle constitutes this 
second proposition (Hanfling, 1981: 7). 
The verifiability principle attempted a general theory of meaning. From this principle 
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it followed that empirical statements were meaningful since they were verifiable by 
observation and experiment. That they were considered meaningful does not mean to 
say that they were true. The process of verification might prove them false. But the · 
fact that they were capable of being either true or false made them meaningful. By 
contrast, metaphysical statements were those statements which were neither capable 
of being true or false. The other kind of meaningful statements recognised by logical 
positivists were those of logic and mathematics. Kant had regarded these as synthetic 
a priori statements. Following Wittgenstein, the logical positivists regarded them as 
analytic, ie, they were viewed as not capable of yielding any new knowledge about 
the world. They were meaningful because they were capable of being true or false. If 
they were true they were true by definition, ie, tautologically true, while if they were 
false they represented logical contradictions. 
While one concern of the logical positivists was with providing a general theory 
meaning, a more primitive concern was with combating metaphysics. For this 
purpose what was needed was a criterion of meaningfulness. Ayer attempted a 
weaker form of verificationism which avoids some of the difficulties of the 
verifiability principle. It consists of a criterion of meaningfulness. It is 'more modest 
than the principle; it is entailed by, but does not entail, the principle' (Hanfling, 1981: 
33). According to Ayer (1946: 48): 
We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only 
if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express - that is, 
if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to 
accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false. 
According to this criterion a statement is meaningful if, and only if, it can be verified. 
'It was this criterion which was thought to bring about a revolution in the history of 
philosophy' (Hanfling, 1981: 31 ). 
Ayer introduced his weak sense of verifiability because he acknowledged that the 
stronger verifiability principle of meaning excluded many scientific statements which, 
though meaningful, were not conclusively verifiable. 'It seems to me that if we adopt 
conclusive verifiability as our criterion of significance, as some positivists have 
proposed, our argument will prove too much' (Ayer, 1946: 50). This was what 
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Popper referred to when he remarked that in their enthusiasm to exclude metaphysics, 
the positivists had ended up in ruling out science. Ayer' s most important concern was 
that the stronger principle ruled out scientific laws since these necessarily take the 
form of general statements and general statements cannot be conclusively verified. 
However, his attempt met with criticism that left it largely crippled. 
Far more successful was Popper's (1934) proposal that falsifiability be the criterion of 
demarcation between science arid non-science. He pointed out that this was not a 
criterion of demarcation between meaning and meaningless statements. Indeed, he 
regarded the logical positivists' theory of meaning as a disaster for the philosophy of 
science (Hacking, 1983: 43). While Popper had several reasons for introducing his 
new criterion, the one .that is of relevance to this section is that he did not suffer from 
the positivists' phobia towards metaphysics. While he accepted that metaphysics was 
not part of science, he was not willing to label it as meaningless. Indeed it could be 
useful to the project of science. 
Nevertheless it was via the verifiability criterion that the logical positivists believed 
they had a weapon which enabled them to deal decisively with metaphysics. Carnap 
(1959b [1931-2]) points out that previously opponents of metaphysics had declared it 
to be false, uncertain or sterile. However, modem logic had made it possible to give 
'a new and sharper answer to the question of the validity and justification of 
metaphysics' (Carnap, 1959b: 60 [1931-2]). Logical analysis yields the result that the 
alleged statements of metaphysics 'including all philosophy of value and normative 
theory ... are entirely meaningless. Therewith a radical elimination of metaphysics is 
attained which was not yet possible from the earlier anti-metaphysical standpoints' 
(ibid: 61). Carnap (1959b: 80 [1931-2]) explains that he uses the term 'metaphysics' 
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for 'the field of alleged knowledge of the essence of things which transcends the 
realm of empirically founded, inductive science'. He lists as examples of metaphysics 
the 'systems' of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Bergson and Heidegger. Ayer (1959: 16) 
gives the following examples of metaphysics: McTaggart's statement that time is 
unreal, Berkeley's contention that physical objects are ideas in the mind of God, and 
Heidegger's proposition that 'nothing nihilates itself. 
Ayer (1959: 10) points out that the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle did not go 
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so far as agreeing with Hume that all metaphysical works should be consigned to the 
flames since they might have 'poetic merit' or express an 'interesting attitude to life'. 
Their concern was that, following from the verifiability criterion outlined above, since 
metaphysical statements could not state anything that was either true or false, they 
could not add anything to knowledge. 'Metaphysical utterances were condemned not 
for being emotive, which could hardly be considered as objectionable in itself, but for 
pretending to be cognitive, for masquerading as something that they were not' (Ayer, 
1959: 10-11 ). He goes on to note the well-known objection to the verifiability 
principle: that it is not itself verifiable. He resolves its status by contending that it 
should be interpreted as a convention. While it was to some extent descriptive 'it 
became prescriptive with the suggestion that only statements ... that were capable of 
being true or false should be regarded as literally meaningful' (Ayer, 1959: 15). 
While he accepts that, so interpreted, it does not follow that statements that are neither 
true nor false are nonsensical, its merit is that it 
removes the temptation to look upon the metaphysician as a sort of scientific 
overlord. Neither is this a trivial matter. It has far too often been assumed that 
the metaphysician was doing the same work as the scientist, only doing it more 
profoundly; that he was uncovering a deeper layer of facts. It is important to 
emphasize that he is not in this sense describing any facts at all (Ayer, 1959: 
16). 
Ayer's interpretation of the verifiability criterion as prescriptive is in line with 
Kolakowski's (1972: 11) interpretation of positivism as a normative attitude towards 
what constitutes knowledge. Yet this outstanding, or revolutionary feature of logical 
positivism, the criterion of verifiability, was the weapon which apparently allowed 
them to deal a crippling blow to the status of metaphysics. More immediately, as far 
as economics is concerned, along with metaphysics it ruled out value judgements and 
normative questions as having any cognitive status: apart from analytic statements, 
only positive questions of fact had cognitive significance. It thereby re-enforced the 
importance of the need, long accepted in the methodology of economics (Hutchison, 
1964), to distinguish between positive and normative statements. 
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1.3.2 An empiricist theory of meaning 
Logical positivism is to be understood, via the verifiability principle, as a theory of 
meaning (rather than as a criterion for distinguishing science from metaphysics). 
Here we shall examine the verifiability principle (rather than the criterion). Here the 
method of logical analysis, or language analysis, is used in an attempt to reduce 
propositions in ordinary language to statements in terms of the empirical base. This 
involved a commitment to the analytic-synthetic distinction. The expositions by 
Schlick (1925), Carnap (1928) and Ayer (1936) drew on phenomenalism. Concerning 
the empirical base, Neurath later converted Carnap from a phenomenalist to a 
physicalist stance. 
The idea that the meaning of something is to be found outside language is central to 
the verifiability principle. It is not saying that the meaning of 'It is raining' means the 
same thing as another set of words 'putting one hand out the window' which might 
describe the process of verification. It is rather identifying the meaning with the 
method of verification itself (Hanfling, 1981: 18). Wittgenstein (1922) had first 
outlined this idea in his theory of langi.iage in which propositions directly picture the 
empirical base: 'The name means the object. The object is its meaning' (Tractatus 
3.203). The meaning of a proposition was to be found via logical analysis: 'To 
analyse a proposition means to consider how it is to be verified' (Waismann, in 
Hanfling, 1981: 45). 
The logical positivists accorded meaning to only two kinds of statements: those of 
mathematics and logic (which were analytic a priori) and those which could be 
verified by experience (which were synthetic a posteriori): 
It is precisely in the rejection of the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori 
that the basic thesis of modem empiricism lies. The scientific world conception 
knows only empirical statements about things of all kinds, and analytic 
statements oflogic and mathematics (Hahn et al, 1973: 308 [1929]). 
This reflected Wittgenstein's influence. He had earlier convinced Russell that 
mathematical statements were to be regarded as analytic rather than synthetic. The 
Vienna Circle's verifiability principle of meaning may be viewed as a particular 
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interpretation of Wittgenstein's ideas on meaning and language: 
Following Wittgenstein, the logical positivists maintained that the meaning of an idea 
must be sought in the context of a proposition. Earlier Locke and Hume had linked 
the meaning of an idea to a word. Wittgenstein, following Frege, had said that a word 
only has meaning in the context of a proposition. Therefore to understand whether an 
idea was meaningful or not, required the examination of propositions, rather than 
words. The understanding of propositions in turn requires the use of truth-functional 
relations such as those of conjunction (p and q), disjunction (p or q), implication (p 
implies q) and negation (not-p). For example, say we want to understand the meaning 
of the statement 'This is a virtuous horse'. We can say that this statement is a truth-
function of 'This is a horse' and 'This is virtuous'. The idea here is that the truth or 
falsity of the first statement depends on the truth or falsity of the latter two statements 
via a strict logical relation, ie, by a process of logical analysis. We should be able to 
break down the two latter statements into more primitive truth-functional components 
so arriving in the end at basic, or elementary, statements which cannot be broken 
down any further. In this way the meaning of the original statement would be 
clarified as well as what is involved irt having knowledge of it (Hanfling, 1981: 11). 
Whenever we ask about a sentence, 'What does it mean?', what we expect is 
instruction as to the circumstances in which the sentence is to be used; we want 
a description of the conditions under which the sentence will form a true 
proposition, and those which will make it false (Schlick, 1936, quoted in 
Hanfling, 1981: 17). 
It was over the nature of the basic or elementary statements that come at the end of 
analysis that there emerged a key difference between Wittgenstein and the Vienna 
Circle. To the verificationists of the Vienna Circle it was crucial that these statements 
were observation statements which facilitated a process of verification. For then it 
could be argued that the method of verification constituted the meaning both of the 
basic statements and of those derived from them by truth-functional relations. To 
Wittgenstein, however, their logical properties rather than any connection with 
verification defined the basic statements. Basic or elementary statements, for 
Wittgenstein, had crucially to be logically independent of each other. 'For example, if 
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"This is blue" entails the falsity of "This is red", the statements cannot both be 
eiementary' (Hanfling, 1981: 11). 
To the logical positivists, the elementary statements had to be observation statements. 
Following the verifiability principle, meaningful statements must be verifiable by 
reference to experience. They must be capable of being reduced to direct records of 
experience, or protocol statements. 
Since the meaning of every statement of science must be statable by reduction 
to a statement about the given, likewise the meaning of any concept, whatever 
branch of science it may belong to, must be statable by step-wise reduction to 
other concepts, down to the concepts of the lowest level which refer directly to 
the (empirically) given (Hahn et al, 1973: 309, cfp 306 [1929]). 
The verifiability principle now gave rise to a key problem: what was to count as a 
statement of experience? What constituted the empirical basis, base, or ground? One 
attempt to answer this question is to interpret verification not in its usual active sense, 
but in a passive sense of being aware of phenomena. Verification in this passive 
sense is more usually known as phenomenalism (Hanfling, 1981: 4 7). For Russell 
this was the 'sense data' which figures in his theory of logical atomism. Schlick 
(1925), Carnap (1928) and Ayer (1936) followed Russell's (and Mach's) 
phenomenalistic interpretation of experience. However, Neurath converted Carnap 
from his phenomenalism to a physicalist interpretation of experience. 3 According to 
Halfpenny, Neurath developed his physicalist ideas out of Marx's materialism. For 
Neurath, physicalism avoided the metaphysical implications of materialism: "'mind" 
is not a product of "matter"; rather, both mind and matter exist for science only in so 
far as they are publically available space-time formations describable in the language 
of physics. Otherwise they are meaningless metaphysical concepts' (Halfpenny, 
1982: 58). The phenomenalist and physicalist interpretations of the verifiability 
principle led to the well known protocol-sentence debate in the early 1930s. While 
this debate is relevant to understanding the extent to which Hutchison's (1938) 
contained phenomenalist and physicalist elements, these issues are best dealt with in 
an appendix to this chapter. In this way, we hope to achieve a shorter, and more 
focused, account of the major characteristics of logical positivism. 
3 The distinction between phenomenalism and physicalism is discussed in the chapter appendix. 
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At this stage, we want mainly to draw attention to the point that, while the logical 
positivists wielded the verifiability criterion (a statement is meaningful if and only if 
it can be verified) as a weapon against metaphysics using it to limit the sphere of 
knowledge to scienc~, the principle of verifiability on which the criterion was based 
contained deep-seated problems that were in time to lead to significant criticisms of 
the logical positivism such as those of Quine (1951 ). In so far as the outcome of the 
protocol debate is concerned, what.is of importance for the next section is that it was 
Neurath's physicalist stance that won out over phenomenalism. It was this 
physicalism that formed the foundation for the unification of science. 
1.3.3 The quest for the unification of science 
Logical positivism is to be understood as a quest for the unification of science. This 
quest needs to be viewed against the fact that in Germany in 1900 it was commonly 
accepted that a huge difference existed between the natural and social sciences. 
Neurath saw physicalism as establishing the unification of science. 
In the nineteenth century Comte had proposed the view that all sciences could be 
integrated into a single natural system. This theme was taken up by the logical 
positivists of the Vienna Circle. In their manifesto of 1929 it had been explained that 
the ideas of the Circle consisted 'not so much of theses of its own, but rather its basic 
attitude, its points of view and direction of research. The goal ahead is unified 
science' (Hahn, et al 1973: 305-6, original emphasis). It is this naturalism of the 
logical positivists that makes their views relevant to economics and the other social 
sciences. They viewed science as unified in two senses (Kincaid, 1998: 559). First, it 
was unified in that there was one scientific method common to both the natural and 
· the social sciences. Second, it was unified in that it was believed that the different 
sciences could and should be unified by being reduced to physics, that is, their 
positivism was reductionist rather than 'sociologistic' (Halfpenny, 1982: 55).4 
Carnap emphasised the role of logical analysis in the unification of science: 
4 Comtean positivism was sociologistic 'because psychological study of human subjectivity was 
ousted by sociological study of sociological phenomena, which precede and constitute the 
individual psyche' (Halfpenny, 1982: 19). 
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Thus, with the aid of the new logic, logical analysis leads to a unified science. 
There are not different sciences with fundamentally different methods or 
different sources of knowledge, but only one science. All knowledge finds its 
place in this science and, indeed, is knowledge of basically the same kind; the 
appearance of fundamental differences between the sciences are the 
1
deceptive 
result of our using different sub-languages to express them (Carnap, 1959a: 144 
[1930-1]). 
For logical positivists the start of this unification process was via a common language. 
This language was to be reached by a logical analysis, and thereby a clarification of 
the statements made in the various sciences. The verification principle of meaning 
was adopted to aid in this process of clarification (White, 1999a: 592). 'The logical 
positivists aimed to provide not only a unifying formal language: they also sought to 
establish a substantive unity. The primitives of the unifying formal language were to 
be based on experiences captured in one single descriptive language. This ideal arose 
from Neurath's (1931-2) observation that scientific propositions cannot be directly 
compared with experience, but only with other propositions describing those 
experiences. It is not sensations themselves that form the basis of science, but 
elementary or protocol sentences, sentences that are immediate records of experience' 
(Halfpenny, 1982: 55). 
We have learnt in the previous section how the result of the Carnap-Neurath protocol-
sentence debate appeared to nullify the hopes of grounding protocol sentences in 
experience. Nevertheless, it was their common belief that, despite the outcome of this 
debate, some solution would eventually be found. Although Neurctth was the main 
force behind launching the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, which he 
saw as a vehicle for achieving the unity of science, it was Carnap (1938) who 
provided the philosophical thesis about the unity of science. His thesis is that there is 
a basic kind of language to which the statements of all the various sciences are 
reducible. 'The core of their reductionist faith rests on the assumption that it will 
always be possible to reduce all empirical statements to more basic statements with 
clear-cut observational consequences' (Ray, 2000: 250). 
Carnap (1953: 67-70 [1936-7, section 11]) writes about physicalism and a 'thing-
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language'. A few years later, in writing about the unity of science, he refers to ' a 
unity of language in science, viz., a common reduction basis for the terms of all 
branches of science, this basis consisting of a very narrow and homogeneous class of 
terms of the physical thing-language' (Carnap, 1938, quoted in Hanfling, 1981a: 128). 
When Carnap says that the statements of science are reducible to a basic language, he 
is not using the term 'reduction' in the sense described earlier according to which a 
meaningful statement is analysable into a set of observation-statements. Rather, his 
view is primarily a thesis about words or terms. These, he maintains, must be 
reducible (via terms in the thing-language, eg, stone, water, elastic, soluble) to 
'observable thing-predicates' by means of 'reduction statements'. Furthermore his 
reductionism, in its use of conditionals, is akin to operationalism and phenomenalism 
(Hanfling, 1981: 107-109). 
Although this unity of language is far less effective than a unity of laws would be, 'it 
is a necessary preliminary condition for the unity of laws. We can endeavour to 
develop science more and more in the direction of a unified system of laws only 
because we have already at present a unified language'(Carnap, 1938, quoted in 
Hanfling, 1981 a: 128). 'In such a system the laws of any particular science would be 
explicable from the laws of the science preceding it in a vast hierarchy. Thus, sub-
atomic physics would explain atomic physics, atomic physics would explain 
molecular physics, molecular physics would explain chemistry and hie-chemistry, and 
so forth until the hierarchy even included sciences such as biology or economics or 
anthropology' (Musgrave, 1999: 579). 
Thus the Vienna Circle rejected the view, which many still hold, that there is a 
radical distinction between the natural and the social sciences. The scale and 
diversity of the phenomena with which the social sciences dealt made them less 
successful in establishing scientific laws, but this was a difficulty of practice, 
not of principle: they too were concerned in the end with physical events (Ayer, 
1959: 21). 
In this connection Musgrave (1999: 579) notes that 'the unity of science thesis is also 
associated with the doctrine that all sciences share the same methods - the 'unity of 
method' thesis'. 
One of the consequences of the verifiability principle is that value judgements, as a 
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certain kind of metaphysical statement, were meaningless and . outside the realm of 
science. A contrast was made between facts and values. One of the consequences of 
the unity of science thesis is that this exclusion of value judgements applies now not 
only to the natural, but equally to the social, sciences. 
Ayer (1959: 22) points out that the logical positivists' stance on this matter followed 
on from the point of logic already made in Hume: that normative statements are not 
derivable from descriptive statements, that 'ought' does not follow from 'is'. 
However, an exception amongst the logical positivists to the exclusion of the ethical 
realm from science was Schlick (1930). 
Even today, Hanfling (1981: 155-6) points out, 'the view that moral statements are 
non-cognitive is very widely accepted. It is often thought, in ordinary discussions, 
that merely to identify a question as moral is enough to show that it cannot be treated 
as one of fact, but must be left to the feelings of the individual. It is not easy, 
however, to produce arguments for this view'. This, he contends, was recognised by 
Ayer in a paper in 1949. 
We will see in Chapter Three, that Hutchison (1938) followed Schlick's (1930) 
position on the exclusion of ethical statements in arguing that the distinctiol) between 
positive and normative statements was essentially false. In 1938 he appeared to be 
more concerned with arguing against the view that there was a fundamental difference 
between the methods of the natural and social sciences, than for the view of a unified 
physicalist science. This may have been due to his regard for Schlick on this issue. 
Neurath's unified physicalist science envisaged science incorporating philosophy 
within science, whereas Schlick adhered to a dualism of science and philosophy 
recognizing a distinction between them (Stadler, 1998: 607-8). 
1.3.4 Two theories of scientific method 
Logical positivism is to be understood as incorporating a tension between two 
competing theories of scientific method or views about the empirical status of 
scientific laws. Firstly, there is the inductivist theory of scientific method. Chalmers 
( 1982: 11) has characterized logical positivism as 'a particular brand of inductivism'. 
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With its roots reaching back to Francis Bacon and Mill (1843), this theory is closely 
in tune with empiricism, nominalism and anti-realist sentiments associated with 
logical positivism. Secondly, there is the hypothetico-deductive view of scientific 
method. This can be traced back to Herschel (1830), Whewell (1837) and Jevons 
(1874). More recent representatives are Popper (1934) and Carnap (1936-7). This 
view gives more scope to deductivism. It facilitates Popper's falsificationism which 
he argues avoids the problem of induction while retaining the empiricist demand for 
empirical testing. It is easily in tune with the view that central to science is the notion 
of laws which are described by general statements. 
Before we look more closely atthese two methods, it may be helpful to briefly clarify 
a related issue. This concerns the logical positivists' view of the formal structure of a 
scientific theory. Logical positivists viewed scientific theories as 'axiomatic theories 
formulated in a mathematical logic' meeting a number of specific conditions (Suppe, 
1977: 16). As this Received View of the structure of a theory changed and developed, 
~":"';: . 
it came more and more to reflect the-notion that science develops according to the 
hypothetico-deductive method. 
It is almost,,-a platitude to say that science proceeds, more or less explicitly, by 
thinking of general hypotheses, of greater or less generality, from which 
particular consequences are deduced which can be tested by observation and 
experiment ... For science, as it advances, does not rest content with 
establishing simple generalizations from observable facts: it tries to ~xplain 
these lowest level generalizations by deducing them from more general 
hypotheses at a higher level (Braithwaite, 1953: ix). 
Inductivism may be described as a theory of scientific method that emphasizes the 
importance to science of inductive arguments. Induction involves reasoning from the 
truth of particular statements to the truth of a general statement. For example, since 
on a number of occasions sodium when heated glows bright orange, we might 
conclude all sodium when heated glows bright orange. This principle of induction 
seems to allow us to predict that the next sample of sodium when heated will glow 
bright orange. However, Hume famously pointed out that there is no reason to expect 
that 'the course of nature will continue uniformly the same' (Jones, 1996: 574). This 
problem of induction applies equally to established laws such as the law of gravity. It 
may be accepted that while scientific laws do not give us absolutely certain 
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knowledge, they probably hold true. According to Salmon {1993: 288), Hume also 
challenged this belief. Even if a law has held reiiably and regularly in the past, there 
is no logical reason why it should hold in the future at all. Furthermore, Chalmers 
(1982: 17) has pointed out that the attempt to replace the principle of induction by a 
probabilistic version does not overcome the problem of induction. Much of the 
philosophy of science since Hume is concerned with attempts to overcome the 
problem of induction. Popper (1934) proposed falsificationism. Conventionalism, 
instrumentalism and pragmatism are other positions which claim to avoid the problem 
of induction. The importance of the principle of induction had been recognized by 
Russell (1946: 699-700): 
Hume has proved that pure empiricism is not a sufficient basis for science. But 
if this one principle [induction] is admitted, everything else can proceed in 
accordance with the theory that all our knowledge is based on experience . . . 
without this principle science is impossible. 
Gillies (1993: 3), like Chalmers (1982), also regards the logical positivists as 
supporters of inductivism (Gillies, 1993: 3). Although both authors make these 
statements within the context of chapters on inductivism as a theory of scientific 
method, it is ambiguous as to whether they mean that logical positivists supported 
particular inductivist methods within science or whether they mean that they 
supported inductivism as a theory of scientific method. To distinguish between these 
two notions, inductivism as a theory of scientific method will be referred to as 
'inductivism-SM'. 
We will take inductivism-SM to refer to the theory that it is by inductive reasoning 
that scientific theories and laws are both discovered and justified. This is what Losee 
(1980: 148) refers to as inductivism 'in its most inclusive form'. Inductivism-SM can 
be traced back to Francis Bacon's 1620 Novum Organum. Bacon proposed a general 
approach or method which, if followed, would result in the growth of scientific 
knowledge. According to this approach, science starts with the collection of facts via 
a process of systematic observation. It then proceeds to infer generalisations (laws 
and theories) from this factual data (Gillies, 1993: 5-6). Both laws and theories are 
confirmed or verified by comparing their predictions with 'all the observed facts, 
including those with which they began' (Blaug, 1980: 2). Mill's (1843) is often cited 
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as a classic description of inductivism-SM. 'Mill made extreme claims about the role 
of inductive arguments both in the discovery of scientific laws and in the subsequent 
justification of these laws' (Losee, 1980: 148). In his account Mill acknowledged his 
debt to Herschel (1830) and Whewell (1837). 
Herschel (1830) distinguished between the 'context of discovery' and the 'context of 
justification'. Inductivism-SM is the view that inductive reasoning is crucial in both 
the context of discovery and the context of justification. Regarding the context of 
discovery, scientific theories and laws are interpreted as arising from inductive 
reasoning, that is, by induction from facts established by observation. Regarding the 
context of justification, scientific theories are viewed as justified to the extent that 
their consequences (predictions and explanations) - which may be clarified via 
deductive reasoning - are justified by a process of inductive inference. Herschel 
distinguished between the contexts of discovery and justification because he 
contended, contrary to Francis Bacon, that the method used to generate a theory is 
'strictly irrelevant' to the question of its justification. 'A meticulous inductive ascent 
and a wild guess are on the same footing if their deductive consequences are 
confirmed by observation' (Losee, 1980: 116). Whewell (1837) broadly agreed with 
Herschel's hypothetico-deductive theory of scientific method. His debate with Mill 
led to 'the first great controversy' in the modem era of the philosophy of science 
(Harre, 1967: 289). 
According to the hypothetico-deductive theory of scientific method, science begins 
with a theory, or hypothesis. This hypothesis may be the result of many different 
factors ranging from an inspired conjecture, or even a dream, to observations and the 
results of experiments. 'But the theory is not inferred by the scientist from any of 
these sources. The discovery of a new theory is a "happy guess", that may require the 
presence of certain causal conditions, but not a reasoning process subject to rules of 
inference' (Achinstein, 2000: 325, original emphasis). 'The point of the [hypothetico-
deductive] model is that it employs no other rules of logical inference other than that 
of deduction' (Blaug, 1980: 4). It is in the context of discovery that unobservable 
terms, such as light waves, may be introduced. 
In terms of the hypothetico-deductive approach to scientific investigation, it is only in 
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the context of justification that it is sensible to discuss the procedure of science. 
Nothing systematic can be said about the context of discovery. Logical positivists, 
following Reichenbach (1938), support this view. It is only in the context of 
justification that reasoning takes place in the attempt to defend or criticise a theory. 
This reasoning consists of a process of deductive reasoning in which conclusions are 
derived from the asswpptions of the theory. If these conclusions are inductively 
verified by experience, the theory could be regarded as true. The problems with 
verification (outlined in the previous section) soon led logical positivists, notably 
Carnap (1953: 48 [1936-7]), to substitute the notion of confirmation for verification. 
In an effort to. clarify the notion of the (degree of) confirmation of an hypothesis, 
greater research was carried out in the field of probability and inductive inference 
(Caldwell, 1982: 22-3). Within the hypothetico-deductive tradition scientists 
(economists) put forward null hypotheses and used inductive statistics to refute those 
hypotheses and so confirm the alternative hypotheses (Halfpenny, 1982: 102). Much 
of this work on inductive reasoning has followed the lines Jevons (1874) initiated. 'In 
the works of J M Keynes, Richard von Mises, Hans Reichenbach, and Rudolf Carnap 
the probabilistic exegesis of the measure of inductive support has been developed' 
(Harre, 1967: 293). 
A weaker version of the hypothetico-deductive method was outlined by Popper 
(1934). If a theory survives attempts to falsify it, it may be regarded as corroborated. 
Whereas the logical positivists test theories by looking to inductive support, Popper's 
process of testing by falsification allegedly does not require inductive reasoning. The 
problem of naive falsificationism is outlined by the Duhem-Quine thesis: theories 
cannot be tested one by one, but only in groups. Since all testing must be carried out 
on groups of linked hypotheses, it is a matter of choice, or convention, which of these 
hypotheses we regard as having gained, or lost, support as a result of testing (Stewart, 
1979: 224). 
But common to both the inductivist verificationist and Popper's falsificationist 
approaches, 'a hypothetico-deductivist can postulate any unobservable entities or 
events he or she wishes in the theory, so long as all the observational conclusions of 
the theory are true' (Achinstein, 2000: 326). This sets alarm bells ringing for any true 
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blue inductivist-empiricist, that is, one subscribing to inductivism-Sl\1. 
According to Achinstein, not only Mill, but also Newton were avowed inductivists 
and opponents of hypothetico-deductivism, or the method of hypothesis. 'Mill cites 
as an example the wave theory of light, which postulates an ether': 
The existence of the ether still rests on the possibility of deducing from its 
assumed laws a considerable number of actual phenomena ... Most thinkers of 
any degree of sobriety allow, that an hypothesis of this kind is not to be received 
as probably true because it accounts for all the known phenomena, since this is a 
condition sometimes fulfilled tolerably well by two conflicting hypotheses; 
while there are probably many others which are equally possible, but which, for 
want of anything analogous in our experience, our minds are unfitted to 
conceive (Mill, 1959: 328 [1843]). 
Achinstein points out that many observed phenomena derived from the wave theory 
( eg reflection, refraction, and diffraction) were also derived from the competing 
particle theory. 'So the wave theorist should not be able to claim truth, probability, or 
even very much support for his theory from the fact that it entails these observed 
phenomena' (Achinstein, 2000: 326). 
Problems such as this led Whewell (1840) to formulate a more sophisticated version 
of the hypothetico-deductive method, the 'consilience of inductions'. According to 
this version, it is not sufficient that the theory entail simply known phenomena that 
have been observed: it must also entail new ones. If it does so then it is certain, or 
according to a weaker interpretation, highly probable or strongly supported. Mill 
remained unconvinced. He argued that, given the above, there could still be an 
incompatible theory that entails the same phenomena. If so, Mill concluded, one 
cannot claim truth or even high probability for the (first) theory. According to 
Achinstein, hypothetico-deductivists have so far been unable to answer Mill. Gillies 
(1993: 39-53) describes two accounts of scientific discoveries (Fleming's penicillin 
and Farben's sulphonamide drugs) which, he argues, have occurred as the result of 
'creative induction' in the case of penicillin and 'mechanical or Baconian induction' 
in the case of sulphonamide drugs. Both cases support the view that science · 
progresses according to the inductivist method of procedure. Supporting this view, 
Hacking (1983: 149) contrasts the experimental method of scientists with 
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philosophers' tendency to 'constantly discuss theories and representation ofreality'. 
'Mill, by contrast to Whewell, proposes what he calls the "deductive method" for 
making inferences to scientific theories. It has three steps, the first of which is 
inductive and includes inferences to causes and laws. The second step Mill calls 
"ratiocination" which involves logical reasoning to determine the consequences of the 
causal claims. The third step is verification. What Whewell omits, says Mill, is the 
crucial inductive step at the beginning' (Achinstein, 2000: 327). The debate 
continued when Jevons (1874) criticised Mill's claim that justification of hypotheses 
is by satisfaction of inductive schema and re-asserted the importance of deductive 
reasoning (Losee, 1980: 158). 
This section has aimed at combating the view, contained for example in Caldwell 
(1982), that the hypothetico-deductive method favoured by the logical positivists and 
Popper superceded their espousal of an earlier cruder inductivism. The matter is more 
complex. For example, Gillies has argued that, even in the natural sciences, there is 
support for the view that science progresses according to the inductivist method of 
procedure. When we turn to Chapter Three, we wiiI see that Hutchison makes use of 
both inductivism-SM and hypothetio-deductivism. An obvious example of 
Hutchison's use of hypothetico-deductivism is his criterion of testability which draws 
on Popper (1934) and calls for the 'finished propositions' of science to be conceivably 
empirically falsifiable. Yet, Hutchison also refers to the inductivist and 
phenomenalist approaches of the early Carnap and Schlick. And, he espouses an even 
more inductivist-SM stance in his sympathy with the institutional and historical 
approaches of Schmoller and Cliffe Leslie. Hutchison then, may be seen as a drawing 
attention to the importance of inductivism in economics. 
1.3.5 The status of theories and laws 
Logical positivism is to be understood as involving views about the realist or non-
realist status of theories and laws. Here we adopt and adapt classifications from 
Hacking (1983: 42) and Achinstein (2000: 328). Firstly, we will proceed to explain 
how the holding of realist or anti-realist views affects the status of theories and laws 
that deal with unobservable entities. It is here that the positivists' account (in the 
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Received View) of theories as no more than formal ~iomatic structures or systems 
reflects their anti-realist views on this issue. These include instrumentalism, 
pragmatism and conventionalism. Secondly, we will describe how the holding of 
realist or anti-realist views affects our interpretation of the causal nature of scientific 
laws. Here Hempel and Oppenheim's (1948) account of explanation may be viewed 
as in line with Hume's view on causation. This is the view that there are no essential 
relationships between matters of fact. In other words, it involves the assumption that 
experiences are given individually or atomistically. It is this view that sharply 
distinguishes empiricists from rationalists and various kinds of neo-Kantians 
(Spurrett, 1998). The problem of attaching necessity to the laws in Hempel and 
Oppenheim's account has led to· analysis of non-Humean views on causation 
(Halfpenny, 1982: 68) since 'Humean analysis of causation in terms of constant 
conjunction fails to distinguish laws from accidental regularities' (Halfpenny, 1982: 
74). 
Realism and anti-realism: how theories and laws about observables should be 
interpreted 
These opposing views take many different forms. Williamson (1995) even contests 
the notion that they are views or positions. Instead they are better thought of as 
directions. 'To assert that something is somehow mind-independent is to move in the 
realist direction; to deny it is to move in the opposite direction' (Williamson, 1995: 
746). In medieval scholastic philosophy realism was opposed to nominalism (only 
particulars not universals are real, ie, mind-independent) and conceptualism 
(universals are mind-dependent) (Mautner, 1999). Realism may also be opposed to 
idealism (only minds exist) (cf Torr, 1999). According to Chalmers (1982: 147), 
'realism typically involves the notion of truth. For the realist, science aims at true 
descriptions of whatthe world is really like'. Hacking (1983: 21-31) describes what 
he labels 'scientific realism'. His account is broadly in line with that given by 
Achinstein below. 
According to Achinstein (2000: 329), one prominent type of realism makes two 
claims: unobservable entities exist independently of us and theories which claim to 
describe are either true or false. By contrast, one prominent type of anti-realism 
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denies unobservable entities exist and asserts that only observable entities exist so that 
only the latter may be construed as making claims that are either true or false. 
Harre (1967: 289) presents a 'grand opposition' between anti-realist and realist 
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philosophers of science. The anti-realists are characterised by holding to (a) 
inductivism-SM, (b) Humean causality, and (c), aiming at the reduction of all 
theoretical concepts to functions of observables. In this camp have been J S Mill, 
Mach, Duhem, Hempel, Carnap and Braithwaite. He gives, as an example of the 
power of this view, the chemists' abandonment of the atom in the nineteenth century 
and an official prohibition on theoretical papers in the Journal of the Chemical 
Society (1967: 291). 
Realists opposed to this tradition include Whewell and Campbell (1920). These hold 
that (a) theory construction is more complex than inductivism will allow; (b) the 
meaning of theoretical concepts is not exhausted by logical function and observational 
basis, and ( c) that the actual procedures of science have more authority than formal 
logic has. A position that is difficult to classify is that of Poincare who, as we have 
earlier seen, espoused commodisme rather than what has since been called 
conventionalism. 
From the side of the anti-realist camp Mach's extreme reductionism combined with 
his sensationalism exerted a powerful influence on logical positivism. 
The net effect of this movement was a steady denigration of the power of theory 
in favour of logically ordered structures of empirical concepts. The marriage of 
Mach's views on science with Russellian logic initiated the era of hypothetico-
deductivism, when a theory was thought to be an axiomatic structure, like 
formal logic or geometry (Harre, 1967: 291). 
According to the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 'a scientific theory - in 
Carnap's opinion. - is an interpreted axiomatic formal system'. As mentioned in the 
previous section, the Received View construes 'scientific theories as axiomatic 
theories formulated in mathematical logic' and comprising logical, observational and 
theoretical vocabularies. A set of correspondence rules (dictionaries, interpretative 
systems) explicitly define the empirical counterparts of theoretical entities in terms of 
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a physicalist language (Suppe, 1977: 16). 'The system gams empirical 
meaningfulness only when the system is given some empirical interpretation by 
means of interpretative sentences' (Caldwell, 1982: 25). 
Caldwell points out that, as the Received View developed (Braithwaite, 1953; 
Hempel, 1958), it was accepted that theories be judged as entire systems: each 
theoretical term need not be explicitly defined. Theories are viewed as hierarchical 
systems with the higher-level hypotheses often referring to theoretical entities, while 
the lower-level hypotheses describe observable phenomena and are the propositions 
which may be empirically tested. An advantage of this development was that 
theoretical terms did not need to be tested directly: they gain meaningfulness 
indirectly when the lower-level propositions are empirically confirmed. This seems to 
allow a more normal role for theoretical terms in science. However, this·more normal 
role turns out to still be a very hollow one. 
Before expanding on this contention, a more general limitation of the Received View 
needs to be pointed out. The indirect testability hypothesis implies that, unless a body 
of non-theoretical terms can be independently distinguished from theoretical terms, 
the status of theoretical terms is ambiguous since no observational interpretation 
would be possible. There are three types of problems facing the drawing of this 
distinction: (I) distinguishing between theoretical and non-theoretical terms, (2) 
distinguishing between observable and non-observable terms, and (3), the question of 
passive observation (Chalmers, 1982: 24-8). 
It turns out that the indirect testability hypothesis does not significantly change the 
Received View on theories which remains only marginally, rather than substantively 
different from Mach's fictionalist view of theories. In Mach's view theoretical terms 
had no meaningful role to play in science, being purely temporary devices which 
would be replaced by observational terms as science progressed: 
It would not become physical science to see in its self-created, changeable, 
economical tools, molecules and atoms, realities behind phenomena . . . The 
atom must remain a tool for representing phenomena, like the functions of 
mathematics (Mach, 1894: 206). 
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While Caldwell is quick to point out an advantage of the Received View (theoretical 
terms can now be accommodated in terms of the indirect testability hypothesis), he 
neglects to point out, as has Harre (1967), that in the Received View theories are 
reduced to 'empty shells' being no more than 'logically ordered structures of 
empirical concepts' - without any meaning whatsoever apart from a Procrustean 
empirical interpretation. 
The fact that axiomatic structures can never lead into the new and hitherto 
unknown, that they are, precisely because of their logical coherence, quite 
unfruitful, does not seem to have bothered the advocates of the hypothetico-
deductive view. The logicians of this era were apparently not interested in the 
question of theory origin or theory growth, but only in the question of the best 
mode of formalizing theories that were already known (Harre, 1967: 291). 
Here Harre's statement could be a little misleading when referring to advocates of the 
hypothetico-deductive view. Caldwell (1982: 26) is quite correct in contending that 
the hypothetico-deductive method is itself entirely neutral between realists and anti-
realists. For example, Popper (1934)~ an avowed realist, sets out his falsificationist 
view of science in terms of the hypothetico-deductive method. Rather, it is the 
insistence by these particular 'advocates' and logicians that theories be construed as 
no more than axiomatic structures that is anti-realist. For example, those positivists 
who were instrumentalists (Mach, Schlick) were not interested in theory growth 
because they were not interested in truth but rather in usefulness (Leplin, 2000). 
(Neither would pragmatists be interested in theory growth because they seem to 
identify truth with usefulness.) (Mautner, 1999: 277; Worrall, 2000). This anti-realist 
nature of much of positivist thought has been discussed by Hacking (1983: 41-57). 
Fifty years earlier Planck had criticised the phenomenalist and instrumentalist aspects 
of positivism from a realist perspective: 
Of what value to the world are the sensory impressions of a mere individual? .. 
. No science can rest its foundation on the dependability of single human 
individuals. And the moment we have made that statement we have taken a step 
which puts us off the logical pathway of the positivist system. We have 
followed the call of common sense. We have taken a jump into the 
metaphysical realm; because we have accepted the hypothesis that sensory 
perceptions do not of themselves create the physical world around us, but rather 
that they bring news of another world which lies outside of ours and is entirely 
independent of us (Planck, 1932: 80-81). 
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When we turn to examine Hutchison's 1938 intervention in Chapter Three we argue 
that he adheres to certain aspects of the anti-realist orientation of the logical 
positivists, especially that of Humean causality. Yet he approvingly cites the realist 
views of Campbell (1920). He accepts that theory construction cannot be limited to 
inductivism-SM and, following Popper, that there is a need for employing the 
hypothetico-deductivist . method. But, in turll, he has serious reservations with the 
extent to which in this method theories are interpreted as axiomatic formalised 
structures since this emphasises the logical coherence, rather than the empirical 
realism, of a theory. 
Realism and anti-realism: how the causal and explanatory nature of theories and 
laws is to be interpreted 
Anti-realists view science as a body of laws that explain and predict, but not in a way 
that would satisfy realists. Probably the most well known positivist and anti-realist 
leaning account of scientific explanation and prediction is given by Hempel and 
Oppenheim' s ( 1948) deductive-nomological (D-N) model of scientific explanation. It 
is also known as the covering-law thesis (Newton-Smith, 2000). It states that a 
scientific explanation must consist of two parts: an explanans and an explanandum. 
The explanans, or premises, contain the antecedent conditions and the general laws. 
The explanandum is the sentence describing the phenomena to be explained. It 
follows from this account that both explanation and prediction involve the same 
logical procedure. This is not all. For an explanation to be sound three logical, and 
one empirical, condition(s) of adequacy must also be fulfilled: (i) the explanandum 
must follow logically from the explanans; (ii) the explanans must have general laws; 
(iii) the explanans must have empirical content. The empirical condition, (iv), is that 
- the explanans must be empirically true (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948, [1953: 321-
24]). In this model explanation is deductive in form. Given the explanans, the 
explanandum must occur. Partly as a result of problems surrounding the concept of a 
general law, and partly to take account of the fact that many explanations in science 
make use of statistical laws, Hempel (1962) developed a second inductive-
probabilistic (1-P) covering law model of scientific explanation. Both types of 
covering-law models have been subjected to three main realist criticisms. 
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The first revolves around the 'symmetry thesis', ie, the view that ~ere is a logical 
symmetry between explanation and prediction. The idea is that every explanation 
must be a potential prediction. The only difference between the two is a temporal 
one: while explanation refers to events taking place in the past, prediction concerns 
future events. Critics have contended that explanation and prediction are not the same 
thing: a prediction requires only a correlation. Likewise explanation need not imply 
prediction. · For example, Darwin's theory of evolution explains how species 
developed, but cannot predict what new forms will emerge. Caldwell (1982: 30) has 
argued that the covering law model is at odds with an instrumentalist view of theories 
since instrumentalism 'cannot claim an explanatory role for theories'. However, it 
should be pointed out that the notion of explanation involved in the covering law 
model is very 'thin'. It is not something that would satisfy many realists, since its 
conception of explanation is essentially Humean in that it draws on Hume's 'billiard 
ball' model of causation. According to this, causation is nothing but the constant 
conjunction of two events that happen to be contiguous in time and space. The earlier 
event is called the 'cause' while the later event is called the 'effect' although there is 
no necessary connection between them. 
The second arises out of problems with the concept of a general law referred to above. 
The problem concerns the difficulty of identifying the necessity that characterises 
laws but is absent from accidental generalisations. The problem arises because the 
Humean analysis of causation, to which positivists subscribe, fails to distinguish laws 
from accidental regularities (Halfpenny, 1982: 74). One way out of this difficulty is 
to view laws as expressing causal necessity. 'Yet many early positivists were 
antithetical to causality because of its mysterious, metaphysical undertones. . . . 
Russell ( 1917) held that causal talk belongs to pre-scientific discourse, and 
"causality" featured on Neurath's index verborum prohibitorum' (Halfpenny, 1982: 
68). Those not adopting the positivist anti-metaphysical stance~ eg certain realists, 
can easily live with the notion that explanation involves a causal mechanism which 
guarantees that the relationship between the two events is a necessary one and is not 
just a chance occurrence. 'Explanation requires some sort of causal narrative .. 
Whereas a prediction states that something will be the case, an explanation concerns 
how it comes to be the case' (Coddington, 1972: 5). For realists, such as Popper, 
explanation is a major goal of science. It therefore needs to be clearly distinguished 
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from prediction: 'I consider the theorist's interest in explanation - that is, in 
discovering explanatory theories - as irreducible to the practical technological 
interest in the deduction of predictions' (Popper, 1959: 61 n). 
The third revolves around the contention that the covering-law models describe all 
legitimate explanation in both the natural and social sciences. Three other types of 
explanation will be mentioned here. Firstly, challenging the unity of science notion, it 
has been argued that in the social sciences motivational explanations are legitimate 
although they do not generally provide predictions. Secondly, it has been contended 
that anotper legitimate form of explanation is functional: the characteristics of some 
phenomenon are explained by reference to certain ends or purposes which the 
characteristics are said to serve. An example from botany would be: 'The function of 
chlorophyll in plants is to enable plants to perform photosynthesis'. Thirdly, non-
positivist models of explanation have been presented by Harre (1960), Hesse (1966). 
Other non-positivists have put forward the notion of story-telling as a valid form of 
explanation in social science (McCloskey, 1989: 227; Ward, 1972, ch 12). 
When we turn to Chapter Three, we argue that Hutchison in 1938 leans towards a 
Humean perspective on the problem of causality. He accepts Hempel and 
Oppenheim' s (1936) view that empirical laws are central to scientific explanation 
(Hutchison, 1938: 64-5) and Popper's view that laws should be conceivably 
falsifiable. Yet, for Hutchison, such laws are inductive inferences (1938: 62). Popper 
(1960: 115), drawing on the hypothetico-deductive approach, argued that scientific 
predictions need to be based on laws which he distinguished sharply from trends. 
Hutchison (1977: 19-23) responded by arguing that, despite its 'obvious weaknesses', 
the 'nature of the material' in 'some important branches' of economics seem to allow 
for little more than induction of (mere) trends. We argue in Chapter Three that, 
despite his reference to Hempel and Oppenheim (1936), Hutchison in 1938 lent more 
towards emphasising the relevance of inductivism, rather than the covering-law thesis, 
for the purposes of· 'explanation' and prediction in economics. Furthermore, he 
enthusiastically supports (Hutchison, 1992: 16-17) alternative forms of explanation in 
economics such as that of Ward (1972). 
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Conclusion 
We started this chapter by looking at the responses of Mach and Poincare to 
developments in nineteenth century natural science. Mach's response was radically 
empiricist, especially in terms of his phenomenalist or sensationalist theories of 
knowledge. Viewing science as a practical response to everyday problems, he 
rejected the view that it could lay claim to any universal timeless, and especially 
metaphysical, knowledge of the world. While he influenced the logical positivists and 
Hutchison, it should be remembered that he also influenced Einstein. We 
distinguished, with Harre, Poincare's commodisme from other forms of 
conventionalism. According to this, only the language of science is arrived at by 
convention. In this regard, Poincare's comment that 'all the scientist creates in a fact 
is the language in which he enuciates it' was explicitly noted by Hutchison (1938: 
36). Following Gillies (1993), we have documented how Poincare came, in his 1905 
work, to regard the laws of science as empirical laws founded on induction and not 
simply merely conventions. What is important for our purposes is that Hutchison 
(1938) draws on Poincare's 1905 rather than his 1902 views on the status of scientific 
laws. We see then, that both Mach and Poincare acknowledged the importance of 
induction in science. This point will be relevant when fielding criticisms of 
Hutchison's sympathy towards inductivism. 
We then turned to the revolutionary developments in logic and mathematics pioneered 
by Frege and Russell. While Russell showed how mathematics could be reduced to 
logic, it was Wittgenstein's demonstration of how logic reveals the structure of 
language that directly influenced not only the logical positivists, but also Hutchison, 
who learnt about the Tractatus in the early 1930s at first hand from his student friends 
at Cambridge who numbered amongst Wittgenstein's amenuenses. Wittgenstein 
revolutionised the conception of philosophy. Rather than a potential source of 
metaphysical truths about the woild, it was to be limited to the activity of analysing 
and clarifying the concepts and propositions of science. 
The logical positivists adopted and adapted Wittgenstein's verifiability principle of 
meaning. This principle gave them a powerful tool to separate science, or knowledge, 
from various forms of pseudo-science, chief amongst them metaphysics: a statement 
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is only meaningful if it can be verified. Popper replaced this criterion with one of 
falsifiability - which demarcated scientific from non-scientific statements. We will 
see in Chapter Three that Hutchison's (1938: 9) criterion of testability leans more 
towards Popper's criterion than that of the logical positivists. 
The logical positivists also used their verifiability principle of meaning towards 
formulating a general theory of meaning. This involved attempts to apply logical 
analysis to language in order to clarify the empirical base upon which propositions 
rested. Schlick and the early Carnap (1928) adopted a phenomenalist approach to this 
question which was in keeping with an inductivist-empiricism which was linked to a 
correspondence theory of truth. Hutchison appeared to be sympathetic to this 
approach. But Neurath and the later Carnap adopted a physicalist approach which 
was linked to a coherence theory of truth. While physicalism facilitated Neurath's 
project for the unification of science, the acceptance of a coherence theory of truth 
fitted in with the view of a scientific theory as having a formal axiomatic structure in 
keeping with a hypothetico-deductivist approach to scientific procedure. As we argue 
in Chapter Three, Hutchison departed from this (dominant) fomi of logical positivism. 
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CHAPTER 1: APPENDIX 
THE PROTOCOL SENTENCE DEBATE 
'The protocol-sentence debate is about what kind of data science is supposed to be 
responsible to' (Cartwright and Cat, 1996: 81). Can the data be the sense data in the 
phenomenalist interpretation (Schlick and the early Carnap), or must we admit only 
data that are intersubjectively available (Neurath's physicalism)? 
Phenomenalism is an empiricist theory of knowledge. It says that our knowledge of 
the external world is obtained via sense-experience. One of its earliest statements is 
by Berkeley who denied the existence of matter. This implies a phenomenalist stance 
since, for phenomenalists, we have no grounds for assuming that there are such things 
as material objects which exist beyond the immediate data of experience. Both Hume 
(1748) and Mill (1843) contain some phenomenalist tendencies. The latter famously 
referred to material objects as (no more than) 'permanent possibilities of sensation'. 
According to Kolakowski (1972: 11), phenomenalism denies any real difference 
between 'essence' and 'appearance'. But Caws (1965: 320) points out that by this 
denial phenomenalism, although very closely related to positivism, unlike positivism, 
involves a metaphysical claim about the nature of the world: 'that phenomena are the 
world - that the world of appearance is the only world there is'. By a 'short, simple 
and obvious step' we arrive at a 'substantial, although rather thin, world'. 
This position accounts for theoretical terms, not merely as calculating devices 
inserted between descriptions, but as logical constructions out of sense-data .... 
It enables one to talk about objects not merely when they are present but also 
when they are not, as sets of aspects or perspectives. Objects are phenomena, 
actual and potential (Caws, 1965: 320, original emphasis). 
To avoid the ontological difficulties involved in this position, the logical positivists 
focussed on its linguistic aspects. Here the key idea is that, for a statement to be 
· significant, it must be reducible to a statement about sense data. Strict 
phenomenalism goes beyond positivism in ruling out, unlike positivism, even the use 
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of 'empty symbols' as steps from one observational sentence to another (unless they 
· can be reduced to sense data) (Caws, 1965: 321). 
Influenced by Mach and Russell, Carnap (1928) adopted phenomenalism with its 
notion of the incorrigibility of the immediately given. As an introductory motto, he 
selected Russell's (1917: 155) famous line: 'The supreme maxim in scientific 
philosophising is this: Whenever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted 
for inferred entities'. Russell had applied this maxim to mathematics when he defined 
cardinal numbers as sets of sets. 
Carnap's Aujbau was a monumental effort to apply this maxim to all domains of 
scientific knowledge, and to 'construct' the natural world as we know it in a 
precise manner, using a single individual's experiences as substantive content, 
and employing the most powerful tools of symbolic logic to carry out the 
construction (Salmon, 2000: 234). 
Reichenbach (1933) described it as fully presenting, for the first time, the Vienna 
Circle's scientific conception of the world. Influenced by the neo-Kantian 
philosopher, Bruno Bauch, Carnap had written his doctoral dissertation on the theory 
of space (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1999). Richardson (1996: 310) aligns 
himself with recent revisionary work on Carnap which questions the strict empiricist 
interpretation of the Aujbau finding that it contains significant Kantian elements. He 
proceeds to expand on this theme distinguishing three phases of Carnap's movement 
from epistemology to the logic of science: his (1928), his (1931-2a), and finally his 
(1936-7). Cartwright and Cat (1996: 80) distinguish two central aspects of the 
Aujbau: 'one is the logical construction of science upwards; the second is the 
assumption that the foundations of the construction can be epistemologically secure' 
because of the incorrigibility of sense-data reports. 
Physicalism, a term coined by Neurath (Mautner, 1999: 424), embraces the view that 
the language of science must be a language which refers to material, physical entities, 
and in which all basic predicates are physical. There are many interpretations of 
physicalism, not all of them positivist (Seager, 2000). Here we are concerned with 
pointing out that, rather than phenomenalism, 'Neurath,. (who was) drawn to Marx's 
materialism and therefore opposed to the idealist flavour of phenomenalism, preferred 
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physicalism, where sentences about sense-data are analysable into sentences about the 
publically observable properties of physical objects: for example, "this object is 
emitting a high-pitched noise"' (Halfpenny, 1982: 89). 
Carnap had introduced the concept of protocol sentences for foundational 
sentences which incorrigibly report immediate sense-experiences and constitute 
a basis for all other knowledge. Neurath, in contrast, used the concept to 
characterise reports of particular observations of the physical world which, in 
his view, form the set of basic, but not incorrigible, sentences (Mautner, 1999: 
382). 
Neurath had outlined his physicalist views in his (1931, 1931 a) articles. In his (1931-
2) article he again presented physicalism as a non-metaphysical standpoint. Unhappy 
with the metaphysical overtones of the term 'world', he contended that it would be 
better to speak of a Vienna Circle for Physicalism rather than of one for a Scientific 
World-Outlook pointing out that 'world' is not a term found in science (Neurath, 
1959: 282 [1931-2]). Later, he goes on to state: 
Since the views presented here are most nearly similar to the ideas of Carnap, 
let it be emphasized that they exclude the special 'phenomenal' language from 
which Carnap seeks to derive the physical language, which does not even seem 
to be usable for 'prediction' - the essence of science (Neurath, 1959: 290 
[1931-2]). 
In an article immediately following on from Neurath's, Carnap (1931-2a) concerns 
himself with the physical language and its relationship to the protocol language. In 
the Aujbau Carnap had been concerned with the question of how 'we achieve 
objective knowledge despite the subjective beginning of knowledge in private 
sensation' (Richardson, 1996: 330). In continuing this theme he distinguishes 
between two modes of speech: the 'material', or usual, mode and the 'formal' or 
- correct mode. 'The first speaks of "objects", "states of affairs", of the "sense", 
"content" or "meaning" of words, while the second refers only to linguistic forms' 
(Carnap, 1934a: 38 [1931-2a]). In the material mode protocol statements 'refer to the 
given, and describe directly given experience or phenomena, ie, the simplest states of 
which knowledge can be had' (Carnap, 1934a: 45). 
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Science is a system of statements based on direct experience, ap.d controlled by 
experimental verification . . . Verification is based upon 'protocol statements' 
(Carnap, l 934a: 42). 
However, when translated into the formal mode, 'we find a remarkable transformation 
... the crucial appeal to experience falls away' (Hanfling, 1981: 78-9). In the formal 
mode basic statements are not to be characterised by reference to (subjective) 
experience but instead by reference to inter-subjective terms and relations. In the 
formal mode protocol statements are 'statements needing no justification and serving 
as the foundation for all the remaining statements of science' (Carnap, 1934a: 45). 
'Thus the crucial contact with experience is broken. The demands of empiricism are 
to be met by tracing logical relations between statements, and nothing more. Any 
reference to experience will be a confusion due to use of the material mode' 
(Hanfling, 1981: 79). 
Neurath (1959a: 199 [1932-3]) contends that 'the fiction of an ideal language 
constructed out of pure atomic sentences is no less metaphysical than the fiction of 
Laplace's demon'. Again he stresses: 'There is no way of taking conclusively 
established pure protocol sentences as the starting point of the sciences' (1959a: 201 
[1932-3]). Yet, he points out, Carnap (1931-2a) speaks of a primitive protocol 
language an experiential or phenomenalistic language which requires no 
verification. Furthermore, Carnap maintains that 'at the present stage' this language 
cannot be 'precisely characterised'. This might lead 'younger men' to search for a 
protocol language and so to 'metaphysical deviations'. Therefore, as a means of 
keeping 'waverers in line', physicalism needs to be maintained in its most radical 
version (Neurath, 1959a: 201-2 [1932-3]). 
To this end, Neurath proceeds to give a physicalist interpretation of protocol 
sentences. In doing so he rejects Carnap's thesis that protocol sentences 'require no 
verification'. Just as every physicalistic sentence is subject to change, so even 
protocol sentences may be discarded as useless or false. 'The fate of being discarded 
may befall even a protocol sentence. No sentence enjoys the noli me tangere which. 
Carnap ordains for protocol sentences' (Neurath, 1959a: 203 [1932-3]). To illustrate 
this point he asked the reader to imagine an ambidextrous person writing down two 
contradictory protocols at the same time. 
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In the immediately following article, in Carnap (1932-3 ), 'the protocol-sentence 
debate ceases to be one over the facts about the protocol language and its relation to 
the physicalist language - it comes to be a series of proposals for the construction of 
languages for science' (Richardson, 1996: 324). 
Neurath opposes certain features of the view about protocol sentences I 
advocated in my article on the physicalistic language. He wants to contrast it 
with another view according to which protocol sentences are in different form 
and are manipulated according to other procedures. My opinion here is that this 
is a question, not of two mutually inconsistent views, but rather of two different 
methods for stru'cturing the language of science both of which are possible and 
legitimate (Carnap, 1987: 457, original emphasis). 
Here Carnap 'severs any and all connection' between protocol sentences and 
experience. Furthermore, any statement could serve as a protocol. 'One can always 
go beyond any given statement; there are no absolute starting-points for the 
construction of science' (Carnap, 1932-3, quoted in Hanfling, 1981: 82). It would 
appear that, if protocols do not refer to statements that 'describe directly given 
experience' (Carnap), and if they are not distinguished by any special kind of 
certainty (Neurath), there would be no the point in speaking of protocol statements at 
all (Hanfling, 1981: 81). According to Ayer (1959: 231), there is 'no more 
justification for it than there would be for making a collection of all the propositions 
that could be correctly expressed in English by sentences beginning with the letter B, 
and choosing to call them Basic propositions'. 
With the severance of 'any and all connection' with experience, the question arises of 
'what becomes of verification and truth?' One result of the Carnap-Neurath protocol 
sentence debate is that it appears to diminish the importance, if not the need, for 
distinguishing between analytic and synthetic statements. More importantly it leads 
to a version of the coherence theory of truth, 'according to which the truth of a 
statement is a matter of its coherence with other statements' (Hanfling, 1981: 83). 
Hanfling points out in a footnote to this comment that it is ironic that the coherence 
theory had previously been represented by non-empiricist thinkers. Another outcome 
of the Carnap-Neurath debate is that: 
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Once a scientist decides to work within a given framework, intersubjective 
agreement can be delivered, but at a considerable price: the logical principles 
which provide the essential structure for the framework, and indeed the 
framework itself, are chosen, Carnap tells us, on pragmatic grounds . . . (In 
doing so) the judgements which they make are relative to the framework itself: 
what is 'true' or 'false' depends upon internal consistency within each separate 
framework. This resonates with Carnap's view that the whole system of physics 
must be taken into account when judgements are made. In this he is following 
Pierre Duhem's (conventionalism) (Ray, 2000: 249). 
All this was too much for Ayer and Schlick to accept. 'Ayer argued that each rival 
and incompatible system might include the proposition that it was the only acceptable 
system' (Ray, 2000: 249). Schlick forcefully spelt out the consequences of accepting 
a coherence theory of truth and re-affirmed his commitment to experience: 
Anyone who takes coherence seriously as the sole criterion of truth ... must 
consider any fabricated tale to be no less true than a historical report ... so long 
as the tale is well enough fashioned to harbour no contradictions anywhere .... I 
would not give up my own observation propositions under any circumstances .. 
. (they) would always be the final criterion (Schlick, 1932-3, quoted in 
Hanfling, 1981a: 178 and pp 188-9). 
Schlick appeared to believe that knowledge of empirical statements must be wholly 
reducible to corresponding experiences. It is their peculiar closeness to experience 
that endows his observation sentences with absolute certainty. In looking for such 
statements his motive was to vindicate empiricism (Hanfling, 1981: 95). 
For our purposes, this review of phenomenalism, physicalism and the protocol 
sentence debate brings out at least three points relevant to our concern with Hutchison 
(1938). First, while we have. examined the arguments of either side in the debate, 
what is important for our purposes is the logical positivists commitment to the 
importance of sense experience of one kind or another. Secondly, the clarification of 
both the phenomenalist and physicalist positions will prove helpful when we turn to 
examine Hutchison's 1938 tract in Chapter Three. Thirdly, the disagreement between 
Schick (who held to a correspondence theory of truth) and Carnap and Neurath (who 
came to accept a coherence theory of truth) will be helpful when we turn to logical 
positivist views on the realist or non-realist (conventionalist, instrumentalist) status of 
scientific theories and laws (in section 1.3 .5). 
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CHAPTER2 
ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY AND HUTCIDSON'S INTERVENTION 
Hutchison drew not only on the philosophy of science, but also on the methodological 
writings of economists stretching back, for example, to those of Ricardo and Malthus. 
In order to evaluate Hutchison (1938) it is therefore necessary not only to understand 
something of the philosophy of science, but also something of the history of economic 
methodology. As with the philosophy of science, we do not attempt a comprehensive 
overview of the topic, but instead seek only to draw out those aspects of economic 
methodology relevant to Hutchison (1938). In doing so, we use as our organizing 
framework a distinction that Hutchison himself has drawn between two different 
approaches to the methodology of economics. 
While the distinction is implicit in Hutchison's methodological writings from 1938 
onwards, he conveniently sets it out explicitly in an article exactly fifty years after his 
seminal work on methodology (Hutchison, 1998). Here he distinguishes between 'the 
empirically minimalist, ultra-deductivist' approach of Ricardo, Senior, J S Mill, and 
Caimes on the one hand, and the more empirical, inductivist-leaning approach of 
Smith, Jevons, Marshall and Keynes on the other. 
Using this as our organizing framework has both an advantage and disadvantage. The 
advantage is that it will help us to understand Hutchison's interpretation of economic 
methodology and thereby give us an insight into the nature of his 193 8 work. The 
disadvantage is that we will get too caught up in viewing the methodology of 
economics from Hutchison's perspective and thereby lose the critical distance 
necessary to form a balanced appraisal of his contribution to economic methodology. 
We hope to counter this disadvantage by drawing on many authors besides Hutchison 
thereby seeking a wide range of protagonists in the methodological arena. More 
importantly, we hope to counter it by providing a relatively detailed examination of 
the methodological writings of three leading economists in the period leading up to 
1938: Robbins, J M Keynes and Knight, of whom two had dramatically opposed 
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methodological views to those of Hutchison. 
In order to accomplish these ends we divide this chapter into four different sections. 
In the first we attempt to draw out those aspects of the history of economic 
methodology relevant to Hutchison (1938). Here we cover the period from Adam 
Smith to Caimes (1875), who is often viewed as the last of the classical economists, 
before turning to the neoclassical period. This conventionally starts with the marginal 
revolution of the 1870s, which may be viewed as partly prompting the methodenstreit 
between Menger (1883) and Schmoller (1883). We end with Marshall (1890) and 
Keynes (1891). In the remaining three sections we deal respectively with Robbins, J 
M Keynes and Knight. 
2.1 Economic methodology from Smith to the 1930s 
Smith, Ricardo, Malthus and Senior 
Hutchison (1978: 4) points out that Smith saw himself as a philosopher 'in a highly 
comprehensive sense' so that the Wealth of Nations is properly interpreted as part of 
'a much broader study of society and human progress, which involved psychology 
and ethics, law, and politics' (p 5). 1 While he kept abstract reasonings on a very tight 
rein, he employed a system by which he meant an abstract deductive model. 'He very 
much doubted that abstraction could provide either understanding of the real world or, 
by itself, safe guidance for the legislator or statesman' (Viner, 1968: 327). 
Hutchison (1978: 10) describes Smith as 'a leader of the Scottish historical school'. 
Smith referred to his model, as 'the simple system of natural liberty', or what we 
might call the freely competitive, self-adjusting market model. It is a historically 
dynamic model, in that it is concerned not only with a static, or ideal, criterion, but 
with the economic forces which make for progress (p 11). 'The Wealth of Nations 
was not founded on abstractions, nor on the particular abstraction of economic actions 
and processes from their historical interdependence and interpenetration with social, 
legal and political actions and processes' (p 23). 
1 In this chapter unsupported page references are to the work cited immediately prior to such a 
reference, except in the case of section 2.2. l where they are all to Robbins (1935). 
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Blaug (1992: 52) follows Hutchison in accepting that Smith generally used the 
methods of the Scottish historical school in the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the 
Wealth of Nations, except for Books I and II of the latter in which he followed the 
method of comparative statics adopted by Ricardo. In neither of these works did he 
make his methodological principles explicit. But in Smith (1799), written around 
1750, he described the Newtonian method as one in which we lay down 'certain 
principles, primary or proved, in the beginning, from whence we account for the 
several phenomena, connecting all together by the same chain' (cf Redman, 1997: 
220-27). 
The richness of Smith's method lies not in the beauty of a precise mathematical 
theory or in a system like Newton's, but in its wide social emphasis: the special 
stress on the psychological underpinnings and sociological aspects of political 
economy, the striving for breadth of understanding and overall grasp of the 
economy rather than specialized knowledge, and the view of political economy 
as an interdisciplinary pursuit entrenched in the moral, political, historical, 
psychological, and philosophical. ... there would probably be no better antidote 
to the narrowness of economics's current methods than a greater appreciation of 
and revival of the Scottish (historical) approach in association with today's 
analytical, theoretical approach (Redman, 1997: 257-8). 
For Hutchison (1978: 26), more significant than Ricardo's theory of distribution was 
his methodological claim that problems in political economy are problems of 
'determining laws'. Such laws are to be determined by recourse to 'the method of 
extreme abstraction (or 'strong cases')'. Hutchison points out that Walter Bagehot 
regarded Ricardo as the 'true founder of abstract political economy'. 
After detailing the influence of James Mill on Ricardo, Hutchison argues that Ricardo 
was not interested in abstract model-building as an end in itself but rather· in the 
laissez-faire policy conclusions to which it gave rise: 'Ricardo did not buy a seat in 
Parliament simply to expound blackboard exercises or to read out articles for 
Econometrica' (p 45). Instead he was 'overwhelmingly interested' in abolishing the 
Poor Laws and removing the Com Laws. Yet, Hutchison points out, Ricardo's 
approach relies on the assumption of perfect knowledge (p 48). In a letter to Malthus, 
Ricardo acknowledged this assumption as fundamental to his method: 
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The first point to be considered is, what is the interest of countries in the case 
supposed? The second what is their practice? Now it is obvious that I need not 
be greatly solicitous about this latter point; it can clearly demonstrate that the 
interest of the public is as I have stated it. It would be no answer to me to say 
that men were ignorant of the best and cheapest mode of conducting their 
business and paying their debts, because that is a question of fact and not of 
science, and might be urged against almost every proposition in Political 
Economy (Ricardo, quoted in Hutchison, 1978: 48). 
Hutchison proceeds to point out that Ricardo's assumptions regarding the speed of 
adjustment and efficiency of markets followed logically from his assumption of 
perfect knowledge. He cites Ricardo's argument that allowing free imports of com 
would result in labour immediately being applied to the production of more profitable 
commodities. Hutchison comments: 'this seems to suggest a failure to distinguish 
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between a hyper-abstract model and the real world . . . to something having gone 
seriously astray with regard to ... the relationship between analysis and policy' (p 
49). Ricardo's approach was more laissez-faire than Smith (or any other classical 
economist) due to 'political preconceptions', but especially to his adoption of extreme 
versions of Smith's assumptions particularly with regard to (1) natural wages and (2) 
the perfect knowledge assumption (p 51 ). 
According to Blaug (1992: 53), Ricardo was a 'convinced advocate of what we 
nowadays call ''the hypothetico-deductive model of explanation," vigorously denying 
that facts can ever speak for themselves'. Indeed, Schumpeter has labeled this 
propensity of Ricardo to apply abstract models directly to the complexity of the real 
world the 'Ricardian Vice' (1954: 472). 
Redman (1997: 260) refers to the 'maze of myths' surrounding both Malthus and 
Ricardo. Ricardo is known for his logical, deductive theory stripped of sociological 
-- and historical aspects and condemned by Schumpeter for the 'Ricardian Vice'. By 
contrast Malthus is damned for his 'scurrilous' population theory, regarded as 
illogical, fuzzy-minded, the loser in his debate with Ricardo, but with a strong 
empirical-historical bent. 'Like all stereotypes, there is an element of truth in both 
characterisations' (p 260). She proceeds to re-examine the literature pointing out the 
numerous re-evaluations of both economists. Nevertheless her conclusion follows 
much the same line as that of Hutchison (1978). Redman (1997: 316, 319) contrasts 
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Ricardo's 'focusing on logical consistency and quick results' yvith Malthus's 
'empirical, historical approach' with its emphasis on the realism of assumptions. She 
points out that 'orthodox neoclassical economics (especially mathematical economics) 
has evolved more in accord with Ricardo's design, while American institutionalism 
(especially Mitchell's version) more closely conforms to Malthus's methodological 
conception' (p 316). 
Three years after Ricardo's death and ten years before Mill's (1836) essay Nassau 
Senior (1827) had, according to Hutchison (1998: 46), set out the first explicit account 
'of empirically minimalist ultra-deductivism' in an introductory lecture delivered at 
Oxford in 1826. According to Senior, the 'theoretic branch' of economics rests 'on a 
few very general propositions, which are the result of observation or consciousness, 
and which almost every man, as soon as he hears them, admits as familiar to his 
thoughts, or at least included·in his previous knowledge' (Senior, 1827: 7, quoted by 
Hutchison, 1998: 46; Bowley, 1936: 285). The most important of these propositions 
states: 'That every man is desirous to obtain, with as little sacrifice as possible, as 
much as possible of the articles of wealth (Senior, 1827: 30, quoted by Hutchison, 
1998: 46; Bowley, 1936: 288). Hutchison (1998: 47), after noting Senior's 
condemnation of the importance which many economists ascribed to facts, points out 
that, according to Bowley (1937: 64), the approach of Mises 'is the same approach as 
Senior's'. 
John Stuart Mill and J E Cairnes 
From Chapter One (section 1.3.4) we learnt that Mill (1843) has generally been 
interpreted in the philosophy of science literature as a leading example of what we 
termed 'inductivism-SM'. De Marchi (1998: 313, n 2) points out that Mill's Essay, 
first written in 1831, formed the basis of Book VI of his 1843 System of Logic. 
According to Blaug (1980: 69-73), Mill (1843), 'after devoting almost the whole of 
his book to defending inductive methods' accepts in the closing section in which he 
turns to social science that inductive methods are generally ineffectual because there · 
are so many causes at work. This, and the difficulty of conducting controlled 
experiments, means that it 'cannot be a science of positive predictions, but only of 
tendencies' (Blaug, 1980: 66-9). Mill therefore advocates different methods for the 
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social sciences. Political economy is an 'essentially abstract science' based on 
'assumed premises which are not pretended to be universally in accordance with fact', 
but which instead are simplifications necessary for the a priori method to be tractable. 
According to Redman (1997: 340), the a priori method is the 'deductive method' of 
the System of Logic: 
It reasons, and, as we contend, must necessarily reason, from assumptions, not 
from facts. It is built upon hypotheses, strictly analogous to those which, under 
the name of definitions, are the foundation of the other abstract sciences. . . . 
The conclusions of Political Economy, consequently, like those of geometry, are 
only true, as the common phrase is, in the abstract; that is, they are only true 
under certain suppositions, in which none but general causes - causes common 
to the whole class of cases under consideration - are taken into account (Mill, 
in Redman, 1997: 340). 
This 'sudden support for deductive methods after hundreds of pages extolling 
inductive ones ... is well calculated to leave the reader utterly confused about Mill's 
final views on the philosophy of the social sciences' (Blaug, 1980: 72). Hausman 
(1992) has attempted to resolve this apparent inconsistency between Mill's empiricist 
views and his support for the a priori method in economics. According to Hausman, 
Mill's solution was to maintain that the basic postulates of economics are well 
established by introspection or everyday experience: 
These well-supported premises state how specific causal factors operate. If the 
only causal factors influencing economic phenomena were those specified in 
these premises, then the predictions of economic theory would be correct. But 
economic phenomena depend on many causal factors that are left out of 
economic theories. Consequently, the implications are inexact (Hausman, 1992: 
214). 
Verification is undertaken not to confirm the truth of a theory, but rather to ascertain 
whether or not there are 'disturbing causes' which have not been taken into account 
which might prevent it from being applied to particular circumstances, that is, 
verification determines whether the theory is applicable to the case at hand (Redman, 
1997: 341). 
According to Redman (1997: 326), while Mill (1843) was concerned with both 
natural and social sciences, his real quest was to determine the extent to which the 
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methods of the natural sciences could be applied to the social-moral sciences. This he 
attempts in Book VI of his System of Logic from what seems to be a naturalist 
viewpoint: 
The backward state of the Moral Sciences can only be remedied by applying to 
them the methods of Physical Science, duly extended and generalised .... 
(Social science) is a deductive science; not indeed after the model of geometry, 
but after that of the more complex physical sciences (Mill, in Redman, 1997: 
328, 335-6). . 
Blaug (1980: 73 ff) points out that, despite empirical evidence in the first half of the 
nineteenth century falsifying Ricardo's predictions concerning the price of com, the 
share of rent, the level of wages and the rate of profit, Mill 'retained the Ricardian 
system without qualifications'. Blaug concludes his discussion by supporting de 
Marchi's (1970: 266) contention that 'J S Mill's methodological position was no 
different from Ricardo's: Mill only formally enunciated the "rules" which Ricardo 
implicitly adopted'. 
According to Blaug (1980: 77-8), Caimes (1875), like JS Mill, continued to uphold 
the Ricardian system and the view that political economy is a deductive science. 
Hutchison (1998: 51) points out that Cairn es developed one of the main doctrines of 
'ultra-deductivism', later called by Wieser 'the psychological method'. This 'claimed 
to achieve greater certainty for propositions arrived at by introspection; which were 
held to provide a more secure foundation for economic theory than was available to 
the natural sciences' (ibid: 51 ): 
The economist starts with a knowledge of ultimate causes. He is already at the 
outset of his enterprise, in the position which the physicist only obtains after 
ages of laborious research (Caimes, quoted in Blaug, 1980: 78). 
Hutchison (1953: 18fnotes that when Caimes 'claims that "the economist starts with 
a knowledge of ultimate causes", he is describing very closely the rationalist 
Cartesian approach of the Physiocrats'. Be that as it may, there appears to be 
reasonable evidence for Hutchison's (1998: 44) classification of Ricardo, Senior, J S 
Mill and Caimes as representatives of 'the empirically minimalist, ultra-deductivist' 
approach to economic methodology. Hutchison notes that it was this approach, 
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particularly in the extreme form given to it by Wieser and Mises, that was to influence 
Robbins (1932). Yet Robbins (1935: 82) was to describe it as 'orthodox'! 
Jevons, the English historical school, and the methodenstreit 
Jevons (1871), along with Menger (1871) and Walras (1874), is generally recognised 
as introducing the marginal revolution. These works signaled the end of classical 
political economy and the birth of neoclassical economics. Jevons attacked the 
central pillars of what he described as 'the Ricardo-Mill Economics': the theory of 
distribution (the wages-fund doctrine and the natural wage theory) as well as the 
theory of value - and the policies derived from them. 
Apart from this revolution in economic theory, Hutchison (1953: 77) has drawn 
attention to 'a much more fundamental' attack on the abstractions of the Ricardo-Mill 
Method. While some aspects of this attack can be found in Jevons (1871), it is in 
Jevons (1874) that his philosophy of science is more fully set out. According to 
Schabas (1998: 260-1), Jevons was 
a strict empiricist in the tradition of Bacon, Locke and Hume: scientific enquiry 
begins and ends with observation, guided by analogies. . . . Like Mill, Jevons 
maintained that what is now termed the hypothetico-deductive method of 
Newtonian physics was best suited to economics. He recognised that, as a 
species of induction, however, this method did not preclude subsequent 
revisions of a given hypothesis. 
Hutchison (1998: 53) has noted how these empiricist sentiments revealed themselves 
in Jevons (1871). For instance, Jevons claimed: 'The deductive science of economics 
must be verified and rendered useful by the purely empirical science of statistics' 
(1871: 90). While he advocated the introduction of mathematics to economics, he 
insisted that it was only by obtaining empirical evidence that one could 'enhance the 
veracity of a given claim' (Schabas, 1998: 261 ). 
Partly influenced by Darwinism, the 1870s saw a continued rise in the methodologic~ 
criticism of classical political economy as found in Jevons (1871). Moderate 
criticisms came from Toynbee's lectures at Oxford and Bagehot (1877). Stronger 
criticisms came from Ingram (1878) and Leslie (1879), representatives of the English 
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historical school (cf Koot, 1975). 
Political Economy. is not a body of natural laws in the true sense, or of universal 
and immutable truths, but an assemblage of speculations and doctrines which 
are the result of a particular history. [Leslie went on to argue for] the deletion 
of the deductive method of Ricardo: that is to say, of deduction from unverified 
assumptions respecting 'natural values, natural wages, and natural profits'. But 
we are not against deduction in the sense of inference from true generalisations 
and principles, though we regard the urgent work of the present as induction, 
and view long trains of deduction with suspicion (Leslie, in Hutchison, 1953: 
20). 
According to Fusfeld (1987), the methodenstreit began with Menger (1883) 'which 
made the case for pure theory based on assumptions about behaviour and antecedent 
conditions. Schmoller (1883) responded with a strongly worded review that argued 
for principles of economics based on empirical historical data and the inductive 
method'. While each agreed that both theory and empirical studies were necessary, 
they disagreed on their place and importance. For Schmoller, rather than starting with 
assumptions, the proper method is to start with historical-empirical studies and to 
induct general principles from them. Hutchison (1953: 145 ft) points out that in 
answer to Schmoller's criticism of his assumptions as unrealistic, Menger compared 
his assumption of 'pure self-interest' to chemistry's assumptions of 'pure oxygen' and 
'pure hydrogen'. To criticise these as unrealistic is to misunderstand the procedure of 
all sciences. Hutchison (1953: 147) responds by asking whether 'it does not make a 
fundamental difference that practically pure chemical substances can actually be 
isolated, tested, and observed in a laboratory in a way in which pure self-interest and 
omniscience cannot be extracted, observed, and measured separately from the rest of 
human qualities'. 
Marshall and John Neville Keynes 
In his inaugural lecture of 1885 Marshall looked towards 'the possibility of a vast 
improvement in the condition of the working classes' (Pigou, 1925: 155). In both 
men this 'social enthusiasm', to use Pigou's term, was balanced by a disciplined 
adherence to scientific method, for they earnestly believed in economics as a science, 
although not one comparable to physics (Hutchison, 1981: 50-1). Hutchison (1953: 
64 ff) points to the influence of both mathematical (Cournot) and historical (Jones and 
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Roscher) economists on Marshall. On the mathematical side he 'translated Mill's 
version of Ricardo's or Smith's doctrines into mathematics' (Pigou, 1925: 417). 
However, according to Pigou, 
though a skilled mathematician, [Marshall] used mathematics sparingly. He 
saw that excessive reliance on this instrument might lead us astray in pursuit of 
intellectual toys, imaginary problems not conforming to the conditions of real 
life: and further, might distort our sense of proportion by causing us to neglect 
factors that could not easily be worked up in the mathematical machine (1925: 
84). 
Indeed, Marshall believed that if the results of mathematical economics could not be 
translated into English they should be burned (Coase, 1994: 174 [1975]). Marshall's 
wariness towards the use of mathematics in economics extended to the use of 'pure 
theory' in economics as demonstrated by his letter to Edgeworth in 1902: 
In that old phrase you would perhaps take the kernel to be the ,essential part: I 
take it to be a small part; and, when taken alone, more likely to be misapplied 
than in the case of other sciences. In my view 'Theory' is essential. No one 
gets any real grip of economic problems unless he will work at it. But I 
conceive no more calamitous notion than that abstract, or general, or 
'theoretical' economics was economics 'proper'. It seems to me an essential but 
a very small part of economics proper (Pigou, 1925: 437). 
Whitaker (1998: 282) points out that, while deductive argument was central for 
Marshall it 'was to be chastened and constrained from building airy castles on shaky 
empirical foundations by remaining always in close contact with the observable and 
verifiable'. Marshall repeatedly denied any role in economics for 'long trains of 
deductive reasoning' (1920: 773, 781). 
In addition to keeping 'theory' on a tight leash Marshall, in his 1885 inaugural lecture, 
displays an instrumentalist-leaning conception of theory. For him, it supplies (no 
more than) 
a machinery to aid us in reasoning about those motives of human action which 
are measurable ... But, while attributing this high and transcendent universality 
to the central scheme of economic reasoning,. we may not assign any 
universality to economic dogmas. For that part of economic doctrine, which 
alone can claim universality, has no dogmas. It is not a body of concrete truth, 
but an engine for the discovery of concrete truth, similar to say, the theory of 
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mechanics (Pigou, 1925: 158-9). 
Hammond (1991a: 97) interprets Marshall's 'concrete truth' as facts 'which are time 
and place specific' and therefore not universal. 'Theory alone does not yield concrete 
truths about the world; this is possible only with theory informed by and applied to 
perceptual facts' (1991a: 98). 
Marshall's critical attitude to theory and his reservations about the role of 
mathematics in economics may be partly explained by the influence of the historical 
economists mentioned earlier: Jones, the pioneer in England of the historical method 
and Roscher of the German historical school. Hutchison (1953: 66) cites Marshall as 
stating that Jones was among his early readings and 'gave a direction to a good deal of 
iny subsequent thinking'. Likewise the German historical school, notably Roscher 
'attracted him' (Marshall, 1920: 767, 773, 777, and 783). However, he rejected 
extreme historicists warning that 
it must then always be remembered that though observation or history may tell 
us that one event happened at the same time as another, or after it, they cannot 
tell us whether the first was the cause of the second. That can be done only by 
reason acting on the facts (Marshall, 1920: 774). 
In keeping with Marshall, Keynes ( 1891) likewise adopted a conciliatory approach to 
the criticism of the historical schools. Rather than rejecting any role for historical 
forces in political economy, he accepted that these played a part and so wisely granted 
the historical schools' main point. However, he adroitly relegated their part to the 
application, rather than the genesis, of political economy. He did this distinguishing 
three concepts of political economy: (1) a positive science, (2) a normative or 
regulative science and (3) 'an art, or system of rules for the attainment of a given end' 
-(Keynes, quoted in Deane, 1978: 102-3). In doing so, he neatly deflected the 
criticisms of the historical schools - which were to be viewed as more concerned 
with (2) and (3) - than with the core science of political economy itself. In both 
Dillard's (1968: 377) and Blaug's (1980: 82) view, Keynes was biased towards the 
abstract-deductive view of economics. This judgement receives support from 
Hutchison (1981: 53), who cites Marshall's own views on the matter in a letter to 
Foxwell: 
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Most of the suggestions which I made on the proofs of Keynes' Scope and 
Method were aimed at bringing it more into harmony with the views of 
Schmoller. Some were accepted. But as regards method I regard myself as 
midway between Keynes + Sidgwick + Caimes and Schmoller + Ashley 
(Marshall, quoted in Coase, 1994: 170-1 [1975]). 
In the first section of this chapter we have tried to draw out, from the long history of 
economic methodology before 1938, those aspects which have a bearing on 
Hutchison's methodological intervention. In doing so, we have used Hutchison's own 
distinction between two competing approaches to the methodology of economics: the 
empirical-inductivist approach and the 'empirically minimalist ultra-deductivist' 
tradition. We have seen that each approach well established and supported by leading 
economists of the past. To provide some critical distance from Hutchison's 
interpretation, we have quoted and cited the views of other authors. In the light of 
this, it seems reasonable to conclude that Hutchison's 1938 should be seen as arising 
out of an ongoing methodenstreit in economics, rather than merely the equivalent in 
economic terms of Ayer's (1936) propagation of the logical positivist ideas of the 
Vienna Circle. 
2.2 Economic methodology in the 1930s 
We now turn to a relatively detailed examination of the methodological writings of 
three prominent economists in the 1930s. In this way we hope to give some depth to 
the so far rather swe~ping review of aspects of economic methodology important to 
Hutchison's 1938 intervention. In addition, the examinations of these three authors 
will provide a perspective on economic methodology quite removed from that of 
Hutchison and so allow for the development of some critical perspective on the proper 
place and nature of Hutchison (1938). It will also allow us to evaluate claims such as 
Caldwell's that the dominant methodology prior to Hutchison (1938) stressed 
'subjectivism, methodological individualism, and the self-evident nature of the basic 
postulates of economic theory' (1982: 99). 
Already in 1930, in his inaugural lecture, Robbins had mounted a defence of 
deductivist-oriented economics. He rejected the arguments of 'so-called 
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institutionalists' who sought to replace deductive methods with 'historical and 
statistical inductions': 
By the application of the methods of higher statistical analysis to dense masses 
of statistics, laws of 'economic behaviour' are to be discovered which will put 
Economic Science on a basis of equality with the Natural Sciences (Robbins, 
1930: 20). 
And before Hutchison (1935), Robbins's views had provoked an implicit reaction in 
Kaufmann (1933). Kaufmann (1933: 381) traces the 'sterility' of methodological 
discussion to 'a lack of precision in the formulation of the problems involved'. To 
this end he attempts clarification of the questions concerning the scope and method of 
economics (pp 383-4). He rejects the view that we can formulate laws in economics 
such as are found in physics (pp 386-7). This poses severe methodological problems 
in economics as compared to physics. In the light of these problems it is important to 
note that, in an empirical science such as economics, the correct method cannot be 
claimed to be 'a priori recognisable', or self-evident since 'as a matter of principle no 
apodictical assertions whatever can be made regarding matters of experience . . . the 
incorrectness [of which] must always be allowed to be possible' (p 388). 
Bemadelli (1936), in a review of Kaufmann (1936), adopts the 'neo-Kantian' view 
associated with von Mises: economic laws are essentially a priori and do not depend 
on experience for their validity. In reply Kaufmann denies that synthetic propositions 
a priori exjst in economics: 'The death blow to this doctrine was dealt by Poincare's 
conventionalist explanation of geometry and finally by Einstein's general theory of 
relativity' (1937: 338). In his 'Live and dead issues in the methodology of 
economics', Robbins (1938: 347) refers to the logical status of the general 
assumptions . of economics as one of the live issues. Here he notes that the 
protagonists in the debate over their status are Mises and Bemadelli on the one side 
and Kaufmann and Hutchison on the other (p 348). On the side of the empiricists, 
Leontief (1937) criticised the deductive 'implicit theorising', not only of the 'neo-
Cambridge school' of Robinson, Kahn, Hicks and Keynes, but also of Robbins 
(1932). 
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2.2.1 Robbins2 
According to Peston (1981: 183), Robbins's famous Essay 'has usually been 
interpreted as a priorist and anti-empirical'. Nevertheless Blaug (1980: 87) describes 
Robbins's Essay in broader terms as a restatement of 'the Senior-Mill-Caimes 
position in modem language along with some elements from the Austrian tradition'. 
And Caldwell rejects the a priorist tag since this may be read to imply that Robbins 
subscribed to von Mises's view 'that the status of the fundamental axioms is that of 
synthetic statements that are a priori true'. Yet, he points out, 'nowhere in Robbins's 
essay can one find the term "a priori'" (Caldwell, 1982: 104-5). 
A factor that may help towards understanding Robbins's Essay is the extent to which 
it arose as a reaction to opposing methodological positions. From around 1900, 
American institutionalism had been on the rise, nearly becoming dominant in the 
USA during the inter-war years. Robbins (1971: 149), referring to his Essay, 
explains: 
This part of the book, more than any other, reflects the circumstances in which 
it was written. It is a reaction - doubtless overdone - against the ridiculous 
claims of the institutionalists and the cruder econometricians and an attempt to 
persuade Beveridge and his like that their simplistic belief in 'letting facts speak 
for themselves' was all wrong. 
While institutionalism may have featured in the background, the immediate 
methodological position to which Robbins reacted appears to have been the more 
direct and personal one of his fundamental disagreement with Beveridge on matters 
methodological. In his Autobiography Robbins makes it clear how strongly he 
opposed Beveridge' s views on economic methodology. describing them as 'primitive 
in the extreme': 
He thought that even astronomy proceeded simply by the 'unbiased collection 
of facts'. No disciple of Schmoller or the extreme American institutionalists 
could have exceeded his denunciations of abstract theory . . . the bias of his 
preconceptions in this respect made nearly all departmental developments on 
the theoretical side something of a struggle, and on one occasion at least 
involved a severe impoverishment of our strength (Robbins, 1971: 136-7). 
2 In this section all unsupported page references are to Robbins (1935). 
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The Essay 
Three major themes may be distinguished in Robbins's work: (a) that of generalising 
the scope of pure economics to cover non-material, as well as material, welfare; (b) 
that of separating out a body of economic science, or pure economics 'from those 
discussions of economic issues that involved value judgements' and, (c) that of 
clarifying the nature of the generalisations which comprised the scientific part of 
economics (Corry, 1987: 207). While the first two themes concerning the nature of 
the subject matter of economics became widely accepted amongst orthodox 
economists, the third has remained controversial. It was directed at supporting the 
view that the scientific part of economics is sound: 
The efforts of economists during the last hundred and fifty years have resulted 
in the establishment of a body of generalisations whose accuracy and 
importance are open to question only by the ignorant or the perverse (Robbins, 
1935: 1). 
(a) The scope and definition of economics 
Robbins (1935: 64) points out that, traditionally, economists have viewed economics 
as being concerned with the causes of material welfare and proceeds to discuss the 
implications of defining economics in this way. He shows that it is not reasonable to 
limit the concerns of the subject to those of material welfare alone. He therefore 
proposes a 'formula to describe the general subject-matter of Economics' (p 3). This 
is 'a definition which is echoed in the first chapter of every textbook on price theory' 
(Blaug, 1980: 87): 'Economics is the science which studies human behaviour as a 
relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses' (p 16) . 
. Robbins goes on to point out that the traditional materialist definitions of economics 
may be called 'classificatory' conceptions since they delineate those kinds of human 
behaviour that are concerned with material welfare. However, his definition is an 
'analytical' conception: it does not attempt to isolate certain kinds of behaviour. 
Instead it looks at a particular aspect of human behaviour: namely, that which results 
from the influence of scarcity. 
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It follows from this, therefore, that in so far as it presents this aspect, any kind 
of human behaviour falls within the scope of economic generalisations. We do 
not say that the production of potatoes is economic activity and the production 
of philosophy is not. We say rather that, in so far as either kind of activity 
involves the relinquishment of other desired alternatives, it has its economic 
aspect (p 1 7). 
Traditionally, from Adam Smith's great work onwards, economists have professed to 
deal with the causes of wealth, or total social product, and its distribution. Yet, 
Robbins argues, the lasting achievements of economics have not sprung from such 
wide-ranging concerns since these involve notions that are too vague for the 
requirements of science. The development of laws has related to precise concepts as 
found in the theories of equilibrium, comparative statics and dynamic change which 
are not enquiries into the causes, or distribution of wealth. 
Instead of regarding the economic system as a gigantic machine for turning out 
an aggregate product and proceeding to enquire what causes make this product 
greater or less, and in what proportions this product is divided, we regard it as a 
series of interdependent but conceptually discrete relationships between men 
and economic goods; and we ask under what conditions these relationships are 
constant and what are the effects of changes in either the ends or the means 
between which they mediate and how such changes may be expected to take 
place through time (p 68). 
While Robbins' s definition appeared to widen the scope of the subject, in practice it 
excluded whole fields of economic enquiry concerned with broader macroeconomic, 
developmental and social issues (Deane, 1978: 147). . 
(b) The separation of value judgements from pure economics 
Another major theme is Robbins's attempt to 'separate economics from ethics' 
(O'Brien, 1998: 424). He put forward the view 'that economic science could be 
clearly demarcated from those discussions of economic issues that involved . value 
judgements' (Corry, 1987: 207). For Robbins, there are two important reasons for 
wanting to separate value judgements from economics. The first reason relates to 
Weber's notion of wertfrei and his views on objectivity in the social sciences. 
Robbins makes it clear that the practical significance of economics depends upon 
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being able to distinguish the propositions of pure science, which are strictly neutral 
between ends, from normative propositions which embrace value judgements (p 152). 
Economics, as a science, cannot help us with the problem of choosing between 
different ends, all of which may be desirable. This is a problem for the field of ethics. 
Instead, economics as a science can help us with ethical problems by clarifying the 
implications of the different ends that we are thinking of choosing. In other words it 
allows us, when choosing, to do so rationally, ie with a knowledge of what it is we are 
choosing as well as to choose ends which are consistent in the sense that they are 
mutually achievable. 
The second reason for wanting to separate out value judgements from economics was 
Robbins's desire to debunk the 'scientific pretensions of Pigovian welfare economics 
(O' Brien, 1998: 424). 'By value judgements Robbins had especially in mind those 
evaluative statements of the form "better or worse" where inter-personal comparisons 
of utility were involved' (Corry, 1987: 207). Robbins argued that individual welfare 
was a fundamentally subjective matter which could not be objectively measured. This 
viewpoint had its origins in Austrian writings, in particular von Mises, with the idea 
that only ordinal, and not cardinal, comparative rankings were possible (O'Brien, 
1998: 425). 
( c) The foundations of economic generalisations 
We look first at Robbins's views on the nature of economic generalisations, ie, 
economic laws or theories (his Chapter IV). O'Brien (1988: 34) refers to Robbins's 
position as 'essentially English' by which he means that it is characterised by 
'elements of imprecision and compromise about the extent to which the basic 
premises of economics are hypothetical and a priori'. We then turn to his views on 
their relationship to 'reality' or the 'procedures for checking the validity of economic 
theory' (Corry, 1987: 207) (his Chapter V). 
Robbins sets out the purpose of his Chapter IV: it is to discuss 'the nature and 
derivation of economic laws' (p 72). He goes on to make it clear that he is not 
concerned with the correct methods for discovering 'how economics should be 
pursued' - this, he regards, as settled. He is, rather, interested in ascertaining the 
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significance of its results. Talcing the propositions of economics as established (the 
best established are those of the theory of value), the procedure is to 'inquire on what· 
their validity depends' (p 73). 
He answers this question by ruling out vanous responses. The foundations of 
economic generalisation~ cannot rest on an appeal to historical induction (p 74). Nor 
can they rest on the results of controlled experiment which cannot justify the wide-
ranging propositions of the theory of value (p 75). Robbins then asks the question 'on 
what, then, does our belief in the general propositions of economics depend?' After 
discussing various general propositions, he concludes: 
The propositions of economic theory, like all scientific theory, are obviously 
deductions from a series of postulates. And the chief of these postulates are all 
assumptions involving in some way simple and indisputable facts of experience 
relating to the way in which the scarcity of goods which is the subject-matter of 
our science actually shows itself in the world of reality .... These are not 
postulates the existence of whose counterpart in reality admits of extensive 
dispute once their nature is fully realised. We do not need controlled 
experiments to establish their validity: they are so much the stuff of our 
everyday experience that they have only to be stated to be recognised as obvious 
(pp 78-9). 
Robbins next points out that these self-evident facts of experience need to be 
combined with 'subsidiary postulates' (p 79). These subsidiary postulates are 
'historico-relative' (p 80). Thus we must talce care to 'be sure of the facts' before 
applying our general theory to a particular situation (p 81 ). But, although the 
subsidiary postulates of economics are historico-relative, this is not the case with the 
fundamental assumptions of economics. They have 'universal applicability'. Indeed, 
they carry greater certainty even than the generalisations of the natural sciences: 
In Economics, as we have seen, the ultimate constituents of our fundamental 
generalisations are known to us by immediate acquaintance. In the natural 
sciences they are known only inferentially. There is much less reason to doubt 
the counterpart in reality of the assumption of individual preferences than that 
of the assumption of the electron (p 105). 
Robbins next deals with the behaviourists' contention that proper scientific method 
should follow the procedure of the physical sciences. Drawing on these ideas, 
economists such as Cassel and Pareto demand 'that we should leave out of account 
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anything which is incapable of direct observation . . . Our theoreti.cal constructions 
must assume observable data' (p 87). Robbins responds by pointing out that were 
economists to do so, we should find it impossible to provide explanations of 
behaviour since these are ultimately based on individual's subjective valuations which 
may be understood, but not observed. These psychological elements, which form part 
of any adequate explanation, are one of the essential differences between the social 
and the physical . sciences and explain why the social sciences 'can never be 
completely assimilated to the procedure of the physical sciences' (p 89). 
Robbins goes on to argue, somewhat more controversially, that the assumption of 
rational behaviour does not even number among the fundamental assumptions of 
economics. This contrasts with today's view that ranks it amongst the most important 
assumptions of economics (Caldwell, 1982: 101 ). Instead, Robbins contends, the 
assumption of perfect rationality (as with the assumption of perfect foresight), 
properly interpreted, should be seen as no more than an 
expository device - a first approximation used very cautiously at one stage in 
the development of arguments which, in their full development, neither employ 
any such assumption nor demand it in any way for a justification of their 
procedure (p 97). 
We now turn to look at Robbins's views on the relationship of economic theory to 
reality or the 'procedures for checking the validity of economic theory' - the topic of 
his Chapter V. Given Robbins's satisfaction with the orthodox body of economic 
thought, 'the question arises whether any of this body of theory requires confrontation 
with data. It seems quite clear that Robbins rejected both the attempts to arrive 
inductively at empirical regularities and also the direct testing of economic theories .. 
. for the simple reason that economic theories were necessarily true if they were 
arrived at by reasoning correctly from plausible premises' (O'Brien, 1998: 425). 
Robbins begins by contending that economic generalisations, like scientific 
generalisations, refer to that which exists or may exist. 'If the premises relate to 
reality the deductions from them must have a similar point of reference' (p 104). He 
therefore rejects the view that economics consists of merely formal propositions such 
as those of logic and mathematics. Nevertheless, the propositions that have been 
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established in economics 'are very general in character' (p 106). While it would be 
useful to be able to attach numerical values to scales of individual valuation or to 
establish quantitative laws of demand and supply, 'a moment's reflection should make 
it plain that we are here entering upon a field of investigation where there is no reason 
to suppose that uniformities are to be discovered (p 107, original emphasis). 
In a famous passage referring to a mythical economist called Blank attempting to 
estimate the elasticity of demand for herrings, Robbins proceeds to explain why we 
cannot hope to arrive inductively at economic generalisations: 
Is it possible reasonably to suppose that coefficients derived from the 
observation of a particular herring market at a particular time and place have 
any permanent significance - save as Economic History? . . . However 
accurately they describe the past, there is no presumption that they must 
continue to describe the future. Things have just happened to be so in the past 
(pp 108-9, original emphasis). 
Here Robbins is voicing Hume's the problem of induction. For Robbins these 
problems were such that theories could not be specified in quantitative terms: 'What 
the economist possesses is merely a qualitative calculus, which of course may or may 
not apply in a particular case' (Blaug, 1980: 88). 
Robbins then goes on to argue that if we cannot specify such elementary concepts as 
demand and supply functions in quantitative terms, then there is even less reason to 
hope that we can arrive at 'concrete' laws for more complex economic phenomena. 
Yet there has been a great multiplication of such attempts under the name of 
'quantitative economics'. These are doomed to failure for 
The theory of probability on which modem mathematical statistics is based 
affords no justification for averaging where conditions are obviously not such as 
to warrant the belief that homogeneous causes of different kinds are operating. 
Yet this is the normal procedure of much of the work of this kind. The 
correlation of trends subject to influences of the most diverse character is 
scrutinised for 'quantitative laws'. Averages are taken of phenomena occurring 
under the most heterogeneous circumstances of time and space, and the result is 
expected to have significance (p 112). 
According to Robbins, the recent multiplication of such attempts is nothing new: it is 
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no more than the continuation of a century-old revolt against the 'formal abstraction' 
of Ricardian economics. The arguments of the 'quantitative economists' echo those 
of earlier advocates of 'inductive methods', namely, the Historical School and 
Institutionalists. Since this movement has 'continually invoked a pragmatic logic, [it] 
may wel.l be judged by a pragmatic test' (p 113): Despite this long time span, and 
despite them becoming 'a highly respectable band of expert authorities ... and the 
directing functionaries of expensive research institutes . . . not one single "law" 
deserving the name, not one quantitative generalisation of permanent validity has 
emerged from their efforts' (p 114). Instead the substantial uniformities that have 
been discovered have flowed from orthodox theoretical analysis (p 115). 
Our discussion of Robbins's methodology has dealt with Caldwell's misgivings about 
an over-readiness to label Robbins's Essay as a priorist and anti-empirical - as no 
more than a restatement of the Austrian economics. Robbins does indeed use 
doctrines beloved by Austrians such as· the verstehen doctrine (Blaug, 1980: 88). For 
instance, he argues that we have better grounds for the generalisations of economics 
than the natural sciences because the assumptions are known to us by immediate 
acquaintance rather than merely inferentially (p 105). Yet, on this issue, Robbins 
refers the reader to Caimes (1875: 81-90) rather than to an Austrian economist. 
Moreover, unlike von Mises, Robbins did not view the basic postulates as 
praxeological. Instead they involved 'in some way simple and indisputable facts of 
experience' (p 78). Furthermore, he embraces the need to separate out posjtive from 
normative statements so as to establish a value-free, objective science. And, as we 
have seen, he acknowledges that, at least part of his book, is a reaction to the 
institutionalists and Beveridge. For these reasons, it appears that Robbins's Essay is 
more accurately described as emphasising apriorism, but remaining within the Senior-
Mill-Caimes position. 
2.2.2 J M Keynes 
We tum next to discuss the views of Keynes. This might seem to require some 
justification. For one thing, Keynes's contribution to economic methodology in the 
1930s is not nearly as voluminous as either that of Knight or Robbins. For another, 
his writings featured less significantly than either Knight's or Robbins's in Hutchison 
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(1938). Nevertheless, the overwhelming importance of K_eynes as the economist par 
excellence of the twentieth century means that these factors pale into insignificance. 
Whereas prior to around 1980 Keynes's Treatise on Probability (1921) had been 
viewed as being limited to a technical account of probability, modem interpretations 
have regarded Keynes as having expounded fundamental philosophical views in his 
Treatise. Following Cottrell (1998) we distinguish, for purposes of exposition, 
between Keynes's philosophy and his methodology. 
Keynes's philosophical position 
Although the post-circa 1980 interpretation traces Keynes's philosophical views to his 
Treatise, this is as far as agreement goes. Much of this literature has been concerned 
with whether or not there was a fundamental continuity or discontinuity in the 
development of Keynes's philosophical thinking. 
The discontinuity interpretation (Bateman, 1987; Davis, 1994) contends that Keynes 
abandoned much of his early philosophy. Just as the General Theory is traditionally 
taken to reflect a revolution in Keynes's economic thinking so, it is argued, Keynes's 
later philosophical views expressed within the General Theory are taken to be 
fundamentally different from his earlier views. According to Bateman (1991a: 105), 
these renunciations indicate that Keynes turned towards empiricism. 
The continuity thesis contends that Keynes's renunciations of his early philosophical 
views should not be taken at face value. A less superficial understanding of Keynes, 
it is argued, reveals a continuity between his early and late views. While the idea of 
continuity derives from discerning an essentially unchanged philosophy, there are 
widely differing interpretations of the nature of this philosophy. Among these 
interpretations are those of Carabelli (1988) and O'Donnell (1989). O'Donnell (1989) 
argues that Keynes's philosophy is distinctly rationalist and that it must be viewed as 
a determining force behind his economics. For Carabelli (1988), Keynes's Treatise 
contains a methodology 'which contrasted with the nature and developments of 
Russell's logical positivism' (p 7) so that it should be placed in a 'third stream' 
between rationalism and empiricism (p 246). 
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The fact that some discern rationalist, while others see empiricist, elements in his 
position should not be a cause for concern. Indeed, it can be argued, that the main 
importance of the modem controversy is that it points to the richness of his 
philosophy in which rationalist elements co-existed with empiricist elements. 
Keynes's views on probability and induction 
We now tum to focus on Keynes's Treatise, in particular his theory of probability, 
and its relation to induction. Keynes's major development of the logical theory of 
probability was put forward in opposition to the frequency theory which was 
dominant then, as now, within the 'scientific tradition'. According to this theory, 
probability is defined as 'the limit of a relative frequency of a subset of events to an 
infinite series of realizations of the relevant event population' (Mirowski, 1998: 391). 
'In this sense one could speak of the probability of drawing a king from a deck of 
cards, and this probability would refer to the number of times that this event would 
occur in repeated trials' (Bateman; 1990: 361). 
The frequency theory of probability dearly has empiricist leanings: probability, in this 
approach, is a property of physical things or events. According to Black (1967: 475) 
the key idea in this theory is to 'deny the existence of any logical gap between 
frequency and reasons . . . This idea has great intrinsic appeal to empiricists who, 
hoping to interpret basic probability statements as contingent, have nowhere better to 
look than in the direction of observed frequencies'. By contrast, probability in 
Keynes's theory, instead of being defined as a property of physical things or events, is 
regarded as a logical relationship between propositions, (Keynes, 1921 : 5). 
The theory of probability is logical, therefore, because it is concerned with the 
degree of belief which it is rational to entertain in given conditions, and not 
merely with the actual beliefs of particular individuals, which may or may not 
be rational (p 4). 
Keynes introduces the topic of induction in the following way: 
I have described probability as comprising that part of logic which deals with 
arguments which are rational but not conclusive. By far the most important 
types of such arguments are those which are based on the methods of induction 
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and analogy. Almost all empirical science rests on these (p 241). 
In the Treatise Keynes devotes two of his five sections to the topic of induction. He 
distinguishes between two types of inductive arguments: universal and statistical 
induction. While universal induction deals with arguments of the form 'all swans are 
white', statistical induction deals with arguments of the form 'most swans are white'. 
In examining the nature of statistical induction, Keynes (1921, part V) reiterated his 
main point that probabilities are degrees of belief rather than relative frequencies. 
Keynes criticised the early writers on statistical induction for assuming, rather than 
showing by induction, that one can validly infer probability from relative frequencies 
(p 400). In other words, they used only pure induction and ignored the role of 
analogy: 
To argue, without analysis of the instances, from the mere fact that a given 
event has a frequency of 10 percent in the thousand instances under observation, 
or even in a million instances, that its probability is 1/10 for the next instance, or 
that it is likely to have a frequency near to 1110 in a further set of observations . 
. . is hardly an argument at all (pp 445-6). 
Keynes distinguishes between two parts of an inductive argument: 'pure induction' 
and analogy. Pure induction refers to the number of observations we make, while 
analogy refers to the likeness that the various instances bear to one another. 
According to Carabelli (1988: 63), Keynes associated the 'traditional' view of 
induction with 'pure induction' which saw induction as being limited to 'number', ie 
quantitative and empirical matters. For Keynes, this was to omit the key role played 
by 'likeness' or analogy, ie qualitative and non-empirical matters. Positive analogy 
refers to the characteristics of observed instances being similar, while negative 
analogy refers to those that are different. 
The importance of pure induction is strictly secondary to that of analogy. Such 
importance as it has arises only to the extent that further instances introduce new 
differences and so increase the negative analogy. 'For this reason, and for this reason 
only, new instances are valuable (Keynes, 1921: 259). A further instance which 
provides only a positive analogy will not raise the probability of the argument. 
Instead the probability is raised by increasing the negative analogy ie by diminishing 
'the characteristics common to all the examined instances and yet not taken account 
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of by our generalisation' (p 260). 
Keynes's emphasis on analogy rather than number in the problem of induction 
provides us with an. instance of the extent to which Keynes regarded non-empirical, 
rather than empirical, concerns as fundamental to inductive arguments. As such it 
supports our earlier conclusion that points to the importance of both rationalist and 
empiricist elements in Keynes's philosophy. 
Keynes's methodological views 
In marked contrast to questions surrounding the degree of continuity in Keynes's 
philosophical views over time, it has been argued that there is a 'substantial' 
continuity in his methodological views. From the Treatise to the General Theory and 
after, Keynes repeatedly criticises 'what he regards as inappropriate attempts to 
quantify or formalize domains of study whose inherent nature makes such procedures 
problematic' (Cottrell, 1998: 263). For example, with regard to Keynes's misgivings 
about quantification, Carabelli (1992) has drawn attention to the fact that Keynes 
aggregated only quantities of employment and money, not 'real output', which he 
viewed as unquantifiable in principle (Keynes, 1936, ch 4). Keynes's misgivings 
about formalisation covered both statistics and mathematics. 'In his own economic 
work, he cites tables of data for various purposes but never does any formal statistics' 
(Cottrell, 1998: 264). And the mathematics in the General Theory is strictly limited 
( chs 20 and 21 ). Unlike his followers, Keynes did not attempt to describe the 
economic system in terms of a set of simultaneous equations: 
It is a great fault of symbolic pseudo-mathematical methods of formalising a 
system of economic analysis ... that they expressly assume strict independence 
between factors involved and lose all their cogency and authority if this 
hypothesis is disallowed ... Too large a proportion of recent 'mathematical' 
economics are merely concoctions, as imprecise as the initial assumptions they 
rest on, which allow the author to lose sight of the complexities and 
interdependencies of the real world in a maze of pretentious and unhelpful 
symbols (Keynes, 1936: 297-8). 
Many of his reservations about formalisation of mathematical and statistical methods 
in economics are to be found in his criticisms of Harrod and Tinbergen (Keynes, 
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1973: 285-320). In his venture into methodology, Harrod (1938) so!llewhat crudely 
emphasises the role of observation and it is this emphasis which provokes a response 
from Keynes. For example, Harrod refers to the 'heroic attempts' made by Schultz to 
obtain quantitative laws of demand and argues that progress depends on 'empirical 
observations as make it possible to fill in the blank-forms of equations with 
quantitative data' (1938: 400-1). Later Harrod argues: 
The generalisation [falling prices associated with rising output] is a direct result 
of observation, an excellent example of the facts speaking for themselves. And 
if theoretical explanations have subsequently been woven round it, this must not 
blind us to the true source of our knowledge. If rather crude observational data 
can yield appetising morsels of this sort, may we not legitimately hope that 
when subjected to refined statistical treatment they will yield more fruit in 
plenty? (p 408). 
While Keynes (1973) praises Harrod's address as 'the best for many years', he states 
that he has reservations about certain sections: 
It seems to me that economics is a branch of logic, a way of thinking; and that 
you do not repel sufficiently attempts a la Schultz to turn it into a pseudo-
natural-science . . . Progress in economics consists almost entirely in a 
progressive improvement in the choice of models ... 
But it is of the essence of a model that one does not fill in real values for the 
variable functions. To do so would make it useless as a model. For as soon as 
this is done, the model loses its generality and its value as a mode of thought. 
That is why Clapham with his empty boxes was barking up the wrong tree and 
why Schultz's results, if he ever gets any, are not very interesting (for we know 
beforehand that they will not be applicable to future cases). The object of 
statistical study is not so much to fill in missing variables with a view to 
prediction, as to test the relevance and validity of the model (pp 295-6, original 
emphasis). 
While Keynes's scepticism regarding formalisation of mathematical and statistical 
methods in economics is clear, the deep-rootedness of his misgivings becomes evident 
in his criticisms of Tinbergen (1939). Keynes reviewed Tinbergen's book in the 
September 1939 Economic Journal. Tinbergen replied in the March 1940 Economic 
Journal and his reply was followed in the same issue with a comment by Keynes. . 
Earlier, Keynes had drafted numerous comments on Tin~ergen's work prior to its 
publication (Keynes, 1973: 285-320). 
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In analysing Keynes's criticism of Tinbergen we will follow Carabelli (1988, ch 10) 
in distinguishing four main features of the debate: a) the nature of economic theory, b) 
inductive inference in economics, c) characteristics of economic material and, d) the 
validity of economic theory. 
a) Keynes (1973: 302) had no quarrel with Tinbergen in so far as his statistical 
investigations were concerned only with the descriptive function of verifying 
economic theory. However, Tinbergen was not content to confine statistics to 
verifying theory: statistics, via correlation analysis, should also deal with the problem 
of measurement, ie identifying not merely the causes that are operative, but measuring 
the individual strength of each of these causes. Keynes, as we have noted before (p 
299), stressed that economic theory was essentially qualitative. Moreover, qualitative 
theory logically preceded measurement (pp 307-8). Keynes also clashed with 
Tinbergen's view of causation. Tinbergen's view was attuned to the Humean notion 
that restricted cause to no more than constant conjunction of events. Therefore, for 
Tinbergen, correlation analysis, insofar as it sought out empirical regularities, isolated 
causal relations. Economic theory was thus seen as grounded on empirical, 
quantitatively measurable relations. Keynes's view of causation, as propounded in his 
Treatise, was put forward together with his notion of induction as a logical, rather 
than an, empirical concept. Assuming he carried these views over to economics 'one 
can also say that Keynes's concept of economic explanation was far from that of 
causation implied in positive economics' (Carabelli, 1988: 180). 
b) The next point about inductive inference is one that has been made by both 
Bateman (1990) and Lawson (1985). Keynes criticised Tinbergen for not having the 
grounds for making inductive inference: 
I have not noticed any passage in which Professor Tinbergen himself makes any 
inductive claims whatever. He appears to be solely concerned with statistical 
description. Yet the ultimate purpose which Mr Loveday outlines in the pfeface 
is surely an inductive one (Keynes, 1973: 315). 
For Keynes, correlation analysis was not sufficient ground to enable the statistician to 
pass from statistical description to statistical inference. To take the step from 
describing the past to predicting the future one needed proper inductive grounds. For 
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Keynes, these were given by the logical theory of induction· propounded in his 
Treatise. His main point was that Tinbergen's statistical inferences had been made in 
the absence of any inductive argument: 
I pass in conclusion to a different department of the argument. How far are 
these curves and equations meant to be no more than a piece of historical curve-
fitting and description, and how far do they make inductive claims with 
reference to the future as well as the past? (Keynes, 1973: 315). 
Lawson (1985: 129) points out that Keynes is not saying that empirical evidence is 
not relevant to economic analysis, nor does he reject the usefulness of inductive 
argument. His point is, rather, that while methods such as correlation analysis which 
depend on induction may be valid in the natural sciences, they may not be valid in the 
social sciences: 
Unlike the typical natural science,_ the material to which [economics] is applied 
is, in too many respects, not homogeneous through time (Keynes, 1973: 296). 
In chemistry and physics and other natural sciences the object of experiment is 
to fill in the actual values of the various quantities and factors appearing in an 
equation or a formula; and the work when done is once and for all. In 
economics that is not the case, and to convert a model into a quantitative 
formula is to destroy its usefulness as an instrument of thought (p 299). 
The pseudo-analogy with the physical sciences leads directly counter to the 
habit of mind which is most important for an economist proper to acquire . . . I 
also want to emphasise strongly the point about economics being a moral 
science. I mentioned before that it deals with introspection and with values. I 
might have added that it deals with motives, expectations, psychological 
uncertainties (p 300). 
c) Turning to the characteristics of the economic material, Keynes 'makes it clear that 
he did not believe that the material of economics exhibits enough stability and 
homogeneity over time to license the application of formal statistical methods' 
(Cottrell, 1998: 264). Keynes argued that, in order for Tinbergen's method of 
correlation analysis to be validly applied, the economic material had to be 
homogeneous through time, numerically measurable and completely comprehensive. 
Keynes found Tinbergen's attempt to take account of these factors 'grievously 
disappointing'. His contention was forthright: 'In fact we know that every one of 
these conditions is far from being satisfied by the economic material under 
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investigation' (Keynes, 1973: 285-6). Although Tinbergen had recognised that non-
measurable factors may play an important role, Keynes queried how, in terms of his 
analysis, he could take into account any possible influence they might have. 
d) Carabelli's (1988: 191) last heading concerns the validity of economic theory. 
According to Tinbergen, although no statistical test could prove a theory to be correct, 
it could prove it to be incorrect. Keynes disagreed with Tinbergen's view that a 
statistical test could prove a theory to be incorrect. His disagreement arises from his 
notion 'that inductive inference was valid on logical rather than empirical grounds' 
and his 'view that theory always came first, before observation'. These two factors 
are in addition to his criticisms of Tinbergen discussed under a) to d) above. Keynes 
summed up his criticism of Tinbergen with the following rhetorical query: 'If the 
method cannot prove or disprove a qualitative theory, and if it cannot give a 
quantitative guide to the future, is it worthwhile? For, assuredly, it is not a very lucid 
way of describing the past' (Keynes, 1973: 308). 
In this section we have distinguished, for purposes of explanation, between Keynes's 
philosophy and methodology. Concerning his philosophy, we saw how Keynes set 
forth his logical (cognitive) conception of probability and induction in distinct 
opposition to the then prevailing frequentist (physical) theory. The interpretation of 
his Treatise has led to a major debate. We concluded earlier that claims that both 
empiricist and rationalist elements are to be found in Keynes's philosophy reflects the 
richness of, rather than any latent inconsistency within, his philosophy. Concerning 
his methodology we have learnt that he was consistently sceptical of quantification 
and formalisation in both mathematics and statistics in economics. He accepted that 
qualitative, non-quantifiable factors play an essential role in economic explanation 
and that a difference exists between the methodology relevant for economics and that 
for the natural sciences. 
2.2.3 Knight 
To get to grips with Knight's views on the methodology of economics is no easy task. 
This is due partly to the fact that, having come to economics from philosophy, his 
philosophical position is unusually well-informed. Accounts of his views by less 
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philosophically sophisticated economists have therefore often led to confused and 
conflicting claims resulting in a fragmented portrait of him as an 'elusive mixture of 
scepticism and mysticism', a rationalist, an extreme a priorist, 'an institutionalist in a 
broad sense' and a maverick vacillating between orthodoxy and institutionalism 
(Gonce, 1972: 548). More recently, various attempts have deliberately aimed to 
counter this fragmented image. 
Gonce seeks to do so by arguing that 'a tripartite system' - consisting of his own 
philosophy and ethics; his methodological principles; and his answers to the 
challenges of behaviourists, institutionalist and positivists - underlies his views. For 
Hammond, Knight's tendency to make claims that contradict each other, eg, that 
economics is a science and that it is not, may be resolved by interpreting him as 
presenting a highly personal and original 'anti-positivism' (1991: 371). He takes 
issue with Hirsch and Hirsch (1980), who interpret Knight as viewing economics as 
differing fundamentally from the natural sciences. He argues that Knight was not so 
much opposed to interpreting economics as a science similar to the natural sciences, 
as he was to the particular conception of science put forward by the positivists. Hands 
(1997: 196) accepts Hammond's view of Knighfs position as anti-positivistic, but 
contends that he is also 'relatively hermeneutic and anti-scientistic about social 
science' (cf Latsis, 1972: 235, n 5). He argues that, for Knight, positivism leads to 
behaviourism where agents are reduced to physical or biological processes rather than 
having the motives and free will of human beings. As such, positivist human science 
is impossible. 
In this section we .seek to highlight various aspects of Knight's methodological 
interventions - those relevant to providing a better understanding of Hutchison 
(1938), the topic of Chapter Three. These aspects will also prove useful in Chapter 
Four when we consider Knight's (1940) famously fiery review of Hutchison (1938). 
As a unifying theme in this account we emphasise the extent to which Knight's 
interest in economics arises out of his ethics (Gonce, 1972). In the field of ethics 
Knight was deeply concerned with the problem of 'social control'. This has been 
described as the problem of 'understanding how by consensus based upon rational 
discussion we can fashion liberal society in which individual freedom is preserved 
and a satisfactory economic performance achieved' (Stigler, 1987: 58). According to 
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Gonce (1972: 550), Knight turns to economics for help in solving the problem of 
social control. But for economics to help, Knight argues we need to be clear about its 
nature and its limitations. He sets out upon such clarification in his Risk, Uncertainty 
and Pro.fit (1921). For Knight, economics is mainly a pure science. The application 
ofthis pure science is limited and fraught with difficulties. 
Economics as a science 
According to Knight (1921), economics is the only social science with pretensions to 
being regarded as an exact science. In so far as it is an exact science (of which the 
exemplar is physics), this exactness comes at the cost of unreality. The method of 
exact science is the method of analysis and abstraction: these two terms are 'virtually 
synonyms' (p 3). This method allows us to generate laws which hold approximately, 
that is, they tell us what tends to hold true in a situation where the (less important) 
variables not taken into account by these laws are entirely absent. Such laws enable 
us to approach 'practical problems intelligently' (p 5). 
Unfortunately economists are divided over 'the mearung and use of theoretical 
methods' (p 5). On the one hand, we find the extreme views of mathematical 
economists and pure theorists who insist on limiting scientific economics to 'a closed 
system of deductions from a very small number of premises assumed as universal 
laws' (p 6). On the other hand, we find those who insist on 'a purely objective, 
descriptive science'. Knight suggests a 'middle way' (p 6). Just as pure theory is 
fundamental to physics, so it is vital to economics. However, it should be viewed as 
no more than a necessary first step of the procedures in economics and its 
'conclusions must be constantly checked with facts by observation and premises 
revised accordingly' (p 7). 'Where the data are too complex to handle in this way 
induction must be applied and empirical laws formulated' (p 6). However, for these 
to be significant, they must 'be shown to follow from the general principles of the 
science ... we see that there is little divergence left between the two methods (p 7). 
Our knowledge of ourselves is based on introspective observation, but is so 
direct that is may be called intuitive. Its extension to our fellow human beings 
is also based upon the interpretation of the communicative signs of speech, 
gesture, facial expression, etc, far more than upon direct observation of behavior 
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. . . Many of the fundamental laws of economics are therefore properly 
'intuitive' to begin with, though of course always subject to correction by 
induction in the ordinary sense of observation and statistical treatment of data (p 
7, n 1). 
Knight immediately qualifies the above stating that it should not be interpreted as 
being concerned with 'philosophical problems'. He is, 'like Mill, an empiricist, 
holding that all general truths or axioms are ultimately inductions from experience' (p 
7, n 1). While 'the scientific method of reasoning from simplified premises' can be 
applied to economics, it has been applied too uncritically: its proponents have failed 
to be clear about the unreal assumptions involved or that their conclusions ·refer only 
to tendencies. The extent to which these assumptions abstract from the complexities 
oflife should 'be made as conspicuous and as familiar as has been done in mechanics' 
(p 9). 
The present essay is an attempt in the direction indicated above. We shall 
endeavor to search out and placard the unrealities of the postulates of theoretical 
economics, not for the purpose of discrediting the doctrine, but with a view to · 
making clear its theoretical limitations (p 11). 
So far we have emphasised the extent to which Knight is concerned with the problem 
of social control. However, economics is to play only a small part in 'this vast social 
undertaking'. 'The social problem is not one of means and end. It is a problem of 
values' (Emmett, 1998). His economics, to an extent, may be viewed as an attempt to 
help with the problem of social control. But, while he looks to economics, he is at 
pains to stress the limitations of the extent to which economics as a science can help. 
Before turning to these limitations (which arise out of problems in applying the 
scientific method to economics), it will prove fruitful to examine in more detail the 
limitations set up by the interaction between ethics and economics since these provide 
- the background against which problems with the scientific method stand out more 
clearly. 
Economics and ethics 
In 'Ethics and the economic interpretation' Knight (1922) proceeds to explain why 
this part is small. It arises from the fact that, although economics and ethics both deal 
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with values, ethics cannot be collapsed into economics. This is b~cause economics 
adopts a scientific approach, while any real ethics must be unscientific (Knight, 1922: 
39). Economics treats human wants, desires or ends as data in an ultimate scientific 
sense, that is, as objective and measurable magnitudes that will remain constant, static 
or will 'stay put'. Such stability is necessary if they are to be regarded as causes of 
behaviour. If they were to chop and change it is unlikely that statements based on 
them would generally remain true after they were made. 
But, by treating wants in this way, there can be no room for a separate ethics. If 
individual wants or desires are to be taken as given data 'in the ultimate sense', then 
there can be no debate as to the merits of these ends on ethical grounds. Any given 
end would be as economically rational to pursue as any other. 'The ideal man would 
be the economic man who knows what he wants and "goes after it" with singleness of 
purpose' (p 38). Instead, in the world in which we live, this kind of selfish behaviour 
is the object of moral condemnation: there is a separate ethics which stands apart from 
this economic interpretation. 
There is a place for ethical theory in the world because economics is wrong to treat 
human wants as ultimate scientific data and their satisfaction as 'the essence and 
criterion of value': the fact is that the 'given conditions' in economics, the causes at 
work, 'are not really given ... wants are not ultimately data' (p 35). Human wants 
are not only not ultimately given, they are also far from stable. They are forever 
growing and changing, always no more than simply means to new wants (p 23). This 
is not to say that wants cannot be regarded as causes of behaviour, only that behaviour 
cannot be understood as attempting to achieve the satisfaction of any given want. 
People do not expect to, and do not try to, satisfy any given desire (such as 
happiness). Rather the situation is one of shifting goal posts. The very process of 
satisfying desires leads to new or re-defined desires or objectives. 
'A science of conduct is, therefore, possible only if its subject-matter is made abstract 
to the point of telling us little or nothing about actual behaviour. Economics deals. 
with the form of conduct rather than with its substance or content' (p 36). For 
example, wealth only serves as a want because it is no more than an abstract term that 
embraces everything which individuals do actually (provisionally) want. To study the 
I 
97 
concrete content of motives we must turn to history which is not a science. 
Ethics has to do with ends. We have seen that the attempt to treat ends as scientific 
data - as economics does - breaks down under examination. These limitations of 
scientific explanation point to the view that any real ethics will be non-scientific (pp 
38-9). 
Economics is closer to ethics than mechanics 
While mechanics is commonly conceived as being concerned with the action of 
forces, the scientist accepts that he is concerned only with the effects of these forces. 
The forces themselves are unknowable metaphysical entities with no real existence. 
They are no more than an aid to our thinking. Just as 'force' in mechanics 'explains' 
the movement of objects, so 'desire' in economics 'explains' the purchasing of goods. 
Yet the notions of force and desire, Knight maintains, are far more than an aids -
they are indispensable to our thinking (Hammond, 1991: 360). Knight ( 1925) outlines 
two sources of information about desires in economics compared to only one source 
of information about forces in mechanics (the observed effects of these forces). In 
economics we are not limited to merely inferring desires from their behavioural 
effects: we can also feel desires within ourselves directly, and in others through 
language and social interaction. The wants which are the concern of the economist 
are quite different from causes of action analogous to those of mechanical forces 
(Knight, 1925: 81-86). 
While science insists upon a sharp distinction between fact and desire, and between 
observation and inference, such distinctions cannot be made. With regard to 
economic demand, science views our knowledge of various desires as an inference 
from some kind of behaviour. Conscious desires are excluded from being scientific 
data. Consciousness is no more than a convenient assumption. But, not only do we 
infer consciousness directly from our own consciousness, 'we cannot perceive the 
objects themselves as real without making this inference to a certain extent, without 
reading our own experience into them' (p 93). Furthermore, economic wants are 
products of a social culture rather than some sort of objectively definabl~ biological 
need. While much conduct is reducible to mechanical laws susceptible to the 
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application of objective technique, the really important part which stems from 
'deliberate creative choice can never be distinguished and measured' (p 98). 
The purposes of men are inherently dynamic and changing; want-satisfying 
activity is not in the main directed toward gratifying existing desires sharply 
defined as data in the conduct problem; it is largely explorative in character ... 
We do things to prove that we can, and to find out whether we like to; the 
problem is largely to understand the problem itself, and . . . understanding it 
largely carries the actual solution with it as a matter of course. As we know 
more, both the self and the world are enlarged, and this growth is life (pp 101-
2). 
The limitations of the scientific method in economics 
Knight ( 1924) describes various limitations of the scientific method in economics. 
Here we highlight five. In terms of Knight's pragmatic conception of science, science 
I 
is an 'instrumental' activity concerned with how to use given means to achieve given 
ends. However, as we have seen in the foregoing sections, instead of being content 
with satisfying given desires life is a constant striving for better values, for knowing 
ourselves. 'This fact sets a first and most sweeping limitation to the conception of 
economics as a science' (Knight, 1924: 105). 
While the immediate purpose of science is to allow us to understand, in our scientific 
age this has been subordinated to a desire for control. As such science becomes no 
more than the technique of prediction, the process whereby we bring about a desired 
result. However, it should be noted that the complicated techniques of science are not 
used in reaching the practical decisions of everyday life. These are made by a process 
that is mostly unconscious. In the field of human behaviour the various prerequisites 
of science - the need for the data to be static and stable, the ability to classify the 
objects of experience into classes of manageable number, and the objective 
measurement of the aata - do not hold good. The nature of the data thus sets a 
I 
second limitation upon the scientific treatment of social and economic problems (pp 
118 and 147). 
Knight takes for granted the fact that, using common-sense methods, we are able to 
predict and control the behaviour of other people. Common sense does this by 
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connecting actions with feeling. However, according to behaviourism we should 
ignore consciousness in our fellow human beings when explaining conduct. This is a 
third limitation of using scientific method in economics: the scientist is restricted to 
inferring behaviour from previous observations. The 'enthusiastic' behaviourist may 
well deny that behaviour is related to consciousness, but in doing so he is turning 
away from science to philosophy. Instead the scientist should be concerned with the 
practical question of whether the notion of consciousness is useful in prediction. 
Knight argues that it is useful in science and inevitable in social science. · 
A fourth limitation of scientific method relates to the fact that, unlike the natural 
sciences, history plays an important part in the social sciences. For instance, the 
reaction of an individual to an object depends not only on the individual and the 
object, but also on the previous history of the individual (pp 122 and 130). Since each 
individual's history is essentially different, this explains why there are such varying 
reactions to given stimuli among human beings. These varying reactions are 
explained by the 'psychological', rather than the behavouristic, method. 
While 'human phenomena are not amenable to treatment in accordance with the strict 
cannons of science' (p 129), nevertheless, scientific study is much more helpful than 
common sense in estimating probabilities so that we may hope for 'laws' of a 
statistical character. But apart from practical difficulties, turning to statistics 
generates a more general problem. 'It is only with reference to individuals in 
distinctly individual relations that differences cancel out or reduce to percentages': the 
same cannot be said for groups where group psychology and not statistics become 
relevant (p 132). This constitutes a fifth limitation of the scientific method in 
economics. 
The extent to which the methods of the natural sciences may predict and control better 
than those of common sense or the intuitive processes of art appears doubtful. 'The 
kind of thing which human nature is is shown by the forms of language used in 
describing it' (p 134). And the form of language used is figurative rather than literal 
which means it cannot be subjected to the technique of analysis, nor to that of natural 
science. 'It seems to us that science is a special technique developed for and 
applicable to the control of physical nature, but that the ideal so constantly preached 
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and reiterated, of carrying its procedure over into the field of the social phenomena 
rests on a serious misapprehension' (p 133). This misapprehension is not only to do 
with the various limitations just reviewed, but has to do with moral questions 
concerning the notion that, while some social control is necessary, it should be 
minimized since the ideal is freedom. 
Knight (1924) concludes that, in spite of all that has been said so far, there is a true, 
exact science of economics with universal laws similar to those of mathematics and 
mechanics. If economics is to develop further, there needs to be an appreciation of 
both its meaning and limitations. Economic laws, eg, the laws of diminishing utility 
and returns, refer not to the content, but to the form, of economic behaviour. They 
can be thought of either as 'intuitively' known or as arising from fundamentally 
'necessary' Kantian facts of observation. 'The great fact that makes economic theory 
so vague and so difficult is the confusion already referred to as the relations between 
cause and effect, or the interpretation of the 'given' conditions' (p 141). In other 
words, this is the distinction between independent and dependent variables. This 
underlies the· distinctions between static and dynamic, between short and long term, 
deductive theory and institutional economics. These are all matters of degree and all 
useful and necessary distinctions. 
Conclusion 
Since Hutchison (1938) draws on the methodological writings of economists as well 
as those of the philosophers of science, some understanding of the methodology of 
economics is necessary in order to evaluate his 1938 essay. In the first of the four 
sections of the chapter, we made use of Hutchison's own distinction between the 
empirically minimalist deductivist approach of Ricardo, Senior and J S Mill and the 
more empirical inductivist approach of Smith, Jevons and Marshall. To counteract 
the effect of approaching the history of economic methodology from Hutchison's 
viewpoint, we took a closer look at the writings of Robbins, JM Keynes and Knight. 
We found a number of economic methodologists, including Blaug (1980), Coase 
(1994), Redman (1997) and Schumpeter (1954) in support of, at least aspects of, 
Hutchison's distinction. Our more detailed investigation of some early twentieth 
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century methodological writings revealed Robbins and Knight as belonging, broadly 
speaking, to the empirically minimalist line, whilst Keynes appeared to straddle both 
approaches. While it is of course possible to interpret particular economists, eg J S 
Mill or Marshall in ways different from Hutchison, the important point is that there is 
substantial evidence for the existence of a long-standing methodenstreit in economic 
methodology between rationalist-leaning and empiricist-leaning economists going 
back well before the famous exchange between Menger and Schmoller. That this 
point is relevant to interpreting Hutchison's methodology is borne out by the fact that 
Hutchison himself has drawn attention to its existence and longevity by referring to 
the famous debate between Ricardo and Malthus as perhaps the first methodenstreit in 
economics (Hutchison, 1998: 45). 
While this methodenstreit may be regarded as a struggle between competing 
empiricist-inductivist and rationalist-deductivist approaches, such a conception is no 
more than a convenient analytical distinction. The fact is that many, if not most, 
leading economists have long recognized the need for elements of both approaches. 
The issue at stake is the relative role for each. The differences between the leading 
thinkers in the field are based on subtle and fine distinctions. For instance, although 
Kaufmann is closely linked to positivist views (Robbins, 1938; Blaug, 1980), as we 
saw earlier in this chapter he clearly maintained non-positivist notions, eg that the 
methods of physics cannot be applied to economics (Kaufmann, 1933 ). While the 
complexities of an actual methodological position such as Kaufmann's goes some 
small way towards explaining how both Hutchison (1938) and Machlup (1978) could 
regard Kaufmann with approval despite their differing approaches, it is even more 
significant to the extent that it can be interpreted as indicating that Machlup (1955) 
grossly exaggerated the differences between his and Hutchison's methodological 
positions. 
In the next chapter we argue that Hutchison's 1938 essay needs to be viewed as 
arising out of this finely-tuned and long-standing methodological debate, and not 
simply as the result of a youthful over-enthusiasm for the leading theory in the 
philosophy of science of his. day (as implied eg by Knight, 1940). In Chapters Four 
and Five we will see that the failure of Knight and Machlup to view Hutchison's 1938 
essay within the context of this methodenstreit is one of the factors that leads to their 
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respective misinterpretations of Hutchison (1938). With some knowledge of the 
history of economic methodology, we are now in a position to appreciate the extent to 
which Hutchison was familiar with, and drew on, the methodological writings of 
economists as opposed to the literature on the philosophy of science. 
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CHAPTER3 
THE NATURE OF HUTCHISON'S INTERVENTION 
Hutchison's (1938) essay has variously been viewed as introducing positivism, ultra-
empiricism, and Popperian falsificationism into economic methodology (Knight, 
1940; Machlup, 1955; Rosenberg, 1976; Blaug, 1980; Caldwell, 1982; Hausman, 
1992). Hausman (1992: 152) contends that 'the first real change in accepted views of 
theory assessment in economics occurred in the 1930s'. The 'revolution in the 
methodological self-conception of the economics profession' that occurred in the 
1930s was spearheaded by the 'positivist challenge' to the prevailing accepted 
'abstract' ·deductive method presented by Hutchison (1938). 1 The question of the 
extent to which Hutchison (1938) set off a methodological revolution in economics is 
a matter of debate. Caldwell (1982: 115) contends that 'the movement towards 
positivism' was not the result of Hutchison's book - it only served to 'confirm 
changes' that were already taking place. By contrast, Hausman points out that Knight 
(1940) was 'right to worry' about its influence on the young since 'even the defenders 
of economics wound up fully accepting Hutchison's central philosophical premises' 
(1992: 155). While this issue is one that deserves further investigation, our concern in 
this chapter is primarily concerned with the extent to which Hutchison's work is 
accurately characterised as a 'positivist challenge' and, more broadly, with clarifying 
the nature of his 1938 contribution. 
In this chapter we will argue that the general consensus that Hutchison introduced 
positivism into economic methodology has obscured the extent to which the views he 
espoused in 193 8 had their origins in his quite separate engagement with the questions 
and issues of economics. In particular, two key aspects of Hutchison's intervention. 
stand out quite independently from logical positivist ideas. The first is his concern 
with the historical and institutional nature of the subject-matter of economics. The· 
1 Hausman (1992: 153, n 3) points out that 'positivist themes' by Kaufmann (1933, 1934, 1936) and 
Fraser (1937) had little influence compared to Hutchison (1938) - the 'positivist challenge that 
caught the attention of the economics profession' (p 153). · 
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emphasis on this dimension is somewhat in the background in 1938. Nevertheless it 
is this, rather than any logical positivist notion, that lies behind his criticism of the 
'traditional procedure of theoretical economists': the 'optimistic' approach 
(Hutchison, 1938: 73-76). Here, he points out, the analysis of equilibrium under 
conditions of perfect competition appears to be unable to advance from a static to a 
dynamic system 'where an analysis of change or causality can be introduced' (p 75)2. 
A second key aspect of Hutchison's intervention is his preference for the inductive-
SM, rather than hypothetico-deductive, method as the scientific procedure appropriate 
to economics. As we learnt in Chapter One (section 1.3.4) both methods existed in 
logical positivism from its earliest formulations in the 1920s. However, over time, the 
so-called logical positivist 'received view' of the formal structure of a theory came 
increasingly to reflect the notion that science develops according to the hypothetico-
deductive method (Suppe, 1977). By contrast, for Hutchison, inductivism is more 
appropriate to economics given its vital historical subject matter. This is why he 
places such importance on the role of induction and inductive generalisation (193 8: 7, 
25, 62, 164, 166). In particular, it should be noted that the 'conceivable falsifiability' 
that distinguishes scientific from non-scientific propositions, for Hutchison, is the 
characteristic of an inductive inference (p 25). 3 
It is against this background that we argue that it is incorrect to view Hutchison's 
(1938) as representing the wholesale introduction of logical positivist ideas to 
economic-methodology. Instead, Hutchison's essay is better understood as part and 
parcel of a long-standing tension in the methodology of economics. Although 
Hutchison regularly refers to this tension in his 1938 essay, he most explicitly 
characterises it in an article fifty years later in which he distinguished on the one hand 
between the empirically minimalist 'ultra-deductivist' approach of Ricardo, J S Mill, 
Senior, Caimes and Robbins, and the inductivist, empirical and historically-minded 
approach of Smith, Jevons, Marshall and JN Keynes, on the other (Hutchison, 1998).4 
But for reasons of modesty, he might well have included his own name after that of 
2 In this chapter all unsupported page references are to Hutchison ( 1938). 
3 By contrast, Popper valued the characteristic of falsifiability for its role in logically avoiding the 
rroblem of trying to inductively verify the truth of a proposition. 
This is to imply that our evaluation will involve mainly a rational reconstruction of Hutchison's 
intervention (Torr, 2001). 
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Keynes. This methodological tension famously erupted in the methodenstreit of the 
1880s between Menger and Schmoller. Hutchison (1953: 66, n 1) points out that the 
historical movement of the 1870s in England was largely home-grown and 'was not 
an importation from Germany'. In the same way we argue that the most important 
arguments of Hutchison's essay are grounded in the (largely British) empirical 
economic methodological tradition rather than imported from Vienna. 
3.1 Chapter I - Introduction 
Hutchison states that he aims in his book to clarify the significance of the 'pure 
theory' of economics (p 1 ). The main problem in this regard is that it is not clear as to 
what are the basic concepts, assumptions and propositions of economics (p 2). This 
problem is fundamental since 'no advance in the elegance and comprehensiveness of 
the theoretical superstructure can make up for the vague and uncritical formulation of 
the basic concepts and postulates' (p ·5). However, all attempts to clarify these 
foundations have resulted in inconclusive methodological and philosophical 
controversies (p 5). Hutchison suggests that, by distinguishing 'scientific' from 
'philosophical' problems, we will be able to resolve the inconclusiveness of the 
discussions and so clarify the foundations of the subject (p 6). 
While one can talk about the advance of science, the same cannot be said of 
philosophy (p 6). The advance of science is due to the fact that scientists accept 
certain intersubjective criteria for testing their propositions (p 7). This is in contrast 
to the fact that in two thousand years philosophers have never come to agreement. 
Thus, while two economists will very likely agree on whether or not the cheque 
system exists in Paraguay, it is very unlikely that two philosophers will reach 
agreement on this same issue (p 8). 
At this stage let us pause to reflect on Hutchison's comments. His central concern is 
with the significance of the pure theory of economics. This topic is remarkably 
similar to Robbins's (1932, 1935) concern with the significance of economic science. 
Briefly, Hutchison's answer to this question is that while pure theory does have 
significance for economic science, it does not have nearly the significance that 
Robbins attributed to it in his famous Essay. There pure theory and economic science 
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are virtually synonymous. Hutchison is concerned to point out that it plays a far less 
important role as compared to that of the 'finished propositions' which Hutchison 
interprets as empirical statements. 5 Indeed, it is these propositions which are of 
central significance in any science. This reflects Hutchison's view of science which is 
clearly influenced by the logical positivism of his day. 
Hutchison now explains his conception of science: 
The scientist proceeds by means of the two inextricably interconnected 
activities of empirical investigation and logical analysis, the one briefly, being 
concerned with the behaviour of facts, and the other with the language in which 
this is to be discussed (p 9). 
His account of the nature of the scientific enterprise bears a striking resemblance to 
the formulation found in the 1929 manifesto of the Vienna Circle (Hahn et al, 1973: 
309): 
We have characterised the scientific world-conception essentially by two 
features. First it is empiricist and positivist ... Second, [it] is marked by the 
application of a certain method, namely logical analysis. · 
Again, when Hutchison goes on to state that it is 'largely the purpose' of his book to 
carry out 'logical analysis' (p 9), he reflects the logical positivist view of philosophy 
as the handmaiden of science, as an activity aimed at clarifying the concepts and 
language of science. 
Out of this view of science Hutchison develops his Principle of Testability which 
states that the 
finished propositions of a science ... must conceivably be capable of empirical 
testing or be reducible to such propositions by logical or mathematical 
deduction. They need not, that is, actually be tested or even be practically 
capable of testing ... But it must be possible to indicate intersubjectively what 
is the case if they are true or false' (pp 9-10). 
5 He defines 'finished propositions' in expounding his Principle of Testability as propositions 
which must be capable of empirical testing and contrast them to logical and mathematical 
propositions (p 9). Together with his dichotomy (p 26) this implies that 'finished propositions' are 
synthetic empirical statements. 
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In a footnote he refers to the above as his Principle of Testability and goes on to say 
that the finished propositions of a science need not be 'empirically testable directly, 
but may be reducible by direct deduction to an empirically testable proposition ·or 
propositions' as for, example, propositions about electrons in physics (p 19, n 6, 
original emphasis). Such tests should not be viewed as finally deciding on the 
absolute truth or falsity of such propositions (p 9). 
Hutchison points out that he is not suggesting that this principle is the best, or indeed 
some kind of ultimate or final, criterion for distinguishing science from non-science 
(p 12). These are general methodological issues which he leaves for others to discuss 
(p 12). Neither does he particularly want to advocate that this principle or criterion 
should be adopted (p 12). Rather, he is simply concerned to show the consequences 
for economics should such a principle be adopted (p 12). Indeed, his essay is mainly 
directed towards those who already accept that it is only by this principle that we have 
both 'a method of reaching agreement and a barrier against the pseudo-scientist' (p 
13) and for excluding expressions of ethical or political passion, poetic emotion or 
metaphysical speculation (p 10). He accepts that his criterion implies that the 
methods of the natural sciences are applicable to the social sciences (p 14). Such a 
naturalistic conception would be rejected in Germany by writers such as Professor 
Sombart (1930). But then he appears to be left with no defence against the rising tide 
of propagandist pseudo-science (p 16). 
Here we may pause to reflect on Hutchison's Principle of Testability. Hutchison is 
quite explicit about the point that the 'finished propositions' need not be capable of 
being tested directly, or practically now or in the future, so long as it is conceivable 
that it can be so tested, it passes muster as a scientific proposition. In qualifying his 
Principle he makes it clear he has in mind propositions in physics about unobservable 
entities such as electrons which cannot be directly verified. Despite these remarks, 
Machlup (1955) was to accuse Hutchison of ultra-empiricism because, according to 
Machlup, he insisted on the direct verification of basic assumptions (see Chapter 
Five). Hutchison's reference to propositions about electrons in physics is evidence 
that he is far from espousing a naive inductivist position. 
The importance of the Principle for Hutchison is that it provides a 'method of 
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reaching agreement' among scientists and as such is the critical factor enabling 
advance in science as compared to the inconclusiveness of philosophic discussion. It 
also provides a 'barrier against the pseudo-scientist', ie a criterion of demarcation 
between science and pseudo-science, 'quackery, prejudice and propaganda', as well 
as a barrier excluding ethical and metaphysical propositions (p 10). On both these 
points, but especially the second, Hutchison is clearly influenced by logical positivist 
thinking. 
Likewise, Hutchison is aware that his Principle of Testability implies that the 
significant distinction is between science and non-science rather than between natural 
and social science. While, as we have seen from Chapter One, the unity of science is 
a major tenet of logical positivism, Hutchison points to the fact that it follows in the 
tradition of English writers such as J S Mill and Jevons who, unlike the German 
writers such as Sombart (1930), do not mention the idea of any fundamental 
difference between the methods of the natural and social sciences (p 14). Contrary to 
the view that emphasises Hutchison's links with the Vienna Circle, here is an instance 
in which, while he could easily have cited Viennese sources, he chose to limit his 
references to those of British empiricists. Besides which, from the way Hutchison 
phrases his remarks on this question, it appears he is more concerned with having 
some defence against the rising tide of 'propagandist Pseudo-science' in Germany 
than in enthusiastically advancing a tenet of logical positivism (p 16). Again, 
Hutchison's point that any tests should not be viewed as finally deciding on the 
absolute truth or falsity of a proposition appears to reflect Popper's fallibilistic 
thinking that knowledge is provisional, rather than logical positivist verificationism. 
In putting forward this Principle and emphasising its crucial importance for any 
scientific investigation, Hutchison broke new ground in economic methodology. His 
proposal contrasted sharply with the then influential Robbins-von Mises a priorist 
methodology which denied that the scientific validity of economic theories could be 
empirically tested. In much the same way as Robbins (1932) provided what has since 
become the standard definition of economics, so Hutchison (1938) provided what has 
since become standard practice for research in economics. As noted by Coats (1983: 
13), Hutchison's placing of testing on the methodological agenda is one of the 
'greatest virtues' of his 1938 book. 
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Hutchison ends the chapter by outlining the scope and programme of his essay. To be 
useful to the scientist, the methodologist must accept the same criteria (of empirical 
testability and logical consistency) as the scientist himself who is working on the 
superstructure. Hutchison explain that sciences start at a common-sense level of . 
tackling problems and ~en build upwards a superstructure of laws and relations and 
downwards their foundations (p 16). In working either on the foundations or on the 
superstructure, there is no role for the methodologist or philosopher separate from that 
of the scientist (p 16). In particular there are no metaphysical assumptions on which a 
science supposedly rests waiting to be discovered by the methodologist or philosopher 
(p 17). This is not to imply that economists should not bother about philosophical 
problems and confine themselves to tackling problems at the common sense surface 
level (p 18). The purpose of science is to overcome the crudities of common sense. 
Furthermore, it is the unsatisfactory state of the foundations of economics that is its 
most serious problem (p 18). 
Hutchison began the chapter with the contention that it was difficult to discern the 
significance of the pure theory of economics because the foundations of the subject 
are not clear. This is due to the inconclusiveness of traditional methodological and 
philosophical discussion. In an effort to advance out of this state of inconclusiveness, 
Hutchison distinguishes between science and philosophy. Science advances because 
it has intersubjective criteria for testing its propositions, ie a method of agreement 
unlike philosophy. Hutchison attempts to formulate a version of this method of 
agreement, his Principle of Testability. The implication is that if economics is a 
science, then its advance depends upon the application of this Principle or some such 
similar version. Employing empirical testability and logical consistency rather than 
·- searching for metaphysical assumptions, the methodologist (in this case Hutchison) 
will be in a position to clarify the foundations of the science of economics and thereby 
discern the significance of the pure theory of economics. 
The respect for science as opposed to philosophy, the view that there are no 
metaphysical assumptions waiting to be discovered in the foundations of the subject, 
and the conception of the project of his book as clarifying these foundations via 
logical analysis are all in line with logical positivist thinking. But, as we shall see as 
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we progress tlrrough Hutchison's essay, his methodology is by no ~eans limited to 
logical positivist thinking. Instead we will show that he draws on a wide range of the 
philosophy of science as well as extensively on the methodology of economics 
literature. Hutchison is concerned with the methodology of economics, not With 
applying a particular philosophy of science to the subject. 
3.2 Chapter II - The propositions of pure theory 
Hutchison begins by distinguishing tlrree kinds of propositions. The first takes the 
form 'if p then q' and holds with the same unconditional necessity and certainty as 
those of pure logic and mathematics. The pure theory of economics is made up of 
propositions of the kind (pp 23-4). Following Schlick (1925: 43; 1974: 45), he points 
out that it is difficult to distinguish them from a second kind of proposition since this 
also takes the form of 'if p then q' and so in ordinary language may be worded in the 
same way. Yet these propositions are completely different: they are inductive 
inferences 'won by experiential observation' (p 37). Unlike propositions of the first 
kind, they do not represent a logically necessary, but rather a conceivably empirically 
falsifiable, relation (p 25). A third kind of proposition, propositions of applied theory, 
may be distinguished. This kind takes a different form, namely, 'since p then q'. 
Here 'p' is asserted to be empirically true. 
Hutchison now proposes 'an exhaustive twofold classification of all propositions 
which have "scientific" sense': 
Either a proposition which has sense is conceivably falsifiable by empirical 
observation or it is not. If it is not thus falsifiable it does not, iftrue,forbid any 
conceivable occurrence, but only a contradiction in terms (p 26, original 
emphasis). 
Propositions which are conceivably falsifiable correspond to the 'finished 
propositions' of science, that is, to the second kind of proposition distinguished above 
(synthetic empirical). Those which are not falsifiable, correspond to the purely . 
logical or mathematical 'accessory propositions', that is, to the first kind of 
proposition distinguished above (analytic a priori). But the price of the 'unconditional 
necessity and certainty' of such propositions is 'complete lack of empirical content' (p 
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27). Hutchison stresses that this classification can only be criticised for being 
inconvenient, not for being empirically false. In other words he is proposing a 
classification, rather than making an empirical proposition about the existence or non-
existence of other conceivable types of propositions (p 27). For example, neo-
Kantians might find it inconvenient since Kantian synthetic a priori propositions 
cannot be easily fitted into it (p 46,·n 7). 
At this stage we pause for comment on Hutchison's 'exhaustive twofold 
classification'. Coats (1983: 7) notes that this 'central distinction' of Hutchison's is 
'basically Kantian', and can be found inter alia in Kaufmann (1936). Yet, the view 
that only these two kinds of statements have scientific sense draws on both logical 
positivism and Popper (1934), and Kantian synthetic a priori statements cannot easily 
be fitted into it (p 46, n 7). Since, in terms of the classification, all propositions which 
have scientific sense are either synthetic empirical and thereby empirically falsifiable 
or else are analytic a priori, Hutchison's twofold classification may be regarded as , 
reflecting, although not explicitly, Popper's criterion of falsifiability for demarcating 
science from non-science. Hutchison's view that all the propositions of the science of 
economics can be classified exclusively into either synthetic empirical or analytic a 
priori statements has met with widespread criticism (Machlup, 1955; Klappholz and 
Agassi, 1959; Rosenberg, 1976; Blaug, 1980; Caldwell, 1982). 
The chapter is entitled 'The propositions of pure theory' and, following from his 
introductory chapter, Hutchison's main concern is to use logical analysis (cf p 27) to 
clarify the significance of these propositions. This he has now succeeded in doing in 
this chapter by classifying them as-analytic a priori propositions. They are analytic a 
priori because their truth is 'independent of all facts', although the fact of their 
applicability depends on their empirical truth (p 24). On this point Hutchison (p 25) 
cites Jevons (1887: 235): 'If a triangle be right-angled the square on the hypotenuse 
will undoubtedly equal the sum of the squares on the other two sides; but I can never 
be sure that a triangle is right-angled'. And, in one of his chapter two introductory 
mottoes, in this connection Hutchison cites Einstein (1921: 3): 'Insofar as the 
propositions of mathematics relate to reality, they are not certain, and insofar as they 
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are certain they do not relate to reality'. 6 In passing we note that these quotations 
from J evons and Einstein constitute evidence for our thesis that Hutchison drew on far 
more than logical positivism in his 1938 contribution to economic methodology. 
In a lengthy footnote explaining his ideas on pure and applied theory, Hutchison 
(1997: 144 ff) maintains that in 1938 he was trying to clarify the term 'theory' which 
was then being qualified by the two adjectives 'pure' and 'applied' by sharpening up, 
or clarifying, this terminology. The problem with these, we may remember, is that 
As I defined 'pure theory', or propositions thereof (1938: 23), they simply 
stated a purely logical (or mathematical) relationship between empirical 
assumptions which were not asserted as true, but which served as purely 
hypothetical postulates, from which empirical but hypothetical conclusions were 
deduced. Thus 'pure theory' was simply concerned with logical or 
mathematical relatiopships and could not be tested empirically; though, of 
course, both the postulates and the conclusions, usually could be so tested 
(unless laid down as definitions, or as somehow given a priori) (ibid). 
He points out that he described pure theory as without empirical content, but not as 
thereby trivial, a criticism he had then described as 'completely fallacious' (p 32).7 
He goes on to compare his concept of 'pure theory' to 't:Jie kind of instrumental 
concept vaguely indicated by all those metaphors about 'theory' as a 'box of tools', or 
as 'an engine for the discovery of concrete truth, rather than a body of concrete truth' 
(Marshall, in Pigou, 1925: 159). 
Unlike pure theory, he defined applied theory as beginning with the assertion of an 
empirical synthetic statement (p 23). It is therefore 'quite inaccurate' of Hausman 
(1992, p 153) to claim that he (Hutchison) had regarded 'theoretical economics' as 
having no empirical content. 'I only regard, and define, "pure" theory as being 
without empirical content; though this, unfortunately, may constitute quite a large part 
of "theory"' (Hutchison, 1997: 145). 
While the main thrust of this second chapter is to do with the significance of the 
propositions of pure theory, (the a priori analytic propositions of his twofold 
6 As translated by Hutchison (2000: 357). 
7 Hutchison (1997: 144) incorrectly gives p 37 as the reference. 
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classification), it is vital, in coming to grips with Hutchison's contribution, to 
understand what he is saying about the other kind of proposition contained in his 
twofold classification of propositions that have 'scientific' sense. While this kind has 
the same 'outward form' (ie in terms of ordinary language) as the propositions of pure 
theory, it is quite different in that it is an inductive, rather than deductive, inference 
(pp 25, 37). It is a 'conceivably falsifiable, even if in fact not falsified inductive 
generalisation' (p 25, original emphasis). We noted that Hutchison referred to Schlick 
(1925: 43; 1974: 45) in distinguishing these propositions from the a priori analytic 
propositions of pure theory. In articulating his Principle of Testability, Hutchison had 
said that the finished propositions of a science must be conceivably testable. It is only 
now, in distinguishing deductive from inductive inferences, that Hutchison uses the 
phrase 'conceivably falsifiable' (pp 25, 26, 27, 62). 
What needs to be brought out is that the importance to Hutchison of propositions 
being 'conceivably falsifiable' is that, despite such propositions having the same 
outward form as those of pure theory, by using this criterion we are now able to 
distinguish them from the propositions of pure theory. For Hutchison, falsifiability is 
a criterion for distinguishing inductive, empirical synthetic propositions from 
deductive, a pnon ones. That is, it enables us to distinguish the 'finished 
propositions' of science from 'the accessory purely logical or mathematical 
propositions used in many sciences' (p 9). And, for Hutchison, these are inductive 
generalisations (p 25). We emphasise this point, for it is central to our the.sis that 
Hutchison follows a more inductivist-SM-leaning approach to science than logical 
positivists in general who leant more towards a hypothetico-deductive approach to 
science. 
We also emphasise this point because it is important in understanding the extent to 
which Hutchison may be regarded as introducing Popper's falsifiability criterion into 
economics (Klappholz and Agassi, 1959: 63; Blaug, 1980: 94; Coats, 1983: 8). 
Hutchison's concern with falsifiability is not put forward, as is Popper's criterion of 
falsifiability, in opposition to the logical positivists' criterion of verifiability. 
According to the logical positivists, as we saw in Chapter One, a proposition has 
meaning only to the extent that it is verifiable. Popper pointed to the problem of 
induction associated with this criterion. Whereas no amount of confirming instances 
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can ever be said to finally verify a general proposition, just one counter instance can 
falsify a general proposition. Popper therefore proposed falsifiability to as a criterion 
to distinguish between science and non-science (rather than the positivists' sense and 
nonsense) as a solution to the problem of induction. 
Far from displaying Popperian concern with the problem of induction, Hutchison 
argues that it is inductive generalisations that are central to science. So, while 
Hutchison introduced Popper's demarcation criterion into economics, this does not 
imply that he thereby introduced Popperian ideas opposed to inductivism. Blaug 
(1980: 94) is therefore misleading when he implies that Hutchison recognised the 
significance of falsifiability as a solution to the problem of induction that dogged the 
logical positivists' verifiability principle of meaning, something that, Blaug says, even 
Ayer (1936) 'completely missed'. 
Hutchison's (1938) chapter two developed out of his earlier 1935 'Tautologies' 
article. In this article he distinguished only two kinds of propositions - those of pure, 
and those of applied, theory. Although in 1935 he referred to 'inductive hypotheses', 
he did not distinguish inductive inferences as a separate kind of proposition 
characterised by the fact that they are conceivably empirically falsifiable. Coats 
(1983: 10) views Hutchison's 1938 development of this earlier classification as a 
'sizeable step forward ... toward Popper's concept of falsification'. From the 
foregoing discussion, it should be evident that this remark needs qualification. For it 
is accurate in so far as Hutchison supported falsifiability as a demarcation criterion 
between 'scientific' sense and 'non-scientific' sense, but not to the extent that it 
implies he supports falsifiability as an alternative to an inductivist-SM methodological 
programme. Rather than any move toward engagement with Popperian ideas, 
Hutchison's step in 1938 is better viewed as consolidating his inductivist views of 
1935. In 1935 he had stated: 'The necessary fundamental assumption of all scientists 
is that there are some regularities about the facts of the world which allow of 
successful inductive hypotheses (Hutchison, 1935: 161). While this inductivist view 
was espoused by Schlick and the early Carnap (see Chapter One: Appendix), it was a 
view which most logical positivists, in line with the later Carnap, abandoned as they 
increasingly adopted the implications of the hypothetico-deductivist method of 
practising science. 
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In expounding his principle of testability, Hutchison did not refer to any philosopher 
or methodologist in particular (p 9). Later, with regard to his twofold distinction (p 
26), when he distinguished deductive from inductive generalisations (p 25) he referred 
to Schlick (1925: 43; 1974: 45). And in explaining that the price of the 'unconditional 
necessity and certainty' of propositions of pure theory was 'complete lack of 
empirical content' (p 27) he referred to Feigl (1929: 11). In both his principle and 
twofold distinction, there is no direct reference to Popper (1934). Nevertheless this is 
not to imply that Hutchison did not introduce Popper's falsifiability criterion into 
economics. That he preferred to distinguish between 'science' and 'non-science' 
rather than between 'sense' and 'nonsense' (p 19, n 8) would seem to indicate 
awareness of Popper's departure from the logical positivist concern with meaning. 
We are simply explaining the way in which Hutchison can be said to have done so. 
This we attempt in the following paragraph. 
The Popperian element in his twofold classification of all propositions is represented 
by his view that if a proposition has sense, and is not conceivably empirically 
falsifiable, then 'it does not forbid any conceivable occurrence, but only a 
contradiction in terms' (p 26). Hutchison goes on to explain that: 'Propositions obtain 
their empirical content simply in so far as, if true, they exclude, restrict, or forbid 
something (e.g. "This table is wooden", if true, forbids or excludes "This table is of 
iron" etc.)' (p 26). Much later, in his chapter four, in explaining how the empirical 
content of the 'fundamental assumption' had grown smaller and smaller over time (p 
115), Hutchison referred to Popper (1934: 13, 43) for the relation between 
falsifiability and empirical content (p 126, n 52): 'Popper brings out very clearly that 
it is the function of a scientific law to "forbid" some conceivable types of occurrence: 
"Not in vain (or not inappropriately) laws of nature are called laws and they say all 
the more, the more they forbid". 8 A circularity or tautology "forbids" nothing. It is 
true whatever occurs, and therefore empirically empty'. With reference to the 
foregoing, Hutchison goes on to state: 
I thought that was clarifying and that is the essential sentence I picked up from 
Popper - there are one or two others. Well I came to like his whole approach -
8 This sentence from Popper (1934) translated from the German by Hutchison, 10th July, 2000. 
116 
his sort of 'rationalism' - and fallibility. Scien~ific knowledge is fallible and 
testable and may be knocked down at any moment. And being against certain 
things - like these people, such as Mises, who claimed absolute certainty for 
their 'laws' (Hutchison, in Hart, 2002). 
So it is clear that, while Hutchison did not directly refer to Popper in formulating his 
Principle of Testability or his twofold classification, the notion that, what 
distinguished scientific statements from others is their characteristic of excluding, 
restricting, or forbidding some (empirically) conceivable type of occurrence, is 
explicitly traceable to Popper (1934) in Hutchison (1938). Therefore Coats (1983: 8) 
is misleading in stating that Hutchison's first published reference to Popper's 
demarcation criterion occurred only in the 1960 edition (p vii) of his 1938 book. 
Moreover, as we have seen, Hutchison first (p 25) referred to Schlick (1925: 43; 1974: 
45) concerning this notion. And he also referred (p 61) to Mach's (1905 [1976: 352)) 
view that 'A law consists always in a limitation of what is possible'. 9 The notion of 
falsifiability, it seems, is not a uniquely Popperian characteristic, but is part and parcel 
of logical positivist thinking. Later Hutchison was to comment: 'I don't know if he 
[Popper] derived anything from Mach - he might deny that' (Hart, 2002). 
In the second section of his chapter two, Hutchison sets about clarifying the source of 
the necessary truth of the 'analytical-tautological propositions of pure theory' (p 30). 
Tautologies have been taken to be synonyms for self-evident propositions. This is 
incorrect. To describe a proposition as self-evident or obvious is a purely 
psychological subjective judgement (p 28). By contrast, analytical tautological 
propositions are to be judged in terms of logic only. They need not be obvious or 
self-evident in order to be tautologies (p 28). Hutchison expands on this point 
showing logically that, by a process of assigning definitions, the proposition 'Under 
perfect competition firms are of optimal size' (which is far from self-evident or 
obvious) is in fact a tautology (pp 28-30). This is in line with Russell's (1927: 171) 
contention that propositions which 'can be proved by logic' are tautologies (p 30). He 
stresses he is emphasising their verbal rather than empirical nature, not in order to 
belittle pure theory (p 33), but because so much needless controversy has arisen in 
9 Cf' A law always consists in a restriction of possibilities, whether as a bar on action, as an 
invariable course of natural events, or as a road sign for our thoughts and ideas that anticipate 
events by running ahead of them in a complementary manner' (Mach, 1976: 352). 
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economics as a result of people using the material, rather than the :formal, mode and 
supposing that certain propositions are empirical when they are only verbal (pp 31-2). 
If discussion was restricted to the formal mode it would be clear at once that certain 
issues involved no more than questions of convenience (p 32). 
Hutchison's next section examines the use and significance of the propositions of pure 
theory. Foliowing a lengthy quotation (pp 33-4) from Schlick (1925: 35; 1974: 37-8), 
he proceeds to distinguish three roles for them. First, they can serve to draw out the 
implications of, and relations between, our definitions thereby providing a precise 
language with which to confront concrete empirical problems (p 34 ). Second, they 
enable us to pass from one empirical proposition to another (p 34). Third, they enable 
'sharp and clear answers to be obtained from empirical investigation' (p 35). 
Hutchison (1935) had already referred to the fact that it was a commonly held view 
that an allegation that a theory was tautological was tantamount to a criticism of it. 
Likewise tautologies were taken to be synonyms for self-evident propositions. Here 
he tries to put the record straight by outlining the then modern view of Russell, 
Wittgenstein and the logical positivists which saw, or defined, analytical a priori 
propositions as logically necessary statements. The source of their necessity is to be 
found in logic. Their falsity involves a logical contradiction. This again emphasises 
that these statements are propositions concerned only with the meaning of words, and 
have nothing to do with facts, of how the world is. This is not to imply that they are 
trivial: they facilitate logical analysis. 
Hutchison now turns his attention to the hypothetical, or 'isolating' method used in 
economics (p 36). This method consists of investigating hypothetical, or simplified, 
problem cases such as perfectly competitive markets, rather than the real world. 
Despite this, it has been claimed (Bohm-Bawerk, 1924: 193; von Wieser, 1929: 19) 
that these 'hypothetical experiments' are 'full substitute[s] for the laboratory 
experiments of the natural scientist' (p 37). Hutchison dismisses this claim as 
'fantastic' and applies his exhaustive twofold classification of scientific propositions · 
to explain 'why the procedure of the so-called "hypothetical experiment" is 
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completely different' (p 38). The main reason is that, since no synthetic empirical 
propositions are introduced in these hypothetical experiments, any results remain 
limited to analytical tautological propositions. To the extent that the propositions of 
'hypothetical analysis' are based on assumptions which 'are not asserted as facts', its 
propositions are propositions of pure theory (p 39). Nevertheless, such propositions 
have all too often been interpreted as if they had some empirical content (p 38), as if 
they were dealing with 'things' and not 'words' (p 40). This misapprehension has 
arisen partly through ignoring (his) distinction between the two kinds of proposition 
that have 'scientific' sense: analytical a priori and synthetic empirical inductive 
propositions (p 38) and partly due to pure theory being discussed in everyday 
language, that is, working in the 'material', rather than the 'formal' mode of 
expression (p 39). 
In the above section, Hutchison uses his twofold classification of all propositions that 
have 'scientific' sense to argue that the propositions involved in the hypothetical 
method are properly interpreted as propositions of pure theory. They are concerned 
with words and not things. The implication is that (the Austrian) economists who 
insist on using such a method are not engaging in (empirical) science. His reference 
to the material and formal modes comes from Carnap (1934: 210, 225; 1935: 46-81). 
Here Hutchison displays his degree of understanding of logical positivism. 
Rosenberg (1976: 153) presents a criticism of, what he takes to be, Hutchison's 
argument that 'microeconomic general statements' are all tautologies. 10 He claims 
that Hutchison ( 193 8: 3 8) argues that the propositions of pure theory are tautological 
because they 'are arrived at by pure deduction' and proceeds to demonstrate the error 
involved: 
Merely because one proposition is deducible from a second, the first is not 
thereby analytic, even if the second is assumed to be true. For a proposition to 
be shown to be analytic in virtue of its deduction from a second, the second 
must be assumed to be not simply true, but analytically true (ibid). 
10 Hutchison (1997: 146), noting that both Rosenberg's (1976) and Hausman 's ( 1992) concerns are 
with microeconomics only, asks whether they believe that their methodologies 'can usefully be 
applied to macro-economics and its problems?' 
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Rosenberg supposes that perhaps Hutchison is assuming the assumptions of 
microeconomics to be analytic. He contends that such an assumption does not 
generally seem to be true (ibid: 154). Rosenberg concludes that this argument refutes 
Hutchison's claim that the propositions of pure theory are all analytic. 
However, Rosenberg attributes an argument to Hutchison that Hutchison did not 
make. Hutchison did not argue that the propositions of pure theory are tautological 
because they 'are arrived at by pure deduction'. Rather he was concerned to argue 
that it is fantastic to suggest that the same results can be achieved from a 'hypothetical 
experiment' as from a laboratory experiment since the former can be no more 'than a 
preliminary thought-clearing exercise' (Hutchison, 1938: 38). Referring to the 
hypothetical experiment Hutchison explains: 'Here certain simplifying. assumptions 
are made, and then what we have called "propositions of pure theory" without any 
empirical content, are arrived at by pure deduction' (p 38, original emphasis). In this 
sentence the phrase 'without any empirical content' merely describes the nature of 
propositions of pure theory. They can only be 'arrived at by pure deduction' because 
the statements in hypothetical experiments are not asserted as empirically true of 'the 
world as it is' (p 36). 11 In such experiments we are rather concerned with Robinson 
Crusoe-type cases which are claimed to 'throw light on the real problems' (p 37). 
Like Rosenberg (1976), Caldwell (1982: 113) also interprets Hutchison as claiming 
that the propositions of pure theory are analytical or tautological because of the 
'deductive form' of the argument through which they are arrived. For the reasons 
pertaining to the criticism of Rosenberg above, this interpretation appears mistaken. 
However, according to Caldwell, Hutchison also argues that 'the terms used in such a 
deductive framework are only logical categories, and thus do not make references to 
real objects' (ibid). This argument does not, says Caldwell, establish 'lack of 
empirical content'. Caldwell explains that this is because the terms of a hypothetico-
deductive theory gain empirical content indirectly when its predictions are tested 
against reality. While Caldwell is quite correct, this is a criticism that is only 
tenuously related to Hutchison's position, given his scepticism regarding the 
11 A hypothetical experiment describing 'some model community representing an extreme case ... 
cannot be anything more than a preliminary thought-clearing exercise' (1938: 38). Although this 
sounds like no more than a thought experiment, Hutchison (1938: 49, n 29) distinguishes a 
hypothetical experiment from a Gedankenexperiment. 
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suitability of hypothetico-deductive method in economics (Hutchison, 1992: 129). 
Hutchison ends the chapter by looking at the drawbacks of qualifying propositions 
with a ceteris paribus clause. Some ceteris paribus propositions are meant to be 
empirical, while others are meant to be analytical (p 40). In the case of those that are 
meant to be empirical, the purpose of applying the ceteris paribus clause is to prevent 
these propositions from being easily falsified. While some lessening of falsifiability 
may· be acceptable, ceteris paribus clauses are usually so vaguely formulated that 
these empirical propositions either become empirically unfalsifiable (p 41 ), or are 
transformed into necessary analytical-tautological, propositions (p 42). Whether such 
propositions are empirical or analytical is revealed only by test cases when scientists 
are forced to choose between accepting or rejecting that a proposition ( eg all gases 
expand on warming) has been empirically falsified. If they refused to accept that the 
proposition could ever conceivably be empirically falsified, then we would know that 
the proposition (all gases expand on warming) 'was not an empirical law at all, but an 
analytical-tautological definition which was always true because it was not allowed to 
be false' (p 43). Lastly, the ceteris paribus assumption has encouraged the fallacy, 
noted by Edgeworth, of 'treating as constant of what is variable'. It has come to be so 
used that it seems to mean only 'in many cases' something or other follows. If the 
something or other fails to follow, it can be maintained that the proposition still holds 
since this was simply one of the cases in which it did not (or ceteris paribus did not 
hold) (p 44). Hutchison analyses an example from Keynes (1936: 185) to show that 
use of the ceteris paribus clause makes it ambiguous as to whether propositions 
qualified by ceteris paribus clauses are empirical, or analytical. Furthermore, it 
imparts 'an air of some kind of precise and widely valid empirical content' to 
otherwise empirically vague or empty propositions. For these reasons, Hutchison 
recommends that it be used less frequently and with greater caution (p 162). 
In their (1959) criticism of Hutchison's twofold classification of all propositions 
which have scientific sense as inadequate, Klappholz and Agassi focused on this 
section of Hutchison's chapter on ceteris paribus clauses. We propose to explain this 
aspect of their criticism in Chapter Six. At this stage we limit ourselves to pointing 
out that Klappholz and Agassi miss Hutchison's central argument. Hutchison is not 
so much concerned with presenting a philosophical argument about the untestability 
121 
of propositions with unspecified ceteris paribus clauses, as with recommending that 
propositions (irrespective of how well specified their ceteris paribus clause is) should 
be used less frequently and with greater caution (1938: 162). By contrast, Hausman 
(1992: 153, n 4) does not miss out on Hutchison's central argument in this section. 
He criticises Hutchison for imposing 'unreasonably stringent justification conditions' 
concerning the circumstances in which it is legitimate to employ ceteris paribus 
clauses. Here Hausman's criticism arises from his adherence to deductivism in 
economics, a position which, he notes, Hutchison 'forthrightly' rejects (1992: 154). 
From this perspective, it would be surprising if he did not find the demands of an 
inductivist empiricist such as Hutchison 'unreasonably stringent'. 
3.3 Chapter III - The application of pure theory 
Hutchison might more aptly have called this chapter 'The misapplication of pure 
theory'. His main concern in the chapter is to emphasise the extent to which 
conceptions of the subject matter, the laws, and the predictions, of economics are 
misconception since they reflect the dominance of the a priori rationalist tradition (pp 
58, 77, n 17, 63) in economics rather than the inductivist empirical tradition 
appropriate to an empirical science. 
Concerning the misconception of the subject matter of economics, Hutchison says that 
this matter is not to be dealt with by concentrating on defining the subject matter of 
economics (p 53). Instead, it is far more preferable to distinguish between scientific 
propositions and the propositions of metaphysics, poetry, politics or ethics which, 
since they are not conceivably falsifiable, are not scientific (p 54). Rather than 
explaining the benefits of distinguishing between science and non-science, Hutchison 
says he wants to point out how 'certain authoritative definitions' have served to limit 
the propositions of economic science to propositions of pure theory. He selects, as 
one of these authoritative definitions, that given by Robbins (1935: 38): 
The subject-matter of Economics is essentially a series of relationships -
relationships between ends conceived as the possible outcomes of conduct, on 
the one hand, and the technical and social environment on the other. Ends as 
such do not form part of this subject-matter. Nor does the technical and social 
environment. 
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Hutchison contends that, if the technical and social environments are ruled out, this 
would seem to exclude the 'entire possible factual material for the social scientist' -
and, in addition, the study of economic conduct, since this too is something that is 
taken as 'given' (p 54). Instead, the economist's task is limited to pure deduction 
from certain fundamental assumptions of pure theory. And he is said to 'venture 
outside his subject' if he concerns himself with facts. This reflects the classical 
tradition 'brilliantly summed up in Ricardo's contrasting of "questions of science" 
with "questions of fact"' (p 55). 12 
With economics defined in this way 'it is hardly surprising that every single central 
proposition and system of economic theory' since the Physiocrats has been criticised 
for assuming what it was meant to prove (pp 55-6). According to Wicksteed (1933: 
569, 790), Ricardo's theory of rent said nothing more than that 'the better article 
commands an advanced price in proportion to its betterness'. Cairnes (1874: 21) 
criticised Jevons's theory of value as saying no more than that 'value was determined 
by the conditions which determine it' (p 56). The quantity theory of money has long 
been recognised as a tautology. These propositions were claimed to be about the 
empirical world, and still today 'circular' propositions of pure theory are claimed to 
have empirical content (p 57). 
Hutchison's preference for distinguishing scientific from non-scientific propositions 
rather than being concerned with defining the subject matter of economics, is clearly 
an application of his Mach, Schlick and Popper-inspired demarcation criterion (pp 9, 
19, n 6, 25, 26). Hutchison does not explain the benefits of distinguishing between 
science and non-science, ~ut instead seeks to show how attempts to define economics 
have been wrong-headed. In particular, Robbins's (1935) definition has limited the 
propositions of economic science to those of pure theory! It does this by excluding 
the factual investigation of the technical and social environment, and even economic 
conduct itself. The thinking behind these definitions reflects the Ricardian tradition 
of reasoning by 'pure deduction' from fundamental assumptions of pure theory. 
Hutchison interprets Ricardo as implying that 
12 Hutchison's (1938: 121, n 6) reference to Ricardo is his letter to Malthus of22"d October, 1811 
cited in Bonar(l887: 17-19). 
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economists are not to concern themselves with what actually happens in the 
economic world, as this is simply a question of fact, and not of science. The 
scientist assumes that people are omniscient as to their interests and are out to 
maximise their money returns, and deduces conclusions dependent on these and 
other such postulates (Hutchison, 1938: 121, n 6). 
For an empiricist such· as Hutchison, this is a fundamental misconception of the 
subject matter of economics: facts are central to any subject claiming to be an 
empirical science. 
Hutchison now turns to examine the nature of the laws of economics. These are 
conceived of in much the same way, as we have seen, the subject matter is viewed. 
According to Schumpeter (1914: 43) and Halevy (1928: 267-70), the economic 
doctrines of the Physiocrats are part of a wider natural law system which had its 
origins in a priori rationalism. In terms of this system, laws are not viewed as 
empirical regularities, but as behavioural rules. The laws of Ricardo and those that 
followed in his tradition (Senior, Menger) 'were essentially of the same type', that is, 
deduced from postulates describing a 'natural' perfectly competitive community. In 
other words, they are, in Hutchison's terminology, 'propositions of pure theory' (p 
58). 
Although the above conception of laws was dominant, it was not the only conception 
held by economists. For instance, both Jevons (1874, vol. ii: 430) and Pareto (1935: 
35) regarded their laws as empirical and comparable to those of the natural sciences 
(pp 60-1 ). But empirical laws were regarded as inferior, criticised for not being 
necessary and even not considered worthy of being called 'laws' (p 60). 
-In response, Hutchison cites Mach's (1905; 1976: 352) conception of a law as 
consisting 'always in a limitation of what is possible' (p 61). Yet, he protests, in 
terms of the dominant conception of laws in economics, such laws set no such 
limitation. 'They exclude or forbid no conceivable type of occurrence' (p 61). 
Hutchison concludes that the orthodoxy of referring to propositions of pure theory as 
'laws' is 'misleading and inappropriate, and appears to be a survival from eighteenth-
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century rationalist philosophy and theology' (p 63). He recomme11;ds that the term 
'law' should be used only to describe empirical generalisations. This implies not 
merely a terminological change, but rather a fundamental change in the aims and 
methods of economics. In this regard he cites Hempel and Oppenheim (1936: 102): 
The formulation of empirical laws is not just a special problem of the exact 
natural sciences but the central problem in the construction of all scientific 
theories, since empirical laws are the foundation for all scientific explanation. 
As with regard to the subject matter, so with regard to the laws of economics, 
Hutchison is at pains to show the extent to which these are conceived of in the a priori 
rationalist tradition. As we have seen in Chapter One,. there are two main 
charapteristics of empiricism. First, knowledge is based on empirical fact. Second, 
there are no essential relations between matters of fact. Hume had said there were no 
laws, but only tendencies. Here Hutchison shows how he follows in this tradition by 
arguing that the term 'law' should be reserved only for empirical generalisations, ie 
for general trends, rather than any necessary relations (cf Hutchison, 1977: 19-21 ). 
Hutchison's arguments and comments reflect the influence of a general empiricism, 
rather than any specifically logical positivist influence. For example, his conception 
of laws as empirical and comparable to those of the natural sciences need not 
necessarily reflect logical positivist influence. As, Hutchison himself notes, both 
Jevons and Pareto regarded laws in this manner. Yet neither were logical positivists. 
And when he seeks to illustrate the influence of rationalist philosophy as reflected in 
the prevailing tendency to call propositions of pure theory 'laws', he refers, in a 
lengthy quotation, not to a logical positivist, but to Campbell (1921: 4 7) .. As we 
explained in the Introduction, Campbell is a realist philosopher ranged against the 
anti-realism that typified much of logical positivism (Harre, 1967). 
Before, we turn to the next chapter topic, it should be pointed out that Hutchison is 
concerned not just with arguing that economic laws are more appropriately conceived 
as empirical generalisations, but also with refuting the claim that propositions of pure · 
theory are about empirical matters concerning the world 'as it is', that they have 
empirical relevance. 'Still today the discovery of what "determines" the level of 
employment ... is claimed in "circular" propositions of pure theory' (p 57). Indeed, 
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it is the practical, possibly disastrous consequences of such a misconception of what 
are really propositions of pure theory, that are a central concern of Hutchison's 
(1938). This was aggravated by the view that such propositions were necessary and 
certain. Referring to his 193 8 essay, Hutchison (1997: 146) has stated: 'What I 
attacked were dangerously misconceived misinterpretations of propositions of pure 
theory as proclaiming economic "laws" possessing certainty'. 
As with the subject matter and the laws of economics, so with economic predictions 
Hutchison seeks to show up and combat the influence of the a priori rationalist 
tradition. He begins his section on 'prognosis and causality' by pointing out that 
another way of saying that the central concern of science is to formulate empirical 
laws is to say that the aim of science is to formulate predictions. As Knight ( 1921: 
14) has well said 'The aim of science is to predict the future for the purpose of 
making our conduct intelligent'. 
As with economic laws, so with economic predictions, purely due to the necessity of 
the propositions of pure theory, we find them being interpreted as having empirical 
content (Robbins, 1932: 111). Hutchison points out that the inevitability of the 
multiplication table also gives it predictive value, but this is not a prediction which 
has any empirical relevance (p 65). Nevertheless, it is insisted that predictions based 
on propositions of pure theory are not only empirically significant, but are also the 
only possible kind of prediction. 
The explanation of phenomena thus detected (by statistics) if it is to serve as a 
basis for forecasts of the future must in every case utilise other methods than 
statistically observed regularities; and the observed phenomena will have to be 
· deduced from the theoretical system independently of empirical detection 
(Hayek, 1933: 37). 
Such a view would seem to imply that prediction is based on deduction and occurs 
independently of empirical investigation (p 66). But, Hutchison points out, 
predictions in other social sciences, and in the natural sciences, are not given in the 
form of propositions of pure theory. Instead they· are presented as conceivably 
falsifiable empirical generalisations, and, where the ceteris paribus assumption is 
made, it does not render the proposition unfalsifiable (p 67). 
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Hutchison proceeds to clear up two further misconceptions about the nature of 
predictions in economics. First, there is the misleading distinction between 
qualitative and quantitative prediction. The impression seems to be that while 
predictions can be reached via the 'qualitative' analysis of pure theory, little can be 
achieved by way of quantitative prediction. Although we can predict that, in a certain 
situation, price will rise, we cannot predict by how much it will rise. Hutchison 
contends that such qualitative predictions are no more than propositions of pure 
theory (p 68). He accepts that quantitative prediction is limited, but this point should 
not be made by using a false distinction (p 68). Secondly, there is the view that 
prediction in economics is impossible (Morgenstern, 1928,passim). The idea that we 
can predict reflects, to use Pearson's phrase, no more than 'the all too human love of 
certainty'. Such a view is fundamentally misconceived since all life, including 
economic life depends on at least some degree of predictability (p 69). 
The impossibility of prediction in economics is closely related to the question of 
causality in economics. As with laws and predictions, so too in the area of causality 
the propositions of pure theory have been interpreted as if they had empirical content, 
that is, as if they stated causal relations (p 70). Hutchison explains that he is here 
using the word 'cause' in its everyday sense. However, a more precise concept is 
needed in science (p 71). While the concept may be useful in the early stages of a 
scientific explanation, its vagueness is liable to lead to controversies as to whether 
events are 'symptoms' or 'causes' and whether they are 'superficial' or 'real' causes 
(p 72). 
The main point that Hutchison criticises in this section is the view that prediction in 
economics 'depends on deduction and must be independent of "empirical detection"' 
(p 66). In combating this view, we want to emphasise, Hutchison does not appeal to 
logical positivism. Instead he turns for support to one of the members of $e English 
historical school, Cliffe Leslie. _Leslie criticised (Robert Lowe's) view that while 
prediction was impossible in love, war, politics, religion or morals, it was possible in 
economics because here one could reason deductively from 'the two ruling passions 
of mankind - wealth and ease' (1879: 211). Leslie points out that it is precisely 
because these factors - love, war; politics, religion and morals - do powerfully 
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influence the behaviour of people with regard to wealth that the scope for prediction, 
based on reasoning deductively solely from 'mercantile motives', is severely limited 
in economics. 'What would be the worth of a treatise deducing the economy of 
Germany from the assumption that every man is occupied solely in the acquisition of 
wealth ... ?' Leslie asks rhetorically (ibid: 210). Nevertheless, despite the influences 
of all these various factors, there are 'regular sequences' discoverable in society and 
hence limited prediction is possible (ibid: 211). Thus Morgenstem's (1928) view that 
prediction is impossible is mistaken. 
Likewise, while Hutchison's comments on causality reflect the influence of logical 
positivism, they do not represent any strict adherence to it. Instead, he is quite willing 
to make use of the everyday sense of cause in the 'early' stages of a scientific 
explanation. And, as we will see in the next paragraph but one, Hutchison criticises 
closed deductive a priori tautologous systems for not being able to incorporate 'an 
analysis of change or causality' and so not being able to change from analysis of a 
static to that of a dynamic economic system (pp 75-6). 
In the last section of his chapter Hutchison turns to consider the traditional method 
used in constructing equilibrium systems in economics. This has been variously 
termed that of 'decreasing abstraction', 'successive approximations', the 'isolating' 
one-at-a-time, or more recently, the 'optimistic', approach (Robinson, 1932: 6). 
According to this procedure, we start with deductions from 'simple' assumptions 
(perfect competition; 'neutral' money) and then gradually make the assumptions more 
nearly descriptive of present economic conditions (imperfect competition; 'non-
neutral' money) (p 73). Such attempts to find more realistic assumptions would seem 
to require empirical investigation. However, since this procedure is primarily aimed 
at yielding 'significant chain(s) of deductive conclusions' from assumptions, the 
assumptions used must continue to be chosen for 'the possibility of deducing chains 
of conclusions from them - rather than for their correspondence with the facts' (p 74) 
- and so kept 'simple' rather than made more realistic. The 'optimistic' approach 
thus precludes any serious empirical investigation being designed to facilitate 
deductive a priori tautologous analysis. 
Hutchison points out that for decades attempts to replace the traditional static 
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equilibrium system used in economic analysis by a dynamic system have failed 
because so far they have consisted of closed, deductive, and a priori tautologous 
systems where change or causality cannot be introduced (p 75). The question of why 
the attempt to change from a static to a dynamic analysis presents 'almost 
insuperable' difficulties for the traditional 'optimistic' procedure will have to left until 
after the following chapter, when the postulates of economic theory will be examined 
(p 76). 
Two of Hutchison's chapter mottoes may serve as a conclusion to his chapter. The 
first, by Sidgwick (Marshall's predecessor), presents the view that in the social 
sciences, 'even powerful intellects' are liable to lapse into tautologous and circular 
reasoning (p 51 ). The second, by Myrdal, criticises the scientific tradition which 
regards abstract theory as having a more important role than simply clarifying 
empirical issues (p 52). While this tradition may appear 'realistic' by accepting that 
both the 'legs' of deduction and induction are as needed in science as in walking, in 
practice, it confines us to a state of theoretical absolutism stating general laws in a 
deductive way with induction used later only to provide practical examples. 13 Here 
Myrdal appears to have in mind, not a priori rationalism, but the hypothetico-
deductive method of practising science. In terms of this procedure, general laws are 
stated 'in a deductive way' and both deduction and induction are used. This motto is 
evidence for our theme of demonstrating Hutchison's scepticism regarding the 
suitability of the hypothetico-deductive method in economics, and for his support for 
the inductivist-SM method. 
3.4 Chapter IV - The basic postulates of pure theory 
In this chapter Hutchison argues that the deductive method of deriving the 
propositions of economic theory from a few basic assumptions, or postulates, is 'more 
of less useless, because no relevant 'Fundamental Assumption' can, on our present 
knowledge, be made' (p 118). Using this method, whatever assumptions are made 
about the economic behaviour of individuals, or the condition of the economic 
system, unless they are empirically true, simply beg the issues involved, that is, they 
13 Here we have drawn on Hutchison's p 52 quotation from Myrdal as translated by Dr Sabine 
Marschall. 
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'assume what one wants to find out' which is what actually is the behaviour of 
individuals and condition of the system (p 113). In order to find this out, the 
appropriate method is instead extensive empirical investigation of these questions (p 
114). Hutchison seeks to demonstrate the inadequacy of the deductive method by 
explaining the problems that arise in trying to deduce the propositions of economic 
theory from three main postulates: those concerning expectations, rational conduct 
and equilibrium. 
Hutchison begins by arguing that, deeply embedded in the procedure of economics, is 
the notion that most of it can be deduced from some 'Fundamental Assumption' about 
4uman behaviour (p 83). In one of the introductory mottoes to his chapter, he quotes 
Morgenstem's (1935 [1976: 169]) remark that, although the theory of general 
economic equilibrium is the pride of theoretical economics, 'there can be found 
systematically compiled neither exact nor complete statements about the assumptions 
underlying the theory of general equilibrium' (p 81 ). Despite this vagueness, the 
'maximum principle' (Pigou, 1935: 4), that is, the assumption that individuals aim to 
maximise their returns, formulated in various ways in the history of the subject 'from 
the profit-seeking Ricardian business man down to the "rational" consumer balancing 
marginal utilities', appears to be the leading candidate for being this 'Fundamental 
Assumption' (cf Robinson, 1933: 241-2). But, in line with Morgenstem's 
observation, there is little agreement about its precise formulation, whether it is 
analytical, synthetic, fundamental, 'or in fact used at all' (p 84). 
Despite these disagreements, Hutchison draws attention to 'one remarkable 
characteristic' of the various formulations of the Fundamental Assumption: they 
require the further assumption that the expectations of individuals are perfectly 
correct (p 85). The assumption that it is 'rational', 'sensible', or 'natural' to maximise 
returns implies that there is no problem of how one is to maximise returns. This is 
only the case if individuals have perfect foresight, and therefore know for certain how 
to maximise these returns (p 85). However, we know that, in principle, uncertainty is 
everywhere present in our world. In this case one cannot simply 'act so as to 
maximise one's returns' (p 86). Rather one can only act according to one's 
expectations of what conduct would result in the maximisation of returns. 
Furthermore, it is only under these conditions that conduct can properly be described 
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as 'sensible' or 'rational'. Hutchison cites Knight (1921: 268) to the effect that 
without uncertainty individuals would not have to deliberate over various possible 
ways of adjusting to changes: instead all adjustments would be automatic and 
mechanical. In these circumstances one can no more describe their conduct as 
'rational' or 'sensible' than one could describe the parts of a mechanical model as 
behaving rationally or s~nsibly (p 88). 
Hutchison explains that this is why 'the usual Theory of Value' (as formulated for 
example by Robinson, 1933: 15) analyses conditions of such a 'problemless 
mechanical nature', that is, why it is 'confined to economic tendencies where there is 
one definite, unambiguous, and correct answer to the question "How am I to 
maximise my returns?"' 'It is inapplicable where there is any uncertainty about the 
· answer to this question - which is, in principle, always the case in the world as it is' 
. (pp 88-9). In a footnote at this point Hutchison contends that Leslie (1879a: 229) and 
later institutionalists (Veblen, 1919: 227) came close to highlighting this weakness of 
the 'orthodox' Theory of Value. He cites Dickinson (1922: 240-46): 
When we come to the market-place we find dealers absorbed in calculations 
which are reasoning, discovery, invention, rather than choosing among utilities. 
Their desire to make the largest profit possible, within the rules of the game, is 
fairly constant; the problem is how to make it. 
Leslie (1879a) criticises both the economist Nassau Senior and the politician Robert 
Lowe for over exaggerating the extent to which laws may be deduced from the single 
assumption of monetary gain - laws which will allow them to predict human 
conduct. 
You may know that everybody you meet between Belgrave-square and the Bank 
loves wealth of some sort, and money as the means of purchasing all sorts; but 
what can you infer from that with respect to anyone's part or conduct in either 
production or distribution? Can you infer that the Duke of Westminster will, or 
that he will not, sweep a crossing for sixpence? ... [Likewise] you can no more 
predict from their love of money what prices and profits (the) young men will 
get in their business than from their love of fair women what fortune they will 
get with their wives. . . . The orthodox, a priori, or deductive system thus 
postulates much more than a general desire for wealth. It postulates, also, 
(such) full knowledge ... (Leslie, 1879a: 227-9). 
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Talcing up Leslie's arguments, Hutchison emphasises that the wo_rking out of the 
maximum principle in these circumstances needs to be fundamentally distinguished 
from the way it works itself out in a world of uncertainty in which money is present, a 
world 'where people cannot conceivably know or calculate but can only more or less 
vaguely guess, which out of many possible lines of conduct will lead to the fulfilment 
of the principle' (p 87). 
It may perhaps be a broadly true generalisation 'that everyone desires to obtain 
additional wealth with as little sacrifice as possible' [Senior, 1836: 26-8]. ... 
But this tells one nothing as to how, in fact, they set about fulfilling their 
desires, or, dropping the assumption of perfect expectation, how even it is 
sensible or rational for them to do so (pp 89-90). 
Hutchison goes on to point out that it has been argued that the demand for capital 
goods depends on (uncertain) expectations of the future yield of capital (Keynes, 
1936: 141). If we accept that consumption goods talce time to consume, it can 
likewise be argued that the demand for consumption goods depends on (uncertain) 
expectations of the future utility of the consumption good. Such considerations malce 
analysis based on the fundamental assumption 'only very roughly applicable' to the 
demand for capital or consumption goods (p 92). 
At this point, it is convenient to pause and reflect on Hutchison's argument. He is 
concerned with highlighting the limitations of using a deductive procedure (arguing 
from a few basic assumptions) in economics. The major limitation he points out is 
that the fundamental assumption of rational conduct, or maxiip.ising behaviour, is 
sensible only if expectations are assumed to be perfectly correct. In this case analysis 
based on maximising behaviour (such as the orthodox theory of value) is inapplicable 
to the real world of uncertainty. Here, it should be apparent that Hutchison is 
opposing an inductivist empirical approach to the fairly dominant deductivist a priori 
tradition in economics. This inductivist empirical approach has little to do with the 
logical positivist philosophy of science and instead much to do with historical and 
institutional economics. The thrust of the main argument is that many factors (war, 
love, religion, politics) besides pecuniary gain influence economic conduct, and that,· 
while this one factor does enable some prediction of human conduct, to 'isolate a 
single force, even a real force and not a mere abstraction, and to call deductions from 
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it alone the laws of wealth, can lead only to error, and is radically unscientific' 
(Leslie, 1879: 212). 
After concentrating so far in this chapter on the fundamental assumption of 
maximising behaviour and the necessity for it to be combined with the assumption of 
perfect expectations, Hutchison now turns his attention to the third basic postulate of 
pure theory: that of equilibrium. As with the fundamental assumption, Hutchison 
focuses on the extent to which the assumption of equilibrium is bound up together 
with the assumption of (perfect) expectation. He points out that th~re are 'various 
possible conditions' in which an individual or community might be in a position of 
rest, or equilibrium (p 100). While he does not explicitly distinguish between 
Ricardo's notion of equilibrium as defined by a long run uniform rate of profit and the 
equilibrium of supply and demand, his argument about the extent to which perfect 
expectation is bound up with either appears to apply to both conceptions. 14 He 
disagrees, however, with Hayek's (1937: 41) view that perfect expectation is a 
defining characteristic of equilibrium and feels that the term is 'best reserved for the 
optimum maximum condition whether or not the individual or community has been 
led to it by perfect expectation' (p 104). He notes that individuals whose expectations 
are perfectly correct must be in this equilibrium position (p 103). 
Hutchison begins his section on expectations and equilibrium by noting that 
expectations have been completely omitted in most accounts of the theory of value. 
Yet, those-who mention it are divided about its importance for equilibrium. Several 
writers (Knight, 1921: 197; Hicks, 1933: 445; Pigou, 1935: 76) regard the assumption 
of perfect expectation as necessary for equilibrium theory. On the other hand, for 
Morgenstern (1935) it leads to a nonsensical result, 'the very reverse of equilibrium' 
(p 94). Hutchison attempts to clarify this situation. The perfect expectation 
assumption is not meant to describe the actual behaviour of individuals under 
conditions of equilibrium. Instead it is meant only to explain whatever behaviour 
might be since we are dealing here not with human beings, but with 'conceptual 
automata' whose 'behaviour' has been chosen by us when we defined the equilibrium 
14 Leslie (I 879a: 231) notes that the main postulates of the Ricardian theory are that 'the 
advantages and disadvantages of all the different occupations are known, that competition equalizes 
the rewards of both labour and abstinence, and that the prices of commodities therefore are 
determined by the respective cost of production. 
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situation (pp 95-6). 
It is as though one was to sketch out the plans for, or actually construct (as one 
could actually construct a mechanical model of a community in static 
equilibrium) some piece of mechanism, say a cuckoo clock, and then ask the 
cuckoo whether it was because it had perfect expectation of the time that it 
appeared exactly at each hour (p 96). 
Hutchison now proceeds to argue that the assumption of perfect expectation is 
compatible only with equilibrium arising from conduct in perfectly competitive 
conditions, that is, conditions where individuals act independently, taking no account 
of the behaviour of others. In particular, it is logically incompatible with conduct in 
monopolistically competitive conditions, that is, conditions where individuals do take 
account of each other's behaviour (pp 98-9). In these circumstances, endowing more 
than one person with perfect expectation will lead to an indeterminate, nonsensical 
result as, for example, in a game of chess where both players know the future moves 
of their opponent (p 97). Likewise, in the game of Old Maid - which according to 
Keynes (1936: 156) describes the business of speculation - profit-maximising 
individuals able to adjust their own behaviour and armed with perfect expectation 
would simply not play when they knew it was their tum to have the Old Maid (p 98). 
Hutchison points out that equilibrium has always been the core concept of economic 
analysis. It is contrasted with disequilibrium, a purely temporary departure from 
normal conditions. Since, in principle, countless other conditions are possible, the 
justification for the equilibrium concept being centre stage must be that actual 
economic conditions 'tend' towards it (p 105). Indeed, Hayek (1937: 44) contends 
that it is only with this assertion that economics ceases to be an exercise in pure logic 
and becomes an empirical science'. However, for Hutchison, neither Hayek's 
assumption of a tendency towards equilibrium, nor J B Clark's (1931: 279, 408-9) 
question-begging analogy of water in a tank finding its own level after being 
disturbed, are satisfactory justifications for equilibrium to be the central concept of 
economics. Instead, justification requires the notion of a tendency towards 
equilibrium to be asserted as an empirically testable proposition, and that 'equilibrium 
is, in practice, regu1arly attained' (pp 105-7). 
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In his next section, Hutchison explains that the principle of subjective rationality is 
the principle that individuals behave in the manner they expect will maximise their 
returns, that is, utility or profits (pp I 09, 111 ). This principle, or Law of Motivation 
(Schlick, 1939: 31-55), however, cannot tell us what we want to know, namely, how 
individuals actually form their expectations and so just how they will behave (pp 111-
2). In other words, it tells us nothing about the actual behaviour of consumers and 
entrepreneurs. It only explains how individuals will respond when questioned about 
their behaviour (p 114). Just as no generalisation is possible about how, in terms of 
'subjective' rationality, individuals actually form their expectations, so no 
generalisation is possible about how, in terms of 'objective' rationality, individuals 
actually form their expectations (p 113). Behaviour could only be objectively rational 
if we had an economic science which could predict with certainty the results of our 
various choices. Nor can probability theory help make our decisions more objectively 
rational for, as Keynes (1936: 162-4) pointed out, there are simply no grounds for any 
sort of calculation (p 110). Hutchison concludes: 
[W]hether and to what extent people's decisions are dominated by present 
prices as against the whole expected future course of prices; to what extent 
people's economic actions are taken on the spur of the moment, or according to 
a detailed plan; how far people come to any particular expectation at all or act 
unreflectingly according to habit; to what extent people learn from past 
economic mistakes and disappointments . . . are questions which cannot be 
answered by any general 'Fundamental Assumption' or 'Principle' ... 
ultimately all such questions can only be decided by extensive empirical 
investigation of each question individually (p 114). · 
Since the marginal revolution of 1871, attempts have been made to formulate a 
'maximum principle' to apply to consumers' behaviour as business behaviour is said 
to be guided by Ricardo's principle that businessmen's sole concern is to maximise 
money profits. Attempts over the years to broaden this maximum principle to include 
more, and exclude fewer, types of behaviour so as to make it less obviously false, 
have steadily reduced its empirical content until today it is regarded as no more than a 
definition (pp 115-6). Individuals are simply assumed to behave 'rationally' and 
'rationally' is defined as how individuals actually behave (p 116). To define 
economic conduct as 'rational' appears superfluous, inappropriate and misleading. It 
is superfluous because, if our task is to examine economic behaviour, then simply 
defining this behaviour as rational does not help the examination in any way. It is 
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inappropriate because, in the everyday sense, much behaviour is irrational, that is, it is 
based on incorrect and stupid expectations. Finally, it is misleading because it may 
seem as if we have an empirical generalisation about economic behaviour instead of 
simply a definition (p 117). 
Hutchison concludes that, to the extent that one views as unsatisfactory the omission 
of uncertainty since it is this factor that calls for economic as opposed to mechanical, 
technical behaviour, 'the method of deduction from some "Fundamental Assumption" 
or "principle" of economic conduct is more or less useless, because no relevant 
"Fundamental Assumption" can, on our present knowledge, be made' (p 118). The 
view of economics as a science based on a few fundamental propositions is shown to 
be 'entirely inadequate'. That the deductive method seemed applicable is only due to 
assumptions about expectations being tacitly made. Once these are made explicit, 
'there come, quite rightly, accusations of "circularity", "begging the question", and 
"assuming what one requires to prove"' (p 118). For a more 'realistic' analysis we 
need an idea of 'the more realistic assumptions on which it is to be based' (p 119). 
While various objections have been made to employing empirical and statistical 
investigations in economics, these represent 'the only possible scientific method open 
to one' (p 120). 
Hutchison's central concern in this chapter is to show that it is necessary to assume 
that individuals have expectations which are perfectly correct in order for them to be 
able to engage in the behaviour that will, in fact, maximise their returns (the 
fundamental assumption of orthodox theory) and so attain the optimum maximum 
condition, or equilibrium. He repeats, on several occasions, that this (drastic) 
assumption means that analysis based on it cannot be applied to the everyday world of 
which uncertainty is part and parcel: it effectively 'assumes most or all economic 
problems out of existence' (p 162). 
According to Keynes, if orthodox economics is at fault, the problem has to do with its 
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assumptions (p 81). 15 By highlighting the crucial dependence of orthodox theory (ie 
theory based on the 'fundamental assumption') on the assumption of perfect 
expectations, Hutchison hopes to have exposed the extent to which it deals with a 
fictional (a world of 'pure theory'), rather than the everyday world in which 
uncertainty is present. It is the 'uncertainty factor' that makes money appear 'which 
can be construed as a sign that uncertainty is present, or even as a measure of its 
amount' (p 88) - just as the assumption of perfect expectation makes it disappear (p 
105). The similarity between Hutchison and Keynes on this point is striking: the 
uncertainty factor was one of Keynes's (1937) two major disagreements with 
orthodox analysis. More broadly this chapter fits in with a central theme of 
Hutchison's essay, which is that the a priori deductive method based on a few 
fundamental assumptions is inherently defective. 
3.5 Chapter V - Introspection and utility 
Hutchison now examines a doctrine, called by Wieser (1929: 17) the 'psychological 
method', which is claimed to give economics an advantage over the other sciences. It 
can be traced back to Senior and Cairnes. According to Senior, the premises from 
which economic propositions are deduced consist of 
a very ·few general propositions, the results of observation, or consciousness, 
and scarcely requiring proof, or even formal statement, which almost every 
man, as soon as he hears them, admits, as familiar to his thoughts, or at least 
included in his previous knowledge (1836: 5). 
Caimes goes further: 
The economist starts with a knowledge of ultimate causes. He is already, at the 
outset of his enterprise, in the position which the physicist only attains after 
ages of laborious research. . . . [He is] already in possession of those ultimate 
principles governing the phenomena which form the object of his study ... 
since we possess direct knowledge . . . of causes in our consciousness of what 
passes in our minds (1875: 83-90). 
15 
'To get back to Keynes. He did raise the knowledge question. He denounced the fundamental 
assumption, you see. That never got to be a part ofKeynesianism which had much effect. Shackle 
made this point about ignorance, but he didn't push what the methodological consequences of that 
are, that is, that there isn't this one postulate here from which you can deduce so much' (Hutchison, 
in Hart, 2002). 
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According to Wieser: 
We can observe natural phenomena only from outside, but ourselves from 
within. [The employment of this inner observation is the psychological method] 
which finds for us in common economic experience all the most important facts 
of economy. . . . It finds that certain acts take place in our consciousness with a 
feeling of necessity. . . . What a huge advantage for the natural scientist if the 
organic and inorganic world clearly informed him of its laws, and why should 
we neglect such assistance? (1929: 17). 
This doctrine has been giveri 'an important anti-empirical turn' by von Mises (1933) 
who argues that these general propositions 'logically precede all experience and are a 
condition and assumption of all experience', and by von Hayek (1937: 36) who refers 
to them as 'a priori facts'. Of these 'ultimate principles' from which it is claimed so 
·much can be deduced, three appear to be among the most important: the 'fundamental 
assumption' or maximum principle; Gossen's Law or the law of diminishing marginal 
utility; and the principle of scarcity. Yet none of these, Hutchison contends, yields 
much of significance about human behaviour pp. 133-6). Furthermore, there is no 
indication of how they can be empirically tested. 
While, for Wieser it is the employment of inner observation, or introspection, which is 
the source of the advantage of the psychological method, for Hayek it appears to be 
the existence of 'a priori facts'. This points to a confusion between the concepts of 
the a priori and introspection that occurs in discussions of this method, as well as to a 
lack of clarity concerning the empirical content of the Fundamental Assumption. 
Since this confusion, as well as the notion of a fundamental difference between the 
methods of the natural and social sciences, appears to hinge around Wieser' s 
distinction between inner and outer observation, an examination of this distinction is 
called for. 
The 'psychological method' appears to be a variation of the Ricardo-Senior-Mill 
empirically minimalist 'ultra-deductivist' approach. The variation involves the 
addition of, or emphasis on, the process of introspection. By referring to the 'anti-
empirical tum' given to it by Mises and Hayek, Hutchison makes clear his opposition 
to a priori facts and the Kantian notion of synthetic a priori knowledge. Yet, while 
critical of such a priorism, Hutchison demonstrates the balanced and mature nature of 
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his empiricism (and his divergence from at least some versions of l<?gical positivism) 
by accepting that although introspection does not involve externally observed and 
measurable empirical facts, it is nevertheless an invaluable aspect of scientific 
method. 
Hutchison chooses the example of the law of diminishing marginal utility to illustrate 
the use of introspection in the empirical procedure of discovering empirical 
generalisations. At the same time he illustrates how the concept of introspection 
differs from the a priori. Using the method of introspection, the economist notices 
that the marginal utility of various amounts of money declines the larger total money 
income. He then notices that the results of this introspective exercise are correlated 
with his own external behaviour. It is by external observation that he concludes that 
his external behaviour concerning money is generally similar to everyone else's. He 
assumes, or concludes from this that everyone else has the same internal experience as 
himself. Hutchison leaves aside how this internal assumption may conceivably tested 
in order to emphasise the point that, while introspection is 'invaluable and practically 
indispensable' in deriving the empirical law of diminishing marginal utility, it is the 
observation of external behaviour 'which must furnish an overwhelming part of the 
evidence' (pp 140, 143). The two methods are not comparable, but are rather 
different procedures used at different stages in the enterprise of science. 'It appears, 
therefore, a misuse of terms, to put it mildly . . . to say that introspection yields 'a 
priori facts' (p 142). 
This passage raises a point to which we refer regularly in this thesis. Hutchison's 
acceptance of introspection differentiates his position from that of logical positivism, 
or at least its leading characteristics as described in Chapter One. As with his view 
concerning the legitimate role of electrons in the natural sciences, Hutchison again 
shows that he quite accepts that unobservable entities are involved at a basic level, ie 
that the process of deriving the finished propositions of economic science does not 
rest exclusively on (external) observation as implied in criticisms of his view as 
espousing naYve inductivism or 'ultra-empiricism' (Machlup, 1955: 7-8). 
Hutchison now turns to the concepts of expectation, utility and social utility which, 
due to their involving subjective valuation, have been called 'elusive' (Robbins, 1934: 
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4) and have even had their legitimacy questioned (Reddaway, 1936: 419). The 
legitimacy of a concept depends on one's criterion of legitimacy and definition of the 
concept: 'No sign or word is, as it were, somehow stamped from birth as illegitimate, 
"unscientific", or nonsensical; if it is this, it is because of the definition we choose or 
refuse to give it' (p 144, cf Schlick, 1936: 339-69; Wittgenstein, 1922: 129, para 
5.4732). He uses this point to show that expectation and utility are easily legitimately 
defined according to his criterion of testability. For example, propositions such as 'A 
gets utility from a good' or 'A expects a rise in prices' are clearly conceivably 
empirically testable (p 145). In this vein he rejects the argument that, because such 
concepts are used in the social sciences, there is a fundamental difference in the 
methods of the social and physical sciences. If such concepts cannot be defined 
according to his criterion, he rejects them for any science, social or physical (p 146). 
There is no question of large parts of 'welfare' economics and Public Finance 
'going by the board', or suddenly collapsing before a philosophical pin-prick. 
For the objections to 'welfare' economics consist in taking the word 'utility' out 
of its everyday use, giving it some kind of scientifically unusable 'definition' .. 
. and then concluding that since 'welfare' economics needs this concept it must 
be scientifically disreputable (p 153). 
Discussions of welfare, social utility and comparisons of utility are often mixed up 
with controversies over normative and positive propositions and sciences. But, as 
Schlick (1930: 14; 1939: 17) has pointed out, the distinction between normative and 
positive sciences is false. Hutchison proposes 'only the criterion of conceivable 
empirical testability' (p 154). 
Hutchison displays the influence of logical positivism in arguing that the meanings 
and definitions we give to words is essentially arbitrary in that they are chosen by us. 
In particular we can choose to define words or concepts in terms of conceivably 
empirically testable propositions or we can choose not to do so. Yet, in adopting 
Schlick's notion that the distinction between normative and positive science is false, 
Hutchison departed from the bulk of logical positivist thought which, as we 'saw in 
Chapter One, regarded the positive-normative distinction as basic to the development 
of an objective science. 
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3.6 Chapter VI - Conclusion 
After presenting the main conclusions of his book, Hutchison lists 'even more 
tentatively' two further conclusions (p 163). Firstly, throughout his book he has been 
implying that scientific knowledge, aside from logic and mathematics, must be based 
on empirical regularities or generalisations. Progress in economics depends on 
discovering such empirical regularities, rather than on deductive analysis. In 
economics these will be regularities about how people actually behave. Although 
economic problems may be formulated in terms of wages, money, interest, etc, they 
are reducible to problems 'as to how people behave'. Yet 'Equilibrium Economics 
describes a community without economic problems because so far as it affects him 
everybody knows how everyone else is going to behave' (p 164, original emphasis). 
Secondly, for some time now scientists have not claimed any certainty for their 
conclusions and have instead justified their work in terms of its practical usefulness. 
If economists are to follow suit, their conclusions should be extended to include 
political and sociological factors. For, following Weber (1922: 168-9), every policy 
problem involves both economic and political factors. Purely economic, or purely 
political, advice is equally to be condemned and is of academic interest only. It is 
noteworthy that great equilibrium economists, for example Pareto and Wieser, and 
great historical economists, for example Weber, have viewed their economic analysis 
as a prelude to 'wider sociological investigations'. It has been shown earlier that the 
'optimistic' procedure of starting with extremely simplified assumptions, later 
replacing them with more 'realistic' ones, leads nowhere and that to progress 
empirical investigation is needed more or less from the beginning (p 166). Much the 
same can be said of the attempt to simplify social phenomena by separating them into 
political and economic spheres. 'Exclusively "economic" conclusions are vitiated by 
the same neglect of relevant factors as is "static" economic analysis' (p 166). Policy 
advice will prove helpful only if it is informed by both economic and political factors. 
Hutchison concludes by applying his analysis and distinctions to the controversies 
surrounding the current problem of the trade cycle. Such a discussion forms an apt 
conclusion, he says, since these controversies reflect basic methodological 
disagreement, that is, disagreement about the fundamental procedure and assumptions 
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by which to mount any economic analysis. According to Hutchison, scientific 
disagreement can be only of two kinds and can always be removed. First, 
disagreement can be verbal. Currently trade cycle problems are discussed in a 
number of different languages, or 'sets of concepts'. Since concepts peculiar to one 
language, and hence not fully translatable between languages, are used to discuss 
critical aspects, it would seem to follow that much apparent disagreement could be 
reduced if economists came closer to employing one common language, or standard 
terminology (pp 167-9). Second, disagreement can be factual. Such disagreement 
has generally not been taken seriously in economics since factual questions have been 
regarded as no more than data or assumptions, not as questions of science (p 170). 
Consequently, not much more is expected of economic propositions other than that 
they be 'plausible' and 'tractable'. The 'optimistic' procedure can be relied upon to 
address any 'realistic' shortcomings of these propositions. 
According to Hutchison, the fundamental disagreements surrounding the trade cycle 
are due to 'basic questions of fact' (p 170). He reminds the reader that, as he tried to 
show in his chapter four, such questions cannot be answered by-deduction from some 
fundamental assumption. In cases where questions of fact are 'answerable by existing 
statistics', there is no room for further disagreement. In cases where it is not possible 
to obtain statistics, disagreement may remain and then the 'inconclusiveness of the 
position must be admitted' (p 171 ). Consequently, as far as the problem of the trade 
cycle goes, the economic scientist must stick to the facts and attempt to · obtain 
'regularities and correlations in the facts' (p 173). To venture beyond this will 
probably involve putting forward propositions which cannot conceivably be 
empirically tested. To obtain agreement on the problems of the trade cycle, the 
following is necessary: (1) a unified terminology; (2) statistical investigation of 
empirical fact; (3) avoidance of arguments not supported by statistical evidence. This 
conclusion is similar to that of Malthus (1820: 8) for whom disagreement in 
economics stemmed from a 'tendency to premature generalization' that militated 
against the willingness to submit theories to 'the test of experience' (p 174). 
In this chapter Hutchison lists two final conclusions. First, progress in economic 
knowledge depends on discovering empirical regularities rather than the 'optimistic' 
pr~cedure whqse dependence on the assumption of perfect expectations has resulted 
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in it assuming 'most or all economic problems out of existence' (p 162). The 
empirical regularities that can be discovered wili be 'very qualified and far from 
universal' (p 163). Here Hutchison nails his empiricist colours firmly to the mast: 
there are no essential relations between matters of fact. But, in doing so, he views 
himself as following in the British empirical tradition in the history of the 
methodological writings of leading economists of the past (notably Smith, Malthus, 
Jevons, and especially Marshall), rather than particularly attempting to introduce 
logical positivism into economic methodology. Indeed, to the extent that Hutchison 
accepts 'basic questions of facts' as unproblematic, he differs from logical positivists 
who, for instance, enter into (philosophical) discussions concerning the subjective and 
objective foundations of facts, as in the protocol sentence debate. 
We would go further and suggest that Hutchison's interest in methodology and 
philosophy is far from arising from, or being concerned with and limited to, 
philosophical issues, eg the rationalist-empiricist debate. Rather, the goal that 
motivated Hutchison in 1938 was that of transforming economics into a practically 
useful subject able to offer helpful policy advice. It is in line with this goal that the 
second conclusion listed in his final chapter is that, for policy advice to be useful, it 
must involve both economic and political factors. Here two remarks are in order. 
First, here again, Hutchison departs from logical positivism, and more particularly 
from the view that economics can, and must be, a positive science yielding objective 
advice free from normative political considerations (Friedman, 1953; Lipsey, 1963). 
While this might be said to reflect no more than Schlick's (1930) views, the influence 
of economic methodology is also evident, for apart from Weber (1922), he cites (p 56) 
from Myrdal's Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory (1931 ). 
Secondly, it appears that the inductivist-empirical approach is more suited to 
engendering fruitful, practical results since it can so easily be extended to 'wider 
sociological investigations' needed for integrated policy advice than the 'optimistic' . 
deductive procedure. Given this background, it is an understatement to say that 
Machlup (1955) quoted Hutchison out of context when he cited Hutchison's call, in 
this section, for beginning with 'extensive empirical investigation'. Here Hutchison is 
not calling for some nai"ve, or Machlupian 'ultra-empiricism' ie beginning with 
empirical investigation. Rather he is pointing to the need for 'wider sociological · 
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investigations' necessary to include political and not purely economic factors in 
formulating fruitful policy advice. This is apparent in the very next sentence whic_h 
Machlup fails to quote. Referring to his contrast between the 'isolated' abstractions 
of the deductive approach and that of 'extensive empirical investigation', Hutchison 
states: 
It is the same with attempts to simplify inextricably interconnected social 
phenomena by 'isolating' them in watertight 'political' and 'economic' 
departments. Exclusively 'economic' conclusions are vitiated by the same 
neglect of relevant factors as is 'static' economic analysis (p 166). 
Whereas the crucial need for economics to be a policy-oriented discipline was not 
brought out clearly in his 1938 work, this aspect constitutes a key theme sustained in 
his later works (1964, 1968, 1992, 1994). In this connection it should be remembered 
that, against the background of the Great Depression, Hutchison gave up a classical 
(academic) training at Cambridge in order to switch to the newer, but more 
practically-oriented, subject of economics (Tribe, 1997; Hart, 2002). 
Appendix: Some postulates of economic liberalism 
According to the classical economists, economic science demonstrates that a laissez-
faire, rather than a collectively planned, policy leads to the greatest possible returns. 
Hutchison calls this the doctrine of Economic Liberalism (p 177). He examines how 
this doctrine came to be held in order to further clarify his criticisms of economic 
theory and illustrate the general arguments of his essay. Hutchison argues that a large 
part of the reason as to why it came to be held was due to the asswnption of perfect 
expectations being implicitly, rather than explicitly, made. For instance, von Mises 
(1927) contends that, in a capitalist economy, costs and revenues of various projects 
can easily be calculated to determine the most profitable project in contra5t to the 
situation in the planning authority which could not begin to solve the problem. This, 
Hutchison complains, is a 'conspicuous example of assuming precisely what one has 
to prove' (p 182). It seems as if Liberals have been trying a priori to demonstrate 
some 'inner contradiction' in collectivist planning and have been supported in this 
endeavour by their methodology. 'It must always be remembered that laissez-faire 
and equilibrium doctrines had their origin in rationalistic Utopia-building' (p 184, 
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original emphasis). Since the assumptions of economic theory have often been 
ambiguous, the doctrines pertaining to this ideal world have become confused with 
the way the actual world works. Such theories need to be seen clearly as no more 
than Utopian constructions. 
Hutchison is not in fav9ur of planning and against laissez-faire. He is pointing out 
that, if one is to have a scientific evaluation of the two systems, the a priori approach 
suffers from two weaknesses. First, it facilitates prejudices (in this case of the 'old 
capitalism-socialism controversies') to be aired as 'confident generalisations' which 
have a ring of scientific authority about them. Secondly, the issue of planning versus 
laissez-faire is too complex an issue to be decided via the sweeping assumptions of 
the a priori approach. Instead a scientific evaluation of the issue requires detailed 
empirical investigation. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion we emphasise four points in Hutchison's 1938 essay. The first is one 
that most concerns Hutchison's relationship to logical positivism and Popper. In his 
chapter one Hutchison regards the distinction between scientific and philosophical 
problems as of 'fundamental importance for our discussion' - noting that 'these 
vague and highly ambiguous adjectives are being used here in a sharply and clearly 
separable sense' (p 6). It is this distinction, he argues, that is vital to making progress 
in economic investigation. This distinction is made in two stages. In his chapter one 
he puts forward his principle or criterion of testability: the 'finished propositions' of a 
science must be testable (p 9). Given that Hutchison is here distinguishing science 
from non-science, and that testability implies falsifiability, Hutchison hereby 
introduces Popper's falsifiability criterion to economics. 
In his chapter two Hutchison turns to the second stage of his distinction between 
scientific and philosophical problems. His purpose is to clarify the meaning of the 
type of proposition of which the pure theory (as opposed to the applied theory) of 
economics consists. Propositions of this kind are analytic and deductive and follow 
with logical necessity if true. They are to be distinguished from empirical synthetic 
propositions which are inductively inferred and therefore may conceivably be falsified 
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(cf his principle of testability). One of Hutchison's examples. of this kind of 
propositions is: 'If the clouds are grey it is going to rain'. In proposing that all 
propositions which have scientific sense consist exclusively of these two kinds of 
propositions, Hutchison adopts a logical positivist principle which appears to be 
modified by a reading of Popper (1934). The modification concerns Hutchison's 
qualifying the term 'sense' or 'meaning' by the term 'scientific' which he, still, as in 
his chapter one, puts in inverted commas. Thus, rather than implying that these two 
kinds of propositions are the only two meaningful kinds (the logical positivist notion), 
his 'exhaustive twofold classification' implies that 'science' is comprised of only 
these two kinds (closer to Popper's nqtion). This conforms to his view of the nature 
of science (p 9). 
The second point is Hutchison's scepticism concerning the extent to which deductive, 
and his emphasis on the extent to which inductive, reasoning can be useful in science. 
This, in tum, reflects the extent to which he follows the inductivism-SM, rather than 
the hypothetico-deductivist, approach to scientific method. More recently, concerning 
the necessity for economists to induct from trends, Hutchison has emphasised: 
In this connection, it should be insisted that, as regards economics and the social 
sciences, the rejection or neglect of induction by strict hypothetical deductivists 
(like Popper and Hayek) also tends towards obscurantism by insisting on 
excluding a method not used in physics, even when the material of economics 
requires induction if the aims and problems of the subject are to be tackled 
(1992: 57). 
In his second, third and fifth chapters Hutchison criticises various methods used in 
economic theorising for leaning too much towards the a priori deductivist and 
hypothetico-deductivist approaches to scientific method: the hypothetical method, the 
'optimistic' approach, and the 'psychological' method. The hypothetical method is 
the most deductivist and a priori leaning. While introspection in the 'psychological 
method' is an added advantage in social as compared to the natural sciences, and is 
'invaluable and in fact practically indispensable method' in suggesting hypotheses to 
be observed, it cannot of its own yield any 'finished propositions' of science: it cannot . 
yield 'a priori facts' (p 142). 
Hutchison reserves most of his criticism for the 'optimistic' approach, or traditional 
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method used by Clark, Marshall, Pareto, Wieser, and Wicksell in developing 
'equilibrium economics'. It appears to be more realistic by accepting that both the 
legs of deduction and induction are as needed in science as in walking. Yet in 
practice it confines the analysis to a state of theoretical absolutism stating general 
laws in a deductive way with induction used only later to provide practical 
examples. 16 'The postulates of the equilibrium system were specially chosen for their 
"tractability" . . . rather than for their correspondence with the facts: that is the 
essence of the optimistic procedure' (p 74). When Hutchison points to this tractability 
as making possible 'a fascinating display of mathematical or geometrical ingenuity' 
(p 120), he is putting forward one of his first criticisms of formalism in economics 
(Hutchison, 2000). In his fourth chapter it is the optimistic approach that he implicitly 
criticises. He does this by showing how difficult it is to formulate any basic 
postulates from which much of significance for economic behaviour may be deduced. 
That this equilibrium economics appears adequate is only because the basic postulates 
on which it depends tacitly involve the further assumption that people's expectations 
are perfectly correct. But in this case, we are dealing with a Schlarajfenland in which 
there is no economic problem. 
The third and fourth points are more easily summarised. The third concerns an 
advantage of inductivism-SM (apart from its being a surer route to scientific 
knowledge than the hypothetico-deductive method) for Hutchison's approach to 
investigation in economics. This is that, by working 'more or less from the beginning 
with extensive empirical investigation', this method is better suited to the fact that 
social phenomena are 'inextricably interconnected' (p 166). It thereby fits in more 
naturally with, and is able to draw more easily on, the historical, institutional, 
sociological and political aspects of economics (Leslie, 1888; Weber, 1922; Pareto, 
1935). This in turn is important for Hutchison for it means that the results of such 
investigations are more likely to yield policy advice which is of practical use in 
solving particular economic problems. From the introduction to this chapter, it will 
be remembered that the desire to further economics as a science able to dispense 
fruitful policy advice was one of Hutchison's motivations for switching from classics 
to economics. The fourth point concerns Hutchison's views on the realist status of 
16 Hutchison draws on this criticism of Myrdal (1933) in one of the mottoes to his chapter three (p 
52). The motto translation is by Dr. Sabine Marschall. 
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scientific theories and laws. Here it is difficult to classify him as adhering particularly 
to any one realist or anti-realist view. In parts of the essay, and to the extent that he 
draws on logical positivism, he leans towards anti-realist views such as nominalism, 
conventionalism, instrumentalism and pragmatism (cf Torr, 1999). Yet, this is always 
in a cautious, qualified manner. For example, his 'conventionalism' is closest to that 
of Poincare' s commodisme. In other parts of his essay he leans towards the realism of 
Popper's fallibilistic approach and that of Campbell (1921). 
Apart from these four points, our main conclusion is that the popular consensus that 
Hutchison (1938) served as the vehicle for the introduction of positivism into 
economics in something like the way Ayer (1936) introduced positivism to the 
English-speaking world, is largely mistaken. While logical positivism did indeed play 
a significant role in his essay, we have shown that so did other philosophies of 
science. For example, Hutchison quotes extensively in his chapter mottoes from 
Poincare. At least as important as the part played by logical positivism is the extent to 
which his essay is informed and influenced by the methodological views of the 
leading economists dating back to Ricardo and Malthus. In this respect it is 
significant that Hutchison's closing passage is a quotation from Malthus (1820: 8) in 
which the clergyman bemoans the 'tendency to premature generalization' as one of 
the 'principal causes of error' in economics since this exacerbates the unwillingness to 
submit theories to 'the test of experience'. Over a century later Hutchison (1938) 
repeated this basic message. 
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CHAPTER4 
THE INFLUENCE OF HUTCHISON'S INTERVENTION: KNIGHT 
The question of the influence of Hutchison's (193 8) essay on economics begs the 
wider question of whether ideas, contained in books or otherwise, can or do influence 
the world of events. Keynes (1936) famously contended in his closing pages that it is 
the ideas (of economists and political philosophers) rather than vested interests that 
rule the world so supporting the view that the direction of influence runs from 
economic thought to policies and the real world. In terms of Marxist dialectical 
materialism, the influence runs in exactly the opposite direction with the material 
relationships determining the superstructure of ideas and ideology. With regard to 
Keynes's view, Robbins (1963) finds evidence in the effect of the English classical 
economists on the policy of free trade, in that of Marx's theories of history and in 
Keynes's influence on policy. However, Hutchison has voiced scepticism with regard 
to Keynes's generalisation: 
Roughly simultaneously, a new dawn gradually begins to break, cocks crow, and 
people get out of bed. Claims by the birds that 'the world is ruled by little else' 
than their crowing should be treated with reserve, without denying them any 
influence whatsoever, on particular occasions, on the course of events (1978: 
282). 
In this vein Hutchison holds that it is vital to distinguish between 'the different modes 
or channels by which economists may influence policy ... and to distinguish between 
the political and economic content in what economists write, as well as between very 
different types of economic propositions' (1978: 283). In good empiricist fashion he 
concludes that it is unlikely that there is any 'short and simple' argument about the 
influence of theory that is valid. Instead each particular case must be examined 
individually. 
Keynes's 1936 General Theory does appear to support the view that ideas can and do 
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influence policies and the real world. Keynes's book precipitated a policy revolution, 
if not a theoretical revolution. Textbook writers such as Harris (1947), Klein (1947), 
Dillard (1948), Samuelson (1948), and Hansen (1953) successfully popularised his 
ideas and led to the post-second-world-war generation in America being brought up 
on Keynesian macroeconomics. Keynesianism dominated economic policy for the 
two post-war decades (Canterbery, 1995: 179). 
While in the case of Keynes the channels of influence seem clear, in the case of 
Hutchison things are quite different. Keynes had textbook writers popularising his 
General Theory and governments implementing his conclusions in their economic 
policies. Hutchison had none of this. The direct effects of the influence of 
Hutchison's ideas between 193 8-1963 are instead limited mainly to the various 
debates in the economics journals of the period. These will be the topic of the 
remainder of this, and the following chapters. 
The indirect effects of his ideas are a more difficult matter to discern. Here we must 
look at the extent to which his main methodological propositions were taken up by the 
economics profession. Caldwell (1982: 115) lists three propositions as being put 
forward by Hutchison: (1) that economists should search for 'conceivably falsifiable, 
though not practically falsified' empirical generalisations; (2) that various aspects of 
economic behaviour be empirically investigated; (3) and that economists abandon the 
psychological method or method of introspection as a means for evaluating or 
justifying their theories. 
These principles and practices advocated by Hutchison were to meet with nearly 
universal approval among economists in succeeding decades. Why were 
economists so eager to embrace the tenets of positivism? (ibid: 115) 
Caldwell proceeds to answer this question: 
The movement toward positivism was not the result of any expressly 
methodological treatises; Hutchison's book did not cause the mathematization 
and quantification of economic theory. Methodological works taken alone 
seldom change the minds of readers, their purpose instead is to confirm changes 
that are already in motion (ibid: 115). 
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Caldwell ascribes the post-war changes in economics to three main factors. First were 
'purely technical' factors. These involved the increased collection of statistics; the 
development of linear programming and progress in statistics and econometrics; and 
the mathematisation of consumer theory. Second were conceptual developments in 
macroeconomics, welfare economics and growth theories. Third, those opposed to the 
new post-war interventionist Keynesian policies clung to outdated notions such as 
subjectivism, introspection, and a priori true synthetic statements. For their arguments 
to be taken seriously, they needed to adopt positivist quantification and testing. 
To go into the changes in theory and technique in more detail would take us too far 
into the realm of the history of the economics of this period - 'a matter on which 
discord rather than consensus currently seems to be growing' (ibid: 116). In this 
regard, Caldwell cites Shackle ( 1967), Deane ( 1978) and Hutchison ( 1978, ch 9). 
It is no easy matter to demonstrate on the one hand the extent to which the various 
changes that took place in economics between 1938 and 1963 arose from the (indirect) 
influence of Hutchison (1938), and on the other the extent to which they were the 
result of factors such as those outlined by Caldwell in the paragraph above. 
Consequently, in assessing Hutchison's influence in the period 1938-1963, we will 
limit ourselves to an examination of his influence as directly reflected and 
documented in the various debates in the journals of this period. While we will cast 
our net amongst the journals as widely as possible, the discussion will focus on three 
major debates. In this chapter, chapter four, we will focus on Hutchison's pre-war 
debate with Knight. In the next two chapters we will focus on his post-war debates 
with Machlup (Chapter Five) and Klappholz and Agassi (Chapter Six). 
The question of the influence, both direct and indirect, of Hutchison's 1938 
intervention is closely bound up with the issue of how his intervention was 
interpreted. Consequently, for the remainder of this introduction, we will consider 
this topic. In line with our thesis we argue that Hutchison's 1938 intervention is 
correctly interpreted as an attempt to redirect the nature of economic investigation 
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away from the a prioristic direction that Robbins (1932, 1935) was urging and towards 
a more empirical approach. Hutchison in 193 8 was chiefly concerned with countering 
the then recent rationalist resurgence (Robbins, 1932, 1935). In this regard, Latsis 
(1972: 234 ff) corre~tly interprets Hutchison's intervention as advocating the adoption 
of a general methodological approach - although Hutchison himself claimed only to 
show the consequences· of adopting certain key methodological distinctions (1938: 
12). 
Against the above, Knight (1940) and Machlup (1955) appear to have interpreted 
Hutchison's intervention not so much as proposing a general methodological 
approach, but rather more as an attack on the neoclassical programme - in particular 
. on the theory of the firm - using methodological arguments. It is this latter (and 
incorrect) interpretation that, it will be argued, lies behind the polemical and furious 
response of Knight (1940) and behind the attempt by Machlup (1955) to position 
Hutchison on an extremist methodological fringe. Our argument, following Latsis 
(1972: 234 ), is that their chief goal was to defend the neoclassical theory of the firm 
rather than simply debate methodological issues with Hutchison. In the process, 
Hutchison's methodological position was misrepresented and the chance to steer 
economics towards embracing a more even mix of empiricism and rationalism was 
lost. 
While Latsis correctly interprets Hutchison as concerned with the implications of a 
particular methodological and philosophical position, his further contention that 
Hutchison's main interest 'was philosophical, external to economics proper' is 
misleading (1972: 234). Hutchison was certainly interested in philosophy - witness 
his early reading of Wittgenstein (1922) - but his switch after his first year at 
Cambridge was from classics to economics, not to philosophy. Given this particular 
switch, it appears reasonable to argue that Hutchison was motivated by questions of 
immediate practical relevance, in particular those relating to the povert)' and 
unemployment of the then current Great Depression. His switch also appeared to be 
in line with the 'social enthusiasm' of Marshall and Pigou. This 'social enthusiasm' 
rather than philosophy per se appears a better contender for capturing Hutchison's 
main interest. Such a view helps explain why he reacted strongly to the complacency 
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of his academic tutors, and in particular, to Robinson's (1932) reversal of the 
Baconian dictum when she argued that economists should be concerned with 'light-
producing' rather than 'fruit-producing' investigations. 
Hutchison viewed this reversal with alarm for he saw himself as belonging to the 
empiricist tradition in philosophy (Hutchison, 1941: 73 5). Nevertheless, contrary to 
Latsis, Hutchison's main interest was not philosophical. It would thus be wrong to 
view Hutchison (1938) as a work in the same vein as Ayer (1936), but directed 
specifically at economists. Rather, Hutchison's philosophical concerns were 
secondary to (or at least always closely intertwined with) a type of Marshallian and 
Pigovian 'social enthusiasm'. 
It is this background that needs to be brought to bear on Latsis's (1972: 234) clarifying 
distinction which will be applied, subject to modification, to our discussion for the 
remainder of this chapter and the next. With respect to the discussion of economic 
methodology since the 1930s, especially as it relates to the theory of the firm, Latsis 
views the 'most interesting conflict' as that 'between a Popper-inspired criterion 
directed against different versions of the neoclassical programme on the one hand, and 
the apologetic defence of that programme on the other' (ibid). In the Popper-inspired 
camp 'the most influential figure' was Hutchison. In the apologists' camp were 
arraigned Knight, Mises, Robbins and, somewhat later, Friedman and Machlup. This, 
we hold, is the perspective from which the debates between Hutchison and Knight, 
and later with Machlup need to be viewed. While the issues in these debates appear to 
be concerned with methodological and philosophical questions, the motivating factor, 
we argue, for both Knight and Machlup (and Friedman) was their quest to defend 
orthodoxy, particularly the theory of the firm. In this quest Knight drew, mainly, but 
not only, upon a priorism, Friedman (1953) upon instrumentalism, and Machlup 
(1955) upon conventionalism. 
Before adopting Latsis' s distinction as central to our organising framework for this. 
and the next chapter, it is in need of some modification. Latsis correctly describes 
Hutchison's interest in wanting to establish a general criterion to distinguish scientific 
from non-scientific statements in order to apply it to economics 'come what may'. 
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Latsis, however, also implies that Hutchison sitting writing his book in Nazi Germany 
in the late 1930s, was on the look out for a criterion to distinguish scientific from 
pseudoscientific statements when 'he came across' Popper (1934) 'and discovered in 
Popper's demarcation criterion the weapon he wanted' (1972: 235). If we are to 
interpret Hutchison's influence properly, we need to understand that the process of 
discovery was a good deal more complicated than Latsis would appear to suggest, and, 
more importantly, that, while Hutchison did discover Popper's criterion, this 
discovery constituted an important input, but not the only input into his own criterion, 
namely, the Principle of Testability. 
4.1 The journal reviews of Hutchison's intervention 
It was already in these early reviews that Hutchison was labeled a positivist. Yet, as 
we have argued, positivism is not central to Hutchison's methodological position. 
What is central instead is a thorough-going inductivist-empiricism. Hutchison drew 
on positivism to a certain extent, which was to be expected, since it was then the latest 
form of empiricism. Hutchison's empiricism led him to be critical of orthodox 
economics because much of it was interpreted as propositions arrived at by deduction 
from self-evident a priori assumptions. Intrinsic to Hutchison's interventions in the 
journal debates was this fundamental criticism. Yet Hutchison was not attacking and 
dismissing all orthodox economics. There were those parts which were empirically 
based an<!_ those parts which, while stated in a non-empirical form, could be re-cast in 
an empirical form. 
By contrast Knight, and more so Friedman and Machlup, were concerned with 
defending orthodoxy. The irrelevance, or unimportance, of viewing Hutchison as a 
positivist is seen in the folloWing state of affairs. Knight regarded Hutchison (1938) 
as a positivist attack on orthodoxy. Yet Friedman's 'positivist' (1953) is regarded as a 
classic defence of orthodoxy! To focus on Hutchison's positivism is to risk 
misunderstanding the influence of Hutchison as, not only critical of orthodoxy, but as 
presenting an alternative inductivist-empiricist methodology for economics. The 
influence of Hutchison's 'positivism' was paradoxically transformed via Friedman 
and Machlup into a defence of orthodoxy. In these terms, Hutchison's (1938) attack 
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appears to have had little influence. From being a potentially dangerous force, 
positivism is brought to the defence of the orthodox camp. Moreover, Hutchison gets 
blamed earlier for a position which is not central to him while Friedman gets credit for 
introducing positivism. The misinterpretation of Hutchison (as a positivist) results in 
his empirical-historical stance not being understood, with even less chance of it being 
influential. 
The first economist to label Hutchison's intervention 'positivist' appears to be Stonier 
(1938) whose review in the Economic Journal has been described by Latsis as 'briefly 
contemptuous' (1972: 235, n 6). Stonier acknowledges Hutchison's 'extremely wide 
and accurate' knowledge of economic theory. He finds Hutchison's distinction 
between 'analytical deduction' and 'synthetic assertion' helpful. For example, it 
clarifies whether a particular version of the quantity theory of money is to be regarded 
either as true by definition or as a synthetic, verifiable statement. In this respect 
economists 'can learn much from Mr. Hutchison's book'. But, in general, Stonier 
criticises Hutchison ( 193 8) for being 'an application of logical positivism to economic 
theory'. 
According to Stonier, the problem with logical positivism is that it is 'anti-
metaphysicalism'. This explains why Hutchison seeks to deny, or at least limit, the 
extent to which science depends upon metaphysical assumptions. Logical positivism 
ignores the relation between subject and object and so has no method of self-criticism. 
The problem that emerges concerns the meaning of verifiability. Stonier notes that, 
while Hutchison rejects behaviourism, he appears to argue that all economic theory 
can be tested by statistics, and that statistics 
are description~ wholly from 'outside' of purely physical facts. This is not 
satisfactory, since all economic statistics imply some economic theory, and, on 
the other hand, some theory is subject only to introspective or intrapersonal tests 
(Stonier, 1938: 115). 
Stonier misrepresents Hutchison's position. As we saw in Chapter Three, logical 
positivism is not of central importance to Hutchison. Rather, he draws on it to 
support a more broadly-based inductive-empiricism. He does not ignore the relation 
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between subject and object and indeed, argues that introspection is 'an invaluable and 
in fact practically indispensable method' in science (Hutchison, 1938: 143). His 
argument is rather that we cannot get anywhere in an empirical science by 
introspection alone. He accepts that theory plays a vital role in organising the facts, 
but would probably differ in his interpretation of theory from that of Stonier. 
Stonier's labeling of Hutchison appears to have started the image of 'Hutchison the 
positivist'. Unfortunately, this interpretation forestalled the extent to which his more 
broadly-based inductive-empiricism may have influenced economists and economics. 
Writing in the American Economic Review, Whittaker (1940) also interprets 
Hutchison as a positivist in philosophy (and a neoclassicist in economics). Yet, he 
argues, Hutchison attempts little justification of these positions. Similarly Hutchison 
argues that the goal of science is to discover empirical generalisations, or laws 
properly so called. Yet, he appears not to recognise the substantial difficulties 
involved. 
From the discussion of Chapter Three, it appears misleading to describe Hutchison as 
a neoclassicist in economics. Hutchison's argument is that, to the extent that the 
propositions of neoclassical economics are interpreted as propositions arrived at by 
purely a priori deductive reasoning, and hence empirically untestable, it. is not 
scientific. To the extent that propositions are formulated as propositions inductively 
arrived at, it is scientific. For Hutchison there are a number of such propositions: eg, 
the law of diminishing returns, the law of diminishing marginal utility or Gossen's 
law, Gresham's and Pareto's law (1938: 60, 64, 134, 135). Yet Hutchison also 
supports the non-neoclassical empirical-historical approach of Leslie (1888) and 
institutionalist economics of Mitchell (1928) - (see Hutchison, 1938,passim; 1998: 
82-3). His position defies easy pigeon-holing. 
Whittaker (1940) claims that many economists already accepted that the goal of 
science is to discover empirical generalisations. They did not need Hutchison to tell 
them. From our discussion of Chapter Two it would seem that Whittaker neglects the 
influence of Knight in America. Furthermore, as we have seen, in Europe and 
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England, Robbins (1935) and Mises (1934) were influential. Moreover, given the 
growth of formalism in economics, it appears that Whittaker's 'many economists' 
were not that concerned with discovering empirical generalisations. Hutchison's 
cautions about the need for economists to 'extend the range of their conclusions to 
include political and sociological factors' (1938: 165), and his call to notice that 
'several great economists . . . have treated their work on Economics as essentially a 
preliminary to wider sociological investigations', were largely ignored (1938: 166). 
It is unfortunate that the two reviews discussed above were largely negative since, 
being in the Economic Journal and the American Economic Review, they were highly 
influential. While the next two reviews were more positive, they were in less 
influential journals. 
Shearer (1939), writing in the Australian Economic Record, describes Hutchison's 
1938 as 'a patient and careful survey' of the foundations of static equilibrium theory. 
Hutchison's survey points to two conclusions. Firstly, propositions of 'pure theory' 
are put forward as being laws applicable to the real world. Yet they are not 
conceivably empirically falsifiable. In the past economic laws had empirical 
relevance because they were founded on 'realistic assumptions'. However, 
continuous refinement of these laws so as to facilitate deductive reasoning (by using 
the isolating procedure) has transformed them into formal propositions. Secondly, 
generalisations about economic behaviour should be derived by inductive reasoning, 
especially in the light of uncertainty in the world in which we live. 
Shearer chides Hutchison for failing to tackle the problems of verification or to 
provide concrete suggestions concerning his call for more empirical analysis of 
economic behaviour. Instead, his discussion is 'too abstract and general' and is 
directed more towards the problems and status of theory in economics. 
While Shearer presents a reasonably balanced summary of Hutchison's book, he 
appears to have overlooked Hutchison's (1938: 9) statement of the aims of his work. 
Here Hutchison explains that the scientist uses both 'empirical investigation and 
logical analysis'. 'It is this latter activity which it is largely the purpose of this book 
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to analyse and itself carry out' (ibid: 9). Hutchison can hardly be criticised for 
carrying out what he intended to do. At the same time, Shearer's criticism of 
Hutchison as 'too abstract and general' contrasts with the claims of those who have 
criticised Hutchison for underplaying the importance of theory. It also draws attention 
to the limitations of Stonier' s depiction of Hutchison's (1938) as nai:'vely empiricist. 
However, it must be acknowledged that Hutchison's concern with 'logical analysis' is 
a clear instance of the influence of logical positivist thinking. 
Shearer appears to be one of the few economists at the time who recognised the 
priority Hutchison accorded to generalisations about economic behaviour being 
derived by inductive reasoning, especially in the light of uncertainty in the real world. 
This is in tune with our interpretation of Hutchison in Chapter Three. It is one of the 
main aspects that significantly differentiates his position from being an 'application of 
logical· positivism', as Stonier would have it. However, the influence of these views 
of Hutchison's remained lost behind the positivist portrait by which he came to be 
represented. 
Dobb (1942) points to the resurgence 'in the last few years' of criticism of orthodox 
economics. Such criticism has ranged from general criticisms such as Hogben (1938) 
and Wootton ( 193 8) to those of 'the Keynes school' concerning the validity of the 
fundamental assumptions of 'classical economics'. But, he argues, the most 
significant has been that of Hutchison (1938). 
He describes Hutchison's essay as a logical positivist criticism of the 'language-habits 
of economists' (Dobb, 1942: 390). It is directed at those economists who have 
claimed that their science deduces a priori economic laws of universal necessity. Its 
alarming conclusion is that most economic principles are tautologies devoid of 
empirical content and hence any power of prediction. 
According to Dobb, much of what Hutchison is saying compares with American 
institutionalism. Yet it is more radical for it implies that the method of deductive 
reasoning can yield little or nothing of value. For Dobb, it is quite clear that there is a 
role for general reasoning in economics. For example, conclusions about specific 
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features of capitalism can be deduced from its general character. Hutchison's error 
lies in rejecting the method of deductive reasoning rather than criticising its misuse. 
This means, for example, that he is unable to discriminate between Mises's and 
Marx's conceptions.of economic reality (Dobb, 1942: 393). 
Dobb traces Hutchison.'s error to his exhaustive classification of propositions into 
either verbal or empirical statements. He says he cannot understand how any set of 
propositions can be purely verbal, particularly those used in ordinary conversation and 
economics. It follows from the context of such statements that they are primarily 
about real world events. Controversy in economics is never simply about words, but 
about different interpretations of capitalism. In this case the crucial question does not 
turn on whether or not deductive or inductive methods of reasoning are used, but 
whether or not they give a picture of relations that hold in the real world. 'Our main 
quarrel, in other words, is not with a method ... but with a false use of that method, 
creating a distorted picture of contemporary society' (Dobb, 1942: 395). 
While Dobb makes some worthwhile points, his view of the 'relations that hold in the 
real world' differs sharply from neoclassical orthodoxy. Dobb's criticism of 
Hutchison relates to the fact that Hutchison does not share Dobb's Marxian 
conception of reality. Apart from this, Dobb appears to misunderstand Hutchison's 
twofold classification of propositions, for that classification relates to those 
propositions which have scientific sense, not those used in ordinary conversation. 
Furthermore, it appears perfectly possible for propositions to be 'purely verbal', the 
classic example being definitions, to which Dobb himself refers. Hutchison would no 
doubt ask Dobb how he could tell when the method of reasoning gave a picture of 
relations that hold in the real world. Hutchison's answer to this question is, of course 
clear. The proposition resulting from which ever method of reasoning would have to 
be conceivably testable and would have to be shown at least to be not empirically 
false. But, importantly for Hutchison, this would only show that it held tentatively. 
Following Hume's empiricism, at any moment in the future it is possible that it may 
not hold. For Hutchison, the problem is not one of avoiding a distorted picture of 
contemporary society, but the very existence and meaning of a conception of reality as 
general as Mises's or Marx's. 
159 .. 
While Hutchison may be judged as undervaluing general reasoning and deductive 
methods, given his empiricist stance he would no doubt view it as vital to. keep 
general reasoning on a short leash lest one is tempted into rationalist speculation. 
Nevertheless Dobb does point to a common criticism of Hutchison, namely, what is 
seen as his tendency to underplay the role of general reasoning and the deductive 
method. Furthermore, he draws attention to an important factor affecting Hutchison's 
influence on the practice of economics. This is the extent to which Hutchison's 
(1938) has wrongly been interpreted as primarily a criticism of orthodox economics 
when, in fact it is, rather the (careful) criticism of the a priori deductive method 
which, from Hutchison's point of view, pervaded too much of economics, especially 
when he wrote in the 1930s. 
4.2 Knight's 1940 reaction 
By far the most significant response to Hutchison's essay was that of Knight's. 
Described by Coats (1983: 18) as an 'outspokenly hostile diatribe', it nevertheless 
provided spectacular publicity for Hutchison. A few introductory remarks about 
Knight's position may help in understanding Knight's furious outburst. Given the 
complexity of his position (Chapter Two; Hammond, 1991; Emmett, 1998), we 
confine ourselves to two points. First, Latsis (1972: 235, n 5) draws attention to the 
extent to which Knight (1940) was influenced by hermeneutic philosophy, with 
several of its technical terms scattered throughout his review. Second, Hutchison has 
argued that 'over his long career, Knight's views on the philosophy and methodology 
of economics completely boxed the compass, from crude, extreme scientism, to crude 
extreme anti-scientism' (1997: 148). Blaug maintains that throughout his life they 
came 'straight from von Mises and company' (1992: 86-7). Certainly in 1940 Knight 
seemed to be in an anti-scientism stage. These remarks may help towards 
understanding certain aspects of Knight's review. 
Knight immediately labels Hutchison a positivist (p 1 ). 1 He finds this philosophy 
1 All unsupported page references in this section (4.2) are to Knight (1940). 
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'particularly irritating' because it puts seience on a pedestal and supposes that human 
beings can be studied as if they are objects of the natural sciences. 
Economics and other social sciences deal with knowledge and truth of a 
different category from that of the natural sciences, truth which is related to 
sense observation - and ultimately even to logic - in a very different way from 
that arrived at by the methodology of natural science (pp 5-6). 
Knight begins by taking issue with Hutchison's claim that science is able to advance 
and progress because scientists have definite, agreed criteria for testing their theories, 
unlike the situation in philosophy. He refers to Hutchison's example of scientists 
settling the question of whether or not a cheque system exists in Paraguay by 'having 
a cheque before them'. He points out that it cannot be determined as simply as this, 
but instead requires knowledge of the history, laws and business usages connected 
with this single cheque, and the purposes and results of such a system. A cheque 
system involves more than a series of physical events and therefore questions about it 
cannot be resolved by exclusively empirical evidence. The agreed criteria that, 
according to Hutchison, mark out science from philosophy exist only for trivial, not 
for serious, issues. 
While Knight might argue that positivists suppose that human beings can be studied 
as if they were objects of natural science, this is not what Hutchison is saying. As we 
saw earlier, he acknowledges the 'invaluable' role of introspection (Hutchison, 1938: 
143). While Hutchison was sympathetic to the positivist notion of the unity of 
science, this was not a central feature of his 1938 argument as indicated by 
Hutchison's increasing acceptance of the importance of recognising differences 
between the sciences of degree if not of kind (1981: 276). A more sympathetic 
interpretation of Hutchison's. Paraguayan example is that he is contrasting the 
availability of factual evidence in an empirical discipline with its scarcity in 
philosophical debates. As we have pointed out in Chapter Three, Hutchison, 
following Leslie (1888), acknowledges the importance of a knowledge of history, laws 
and institutions (1938,passim). 
Knight now turns to examine Hutchison's claim that science comprises two fields of 
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knowledge: empirical investigation of the external world, and logical and 
mathematical truths. He makes two points about knowledge of the external world. 
First, because appearances are often deceptive, observations must be 'tested' before 
being accepted as true. Second, this testing of observations is .a social activity which 
means that all empirical knowledge is a social phenomenon. This means that 
knowledge of external reality presupposes 'valid' intercommunication of mental 
content~ in the sense of knowledge, opinion, or suggestion, among the members 
of a knowing group or intellectual community. A conscious, critical social 
consensus is the essence of the idea of objectivity or truth (p 7). 
Knight explains that such a consensus 'is no matter of a majority vote', but depends 
upon honourable behaviour among scientists. 
What is striking about the second field of knowledge, namely knowledge of the truths 
of logic and mathematics, is that it is kriowledge simultaneously of the external world 
and of the way in which minds work. The propositions of logic and mathematics, 
even those regarding imaginary numbers and non-Euclidean space, are empirically 
verifiable. They are not mere 'forms of thought' but instead concern facts about the 
world of such a general nature that 'we cannot imagine a situation in which [they] 
would not be true' (p 10). 
While positivism limits knowledge to these two fields, Knight identifies a third field: 
knowledge of human conduct. This field, into which economics falls, deals with 
human interests and motivation and constitutes a separate sphere of reality from that 
of the external world. Its problems are more subtle and complex that those of the 
'sciences of (unconscious) nature' (p 12). Knowledge in this field is gained mainly 
from the process of intercommunication in social intercourse, and only partly from 
knowledge of physical reality. 
According to Knight, Hutchison follows other positivists in claiming that knowledge 
of the content of human minds may be inferred from observations of their physical 
behaviour. Knight disagrees and argues that the process of inference in this third field 
of knowledge is so different from that in the first that is should be called 'sympathetic 
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introspection' (p 13). While it may be possible to infer thoughts and feelings from 
human speech or facial expression, what is heard or seen is not much more than what 
one understands. No matter how much knowledge of the physical world we have, it 
would not be possible to discover the interests and motivations of human conduct. 
The reason for this is epistemological. According to Knight, individuals are 'born 
completely ignorant, without minds,' and acquire knowledge via intercommunication 
with other selves (p 14 ). 
Thus our knowledge of the world and our knowledge of one another and of 
'mind' in general form inseparable bodies of knowledge which must be studied 
in relation to one another, if we are to know anything about any of them, or talk 
sense about them (p 14.) 
The intuitive nature of the part of human knowledge arising from the ability to see 
ourselves from within, and the fact that human behaviour involves intentions which 
are strictly unobservable, means that it is not possible for the social scientist to verify 
propositions about human (or economic) behaviour empirically. 
Here, we can draw on our introductory comments for some help. Latsis (1972: 235, n 
5) lists 'sympathetic introspection' (einfuhlung) as one of the technical terms of 
hermeneutics. And so it would seem that the notion (that individuals are born 
completely ignorant, without minds, and acquire knowledge via intercommunication 
with other selves) is a concept or construct drawn from Knight's interpretation of 
hermeneutic philosophy. Note that Hutchison (1938: 140) states that he does not want 
to enter into methodological and philosophical discussion concerning the significance 
or legitimacy of the processes of einfuhlen or verstehen. Knight's stressing of the 
point that individuals acquire knowledge via intercommunication with other selves 
appears to imply that this knowledge is more important than knowledge gained from 
physical reality, and so is contrary to empiricist and positivist philosophy. If this is 
the case, it would seem to clash with Knight's earlier espousal of 'radical empiricism' 
(1921: 199, n 1). 
Knight now turns to the basic postulates of economics. The chief of these is the 
reality of economic behaviour whose meaning is intuitively known to us. In other 
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words, it is not possible to determine empirically whether certain behaviour is 
economic. Economics interprets the reality of economic behaviour by assuming that 
individuals know various economic propositions. According to Knight, we kno"w 
these propositions with the same certainty that we know logical and mathematical 
truths, and with greater certainty than any empirical proposition. 
We know them in the same way that one knows he is writing sentences and not 
simply making dark markings on a white surface - or is reading versus seeing 
such marks - by living in the world 'with' other intelligent beings; we neither 
know them a priori nor by one-sided deduction from data of sense observation 
(p 17). 
Knight's interpretation of the apodictic certainty of the basic postulates of economics 
appears to accept the existence of Kantian synthetic a priori propositions. Hutchison 
(1938: 46-7, n 7) pointed out that he did not want to claim that such propositions did 
or did not exist, only that they could not be fitted into his twofold classification 
'without distortion'. While Hutchison's by-passing of the existence of synthetic a 
priori propositions may be interpreted as reflecting a positivist perspective, it may 
equally reflect an empirically moderate stance. 
Knight goes on to point out that economic literature treats goods as if the qualities of 
the goods really inhere in the object and are measurable, resulting in the notion of 
utility. Yet, while some qualities inhere in the object, others are in the mind of the 
observer. Now this presents a paradox. On the one hand, utility does not actually 
inhere in the goods themselves. On the other hand, individual choice does depend on 
quantitative considerations. Yet utilities are not measurable as physical magnitudes. 
Without a technique of measurement it seems impossible to distinguish whether an 
experience (of utility) refers to the mind or to the external world. Furthermore, 
because of ignorance in the real world, as emphasised by Hutchison, the values at 
which goods exchange do not correspond to their utilities. Yet, if practice conformed 
to theory, the behaviour would no longer be economic or deliberate, 'and would 
become a mere mechanical response to a stimulus situation' (p 20). This difference 
between motive and result is further evidence that 'we do not infer the former from 
the latter'. Behaviour cannot be interpreted in positive terms because 'positive 
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science cannot in any sense be problem-solving, while this is the most important fact 
about human conduct' (p 20, n 13). 
Knight makes two points here concerning the problems of analysing economic 
behaviour in terms of positive science. The first is that we have no way of knowing 
whether the utility which informs a choice derives from purely subjective 
considerations, or from attributes of the positive, external world. The second is that 
the key characteristic of behaviour is that it is problem-solving. As such it depends on 
(unobservable) motives which lead to (observable) results, not vice versa. 
Regarding the first point, Hutchison maintains that Gossen's law or the law of 
diminishing marginal utility (as well as the law of diminishing returns and Pareto's 
law) were originally formulated as empirical laws (1938: 60, 64, 134, 135). It is only 
when they are reformulated as exact propositions of pure theory that they lose their 
empirical content. Reformulated in this way, conventional utility analysis of 
consumer behaviour cannot be applied to practical problems given real world 
uncertainty. Indeed, Hutchison (1938: 88) approvingly quotes Knight's (1921: 268) 
point (a point that Knight repeats in his review on p 20) that, without uncertainty, 
behaviour would no longer be economic, but mechanical, 'all organisms automata'. 
Hutchison (1938) frequently refers to Knight (1921) throughout his book and _has 
stated that Knight's 1921 work probably exerted the most influence on him 
(Hutchison, 1997:147, n 7). 
Knight points out that, once we attempt to apply economics to guide social action 
'some theory of value, beyond factual preference, is necessarily involved' (p 22). One 
such attempt to guide social action is the policy of laisser-faire individualism. But, as 
a basis for this policy, it is impossible to accept individual preferences as absolutely 
final since, in the real world, individuals are brought up and educated to function in a 
society. The fact that everyone distinguishes between individual preferences and 
values assumed to be objective serves to remind us that 'no discussion of group action 
can be carried on in propositions which merely state what "I want"' (p 23). Yet 
Hutchison, in his discussion of the economic policy of liberalism, takes the individual 
as datum and fails to recognise that social policy rests on value judgements. 
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While Hutchison may not explicitly recogmse that social policy rests on value 
judgements, he clearly states (referring to Weber, 1922: 168-9) that it involves politics 
'and no separate ec~momic advice or economic solution of a problem of policy is of 
any use until the modifications in it resulting from political factors have been worked 
out' (Hutchison, 1938: 165). On the question of value judgements, Hutchison (1938: 
153-4 ), following Schlick (1930), considers the notion of a contrast between 
normative and positive sciences 'fundamentally false' and the associated controversy 
'very nearly played out'. Hutchison (1960: xxii) however, accepts that his 1938 
statement regarding the controversy surrounding the problem of value judgements as 
'very nearly played out' does seem·now to be 'not a little naYve'. 
Knight contrasts a positivistic with a non-positivistic approach to interpreting human 
action. In the positivistic approach causal laws are interpreted in terms of the 
uniformity of phenomena. In the non-positivistic approach human action is 
interpreted as being problem-solving (where both 'problem' and 'solution' seem to be 
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indefinable) (p 26). Knight points out that a strict positivist would have to stick to the 
realm of physical causality, ie uniformity of sequence, and dismiss interpretations of 
human behaviour in terms of motives as mystical (p 27). 
Knight ends by emphasising the limitations of the possibility of prediction of 
economic behaviour (p 28). To him the control aspect implied in prediction is 
abhorrent to all humane thinking. Prediction depends on assuming economic 
behaviour can be specified in terms of a stable utility function. However, this is 
seldom the case since an individual's actions are rarely motivated by purely economic 
factors - and individuals, unlike physical objects, change their minds. Economic 
positivists and empiricists do not seem to have thought much about how we actually 
predict human behaviour. In the prediction of individual behaviour empirical 
observations play a minor role compared to insight into character and personality. 
While the law of large numbers applies where large numbers of human beings behave 
individually, this is not the case where they act as groups. Here the basis of prediction 
is 'social psychology' which, like that of individuals, has more to do with insight and 
interpretation than statistical extrapolation (p 30). 
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Instead the principles of economic theory can be applied to demonstrate what is wrong 
rather than what is right so far as any proposed line of action is concerned. In this 
respect answers depend on judgements of value and on insight into human nature and 
social values, rather than on the findings of any positive scienc~. The need is for a 
broad social interpretative study (verstehende Wissenschaft). A sound investigation 
on this basis should prove practically successful (p 31 ). 
Knight may be correct in stressing that empirical observations play a minor role in 
predicting an individual's behaviour, but he appears to be on thinner ground in 
arguing that predicting how large groups behave depends more on 'social psychology' 
than on 'statistical extrapolations' (Lipsey, 1963: 8). In any case, Hutchison is not 
recommending thdt prediction be based only on 'statistical extrapolation'. As we have 
seen, he also points to the need for 'wider sociological investigations' in attempts to 
apply economic theory to policy matters (Hutchison, 1938: 166). Whereas Knight 
here severely emphasises the limitations of prediction in economics, Hutchison ( 193 8: 
65) had originally quoted Knight's ( 1921: 14) contention that 'the aim of science is to 
predict the future for the purpose of making our conduct intelligent'. The paradox is 
perhaps resolved by noting that, for Knight, empirical observations play a minor role 
in prediction, whereas for Hutchison the possibility of prediction and 'the formulation 
of empirical laws' are merely two ways of saying the same thing (1938: 65). 
4.3 Hutchison's 1941 reply and Knight's rejoinder 
Hutchison opens by completely disclaiming any concern with Knight's question 
'What is truth in economics?' saying that the questions formulated in his book were 
far less general and ambitious. He complains that the bulk of Knight's criticism is 
directed at the introductory comments rather than the central arguments of his book. 
Therefore his reply to Knight will be limited to three main points: further explanation 
of the arguments of his introductory chapter; answers to some of Knight's more . 
detailed objections; and an appendix aimed at clarifying terminological differences. 
According to Hutchison, Knight is annoyed because he fails to state his 'philosophical 
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position' in his book. But, Hutchison points out, the discussion of his philosophical 
position is deliberately brief because his book is about economics, and the validity of 
its main conclusions are in any case independent of his philosophical position. 
Moreover, such a view is the same as the on_e adopted by Knight himself in the first 
sentence of the following quotation: 
The text must not be taken as expressing any view whatever as to the ultimate 
nature of reality or any other philosophic position. The writer is in fact a radical 
empiricist in logic, which is to say, as far as theoretical reasoning is concerned, 
an agnostic on all questions beyond the fairly immediate facts of experience 
(1921: 199, n 1). 
Furthermore, Hutchison is willing to accept the rest of Knight's description as 
accounting 'for the philosophical starting-point of my book' although 'they are not 
exactly [the words he] would have chosen [himself]' (p 735). Given our interpretation 
in Chapter Three, we argue that Hutchison would not have chosen to use the term 
'radical' should he have used his own words. Moreover, the chances are that 
Hutchison 'went along' with the description mainly in order to dramatise the extent to 
which he accepted Knight's stated philosophical position, after Knight had implied 
that Hutchison's position must be very different to his own. This seems a reasonable 
supposition since Hutchison suspects that Knight is unlikely to find such a response 
satisfactory and he therefore proceeds to spell out his position more carefully. 
Hutchison-explains that he follows the Anglo-Saxon (as contrasted with the Teutonic) 
tradition of Locke, Hume and J S Mill and the development of this tradition by 
Russell, Wittgenstein, Mach, Schlick and Carnap. He notes that, among economists, 
Pareto, Schumpeter and Myrdal have emphasised the importance of empirical 
verification. Furthermore, Kaufmann (1936) reflects the point of view labeled 
'positivist' by Knight (pp 735-6).2 
This more careful explanation provides further evidence for our interpretation, in 
Chapter Three, that Hutchison's position is best described as a fairly broadly-based 
2 Unsupported page references in this section (4.3) from now until the subheading 'Knight's 1941 
rejoinder' are to Hutchison (1941). 
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empiricism which draws on aspects of logical positivism. It is interesting that 
Hutchison approving cites the work of Pareto, Schumpeter and Myrdal. None of these 
has been described as positivist. 
Hutchison now outlines his two main principles - suggested, as he emphasises, only 
as convenient classifications: (a) a sharp distinction between deductive and inductive 
I 
propositions, the former being certain but without empirical content, the latter being 
empirical but only probable; (b) a sharp distinction between propositions put forward 
as empirically testable and those that are not, and the suggestion that both natural and 
social science (apart from their use of deductive theory) can concern themselves only 
with the former (p 736). 
According to Hutchison, these distinctions derive from a two to three hundred year 
old Anglo-Saxon tradition so when Knight criticises him for recognising only two, 
rather than three, fields of knowledge, he is objecting to this tradition rather than to 
Hutchison. Moreover, Hutchison points out that he is not concerned in his book with 
the existence or nonexistence of fields of knowledge, but rather, first of all, with 
clarifying the distinction between deductive and inductive propositions. Inductive 
propositions assert something about the facts of the world and are therefore 
empirically testable or falsifiable. Deductive propositions assert nothing about the 
facts of the world and are therefore empirically untestable and unfalsifiable. Instead 
they assert that the relation between definitions is consistent and are tested by a 
process of mathematical or logical proof. As he pointed out in his book, most of the 
propositions of economic theory have been shown to be tautologies (p 737). 
Here again, supporting our Chapter Three interpretation, we have direct evidence from 
Hutchison that he hiJJ:?.self views his position as deriving from a two to three hundred 
year old tradition, rather- than simply that of 20th century logical positivism. Here we 
also find a remarkably clear statement by Hutchison of the vital role of inductive 
reasoning in gaining knowledge about the world. As we explained in Chapter Three, 
the importance of the testability (or falsifiability) principle for Hutchison is that it 
allows us to distinguish inductive from deductive propositions. For Popper, its 
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importance is that it circumvents the problem of induction. One may ask why it is so 
important for Hutchison to distinguish inductive from deductive propositions. The 
answer, as we have argued in Chapter Three, is that Hutchison supports the inductive, 
rather than the hypothetico-deductive, method of scientific procedure. (Note that 
Hutchison accords a necessary role to deductive reasoning.) Finally, it should be 
noted that he is careful to say most, and not all, of the propositions of economic theory 
are tautologies. Hutchison (1997: 146) thus correctly rebuts Rosenberg's (1992: 244-
5) claim that he 'derided' all of economic theory as a body of tautologies in his 1938 
book. 
Following from his second main principle, (b), Hutchison explains the importance of 
testing or verification. If a proposition claims to tell us something about the real 
world, 'and if it is questioned, but not confirmed by testing, it can remain only a 
hypothetical conjecture and not a scientific conclusion' (p 738). On the other hand, if 
it is denied that it can be tested or even that when someone questions it that it need not 
be tested, then such a proposition is not scientific. At various times in history 
propositions claiming to say something about the world have been held to be above all 
empirical testing. Only when it has been possible again to experiment has that science 
been able to go forward. 
No matter how intuitively obvious are some propositions, to be scientific they ~ust be 
testable and, if questioned, tested by anybody ready to take the trouble for himself. 
Without this we have no grounds for pronouncing Knight's propositions about 
'snakes' seen by the delirium tremens sufferer false (1940: 7). For then the delirium 
tremens sufferer might claim that he knew by intuition that his propositions were true. 
While, as Knight suggests, science is impossible in a world of systematic liars, science 
is also impossible where there is no general acceptance Of empirical tests. Yet Knight 
rejects the criterion of testability: 
It is not conceivably possible to 'verify' any proposition about 'economic' 
behaviour by any 'empirical' procedure, if the key words of this statement are 
defined as they must be defined to be used with relevance and precision (Knight, 
1940: 15). 
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There are two points that call for comment. The first concerns Hutchison's statement 
that if a proposition that claims to tell us something about the real world is questioned, 
'but not confirmed by testing, it can remain only a hypothetical conjecture and not a 
scientific conclusion' (p 738). This statement implies that were the proposition 
'confirmed by testing' it would then qualify as a scientific conclusion. This is not a 
statement to which one could imagine Popper agreeing. For he famously rejects 
attempts at confirmation and instead emphasises the crucial importance of attempts at 
falsification. While this statement could be interpreted as reflecting (Carnap's) notion 
of confirmation in positivism, it is also consistent with our Chapter Three view that 
Hutchison adopted an inductivist approach to science. 
The second point concerns Knight's contention that it is not possible to verify 
economic propositions by any empirical procedure. This contention reflects the extent 
to which Knight appears to be removed from even the most moderate, let alone 
radical, empiricism! Like Knight's (1940: 13) earlier remark that the process of 
inferring knowledge of human conduct should be called 'sympathetic introspection', it 
appears to confirm Latsis' s interpretation of Knight's philosophy as hermeneutic, and 
Hutchison's ( 1997: 148) point that, in 1940 at least, Knight took 'his methodological 
views straight from Mises'. 
According to Knight, not only is the criterion of testability 'fundamentally misleading 
and wrong', but, 
if one begins with confident and sweeping assertions about 'tests', one is under 
a corresponding obligation to make it unambiguously clear what sort of 
propositions do and what sort do not need testing and what tests are accepted as 
valid and not in themselves in need of testing. This follow-up is just what we 
do not find in Mr. Hutchison's essay (Knight, 1940: 6). 
As regards Knight's question as to what propositions do and what propositions do not 
need testing, Hutchison replies that any proposition that is put forward as saying 
something about the facts of economic life is in need of testing. With regard to 
Knight's question as to what tests are accepted as valid and not themselves in need of 
testing, Hutchison argues in the same spirit as Popper there are no tests which will 
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finally decide whether an empirical proposition is absolutely true or false. The 
validity of tests must be, in a sense, relative. Science, like democracy, depends upon 
the willingness to accept certain rules for carrying out tests as well as upon the 
acceptance of the results of such tests. In view of this what tests we accept as valid is, 
in a sense, a matter of convention. While Knight (1940: 4) strongly disagrees with 
this notion of testing as conventional, he himself only a few pages later argues that 
testing is 'a social activity or phenomena' and that 'a conscious, critical social 
consensus is of the essence of the idea of objectivity or truth' (1940: 7). 
Hutchison ends this section of his reply by reiterating that he did not claim any 
'absoluteness' about the criterion of testability. He was merely calling attention to the 
two reasons for maintaining the criterion: first, as Mill urged, the social sciences can 
best advance by adopting the methods of the natural sciences, notably the constant 
empirical testing of their propositions; second, that the only ground on which to 
uphold the authority of science is 'the appeal to fact'. 
It is the task of the twentieth century to get the appeal to fact as widely and 
readily accepted in the field of social sciences as, since the seventeenth century, 
it has gradually become accepted in that of natural science (p 742). 
Two points call for comment. The first concerns Hutchison's view that what tests are 
accepted as valid is a matter of convention. Here Hutchison appears to display the 
influence of Poincare's notion of conventionalism. As we saw, Knight also pointed to 
the notion of testing as conventional. While this appears to show some overlap 
between Knight and Hutchison's positions, discussion of the question of 
conventionalism will be dealt with in the next chapter since there we will be able to 
relate the discussion to Machlup's conventionalist stand which differs from Knight's 
and Hutchison's positions. Second, Hutchison's call for the social sciences to adopt 
the methods of the natural sciences clearly reflects the influence of naturalism and 
positivism. However, as Hutchison explained, by 1960 his views were 'considerably' 
less naturalistic than they had been twenty years earlier: 
Differences between the natural and social sciences seem more important and 
ineluctable than they did then. Indeed, though quite ready, for the most part, to 
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accept and rely on Professor Popper's anti-naturalist thesis in The Poverty of 
Historicism, I would not always want to go so far as he seems to go in denying 
significance to the differences between the natural and social sciences (1960: 
xi). 
Still later Hutchison accepted that his 1938 book 'expressed a highly "naturalistic" 
view' and emphasised t~e importance of recognising the differences between the 
natural and social sciences (1981: 300, 276). As mentioned earlier, this positivist 
issue was not central to Hutchison's stance. 
Hutchison now proceeds to answer some of Knight's more detailed objections: 
He rejects Knight's claim that he was exalting science above non-science. Instead he 
was simply concerned with distinguishing between the two. 
He rejects Knight's claim that he did not stick to his own criterion for scientific 
propositions, ie that of testability. For example, in his chapter five where he discussed 
the concepts of utility and welfare he made it clear that these concepts need not be 
viewed as metaphysical, but could be defined as empirically testable. 
According to Hutchison, Knight puts forward three propositions. First, economic 
behaviour involves allocating limited means among alternative uses. Since nothing is 
said about what means are available or how they will be used, this seems to be no 
more than a very obvious generalisation. Second, different behaviour leads to 
different results. Hutchison comments that if this is not a tautology it might very 
often be false. Third, one particular allocation of means will yield 'more' than all the 
others. Hutchison contends that these propositions do not tell us anything at all about 
·-concrete economic problems such as the trade cycle, unemployment or monetary 
conditions. They are no more than intuitions unverifiable by any empirical procedure. 
Hutchison says his appendix was a discussion of some postulates of economic 
liberalism. Yet Knight criticises it as if it were a discussion of economic policy. This 
procedure epitomises Knight's overall method of attack in his review. Knight claims 
that the author sets out to treat some wide, general subject (eg What is truth?) when 
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the author is instead concerned with a much narrower purpose. Knight might well 
have thought Hutchison's concerns trivial, but he could have said this in 32 lines, not 
32 pages. 
In this section Hutchison rejects Knight's objections and proceeds to criticise Knight's 
three propositions as unverifiable, and therefore, according to the criterion of 
testability, unscientific. He also criticises Knight for criticising him on broad general 
issues which he never attempted in the first place. This quest on the part of Knight to 
discuss broad general issues such as 'What is truth?' and the rejection on the part of 
Hutchison of discussion of such issues shows up the differences between Hutchison's 
empiricist outlook and Knight's 'anti-positivism' (Hammond, 1991). 
In an appendix Hutchison lists some of Knight's propositions which he finds 
'glaringly false' since this might help to show the extent of the intervening gulf 
between them: 
a) The validity of any interpretation of economic behaviour in terms of motives 
depends on the possibility of error or uncertainty. But the conception of any process 
as problem-solving is rejected by positivism as metaphysical (Knight, 1940: 27). 
Hutchison says he wouldn't be concerned to argue on behalf of positivism but for the 
fact that Knight appears to apply this term to his views in general. He says he does 
not understand the sense in which Knight uses the term 'problem', but it seems that 
the proposition quoted is a tautology. Hutchison explains that the sense in which he 
uses the term 'problem' coincides with the ordinary everyday sense in which one 
wants to know whether or not certain practical actions will achieve certain practical 
results. 
b) The positivist might well ponder the fact that no objective definition can be given of 
'work' and 'play' fundamental as these concepts are in economics (Knight, 1940: 25). 
Hutchison replies that he can give such definitions. 
c) Surely no one thinks that from knowledge of the physical world it would be possible 
to predict the interests of intelligent beings living in it even if knowledge of 
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psychology is included? (Knight, 1940: 14). Hutchison replies that psychology should 
be able to tell us something about their interests in 'a particular physical 
environment'. 
d) Changes of mind upset predictions based on observation of previous behaviour 
(Knight, 1940: 29)·. Hutchison asks whether changes of mind cannot be predicted on 
the basis of previous behaviour about which there have been changes of mind? 
e) Where there are agreed criteria for testing there can be no serious intellectual or 
methodological problems (Knight, 1940: 3). Hutchison asks whether there are no 
criteria in the natural sciences the adoption of which has coincided with their growth 
and progress? 
j) Hutchison completely ignores intercommunication (Knight, 1940: 13). Hutchison 
says that Knight quotes him referring to 'spoken and written words, . . . tone of voice 
or facial expression'. 
Hutchison's bringing together of the propositions that most divide his views from 
those of Knight conveniently highlights the extent to which Knight's views are 
influenced by rationalism and Hutchison's by empiricisll}. a) Knight views problems 
as mental phenomena, whereas for Hutchison they are empirical phenomena. c) and 
d) For Knight we cannot acquire knowledge about human behaviour simply from 
knowledge of the physical world, whereas for Hutchison we can. d) Here Hutchison 
displays his inductivist orientation. j) Knight emphasises mental communication 
more than Hutchison. Finally, in a) Hutchison explicitly states that he is 'not 
concerned to argue on behalf of positivism'. This once again provides support for our 
argument in Chapter Three that Hutchison should not be interpreted primarily as a 
positivist. 
Knight's 1941 rejoinder 
In reply Knight says that, apart from reviewing Hutchison's book, he was concerned 
with a school of thought as well as general methodological issues. This is why he 
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takes 32 pages and not 32 lines. In his review he was mainly concerned with calling 
attention to the inconsistencies which arise from trying to reduce the fundamental 
concepts of economics to terms of empirical fact. 
The central issue of debate concerns the view that the propositions of economic theory 
must be testable, because only testable propositions have any place in science. 
Literally speaking, this is a matter of the definition of science which hardly seems 
worth arguing about. Knight says he is not particularly concerned whether or not 
economic theory is regarded as a science. What he is concerned about is that it should 
be clearly understood that it is not a science in Mr. Hutchison's sense, that is, a natural 
or physical science. While the propositions of the natural sciences are indeed testable, 
Knight emphasises they are testable only within limits (p 751).3 
This is because agreements on observations and logic exist 'in a community of 
discourse' only amongst persons who are competent and trustworthy judges. Such 
judges are identifiable only by mutual recognition. Furthermore, physical science 
contains concepts of a purely interpretive character which are not sense data, eg force, 
energy, and matter. While physics has been defined as the science of measurement, it 
should be noted first, 'that at the margin of accuracy, measurement is itself a matter of 
estimation' or judgement and second, that physics cannot state in purely empirical 
terms w~at is being measured (p 752). 
Here two points call for comment. First, Knight reiterates the extent to which testing 
depends-upon mutual agreement within a specialised community. He had made this 
point before when speaking of testing as a social activity (1940: 7). On this issue 
Hutchison agrees with Knight: both the rules for carrying out tests and the acceptance 
of the results of such Jests are clearly acknowledged by Hutchison to depend upon the 
willingness of scientists to accept such rules and results, that is, depend upon 
accepting a convention (1938: 145, 152). Yet, on this earlier occasion, Knight (1940: 
4) had criticised his stance for implying that 'truth is merely a game in which the 
players are free to make any rules they please'! (see Hutchison, 1941: 741). Second, 
3 Unsupported page references for the remainder of this section (4.3) are to Knight (1941). 
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according to Latsis (1972: 235-6), Knight, in stressing that testing depends upon 
agreement within in a 'community of discourse', anticipated the view that 'there can 
be no explicitly formulable demarcation criteria even in natural science'. Yet, -one 
wonders, why did Latsis not extend such foresightedness to Hutchison who had 
already made much the same observation in his 1938 book? Perhaps, he realised that 
Hutchison, while agreeing that a conventional element is involved in testing, would 
not accept such a conclusion. Nevertheless, when Latsis goes on to point out that 
Knight lapses into authoritarianism in insisting that those qualified to judge on the 
validity oftests are 'identifiable only by mutual recognition', he expresses a criticism 
that would appeal only too readily to Hutchison's rejection of dogmatism and 
authoritarianism in any discipline purporting to be scientific. 
Given this conventional element in science, Knight argues that there is no ultimate 
difference between theoretical economics and theoretical physics. However, a 
difference remains and it is so great that it is a difference in kind rather than one of 
degree. The fundamental concepts of economic theory cannot be reduced to the same 
meaning-content as those of physical science. The principles of economics cannot be 
verified in the same sense as the laws of physics or the propositions of mathematics. 
Economic magnitudes are not measurable, but at the most are estimated, and then only 
by the individual subject. 
The difference is so great because economic propositions relate to purposiveness in 
human behaviour. Such purposiveness cannot be inferred from the observation of 
behaviour. The fact that human behaviour is affected by error leads to a divergence 
between descriptions of its purpose and observation of actual behaviour. 'And in this 
contrast centers the primary interest in economic pri!lciples' (p 752). Economic 
propositions attempt to describe an ideal, not the reality. They are subject to no test 
other than the agreement that stems from the intercommunicative life of rational 
individuals. Consequently, Knight says, when he opposes his formulation of ultimate 
economic principles to that of any other writer, he is only giving his opinion; and it 
remains no more than that 'except in so far as it is confirmed by a general consensus 
of competent and trustworthy students' (p 752). 
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Knight ends by saying that he was also interested in pointing out in his review article 
that the fundamental concepts of economic theory must also be contrasted with a third 
type of proposition, namely that which states a value judgement. Men do not behave 
like machines, but instead value some ends above others. And 'the primary value or 
end which ought to be pursued is telling the truth' (p 753). While any proposition 
reflects a merely individual state of mind, rational discourse consists of propositions 
which state truth of a superindividual character or objectivity. 
According to Knight, his debate with Hutchison concerns the principle, or criterion, of 
testability (p 751 ). While Hutchison maintains that the propositions of economic 
theory must be empirically testable, Knight maintains that this criterion is inapplicable 
to economics. Economics is concerned with purposive behaviour in terms of motives. 
Such propositions are to be understood in terms of introspection and cannot be 
inferred from (nor tested by) the observation of behaviour. Even on this central issue 
there appears to be room for agreement. For Hutchison, as we have seen, quite 
accepts a role for introspection in suggesting hypothesis and regards introspection as 
invaluable. And Knight, in view of his 'radical empiricism' (1921: 199, n 1 ), would 
surely agree that at least some statements in economics are empirically testable. 
According to Knight, Hutchison views economics as a science not significantly 
different from the natural sciences. Knight points out that even in the natural sciences 
propositions are testable only within limits. That is, the concepts and relations within 
these sciences cannot be reduced to purely empirical terms. In any event, economics 
is so different from the natural sciences that it involves a difference in kind rather than 
one of degree. Again, on these issues a rapprochement is possible. As has been 
argued in Chapter Three, the extent to which Hutchison adheres to the reductionist 
thesis of logical positivism is debatable. Hutchison (1960: xi) explains that his views 
have become less naturalistic and admits to important differences between the natural 
and social sciences. (He still views the differences as those of degree, rather than of 
kind (p xii).) Nevertheless they 'amount to such a considerable degree as to constitute 
a profound contrast' (Hutchison, 1981: 276). Rather, the divisive issue is over the 
extent to which the natural science method of subjecting statements to empirical 
testing is useful in the social sciences. 
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4.4 Kaufmann's 1942 response 
Kaufmann (1942) argues that the problem of explaining why the achievements of the 
social sciences hardly compare to those of the natural sciences is not to be resolved in 
terms of choosing between the naturalist and the anti-naturalist viewpoint. Rather, 
such an explanation concerns, first, ascertaining the methodology common to all 
empirical sciences, and second, distinguishing between the different methods of the 
natural and social sciences within this common methodology. Kaufmann intends to 
apply this procedure to examine the nature of the basic postulates of economic theory. 
His chief point is that an ambiguity concerning the concept of law underlies the 
methodological controversy between Hutchison and Knight (p 384).4 This 
controversy goes back to Schmoller and Menger and even Ricardo and Malthus (p 
383). 
Kaufmann examines the ambiguity concernmg the concept of law by. extending 
Hutchison's analysis of the role of the ceteris paribus clause in economic theory. He 
argues that further analysis 'reveals that the ceteris paribus clause is a way of 
formulating a heuristic postulate, a methodological program' (p 388). For example, in 
trying to explain changes in the amount demanded of a given commodity, we start by 
investigating empirically whether or not changes in demand are preceded by changes 
in the price of the commodity. If it turns out that this is not the case, we look at other 
relevant factors such as changes in income or the price of substitutes. The programme 
is not complete unless all the 'disturbing factors' are discovered. Kaufmann argues 
that errors that arise as a result of employing this procedure are the result of incorrect 
interpretations of the programme and not, as historical and institutional economists 
argue, the result of the procedure itself. 
The method of isolating a small number of factors, analyzing the relations 
between them and making these relations the backbone of a theoretical 
construction is indeed common to all empirical sciences which are not merely 
descriptive (p 389; cf Kaufmann, 1944: 216). 
4 All unsupported page references in this section (4.4) are to Kaufmann (1942) . 
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This is the method employed by Bacon, Galileo and Newton. They have been as 
much attacked for being too abstract as today's theoretical economists. Yet, 
Kaufmann emphasises, the method of isolation needs 'a method of synthesis'. The 
dangers of its bei~g an incomplete programme on its own are best avoided by 
distinguishing carefully between heuristic postulates and empirical laws (p 389). 
Such a distinction is at the centre of the controversy about the nature of laws in 
economics. Kaufmann asks how Galileo's law of falling bodies can be said to be 
valid if empirical tests show that falling bodies generally do not behave in accordance 
with it. The usual answer is that it is true only under certain conditions, namely that 
of empty space. This goes against the notion that a law is a universal proposition 
stating that certain facts will occur when other facts occur. To say that a proposition 
is true only under certain conditions could properly be interpreted as saying that it is 
generally false. 
This leads us to the realization that the so-called empirical testing of physical 
laws of the type of Galileo's law of falling bodies is in fact a testing of more 
restricted laws. The restrictions are implied in the additional conditions which 
the experimenting physicist considers relevant for the test (p 390). 
Even were this more restricted law empirically falsified it would not imply that the 
more general version of the law 'loses all significance for scientific procedure'. 
Kaufmann points out that the ceteris paribus clause 
may still indicate a certain line of research to be followed, that is, it may still 
function as a heuristic postulate. But we should never forget that a heuristic 
postulate as such is a convention, not a proposition belonging to the corpus of 
science. Such a convention may have to be replaced by another if it does not 
lead to the desired results, and accordingly it may be affected by the negative 
outcome of an empirical test. But it cannot be directly falsified by it (p 390). 
Since it is not possible to falsify the principles of economics directly by an empirical 
test, Kaufmann suggests that they are to be generally understood as heuristic 
postulates. That this has not been recognised is due to 'wishful thinking', by a desire 
to justify whatever method is employed on ultimate grounds, eg the principle of the 
uniformity of nature is used to justify induction, a principle of causality to justify the 
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notion that all events are explainable, and a principle of free will to justify the notion 
that not every fact in psychology or in the social sciences is explicable. 
In orthodox economics the problem is to explain or predict a particular kind of human 
behaviour, namely that involved in exchanging goods. We do this by assuming, with 
J S Mill, that men 'prefer a greater portion of wealth to a smaller one in all cases'. 
'Much has been written to show that this principle, if understood as a statement about 
reality, does not hold universally' (p 391). But, this need not imply 'the approach of 
theoretical economics is inadequate'. While the profit motive does not hold 
universally, it plays a significant enough role in most market transa~tions to give us 
good enough reason for assuming that behaviour is governed by this single motive 
alone. Nor, Kaufmann continues, do we need the assumption of perfect foresight to 
justify assuming behaviour is governed by the profit motive alone. While Hutchison, 
following Morgenstern (1935), has correctly stressed that the assumption of perfect 
foresight leads to contradictions, this does not mean the method of economic science 
is wrong. Rather the contradictions result from misinterpreting the method. This 
misinterpretation has resulted from the desire to give a priori reasons for the adequacy 
of the method. 
According to Kaufmann, Hutchison may agree with the above, but Knight will 
probably disagree by pointing out that the argument above is based on the misguided 
assumption 'that economic theory deals with factual behaviour' (p 392). For Knight, 
economic theory is a normative science like ethics, grammar or jurisprudence and as 
such deals with ideal or rational behaviour. The problem in a normative science is to 
find out whether given (ie actual or ideal) behaviour is in accordance with certain 
norms. 
The underlying idea is that if both a rational end of economic behaviour and the 
correct means to be applied to the promotion of it are predetermined - with the 
result that every deviation from these standards, either in setting goals or in the 
attempt to reach them, can be regarded as an error attributable to human 
weakness - then the method of economics dealing with ideal, perfectly rational 
behaviour is a priori justified. These standards are to be discovered by an 
analysis of motives which are given with absolute certainty by introspection (p 
395). 
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For Kaufmann, this theoretical framework may have its merits, but 'only so long as 
one does not attempt to press empirical science into the procrustean bed of such a 
preconceived scheme' (p 395). This does not mean that we need to go to the extreme 
of conflating economics and physics. There are significant differences between these 
subjects. But, while there are these differences, nevertheless there is a 'structural 
similarity', a basic layer of methodological problems common to all empirical science. 
It is now time to sum up the implications of Kaufmann's intervention for the issues 
raised in the Hutchison-Knight debate. Kaufmann's article represents an important 
turning point in this debate which, until then, had been conducted largely as one 
between empiricism and a priorism. The main result of Kaufmann's intervention is to 
introduce a pragmatic note into the debate which may be said to anticipate, in certain 
respects, the instrumentalism and conventionalism of Friedman (1953) and Machlup 
(1952, 1955). 
Kaufmann is clearly more sympathetic to Hutchison's view of economics as an 
empirical science dealing with factual data than to Knight's view that economics is 
concerned with describing an ideal - an ideal concerned with the purpose or motive 
of economic behaviour - rather than the reality (Knight, 1941: 752). He rejects 
attempts to base a science such as economics on 'ultimate grounds conceived as self-
evident truths' and 'cannot accept von Mises's argument' (Kaufmann, 1944: 1, 226). 
Yet, he argues, Hutchison 'has not come to the root of the methodological problem 
involved' (p 387). This is because economic laws are not to be understood as 
empirical statements (Kaufmann, 1944: 213 ), but rather as heuristic postulates which 
describe a method of scientific inquiry without referring to 'the very nature of the 
objects of inquiry' (p 392). Such postulates are to be interpreted as a methodological 
programme. For example, the assumption that individuals are motivated solely by the 
profit motive may yield useful conclusions. However, in making this assumption we 
are not making any claim about the actual behaviour of the individuals. If our 
conclusions are empirically falsified it means only that our heuristic postulates are 
inadequate as tools, not that some proposition about economic reality has been 
falsified (Lowe, 1942: 432). Here Kaufmann appears to adopt an instrumentalist 
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interpretation similar to Friedman's (1953) later stance. 
Kaufmann's instrumentalism can be traced to Dewey's (1938) influence. Kaufmann 
himself (1944: vii) explains that his 1944 book is 'a very different book' from ·his 
Methodenlehre der Sozialwissenschaften (1936) due to his being influenced by 
Dewey's analysis of scientific procedure in his Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938). 
According to Gouinlock (1998: 47), the core of Dewey's pragmatism - or as Dewey 
himself called it, instrumentalism - is his Theory of Inquiry. 'The logic of inquiry is 
not a set of norms existing independently of and prior to our cognitive efforts' (ibid). 
Rather, 'the philosophy of science starts from the fact that science is already an 
ongoing social activity' (Ryan, 1999: 139). 'Inquiry is inevitably theory-laden - or, 
in Dewey's parlance, meaning-laden' (Gouinlock, 1998: 48). Gouinlock goes on to 
argue that 'Dewey repudiated the archaic idea that knowledge is a correspondence 
between an object and a mental image' (ibid). 
It would appear that this influence was already making itself felt in 1942 in terms of 
Kaufmann's instrumentalist view that his 'heuristic postulates' are to be interpreted as 
tools and not as propositions about reality. This leads to his statement that his 
approach proceeds 'along a different path' from the one that analyses methodological 
issues in terms of opposed philosophical doctrines, eg rationalism-empiricism, 
realism-idealism and subjectivism-objectivism (1944: 2). Here we are clearly far 
removed from the rationalist-empiricist debate between Knight and Hutchison. 
Discussions concerning the nature of the most general principles of classical 
physics, particularly the principle of the conservation of energy, by 
conventionalists like Henri Poincare or Eddington and their opponents reveal a 
striking similarity to the controversies concerning the nature of the principles of 
economics (p 390). 
Kaufmann criticises Hutchison for interpreting economic principles or laws as 
statements that can be empirically falsified. Since in general it is not possible to 
falsify such principles or laws empirically, they are better understood as heuristic 
postulates. This conflicts with Hutchison's (1938: 62, 64) view that scientific laws 
are viewed in most sciences (except economics) as inductive inferences which are 
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conceivably empirically falsifiable. Kaufmann interprets Hutchison's position as 
'radical behaviourism' or physicalism (p 383) or, more generally, as a form of 
sensationalism (Kaufmann, 1944: 7, 151): 
But the rejection of pseudo-philosophical 'ultimate' grounds for the validity of 
the laws of the market, which are supposedly derivable from the nature of man, 
is not bound to lead us to the thesis that they have no other basis than actually 
observed behavior in the market. Analysis of human motives plays a significant 
part in their foundation (Kaufmann, 1944: 216-7). 
In other words, Kaufmann argues, the rejection of Knight's thesis does not necessarily 
lead us to adopting (what he views as) Hutchison's sensationalism. Yet Hutchison 
(1938: 143) explicitly denies he adopts the doctrine of behaviourism. As we have 
argued in Chapter Three, Hutchison adopts an empiricist position broader than logical 
positivism or behaviourism. Instead he is much influenced by Poincare's (1905) 
'conventionalism' and would deny a naYve realist position that scientific inquiry gets 
to 'the very nature of the objects of inquiry'. But, like Poincare, Hutchison keeps his 
conventionalism in check. While principles and laws contain a· conventional element, 
the test of empirical evidence is still relevant. 
The importance of Kaufmann's intervention for our thesis is that here we have what 
appears to be the first attempt to respond to Hutchison's arguments by introducing the 
pragmatist stance of instrumentalism. It seems strange that Friedman's (1953) essay 
which is concerned with defending the neoclassical orthodoxy against Hutchison's 
criticisms, should make no mention of Hutchison at all. It may reasonably be 
conjectured that Friedman's (defensive) approach was influenced by Kaufmann 
(1942). In that case we have a possible link between Hutchison (1938) and 
Friedman's (1953) essay via Kaufmann (1942). Even if this were not so, Kaufmann 
still provides an important link between Hutchison and the later interventions of 
Friedman and Machlup. In attempting to refute what he saw as Hutchison's radical 
empiricism (sensationalism) and Knight's radical rationalism (supremacy of reason 
over sense), Kaufmann (1944: 15) paved the way for Friedman and Machlup to 
introduce a modified rationalism and conventionalism in terms of which empirical 
testability was considered to be relevant only to the predictions of a theory. 
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Hutchison's view, that the empirical testability of the assumptions was relevant, was 
conveniently ignored. This was because the methodological procedure adopted 
allowed both Friedman and Machlup to defend traditional economic theory (a la 
Robbins) yet seemingly adopt the new 'scientific' language of empirical testability. 
Hutchison's consistent empiricism involved too critical a stance towards the 
fundamentals of orthodox economic theory. It called for 'a fundamental alteration' in 
the orthodox approach to economic phenomena (Hutchison, 1938: 64). Kaufmann 
(1944: 228) denies that such a 'radically different' approach is needed. His response 
was to set the trend away from the more radical implications of Hutchison's thesis 
towards a defence of economic orthodoxy. 
According to Coats (1983), Kaufmann's views are constructive and could have helped 
resolve the later dispute between Machlup and Hutchison. This would have involved 
interpreting Kaufmann's heuristic postulates as· a third type of proposition, ie in 
addition to the analytic and synthetic types of proposition of Hutchison's twofold 
classification. Yet as Lowe (1942: 434) pointed out, to treat economic laws merely as 
heuristic postulates 'would simply enable the economist to avoid the implications of 
empirical tests by modifying his postulates' (Coats, 1983: 22). While such an option 
would be rejected out of hand in terms of Hutchison's methodology, it fitted in well 
with the instrumentalist and conventionalist approaches of adopted by Friedman and 
Machi up. 
Conclusion 
Four major points emerge as a result of the discussion of this chapter. First, much of 
the influence that Hutchison exerted on post-1938 methodological debate arose not so 
much because of his alleged positivist ideas, but rather because his 1938 intervention 
was interpreted as too critical of orthodox economic theory. Second, given Knight's 
forthright a prioristic stance in 1940, what is notable is the extent to which he and 
Hutchison came close to agreeing on several methodological issues. Third, after the 
Hutchison-Knight debate, the issues raised by Hutchison ceased to be cast as those 
between rationalism and empiricism. Fourth, there is a sense in which the Hutchison-
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Knight debate reflects a re-emergence of the long-standing methodenstreit m 
economics between rationalism and empiricism. 
The first point refers to our main organising principle of this and the next chapter. 
This involves a modification of Latsis's (1972) classification. Two interpretations of 
Hutchison's 193 8 are at issue. On the one hand, from the side of the apologetic 
defenders of the neoclassical (research) programme (Knight, Friedman and Machlup), 
Hutchison was viewed as too critical of orthodox economic theory. This issue, rather 
than purely methodological considerations, motivated their interventions. Against this 
is the interpretation adopted in this chapter that Hutchison's 1938 is to be viewed as 
primarily concerned with methodological issues, in particular applying an empiricist 
demarcation criterion to all areas of economics 'come what may'. 
The interpretation of Hutchison as primarily a critic of economic orthodoxy simply 
does not hold water. Hutchison (1938) agrees with the views of many orthodox 
economists (eg Smith, Jevons, Marshall and Knight!) and in his 1941 reply to Knight 
singles out Pareto, Schumpeter and Myrdal for approval (1941: 735). In a recent 
article he commented: 
I have come, more and more, in recent decades to see Frank Knight's Risk, 
Uncertainty and Profit (1921) as one of the most (or perhaps the most) 
important and valuable works of this century regarding the more profound, or 
methodological aspects of micro-economics. Jn fact, in Hutchison (1938), I 
think I probably drew more inspiration from this work than from any other work 
on economics (as my citations might suggest) (Hutchison, 1997: 147, n 7, 
emphasis added). 
As Hutchison (1998: 67) points out, in 1921 Knight was 'then, apparently in an "ultra-
empiricist" mode or mood'. Whether in 1921 or 1940 Knight remained in orthodox 
economics mode or mood. Apart from Hutchison's approving citation of leading 
neoclassicalists, Hutchison accepts various key aspects of orthodox economics such as 
Gossen's law or the law of diminishing marginal utility, the law of diminishing 
returns and Pareto's law as they were originally formulated as empirical 
propositions (1938: 60, 64, 134-5). It is their interpretation as a priori propositions 
that Hutchison rejects. Yet it was the extent to which leading apologetic defenders of 
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neoclassical orthodoxy chose to interpret Hutchison as attacking orthodoxy that threw 
Hutchison into the limelight and so brought the attention of the profession to focus on 
his methodological views. 
Second, we have pointed out several areas where Hutchison and Knight in 1940-1 
come surprisingly close. to agreement. Knight himself refers to the central issue of his 
debate with Hutchison as 'the view that the propositions of economic theory must be 
testable' (1941: 751). While Knight has been at pains to emphasise the extent to 
which economic propositions are testable only within limits given that testing is a 
social activity and hence requires social intercommunication and consensus (Knight, 
1940: 7.), Hutchison is far from espousing a naive empiricist or falsificationist stance 
regarding testing. Drawing, perhaps on his reading of Poincare, he fully accepts that 
testing involves a conventional element (1938: 145, 152). (Hutchison (1938: 65) 
approvingly cites Knight's - this time in his 1921 empiricist mode - statement that 
'the' goal of science is prediction). 
Another issue where Hutchison and Knight come closer to agreement than one might 
expect is on the extent, or significance, of the difference between the natural and 
social sciences. Knight is clear that the difference is so great that it is one of kind 
rather than degree (Knight, 1941: 752), while Hutchison (1938: 14-15) rejects this 
anti-naturalistic view. However, since 1938, Hutchison has revised his stance on this 
point going so far as to state that, while the differences may be only those of degree, 
they 'amount to such a considerable degree as to constitute a profound contrast' 
(1981: 276). One may reasonably infer that this was not one of the central props of 
Hutchison's position in 1938 so that the naturalistic-anti-naturalistic divide was 
narrower than may have appeared at the time. 
This is not to suggest that major differences between Knight and Hutchison did not 
exist in 1940-1. One only has to think of Knight's insistence on the existence of a 
third field of knowledge: that of human conduct which involved unobservable motives 
leading to observable results and not vice versa. Our point is that Knight was 
motivated to reply to Hutchison - and this accounts for the fierceness of his response 
- out of a desire to defend neoclassical orthodoxy against what he regarded as an 
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attack on its leading propositions. The casualty in this battle wa~ the depiction of 
Hutchison as occupying an extremist methodological position and the chance for a 
rapprochement in the on-going methodenstreit between rationalism and empiricism in 
the history of economics. 
This brings us to the third point. The Hutchison-Knight debate was one in which the 
main dividing methodological issue was that between rationalism and empiricism. As 
mentioned above, given the calibre of the two representatives of these positions, they 
both showed more understanding of each other's positions than might ordinarily be 
expected in such an exchange. Nevertheless, Knight's insistence on the existence of a 
third field of knowledge lay behind his view that the social sciences should be 
exempted from Hutchison's Principle of Testability, something to which Hutchison 
could never be expected to agree. After the Hutchison-Knight debate the clarity of the 
issue as one between rationalism and empiricism was lost. As Latsis has pointed out, 
Friedman and Machlup recast the terms of the debate. 
They - unlike Knight - do not wish to apply peculiar standards to the social 
sciences. They wanted what I call the neoclassical research programme to come 
out as satisfactory by general methodological standards (1972: 236). 
Indeed, Friedman (1953) presented his position as representing the 'methodology of 
positive economics'! In this vein, he appeared to accept Hutchison's Principle of 
Testability showing how empirical testing could, and should, be applied to the 
propositions of economic theory. In case anyone should decide not to restrict 
empirical testing to predictions and extend it more generally to include assumptions, 
Machlup (1955) made it clear that the adoption of such a procedure would represent 
an extremist, ultra-empiricist stance. Hutchison was chosen as the sole representative 
of such a position. In this way Machlup could both defend the neoclassical 
programme and isolate the all too independent and critical Hutchison. 
This brings us to the fourth point. With reference to the exchange between Hutchison. 
and Knight, Kaufmann comments: 
We have here before us, if somewhat revised, a methodological issue which has 
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troubled economists since the days of Karl Menger and Gustav Schmoller, even 
since those of Ricardo and Malthus (Kaufmann, 1942: 383). 
We would suggest that Kaufmann's point reflects a more accurate description of the 
perspective that should have been brought to bear in appraising Hutchison's (1938) 
contribution. Instead, in the process of attempting to defend the neoclassical 
programme, Friedman and Machlup succeeded in generating a quite wonderful degree 
of methodological confusion in economics. Unfortunately after making this helpful 
point Kaufmann (1942), under the influence of Dewey (1938), went on to suggest that 
the way to resolve the rationalist-empiricist debate in economics was to apply 
Dewey's pragmatism to the issues involved. As discussed earlier, this suggestion may 
possibly have led Friedman to his instrumentalist stance in his famous 1953 essay. 
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CHAPTERS 
THE INFLUENCE OF HUTCHISON'S INTERVENTION: MACHLUP 
No sooner had Robbins (1932) presented economics as a discipline with a body of 
propositions about which all reasonable individuals were in agreement than 
Chamberlin (1933) and Robinson (1933) disrupted this picture of scientific consensus. 
Robbins (1935) responded to the changed mood. The next year Keynes's General 
Theory caused an even bigger disruption by seeking to replace classical theory on the 
subject of employment. Two years later Hutchison's (1938) directly challenged 
Robbins's complacency concerning the status of economics as a science. Then Hall 
and Hitch (1939) questioned the relevance of the neoclassical theory of the firm, 
while Triffen (1940) attempted to carry further the work of Chamberlin (1933) and 
Robinson (1933). 
In this revolutionary decade of the 1930s Hutchison's methodological challenge may 
have been the last straw for Knight. Whatever the reason Knight's (1940) furious 
response represented the last attempt to explicitly represent and defend orthodox 
economics on a prioristic grounds. Hutchison (1938) had been launched on a wave of 
empiricist sentiment that was to push through until well into the 1960s. i;-ms trend 
increasingly made Knight's 1940 defence appear outmoded and called for a 'modem' 
reply to Hutchison that would show not only that neoclassical theory was quite 
consistent with the new methodology of science, but would also rebut Hutchison's 
criticisms using the new methodological framework. This was a tough call and it took 
thirteen years until Friedman (1953) delivered the next major methodological 
statement in economics. Although Friedman did not refer to Hutchison, his famous 
essay can be read as an indirect response to Hutchison's challenge. Machlup's (1955) 
more philosophically sophisticated piece not only shored up Friedman (1953), but 
sought to deal directly with the challenge posed by Hutchison (1938). 
Hutchison's (1938) was directly concerned with the basic postulates of economic 
theory, a topic that had formed the point of departure for the new theories of 
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monopolistic competition. He contested the method of arnvmg at economic 
propositions by deducing them from a few self-evident assumptions. Not only did he 
argue (in his chapters two and three) that using this method rendered these 
propositions empirically untestable, he also directly challenged the basic assumptions 
of this 'pure theory' in his chapter four. In this key chapter he challenged the 
'fundamental assumption' of maximising behaviour; the assumption of perfect 
knowledge and the assumption of a tendency to equilibrium. Robbins (1932, 1935) 
had distinguished between the fundamental assumptions of economics (scarcity, more 
than one factor of production, scales of valuation) and the 'expository devices' of 
maximising behaviour and perfect knowledge. 
Hutchison changed all this by placing the construct of the rational, maximising 
economic agent who operates with full and perfect information on center stage: 
this construct, in his mind, is the 'fundamental assumption' of economic theory. 
The status and importance of this 'unrealistic' assumption, its role in economic 
theory, and the nature of its testing are questions that were to dominate 
economic methodological debate in the 1950s (Caldwell, 1982: 117). 
-
In fact they were to become the focus of debate much sooner than the 1950s. The 
very next year Hall and Hitch (1939) challenged the very assumption that Hutchison 
had so recently shifted to centre stage. They found that the majority of firms in their 
survey set prices by adding a mark-up to average cost in a 'rule of thumb' way which 
would result in maximum profits only by chance. They thus questioned the 
neoclassical assumption of maximising behaviour. Prices were not set by equating 
marginal cost and revenue, but according to a full-cost principle. After the war this 
controversy was continued in England by Andrews (1949) and Robinson (1950) and, 
in America, by Lester (1946) and Machlup (1946). Meanwhile, in addition to Hall 
and Hitch' s findings, there was the challenge to orthodoxy presented by the theory of 
monopolistic competition. 
Taking up our theme from Chapter Four we will, following Latsis (1972), continue to 
cast Friedm~ and Machlup as apologetic defenders of the neoclassical programme. 
Although the first direct influence of Hutchison arises only in his 1955-6 exchange 
with Machlup, in order to evaluate this debate it necessary to understand the 
background to Machlup's (1955) intervention. To this end it is necessary to examine 
the period between Knight (1940) and Friedman (1953) in an effort to understand why 
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it took thirteen years for Friedman's 'modem' methodological reply to Hutchison 
(1938) to be forthcoming. In this intervening period the kinds of discussion are not 
clearly methodological or clearly economic, but are rather a mixture of the two. This 
is because we argue, in line with Latsis, that Friedman and Machlup were concerned 
primarily with defending orthodox economic theory - methodological considerations 
are used as back up when needed. 
The chapter divides the material prior to the Hutchison-Machlup exchange into three 
sections. In the first section we focus on Friedman's initial response to the theory of 
monopolistic competition. Here we note the similarity of his methodological views 
with those of Hutchison. The second section focuses on Machlup's engagement with 
the re-emergence of the marginalist or full-cost pricing controversy in the 1940s and 
contrasts his methodological views with those of Hutchison. The third section 
examines Friedman's (1953) showing how he begins to depart from Hutchison's 
views and, in doing so, adopts instrumentalism. The fourth section finally takes up 
the Hutchison-Machlup debate showing how Machlup adopts conventionalist 
stratagems to further shore up Friedman's defence and to explicitly and finally deal 
with Hutchison. We hope to arrive at a clearer understanding of how Hutchison 
(1938) was interpreted, and the way in which it influenced the debate in economics, in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
5.1 Friedman's pre-1953 methodology and Hutchison 
What we aim to do in this section is to show the extent to which Friedman's response 
to monopolistic competition embodied an empiricist approach remarkably similar to 
that of Hutchison. But first the key difference. In his desire to defend neoclassical 
theory Friedman adopted instrumentalism (Boland, 1979). In doing so he parted 
company with Hutchison who subscribed to Popperian fallibilism. According to 
Niiniluoto (1998: 181), 'fallibilism as an epistemological doctrine was born as a 
middle way between dogmatism and scepticism'. Apart from this, Friedman 
implicitly follows Hutchison's methodology, as described in Chapter Three. Given 
that Hutchison was not against economic orthodoxy per se, but only against its 
formulation in terms of an a priorist-deductivist-leaning methodology, and that his 
approach formed part of the early twentieth century resurgence of empiricism, such a 
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correspondence appears much more likely than Machlup's later depiction of 
Hutchison (1938) as representing an extremist fringe of methodological opinion. 
As Hammond points out (1998: 197), Friedman studied under Burns, Viner, and 
Mitchell. Friedman was thus directly influenced by the two leading American 
institutionalists of his day. Furthermore, under Burns and Viner Friedman was 
introduced to another economist whose methodological views were in line with those 
of Hutchison: Alfred Marshall. In the following we argue that Friedman was close to 
Hutchison's approach in three directions (at least as compared to Machlup). First, and 
most importantly, Friedman sympathised with Hutchison's inductivist-empiricist 
approach as opposed to the hypothetico-deductive-empiricist approach. Secondly, 
they both wanted theory to be of practical assistance for policy guidance. Thirdly, 
their interest in methodology arose from their interest in economic issues rather than 
from the philosophy of science. Here we look at two examples of this similarity. 
The first example concerns the development of econometrics: Friedman's (1941) 
criticism of Tinbergen' s (l 939a). For Friedman, the statistical equations in 
Tinbergen's model are 'an analogue of the Walrasian equations of general 
equilibrium' (1941: 658). He points out that Tinbergen's variables have been selected 
because they yield high coefficients of correlation (ibid: 659). Against this Friedman 
cites Mitchell's (1928: 266-7) criticism: 
A competent statistician, with sufficient clerical assistance and time at his 
command, can take almost any pair of time series for a given period and work 
them into forms which will yield coefficients of correlation exceeding +- .9 ... 
So work of [this] sort ... must be judged, not by the coefficients of correlation 
obtained within the periods for which they have manipulated the data, but by the 
coefficients which they get in earlier or later periods to which their formulas 
may be applied. 
Friedman contends that Tinbergen makes no such attempt. These and other points are 
reasons why Friedman rejects Tinbergen's claim to provide 'an empirically tested 
explanation of business cycle movements' (1941: 660). While the formalisation of 
econometric techniques, boosted by Haavelmo (1944), led to Koopmans's (1947) 
depiction of Burns and Mitchell's (1946) as embracing 'outdated' quantitative 
techniques, Friedman (and Hutchison) would not have agreed. 
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The second example concerns developments in general equilibrium theory. Here we 
have several instances of Friedman's criticisms. Friedman (194 la) explicitly rejected 
of Triffen' s ( 1940) ~ttempt to set the theory of monopolistic competition in a general 
equilibrium framework. (Friedman also rejected the view that the more realistic 
assumptions of monopolistic competition gave rise to benefits which exceeded those 
of working with the admittedly less realistic assumptions of Marshallian theory since 
it meant giving up the benefits of the industry as the unit of analysis.) Friedman's 
reason for rejecting the move Triffen suggested was that it conflicted with his (and 
Hutchison's) methodological priorities. Like Marshall, Friedman's priority was on 
keeping hypotheses close to a factual basis and able to generate predictions 
(Hammond, 1998: 199). Triffen's suggested formalisation of monopolistic 
competition substituted this priority for another: abstractedness, generality and 
mathematical elegance (ibid). 
In the same vein a few years later Friedman (1946) criticised Lange's (1944) work 
published by the Cowles Commission as being over formal and under empirical, two 
themes dear to both Mitchell and Hutchison. Friedman investigates the problem of 
why, despite Lange's 'brilliant display of formal logic', his 'analysis seems unreal and 
artificial' (1946: 277). Furthermore he points out that, according to Lange, 'only 
under very special conditions does price flexibility result in the automatic 
maintenance' of full employment (ibid: 281). Despite this, Lange holds that these 
'very special conditions' were realized from the 1840s until 1914. This apparent 
contradiction emphasizes 'the fundamental weakness of [Lange's] kind of theorizing' 
(ibid: 282). He proceeds to outline three main criticisms of Lange's analysis. 
_ Friedman's first criticism concerns Lange's theoretical approach. In the approach to 
theorizing in the physical sciences, the theorist starts with observed facts (ibid: 282). 
The theory is used to derive generalisations about the real world. 'A theory that has 
no implications that facts can contradict is useless for prediction' (ibid: 283). Lange's 
analysis does not start with observed facts, and it ends up with conclusions 'no 
observed facts can contradict'. Lange concentrates on logical consistency, not 
empirical application or test. 'The theory provides formal models of imaginary 
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worlds, not generalisations about the real world' (ibid: 283). This fir~t criticism could 
have been taken directly from Hutchison (1938). 
Friedman secondly points to the weaknesses of Lange's type of formal theorizing. In 
order to consider an indefinitely large number of variables, it has to oversimplify to 
such an extent that it loses empirical meaning. For example, while his classifications 
appear to have meaning, in order to apply them to his entire analysis, he is forced to 
define them in a way that eliminates their empirical content. Friedman finally points 
to 'errors of execution' fostered by Lange's approach. Some arise from a desire to 
simplify by ruling out possibilities purely by asserting they are unrealistic without 
presenting any empirical evidence. Others arise from a desire to be more realistic. 
But this increased realism is gained only by the sacrifice of logic. For example, 
although there is .no place in Lange's system for time lags, or uncertainty concerning 
expectations about future prices, Lange attempts to introduce these (Friedman, 1946: 
286). 
Friedman concludes that Lange's analysis consists of unsupported empirical 
statements and theoretical conclusions not very relevant to the real world. The lack of 
relevance that derives from oversimplification and formal classification is concealed 
by the 'errors of execution' enumerated above. While the correction of these errors 
would make the analysis formally correct, it would make it clear that the analysis has 
only the remotest bearing on problems of policy (ibid: 299). 
The basic sources of the defects in Lange's theoretical analysis are the emphasis 
on formal structure, the attempt to generalize without first specifying in detail 
the facts to be generalized, and the failure to recognize that the ultimate test of 
the validity of a theory is not conformity to the canons of formal logic but the 
ability to deduce facts that have not yet been observed, that are capable of being 
contradicted by observation, and that subsequent observation does not 
contradict (ibid: 300). 
As with the first criticism, Friedman's further criticisms and his conclusion above 
could all have been taken directly from Hutchison (1938). 
Yet another instance of Friedman's concern with general equilibrium analysis is his 
(1947) review of Lerner's (1944) Economics of Control. Lerner analyses the problem 
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of maximising economic welfare. He is concerned with deriving the formal 
conditions for an optimum and the institutional arrangements for achieving these 
conditions. While it appears as if the book contains a programme for economic 
reform, the institutional proposals are 'almost entirely irrelevant' to the formal 
analysis (Friedman, 1947: 301). Friedman's chief criticism is that Lerner writes as if 
it is possible to base conclusions about appropriate institutional arrangements on the 
formal conditions for an optimum. 'Unfortunately, this cannot be done' (ibid: 316). 
It is possible to construct institutional arrangements which would permit the formal 
conditions for an optimum to be satisfied. However, this would not constitute a 
realistic appraisal of the economic problems involved. 
While Friedman's criticism of Lerner and Lange's over-formal and under-empirical 
analysis is no doubt influenced by his work under Mitchell and by his reading of 
Alfred Marshall, we have been at pains to show how closely in line it was with 
Hutchison's approach. Not only did Friedman and Hutchison both pursue an 
inductivist-empiricist approach that was critical of abstract general theoretical 
systems, they were both interested in the ability of economic theory to provide 
practically relevant predictions for policy guidance. Finally it was this interest that 
led to their excursions into methodology. While we have not shown any direct 
influence running from Hutchison (1938) to Friedman's various writings in the 1940s, 
the closeness of the similarities appears to support a case for at least some indirect 
influence. More importantly, we are now in a position to show how, when we turn to 
consider Machlup's methodological interventions, Machlup's position contrasts with 
that of Friedman, and not only with that of Hutchison. This supports our argument 
that Machlup misrepresented Hutchison in their 1955-6 exchange. With these 
considerations in mind, we now tum to examine the nature of Machlup's intervention 
focusing on his exchange with Lester. 
5.2 Machlup, the marginalist controversy, and Hutchison 
Hutchison (1938) had disagreed with Robbins's categorisation of maximising 
behaviour and perfect knowledge as subsidiary rather than the fundamental 
assumptions of economics. In his key chapter four he had presented the maximum 
principle, perfect expectations and a tendency to equilibrium as 'the basic postulates 
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of pure theory'. The fact that these assumptions became the centre of two major 
controversies, the monopolistic competition and the marginalist or full-cost pricing, 
debates suggests Hutchison's indirect influence. This should have lent greater 
authority and stature to Hutchison's work. That it didn't was partly due to 
Hutchison's all too independently critical methodological stance regarding economic 
orthodoxy, but also partly to Machlup's (1955) portrayal of Hutchison's 
methodological position as extremist. 
In this section we contrast Machlup's position with the three points held in common 
by both Hutchison (1938) and Friedman's 1940s interventions. We argue that 
Machlup is decidedly out of sympathy with the first point: their inductivist-empiricist 
stance. : Instead he leans much more than Friedman towards hypothetico-deductivist 
empiricism. His priorities place abstractness and generality before the need to anchor 
hypotheses closely to fact. Regarding the second point, although he accepts the need 
for empirical testing, he is forever at pains to emphasise just how difficult it is to test 
predictions given the nature of the subject matter with which economics has to deal, 
and how difficult it is to apply economic theory to the world of experience (Machlup, 
1939: 233-4). Regarding the third point, in contrast to either Friedman or Hutchison, 
Machlup explains how he was brought up in the deeply philosophical atmosphere of 
the Vienna associated with Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle, Popper 'and wrote about 
methodology from the early 1920s' (Machlup, 1978: x). His background and 
orientation is more methodological and philosophical than either Friedman or 
Hutchison. For instance, it is difficult to imagine Hutchison in 1978 writing a fifty 
odd page chapter on 'What is meant by methodology' (Machlup, 1978, ch 1). 
Machlup used this background to mount a defence of neoclassical orthodoxy. In 
doing so he chose to cast Hutchison as an extremist. 
In seeking to bring out these aspects of Machlup's methodological stance, we will 
focus mainly on his exchange with Lester since this allows us, in addition, to 
understand and appreciate how Machlup' s ( 195 5) engagement with Hutchison fits 
into, and arises from, the marginalist controversy. 
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The Lester-Mach/up exchange of 1946 
The Lester-Machlup exchange of 1946 that marked the re-emergence of the 
marginalist controversy appears to be the major direct factor leading not only to 
Machlup (1955) but also to Friedman (1953). In this section we will concentrate on 
Machlup's role in this controversy, leaving Friedman (1953) for the next section. 
Lester ( 1946) points out that protests that firms do not operate on the marginal 
principle have failed to shake the confidence of textbook writers who have devoted 
more and more space to 'complicated graphs' (p 63). 1 A gap, however, exists 
between the marginal theory of the firm and general theories concerning employment, 
money, and the business cycle 'which may not mention the principle at all' (p 63). 
His paper represents a step towards bridging the gap. The conclusions of his paper 
are based mainly on 'written replies by 50 odd concerns to questions concerning the 
relative role of different factors in determining their employment . . . and probable 
adjustments to an increase in [relative] wages' (p 64). 'It is clear from numerous 
-
interviews that most business executives do not think of employment as a function of 
wage rates but as a function of output [demanded]' (p 67). Like Harrod's (1939) 
study, his study also found that entrepreneurs do not think in terms of marginal 
variable cost. They seem convinced that profits increase with output until capacity 
and have no faith in the validity of U-shaped marginal cost curves (p 70). According 
to the data collected, methods of manufacture do not readily adjust to changes in 
relative costs of productive factors (p 73). It is questionable as to whether wage 
reductions will lead to more employment. Specifically, according to the 
questionnaires, lower wages in the South have not led employers to use more labour 
and less machinery compared to the North (p 75). 'Unlike economists, business 
executives tend to think of costs and profits as dependent upon the rate of output, 
rather than the reverse (the rate of output as dependent upon the level of cost)' (p 81). 
His paper, he says, raises grave doubts as to the validity of conventional marginal 
theory and the assumptions on which it rests. 
1 Unsupported page references in this paragraph are to Lester ( 1946) 
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Lester (1946) is very much an empiricist intervention showing little patience with 
abstract theory and 'complicated graphs' .. He challenges the neoclassical view that 
entrepreneurs attempt to maximise profits by adjusting output until marginal cost 
equals marginal revenue. It is simply not applicable to the world of business. His 
conclusion is based on the inductivist technique of studying the responses to 
questionnaires handed to business men. It represents a much more 'ultra-empirical' 
stance than Hutchison's (1938). Let us see how Machlup responds. 
Machlup (1946) starts by pointing out that while critics revolt against marginalism, as 
the logical process of finding a maximum, it is clearly implied in the so-called 
economic principle - striving to achieve with given means a maximum of ends. The 
critics of business behaviour are not correct. The alleged inapplicability of marginal 
analysis is often due to a failure to understand it, or to a mistaken interpretation of 
findings (p 520).2 Machlup divides his article into two sections: marginal analysis of 
the single firm, and empirical research on the single firm. 
Regarding marginal analysis of the single firm, Machlup says that any attempt to test 
marginalist theory through empirical research presupposes full understanding of the 
theory. He argues that it does not give a complete explanation of the determination of 
output, prices, and employment. Rather, it explains the effects which certain changes 
in conditions may have upon the actions of the firm. The concept of equilibrium is a 
tool in this theory of change; the marginal calculus is its dominating principle (p 521 ). 
Machlup now examines the relationship between marginal revenue and cost of output. 
Costs, revenues and profits are all subjective. 'Marginal analysis of the firm should 
not be understood as · implying anything but subjective estimates, guesses and 
hunches' (p 522). While, for the business man, the range of possibilities for price and 
output variation is much narrower than the typical curves an instructor draws on a 
blackboard, this does not alter the principles of marginal analysis. In view of attempts 
to derive statistical cost curves from accounting data - which refers to the past - it 
should be noted that marginal cost and revenue concepts refer to expectations of 
future conditions (p 523). Marginal analysis rests on the assumption that the firm 
2 Unsupported page references for the remainder of this sub-section are to Machlup (1946). 
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attempts to maximise its profits (p 525). This is not to deny other non-pecuniary 
considerations. However, it is methodologically sounder not to reduce them to money 
terms since then whatever a business man does is explained by the principle of profit 
maximisation. The analysis would then acquire the character of a system of 
definitions and tautologies, and lose much of its value as an explanation of reality (p 
526). 
Machlup now turns to examine the relationship between marginal productivity and 
cost of input. The determination of output on the basis of factor cost and factor 
product is merely the reverse side of the above analysis, except that the significant 
magnitudes are units of factors and units of product. Almost everything regarding the 
analysis of output holds true, mutatis mutandis, in regard to the meaning of marginal 
productivity and marginal cost of input (p 533). Only the process by which marginal 
productivity may be derived seems so formidable that an analogy will help explain the 
apparent contradiction (p 536). Machlup's analogy is that of the automobile driver 
trying to overtake a truck. The explanation of his action must often include steps of 
reasoning which the acting individual himself does not consciously perform. 'To call, 
on these grounds, the theory invalid, unrealistic or inapplicable, is to reveal failure to 
understand the basic methodological constitution of most social sciences' (p 535). 
Equipped with this understanding of the meaning of marginal analysis, we may 
proceed to a discussion of the empirical findings which purportedly fail to verify it. 
Let us examine the nature of Machlup's response. He contends that critics of 
marginalism fail to properly interpret or understand the theory. Machlup provides a 
more complex account of what the theory is about. This concern with the meaning of 
the theory appears to reflect a philosophical predisposition. His main point is that the 
theory deals with subjective rather than objective empirical factors, and furthermore, 
with expectations of these subjective magnitudes. He readily defends the abstractness 
of the theory using his automobile analogy. It should be apparent that this response is 
far from the inductivist-empiricist orientation of Friedman or Hutchison. A further 
point is that Machlup accepts that marginal analysis rests on the assumption of profit 
maximisation. This is to accept Hutchison's rather than Robbins's stress on this 
assumption as fundamental. While it is difficult to say if this reflects Hutchison's 
influence, it is interesting that Machlup also warns against the dangers of analysis 
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based on this assumption becoming tautological, a well-known theme of Hutchison 
(1938). 
Regarding empirical .research on the single firm, Machlup says the impressions gained 
from questionnaires which appear to form an empirical basis for doubting marginal 
analysis is due to a .naive acceptance of rationalisations in lieu of genuine 
explanations of actions (p 536). The vast majority of business men have never heard 
of expressions of such as elasticity of demand, marginal revenue or cost. How then 
can they be supposed to think in such terms? This does not imply that marginal 
analysis is unrealistic since it is usually possible to translate the terms. Answers to 
questionnaires are likely to be rationalisations in terms that make the actions appear 
plausible and justified to the inquirer (p 537). 
Regarding average cost and price, the marginal calculus may be followed without 
pronouncing or knowing any of the terms in question. The average cost figures, 
despite their prominent place in our business man's statement, had no place in his 
actual decision which was based on the profitableness of the added business. Since 
accountants have emphasised the point that selling price must cover average cost, 'is 
it then surprising that business men try to explain their pricing methods by average-
cost considerations?' (p 540). Contrary to the critics many of their findings confirm 
rather than contradict marginal analysis (p 545). 
Whereas the average cost theory has been advanced as a substitute for the marginal 
theory, no substitute has been put forward from those who decried marginal 
productivity and wage theory. In any case, statistical studies of the relationship 
between wage rates and employment would be nearly useless because we have no 
__ way of eliminating the simultaneous effects of several other significant variables, 
especially those of a psychological nature (p 548). Lester's questionnaires on 
employment, variable cost and adjustments all suffer from many weaknesses. 
Machlup concludes that the marginal theory of business conduct of the firm has not 
been disproved by recent empirical tests (p 553). Furthermore, empirical research 
cannot assure useful results if it employs the method of mailed questionnaires, if it is 
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confined to direct questions, and if it aims at testing too broad and. formal principles 
rather than narrowly defined hypotheses (p 554). 
What is of interest here is Machlup' s response to the charge that businessmen say they 
do not consider marginal revenue or cost in their business practice. He claims that 
they do, but do so unconsciously. The reason they say they do not is that they are 
unfamiliar ·with these technical terms of economic theory. The replies to the 
questionnaires can therefore be interpreted as confirming the marginal theory of the 
firm. Here Machlup takes issue with Lester not by resorting to empirical evidence of 
any kind. Instead he argues along a priori lines that Lester wrongly interprets the 
responses to his questionnaires. In doing so, Machlup is at the same time arguing in 
favour of the realism of the assumptions of the theory, but on a priori and 
introspective, rather than empirical, grounds (1955: 17; Blaug, 1980: 105). Friedman 
(1953) was to change this. 
We are not attempting a thorough interpretation of Machlup's complex 
methodological position in so short a space. Rather, we are simply drawing attention 
to the extent to which there are differences between his and that of Friedman's (1953) 
responses to criticism of the marginal theory of the firm. Our aim in this has been to 
show that, while Friedman and Machlup were equally keen defenders of neoclassical 
theory, the pre-1953 Friedman was considerably more sympathetic to empiricism than 
Machlup. Machlup's criticism of Hutchison needs to be seen in this light. We now 
turn to Friedman (1953 ). 
5.3 Friedman's 1953 essay and Hutchison 
In noting similarities between Friedman's pre-1953 methodology and that of 
Hutchison, we focused on the extent to which Friedman shared Hutchison's 
inductivist-empiricism and his view that theory should be practically useful. This led 
to their being critical of formalist tendencies in economics: abstractedness, generality 
and mathematical elegance pursued as ends in themselves. By contrast we have seen· 
in the previous section that Machlup was far more at home in explaining the need for 
abstraction and generality in economic theory. 
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According to Hammond (1998), Friedman's methodology involved (I) a rejection of 
the (Walrasian) formalisation of theory and (2) a rejection of the assumptions of 
monopolistic competition as representing progress in economic theory. We have 
described how Friedman responded to the first point in his pre-1953 phase. We note 
in passing that Friedman (1955: 908) again criticised Walras for favouring form over 
substance. He suggested that, like Marshall, we favour substance over form. 
We now turn to describe how Friedman parted company with Hutchison on that long-
standing issue in the history of economics: the realism of assumptions. It is widely 
agreed that the central theme of Friedman (1953), 'the centerpiece of postwar 
economic methodology', concerned the 'irrelevance-of-assumptions thesis' (Blaug, 
1980: 103). Many also (including Friedman himself) regard this central argument as 
involving a mainly instrumentalist methodology (Boland, 1979; Caldwell, 1982). 
Boland has pointed out that conventionalist and inductivist elements are also to be 
found in Friedman's essay (1979: 507-8). In this section we will be concerned with 
the extent to which, apart from his instrumentalism, Friedman's (1953) is m 
agreement with Hutchison's methodology. The view of Hutchison's (1938) as 
representing an extremist position needs to be revised, and to be seen as the viewpoint 
of someone, namely Machlup, highly sceptical of empiricism. 
Friedman 's Essay 
In examining Friedman's essay, we focus on two aspects. Concerning the first aspect 
we argue that Friedman still follows a path broadly similar to Hutchison. It is with 
regard to the second aspect that they part company. 
A. The first aspect relates to Friedman's characterisation of positive economics. 
Friedman states that his essay is concerned with the 'problem of how to decide 
whether a suggested hypothesis should be tentatively accepted as part of [the positive 
science of economics]' (p 3).3 This echoes Hutchison's problem in 1938. Given the 
confusion surrounding Keynes's (1891) distinction between economics as a positive 
and normative science, Friedman attempts to clarify the relation between these 
3 Unsupported page references in this sub-section are to Friedman (1953). 
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branches. The task of positive economics 'is to provide a system of generalizations 
that can be used to make correct predictions' (p 4). Positive economics 'is, or can be, 
an "objective" science, in precisely the same sense as any of the physical sciences' (p 
4). While there are differences on issues of policy, these differences derive from 
positive rather than normative issues and so can be resolved by progress in positive 
economics. 
Hutchison would be in enthusiastic agreement with Friedman's concern with 
predictions as the goal of economic science. However, as we discussed in Chapter 
Three, even in 193 8 Hutchison never went as far as Friedman in his adherence to the 
naturalistic, or unity of science, thesis. Later, Hutchison described Friedman's 
adherence to this thesis as 'thoroughly "naturalist"' (1960: xii). Here Friedman merits 
the extremist tag far more than Hutchison, a point missed by Machlup. Hutchison 
(1954) considers that Friedman is rather 'optimistic' in his view that policy 
differences derive from the positive, rather than the normative side. (Regarding this 
well known distinction, Boland (1979: 507) points to its inductivist origins.) 
Friedman goes on to describe theory as both a 'language' and 'a body of substantive 
hypotheses designed to abstract essential features of complex reality'. As a language 
it is no more than a set of tautologies designed 'to serve as a filing system for 
organizing empirical material' (p 7). As a body of substantive hypotheses, it 'is to be 
judged by its predictive power' (p 8). Only factual evidence can show whether it is to 
be tentatively 'accepted' or 'rejected'. Since the number of hypotheses is infinite 
while the number of facts is finite, there will generally be a number of hypotheses 
consistent with the facts (p 9). Choice between these hypotheses will be based more 
on considerations of 'simplicity' and 'fruitfulness' than on logical consistency (p 10). 
While the inability to conduct controlled experiments hinders the testing of theories 
by the success of their predictions, the real significance of non-experimental evidence 
is that it is 'far more difficult to interpret' (p 10). This makes the 'weeding-out of 
unsuccessful hypotheses slow and difficult' and fosters 'a retreat into purely formal or 
tautological analysis' (p 11 ). 
So far Friedman could well have been reflecting the methodology proposed by 
Hutchison (1938). They both view the ability of a theory to yield predictions as vital 
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ifthe theory is not to 'retreat into purely formal or tautological analysis'. Friedman's 
distinction between theory as a language and a body of substantive hypotheses 
corresponds, if only very roughly, to Hutchison's distinction between pure. and 
applied theory. On this point Caldwell (1982: 176) interprets Friedman's reference to 
theory as a language as his way of describing theory as a hypothetico-deductive 
system. Thus interpreted a theory has no meaning until certain empirical counterparts 
are designated (presumably via the indirect testability hypothesis). This, Caldwell 
claims, is a step Hutchison failed to take. We have argued in Chapter Three that 
Hutchison retained a sceptical stance towards hypothetico-deductivism. We are not 
dealing here, as Caldwell seems to imply, with someone who does not properly 
understand the role of the indirect testability hypothesis. Rather we are dealing here 
with someone who maintains a healthy dose of inductivism is needed in scientific 
investigation. In line with this interpretation, Friedman's emphasis on the importance 
of factual evidence would be enthusiastically endorsed by Hutchison. His seemingly 
inductivist point that empirical evidence is important in constructing and not only in 
testing hypotheses likewise would meet with Hutchison's, but not with Machlup's, 
approval. At this stage Friedman expands on his earlier irrelevance-of-assumptions 
thesis and in doing so parts company with Hutchison. 
B. Earlier, Friedman had stated his controversial irrelevance-of-assumptions thesis: 
'the only relevant test of the validity of a hypothesis is comparison of its predictions 
with experience' (pp 8-9, original emphasis). Friedman now points out that a·further 
difficulty of gathering evidence for testing implications (ie apart from the 'retreat into 
purely formal analysis') is that it tempts one 'to suppose that hypotheses have not 
only "implications" but also "assumptions" and that testing these against "reality" 
amounts to a test which is different from or additional to the test by implications' (p 
14, original emphasis). Such a view is fundamentally wrong. 'In so far as a theory 
can be said to have "assumptions" at all, and in so far as their "realism" can be judged 
independently of the validity of predictions, the relation between the significance of a 
theory and the "realism" of its "assumptions" is almost the opposite of that suggested 
by the view under criticism ... in general, the more significant the theory, the more 
unrealistic the assumptions (in this sense)' (p 14). (The converse does not hold: 
assumptions that are unrealistic do not guarantee a significant theory (p 14, n 12).) 
Rather than be 'descriptively realistic', assumptions should be 'sufficiently good 
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approximations for the purpose in hand' and this depends· on whether the theory 
yields sufficiently accurate predictions. 'The two supposedly independent tests thus 
reduce to one test' (p 15). Disregard of the above led to the development of the 
theory of imperfect competition and to the discussion on marginal analysis in the 
American Economic Review. Later (p 30), he again points out that his essay relates 
directly to criticism of orthodox economic theory as 'unrealistic' citing Veblen (1898) 
and Oliver (1947). On this issue he could well have cited Hutchison (1938). 
Hutchison (1960: xiii) admits difficulty m trying to make sense of Friedman's 
seemingly radical solution to criticism of the assumptions of orthodox theory as 
unrealistic. He points out that Friedman himself (p 23) draws attention to ambiguity 
surrounding the concept of assumptions.4 Yet, despite failing to clear up this 
ambiguity, Friedman proceeds to 'blast' attempts to test theories by examining the 
'realism' of their assumptions. Moreover, Hutchison contends, Friedman appears to 
reintroduce the concepts of 'assumptions' and 'realism' under different names. For 
example, Friedman stresses that 'full and comprehensive evidence' is vital 'in 
constructing hypotheses' (pp 12-13). Hutchison argues that when Friedman later (p 
23) outlines the positive roles that assumptions play in theory, he is implicitly 
concerned with the realism of the assumptions of a theory (1960: xiv). 
What follows from our discussion of Friedman's essay, especially the first aspect (A), 
is the somewhat surprising extent to which Hutchison is in agreement with 
Friedman's methodology. Regarding the second aspect (B) of Friedman's essay 
Hutchison's major reservation concerns the irrelevance-of assumptions thesis. Here 
his conclusion is that his disagreement with Friedman may be purely verbal. 
Elsewhere he complains that Friedman's defence of the maximisation-of-returns 
hypothesis is apt to come 'perilously clo.se to presenting theory as a pure tautology' 
(Hutchison, 1954). In particular, Hutchison notes, Friedman appears to reject the 
procedure of using questionnaire studies of business behaviour as a possible way out 
of this peril. 
4 Here Musgrave (1981) would have done much to clear up this ambiguity. 
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In terms of our adoption of Latsis's classification, Hutchison's disagreement with 
Friedman is not verbal, but rather stems from Friedman's apologetic defence of 
existing price theory. In this defence Friedman resorted to instrumentalism. 
Hutchison, by contrast, follows Popper's fallibilistic approach which underlies his 
critical attitude to 'existing price theory'. This is why Hutchison (1960: xiv), for 
example, finds Friedman's account of explanation or prediction inadequate. As Blaug 
has noted, Friedman is 'not really interested in testing the maximisation-of-returns 
hypothesis and is instead seeking to confirm it (1980: 117). We end this section by 
noting Friedman's acknowledgement that his methodological essay was a direct 
response to challenges posed by the theories of monopolistic competition and full cost 
pricing to orthodox price theory (pp 30-1 ). This provides evidence for our view that 
Machlup's 1955-6 response to Hutchison is properly interpreted as an integral part of 
Friedman and Machlup's defence of orthodoxy. 
5.4 Hutchison's 1955-1956 exchange with Machlup 
In this section of the chapter we aim to show how the a priori-leaning nature of 
Machlup's defence of the orthodox theory of the firm is continued in his 1955 article 
on verification in economics. In this article we argue that, while Machlup sought to 
present his own position as a sensible middle of the way one between the extremes of 
a priorism and empiricism (Machlup, 1955: 17, n 42; 1956: 485), it is in fact much 
closer to a priorism than he makes it out to be. To the extent that this is true, it points 
to the view that the exchange between Machlup and Hutchison is more accurately 
represented as yet another instance of the long-standing methodenstreit in economics 
between empiricism and rationalism. We argue that Hutchison should be viewed as a 
reaffirmation, of the empiricist stand in the wake of the then recent resurgence of 
rationalism in the form of Robbins (1932, 1935). Machlup misrepresents Hutchison 
as an extreme empiricist when, as we have seen in the last few sections, he is no more 
extreme than Friedman. Yet Machlup (1955), far from distancing himself from 
Friedman, embraces his 1953 essay and defends it in his own 1955 intervention 
(1955: 17, n 42). While Machlup presented the disagreement regarding the 'problem 
of verification' as one between methodological extremes, issue at stake also 
concerned the apologetic defence of neoclassical theory. As such Machlup's 
sophisticated methodological arguments were the means to this end. 
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Before turning to examine these arguments, we take a more general look at Machlup's 
methodology. As mentioned before, we do not attempt the ambitious task of 
interpretation, but instead limit ourselves to such further clarification as will help us in 
understanding his 1955 attack on Hutchison. To this end, we briefly examine Latsis's 
(197 6) classification of Machi up's position as 'conventionalist'. We drew attention in 
our Introduction to the two very different senses in which the term 'conventionalism' 
is used. Latsis (1976) and Boland (1979) appear to be primarily concerned with the 
extent to which conventionalist stratagems can be used to defend some particular 
dogma in the face of Popperian falsificationism. 
According to Latsis (1976: 9), 'conventionalism grew out of Kant's apriorism'. 
While it agreed with Kant that the mind interprets experience within a framework, this 
framework was not fixed according to Kant's categories, but could be adjusted to 
interpret any experience. Pareto (1909), following Poincare (1902), introduced 
conventionalism to economics. In their defence of the 'neoclassical research 
programme', Machlup (1946, 1952, 1955) and Friedman (1953) have presented 
conventionalist methodologies. 5 Latsis identifies Machi up's view - that 'qualitative 
indirect testability' rather than (empirical) falsifiability is the appropriate criterion for 
appraising a theory - as an example of conventionalism (1976: 10). As such he 
[Machlup] 'repeatedly argues that counter-intuitive and apparently refuted 
assumptions may nevertheless be valuable for explanation and prediction in 
neoclassical microeconomics' (ibid: 10). For Latsis, Machlup's response to the 
potential empirical falsification of a theory nicely reflects 'the defensive attitude of 
conventionalist methodology': 
When there is an apparent conflict between observations and the theory they are 
supposed to test, the observations can usually be disqualified as of uncertain 
reliability; and where this will not do the conflict can usually be reconciled by 
means of auxiliary hypotheses (Machlup, 1952: 73, cited in Latsis, 1976: 11). 
5 Latsis (1976: 12) identifies Friedman's conventionalist methodology as corresponding to what 
Samuelson (1963: 232) has called the 'F-twist': 'to be important ... a hypothesis must be 
descriptively false in its assumptions'. This is a stronger version of Friedman's irrelevance-of. 
assumptions thesis. 
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It is this unwillingness in principle to allow empirical observatio.qs to 'disqualify' 
theory that offends Popperian-minded economists such as Latsis and Boland, and, 
long before them, Hutchison. 
While Machlup (1978: 460) happily accepts Latsis's classification of him as a 
conventionalist, he interprets such a label in the very different, and more general, 
sense of conventionalism referred to earlier. Conventionalism in this sense is a 
nominalist rather than a realist interpretation of concepts, unobservable terms, and 
propositions in scientific theories. We saw in Chapter One that, while Poincare 
applied a conventionalist interpretation to concepts and unobservable terms, he was 
far more cautious about extending such an interpretation to propositions and laws. By 
contrast, Machlup is quite happy to label, what he specifically terms 'basic 
propositions' as no more than conventions. This, we venture to say, is probably 
because his methodological position, as we have mentioned before and attempt to 
highlight when we turn to his 1955-6 exchange with Hutchison, encompasses 
significant a priorist elements. And it is these a priorist elements, rather than 
Machlup's conventionalism, that we argue underlie his attack on what he appeared to 
regard as the then most significant statement for the inductivist-empirical-historical 
side of the methodenstreit. 
Mach/up's problem of verification in economics 
In our examination of Machlup (1955) we consider two main points. First we focus 
on his classification (and criticism) of (extreme) methodological positions in 
economics. Second we turn to his argument that not all assumptions, and particularly 
not 'fundamental' assumptions, need to be verified. 
A. Machlup's avowed aim is to settle the controversial issue of what kinds of 
propositions can be verified, and whether or not all scientific propositions should be 
verified or at least verifiable. He presents two extreme positions concerning, what he 
terms, 'the problem of verification in economics'. 
At one end of the spectrum economic science is regarded as 
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. a system of a priori truths, a product of pure reasop, an exact science reaching 
laws as· universal as those of mathematics, a purely axiomatic discipline, a 
system of pure deductions from a series of postulates, not open to any 
verification or refutation on the ground of experience (p 5). 6 
Writers in this mould include von Mises (1949), Knight (1924), Weber (1949), 
Robbins (1935), and even further back by Cairnes (1875), Senior (1836) and John 
Stuart Mill (1836). While the position as described above might sound 'provocative', 
Machlup (somewhat strangely!) assures the reader that such (a priorist!) writers were 
quite happy to test the predictions of economics and objected only to testing the 
assumptions of economic theory in isolation (p 7). 
Here we note Machlup's immediate defence of this extreme position: it is, he argues, 
not really 'provocative'. Indeed, it appears to coincide remarkably with the so-called 
moderate view in which Machi up casts himself which accepts testing of predictions, 
but not independent tests of assumptions! The same treatment is not meted out to 
'extremists' at the other end of his spectrum. 
This is the position of ultra-empiricism, or the view that propositions at any level of 
analysis must be independently verifiable. This extreme empiricism, associated with 
William James's (1912) radical empiricism, is the one usually discussed and criticised 
in philosophy and reflected in the historical, institutional and quantitative schools of 
economic thought (p 8, n 26). The assumptions of economic theory are criticised as 
unrealisti~ and the hypothetico-deductive . theoretical system built upon such 
assumptions as tautologous, without empirical content, predictive or explanatory 
significance and therefore without application to the real world (Hutchison, 1938: 166 
and 120). The ultra-empiricist rejects indirect verification of hypotheses, that is, 
verification of the results deduced from these hypotheses combined with certain 
factual assumptions. Instead, ·he insists on the direct verification of assumptions at 
every level of analysis (p 8). 
Interestingly for our thesis, we note that Machlup associates 'ultra-empiricism' with 
historical, institutional and quantitative schools of thought. This contrasts with 
Quinton's (1993) description of the most extreme form of empiricism (see 
6 Unsupported page references in this sub-section are to Machlup (1955). 
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Introduction, pp 8-9). Further examination of this matter would take us beyond our 
topic. If Machlup is happy to label (rather than merely associate) historical, 
institutional and quantitative schools of thought 'ultra-empiricist', we would be only 
too willing to accept his classification of Hutchison as 'ultra-empiricist' since this 
would accord entirely with our view of Hutchison and also with our view that 
Machlup stands opposed to the inductive-historical-empirical tradition in economics. 
Yet Machlup seems to imply that Hutchison's position is empiricist in the logical 
positivist 'scientific' sense and it is here that we differ sharply from Machlup. As an 
aside it should be noted that Machlup neglects to include Knight (1921: 199, n 1) as 
one of the adherents of radical empiricism. While, as we argue throughout, he 
incorrectly cites Hutchison as his lone example of an ultra-empiricist, he correctly 
refers to Hutchison's scepticism concerning the hypothetico-deductive system, but 
neglects to say that this scepticism particularly concerns the extent of its application 
to economics. As we shall see, when Hutchison later replies, he cites the passage in 
his 1938 book in which he explains that propositions need not be directly testable 
(Hutchison, 1956: 476-7). 
Machlup criticises ultra-empiricists for not distinguishing between hypotheses on 
different levels of generality. While specific assumptions are intended, fundamental 
assumptions are not intended, to be independently testable. The fundamental 
hypotheses are also known as heuristic principles, basic postulates, or useful fictions. 
They are acceptable so long as they generate successful predictions. According to 
Einstein, Newton's laws of motion rest upon assumptions which cannot be 
independently tested (Einstein and Infield, 1938: 33). Instead, the theoretical system 
is tested by testing the lowest-level hypotheses (p 10). Following from the above, the 
fundamental assumptions of economics such as rational maximising behaviour do not 
themselves need to be empirically tested. This assumption is better understood as an 
idealisation or even as a 'complete fiction with only one claim: that reasoning as if it 
were realised is helpful in the interpretation of observations' (p 11). Fundamental 
assumptions are inextricably bound up with the theoretical system which they support 
and are rejected only together with such an entire system. ' A theory is only 
overthrown by a better theory, never merely by contradictory facts' (Conant, 1947: 
36). 
211 
Here it is interesting to note that Machlup argues more strongly than Friedman, by 
using an analogy from natural science, that the fundamental assumptions of 
economics are properly understood as useful fictions which facilitate 'as if' reasoning. 
Friedman (1953) had argued along similar lines, with one key difference which we 
will explain in our comment on the next part (B) of our examination of Machlup's 
paper. At this stage we wish only to remind ourselves that viewing assumptions as 
useful fictions is not in accordance with the logical positivist interpretation of the 
hypothetico-deductive method. The indirect testability hypothesis, which is 
formulated in terms of this method, says that assumptions need not be directly 
testable, not that it is of no concern if they are obviously empirically false (Caldwell, 
1982: 177). 
B. Machlup now proceeds to his main argument designed to show that not all 
assumptions need to be verified. In doing so he draws upon the hypothetico-
deductive theory of scientific method. He does this by presenting a model of an 
analytical system with various types of assumptions. The system is viewed as a 
machine (Pure Theory) with the input being an Assumed Change and resulting output 
a Deduced Change. The machine helps find a cause for explanations and an effect for 
predictions. The parts of the machine are made up of assumptions or hypotheses of 
different degrees of generality. The fundamental assumptions represent fixed parts of 
the machine. Assumptions about the conditions under which the Assumed Change 
must operate (the Assumed Conditions) represent exchangeable parts. Machlup now 
proceeds to discuss the observational status of the various ·assumptions and the 
requirements of verification (p 12). 
While the theoretical system can be applied where only either the Assumed or the 
Deduced Change are identifiable, to verify the entire theory both changes must be 
identified. A more casual approach to verification of the Assumed Conditions will 
suffice for most types of problems. Machlup lists three types of Assumed Conditions 
(type of case, type of setting and type of economy) in order to show why strict 
verification is not required. For example, with regard to type of case the analyst may 
assume perfect competition. If the results of his model accord reasonably well with 
observed conditions, he may retain this assumption even though he knows it is 
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contrary to the real situation since it avoids the complications of a more realistic 
hypothesis (p 16). 
Machlup now turns to what for him is the important part of his model. This is the part 
that consists of the Assumed Type of Action, or Motivation which forms the 
fundamental postulates of economic theory and therefore does not require 
independent verification. The fundamental postulates have been termed the 
'economic principle', 'maximisation principle', the 'assumption of rationality' and so 
on. Their logical status has been characterised as 'self-evident propositions', 
'axioms', 'a priori truths', 'facts of immediate experience' and so on. While these 
various characterisations appear to be inconsistent, there is little agreement as to the 
relation between such terms in the natural sciences, and even less in the social 
sciences 'where man is both observer and the subject of observation!' (p 16). The 
essential difference between the natural and social sciences is that in the latter the data 
of 'observation' are 'themselves the results of interpretations of human actions by 
human actors' (p 16). This means that in the social sciences the types of action used 
in various models must be 'understandable' in the sense that it is conceivable that a 
sensible man could act according to the type of action assumed. From this 
perspective, the fundamental assumptions of economic theory should be 
understandable rather than independently empirically verifiable (emphasis added). 
According to Machlup, the only serious flaw in Friedman (1953) is that he disregards 
this requirement (p 17, n 42). 
Here we can now comment on the difference between Machlup's and Friedman's 
proposals to view the fundamental assumptions of economics as useful fictions which 
facilitate 'as if reasoning. We saw that such a view cannot be justified in terms of the 
logical positivists' indirect testability hypothesis. Friedman, we saw in our previous 
section, justified his irrelevance-of-assumptions thesis by recourse to an 
instrumentalist interpretation of theories. Machlup's approach to this question differs 
from both Friedman's and the logical positivists'. He rejects the straw man view that 
such assumptions be independently empirically verifiable. He does not go along with 
Friedman's instrumentalism. Instead, he maintains, while the fundamental 
assumptions are properly interpreted as useful fictions, they should be 
'understandable' in the sense that it is conceivable that a sensible man could act 
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according to the type of action assumed. (Remember, for Machlup, Friedman's only 
serious flaw is that he disregards this requirement.) This fits in with Machlup's view 
that the data of the social sciences are 'themselves the results of interpretations of 
human actions by human actors'. As such the fundamental assumptions are not open 
to objective empirical verification, independent or otherwise. 
Machlup's emphasis on this point appears to be a red herring. It diverts attention 
from his adherence to a priorism, subjectivism and the verstehen doctrine. As Blaug 
(1980: 105) has noted, assumptions can be realistic in terms of the verstehen doctrine, 
that is, in terms of ascribing motives to economic actors 'we' can understand. 
Friedman, unlike Machlup, rejects this interpretation. Instead he adopts 
instrumentalism and so argues that it is valid to impute 'as if' motives to economic 
actors 'that they could not possibly hold consciously' (ibid). The important point that 
follows from all of the above is that Machlup in fact adopts a far more subjectivist, a 
priorist and verstehen stance than the middle of the (methodological) road position he 
pretends to in his 1955-6 articles. Instead ofMachlup's view of himself in the middle 
of his spectrum and Hutchison at the extreme, we hope to have shown that it is 
Machlup's position that is extreme, artd Hutchison's that is more moderate. 
Hutchison 's reply 
Hutchison (1956) begins by pointing out that Machlup distinguishes between two 
schools of thought, a priori and ultra-empiricist, on the subject of verification in 
economics. He characterises the latter as insisting on the independent verification of 
all assumptions at any level of analysis, and as rejecting any indirect verification. 
Although he claims he could give dozens of examples of the ultra-empiricist position, 
he chooses to single out only Hutchison (1938). 
Hutchison contends that he has been completely misinterpreted by Machlup. Far 
from espousing ultra-empiricism, his viewpoint 'explicitly denies' such a position. In 
his book, he makes it clear that, by no means, is he insisting on the verification of all 
assumptions. Indeed, he is arguing only that the 'finished propositions' of economics 
'must conceivably be capable of empirical testing or be reducible to such propositions 
by logical or mathematical deduction' (1938: 9). Regarding the fundamental 
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assumption, he states that it does not matter in principle whether it is tested directly or 
indirectly by working back from tests of the conclusions (p 481).7 
Here Hutchison clearly protests against Machlup's characterisation of his position and 
demonstrates that he is quite aware of the limitations of naive inductivism from which 
Machlup implies his po~ition suffers. Despite later (in his 1956 rejoinder) claiming 
only von Mises as representative of extreme a priorism, in 1955 Machlup, as we have 
seen, listed quite a few more representatives including Robbins and Knight. 
Furthermore he assured readers that, despite appearances, such an extreme position 
was more reasonable than it sounded. By contrast, Hutchison remained the sole 
representative of extreme empiricism which Machlup made no attempt to defend as at 
all reasonable. 
Hutchison proceeds to point out that Zeuthen (1955: 8) argues that direct or indirect 
testability is a necessary requirement for statements to be scientific. Zeuthen cites 
Samuelson (1947: 4) and Hutchison (1938: 9) in support and he 'makes it clear that he 
is quoting [Hutchison] in diametrically the opposite sense to Machlup's 
[interpretation]' (p 477). It would help to clarify Machlup's classification if he 
(Machlup) explained whether he regarded Zeuthen (1955), Samuelson (1947), Lange 
(1945-6), Little (1950) and Friedman (1953) as ultra-empiricists or as a priorists (p 
478). 
Hutchison complains that the trouble with Machlup's ultra-empiricist category is that 
his only example (namely, Hutchison) falls outside it, while the trouble with his a 
priorist category is that it is so broadly defined, ranging from J S Mill to Mises, that it 
is hardly significant or an extreme position. Indeed it seems as if this latter position 
_covers the spectrum from extreme a priorism through varying degrees of empiricism 
right up to ultra-empiricism. However, it does not appear that making a distinction 
turn on whether or not 'indirect' testing is accepted 'could be at all serviceable'. For 
example, having measured two sides of the 90 degree comer of a triangular piece of 
ground, Hutchison suspects that there would be no, rather than Machlup's dozens of, 
ultra~empiricists who would insist on 'directly' measuring and testing the Pythagorean 
7 Unsupported page references in this sub-section are to Hutchison (1956). 
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proposition concerning the length of the third side. More9ver, no serious 
methodological error appears to be involved if an 'ultra-empiricist' actually measured 
and tested it (p 4 79). 
We have already referred to Machlup's wide-ranging definition of extreme a priorism 
and will defer further comment until we tum to Machlup's 1956 reply. Meanwhile 
Hutchison's contention that there would be no ultra-empiricists lining up to test the 
Pythagorean proposition by direct measurement points to the extent to which 
Machlup's ultra-empiricism describes a hollow position. 
Having dealt with Machlup's criticisms, Hutchison now examines Machlup's positive 
thesis, in particular, his conception of 'fundamental assumptions' or 'high-level 
generalisations' in economics (original emphasis: 479). Machlup's only example is 
that 'people act rationally, try to make the most of their opportunities, and are able to 
arrange their preferences in a consistent order; that entrepreneurs prefer more profit 
with equal risk' (Machlup, 1955: 10-11). These are all variations on the fundamental 
assumption of maximising or rational action. Unless Machlup can provide further 
examples of fundamental assumptions, the point at issue would appear to tum on the 
status and nature of this proposition about maximising behaviour. 
Machlup describes this assumption as 'empirically meaningful'. This requires that the 
empirical content, or significance, somehow be specified. Yet, he contends, it 
requires 'no independent empirical tests but [instead] may be [a] significant step in 
reaching conclusions which are empirically testable'. While Machlup maintains that 
the conclusions are 'empirically testable', he does not show how these can be deduced 
with logical inevitability from 'empirically meaningful' assumptions about human 
actions (p 481 ). 
In short, while admitting the principle of indirect verification, we cannot agree 
to the loose and sweeping appeal to it which Professor Machlup seems to be 
making. Much more particularity and precision seems to be desirable (p 482). 
For example, if we take a proposition of practical importance such as Walras's 
conclusion that 'free competition procures within certain limits the maximum of 
utility for society' exactly the reverse procedure to Machlup's appears to be required. 
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That is, one needs to work back from this conclusion to the assumptions involved, 
especially to the fundamental assumption of maximising or rational actions and 
enquire what would constitute a test of this assumption. The variant of the 
fundamental assumption that Machlup mentions, that 'consumers can arrange their 
preferences in order', was arrived at thanks to the efforts of a long line of economists 
to make the fundamental assumption testable. Yet, when Machlup describes ~e 
fundamental assumption as the notion that people act rationally it is not clear how this 
assumption can be tested or even whether it is testable. Nevertheless economists such 
as von Mises have used this assumption in arriving at 'wholesale political 
conclusions' backed up by the authority of economic science. Not only are 
Machlup's doctrines on verification in economics questionable in terms of economics, 
they may be used to defend a kind of politico-intellectual obscurantism that seeks to 
avoid the empirical testing of its dogmas (p 483). 
Two points arise for comment. First, Hutchison criticises Machlup for not addressing 
the question of how he can be sure that the conclusions he is happy to test do in fact 
follow from 'empirically meaningful' assumptions. This may sound as if Hutchison 
is either citing a nai.Ve inductivist objection or that he does not properly understand 
the indirect testability hypothesis. Indeed, Machlup's reply (to which we shortly turn) 
proceeds along these lines. Instead, we ·argue, Hutchison's criticism is another 
instance of his scepticism concerning the extent to which the hypothetico-deductive 
method can be applied in economics and hence that inductivist-leaning procedures in 
economics should not altogether be ignored. Second, Hutchison makes it clear that he 
particularly dislikes the authority of science to be used to support conclusions in the 
political arena when the science that is involved is not amenable to empirical 
verification. As in economics, Hutchison is willing to apply his demarcation criterion 
'come what may' to both von Mises's 'scientific' grounds for supporting laissez-faire 
capitalism (Hutchison, 1938, appendix) and (later) to Marx's 'scientific' grounds for 
supporting socialism (Hutchison, 1981 ). Paradoxically it is this even-handedness of 
Hutchison that earned him more than the usual amount of criticism for his critics 
came from both, or all, sides. Hutchison's candour goes quite far in explaining the 
interpretation and influence of his 1938 intervention. 
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Mach/up's rejoinder 
Machlup (1956) responds by saying that, although Hutchison appears to reject some, 
he retains many, aspects of ultra-empiricism. For example, Machlup accepts that 
Hutchison rejects the position which he called ultra-empiricism in his 1955 article, 
that is, one which requires the direct en:ipirical testing of the fundamental assumptions 
of a theory. Machlup notes that Hutchison requires only 'the conceivable testability 
of the deduced consequences', rather than the direct testing, of the fundamental 
assumptions of economic theory (1938: 9; 1956: 476). Yet, Machlup argues, 
Hutchison retains aspects of ultra-empiricism by effectively repudiating this position 
by much of what follows in his 1938 book and his 1956 note. 
Machlup suspects the crucial misunderstanding between them is that Hutchison does 
not accept his interpretation of indirect testing. According to Hutchison, if a 
proposition is not directly testable then.it must be 'reducible by direct deduction to an 
empirically testable proposition or propositions' (Machlup's emphasis). The way this 
is expressed implies that the consequences of any single proposition must 'be tested 
independently of those other propositions with which it is conjoined to constitute a 
case' (p 484). 8 But this goes against the essence of indirect testing. According to 
this, if assumption A cannot be tested, but A and assumption B together yield 
proposition C, and if C is empirically tested, then A has been indirectly tested. 
Machlup 'suspects that Professor Hutchison does not accept the validity of indirect 
verification in this sense' (p 484). He now re-defines as ultra-empiricists those who 
reject the above formulation of the indirect testing of the fundamental assumption and 
insist that the assumption of profit maximisation is tested independently of the other 
propositions involved (pp 484-5). 
Hutchison argues that his 1938 formulation of the Principle of Testability does, in 
fact, take account of Machlup's 1956 reformulation of what is involved in indirect 
testing: 
8 Unsupported page references in this sub-section are to Machlup ( 1956). 
218 
That is, one can leave one assumption at a time, or one part of a hypothesis at a 
time, to be 'indirectly' tested, by testing a conclusion that follows logically from 
it, and any other assumption with which it is combined to yield this conclusion 
(1960: xv). 
Here Hutchison appears to accept Machlup's interpretation of indirect testability 
arguing that Machlup is mistaken in viewing this as the crucial misunderstanding 
between them. However, the situation is not quite as straightforward. This is because 
Hutchison adopts an empirically stricter interpretation of indirect testability than does 
Machlup. In particular, he rejects completely Machlup's (1955: 7) view that 'we need 
not worry about independent verifications of the fundamental assumptions' 
(Hutchison, 1960: xv, n 1). Hutchison appears to interpret Machlup's statement as 
saying that we need not worry at all about independent verification - at all since, for 
Mc;tchlup, the fundamental assumptions are useful fictions - they could well be 
empirically false. Such an interpretation is consistent with Machlup's position as 
explained earlier. It is not a viewpoint acceptable to Hutchison: 
It really will not do for economists now to claim it as a demonstration of 
superior methodological wisdom, rising above the nai."ve demands of ultra-
empiricism, to regard the generalization as scientifically corroborated whenever 
a rise in price is actually followed by a fall in the quantity demanded, without 
'worrying or being very particular' about what had happened to consumers' 
objectives, tastes, expectations, incomes and other prices, that is, without any 
attempt at 'testing assumptions' (1960: xv-xvi). 
With respect to Hutchison's charge that his classification of 'extreme a priorists' 
extends from the extreme through the middle ground right up to his classification of 
'ultra-empiricists', Machlup replies that very few fall into this extreme category, and 
cites only von Mises. (In his 1955 article von Mises was joined by six other well 
known economists, among them Robbins.) In the middle ground Machlup cites 
Zeuthen, Samuelson, Lange, and Friedman and implicitly includes himself (cf Blaug, 
1980: 109). Machlup maintains: 
none of them holds that no conceivable kind of experience could ever cause him 
to give up his theory, and none of them wants his fundamental assumptions 
tested independently of the propositions with which they are combined when the 
theory is applied (p 485). 
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Nevertheless, those occupying the middle ground hold very different and conflicting 
methodological positions. We have seen earlier in this chapter that Friedman (1946) 
had ten years before castigated Lange ( 1944) among others for the remoteness of the 
connection between his theory and experience. Later Samuelson (1963) was to 
deliver his famous F-twist criticism of Friedman. Aside from this, in formulating his 
descriptivist methodology (termed the poor man's version of instrumentalism by 
Blaug (1980: 113)) Samuelson came much closer than any previous economist to 
demanding that all assumptions be tested independently. Latsis (1972: 242, n 1) 
labels Samuelson's methodology 'classical inductivism' which he defines as 'the 
requirement of proving one's theories from facts'. Samuelson, in what Latsis aptly 
describes as his 'one or two too many' methodological contributions, appears to be 
the only, or at least the leading, candidate qualifying for Machlup's ultra-empiricist 
award. 
Machlup now criticises Hutchison's two-fold classification of scientific statements 
into empirical and tautological. In particular, with regard to the maximisation 
postulate, Hutchison appears to regard only empirically falsifiable, and purely 
definitional, propositions as scientifically legitimate. If this is the case, then he rejects 
an intermediate category of propositions, 'the heuristic postulates and idealised 
assumptions', which are neither a priori nor a posteriori. 
Such propositions are neither 'true or false' nor empirically meaningless. They 
cannot be false because what they predicate is predicated about ideal constructs, 
not about things or events of reality. Yet they are not empirically 
'meaningless', because they are supposed to 'apply' or correspond broadly to 
experienced events. They cannot be 'falsified' by observed facts, or even be 
'proved inapplicable', because auxiliary assumptions can be brought in to 
establish correspondence with almost any kind of facts; but they can be 
superseded by other propositions which are in better agreement with these facts 
without recourse to so many auxiliary assumptions (p 486). 
Machlup says that, while he regards the fundamental assumption as empirically 
meaningful, as an heuristic postulate it is not falsifiable (pp 486-7). It neither need, 
nor can be verified independently of the uses to which it is put in economic theory. 
Some economists hold that it need not be verified because common experience tells 
us it is self evident. However, common experience only tells us that we can, and 
usually, seek the highest returns, not that everyone always acts in this way. While this 
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assumption is bound to be sometimes disconfirmed by the facts, the problem is that 
we do not know the significance of such disconfirmations. The solution is to regard 
maximising behaviour as an heuristic postulate and to justify this postulate in terms of 
the successful predictions, or applications, of the theory (p 488). 
As we saw m the previous chapter, the solution of viewing the fundamental 
assumptions as heuristic postulates had been mooted by Kaufmann (1942). 
According to Caldwell (1982: 145), it also emanates from Schlick. This is somewhat 
ironic given Machlup's antipathy to Hutchison's positivist 'ultra-empiricism'. 
Machlup now makes the following statements in reply to Hutchison's various 
questions about the fundamental postulate. The assumption does have empirical 
content if it is 'to apply to empirical data of a certain class'. It applies to large 
numbers of, rather than particular, households or firms. It is considered tested if it, 
together with its theory, yields better explanations or predictions than any other 
assumption and theory. It would be regarded as disconfirmed if another theory not 
using this assumption 'worked equally well for a wider range of problems'. It is far 
from being superfluous: 'Never could a behavioristic approach provide all the 
millions of "entrepreneurial behaviour functions" which would be needed to do the 
job that is now done by the simple postulate of profit maximisation' (p 490). 
Although Hutchison (1956: 480, n 5) believes he has found an ally in Friedman, he 
insists on direct testing of fundamental assumptions and so places himself in direct 
odds with the thrust of Friedman's methodological essay. According to Friedman, 
they should be tested indirectly by testing the predictions of the theory (p 491). 
The above two paragraphs each give rise to a point for comment. Concerning the 
first, to the extent that Machlup implies that Hutchison adopts a behaviouristic 
approach, he is mistaken: this is a position Hutchison explicitly denied (1938: 143). 
Indeed, Hutchison's argument implies that there are plenty of stopping places within 
empiricism before behaviourism. Concerning the second, we have argued at length in 
this chapter that Hutchison is correctly viewed as much closer than Machlup to 
Friedman's methodological position. 
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Finally, Machlup deals with Hutchison's charge that his theory is tautological. 
According to Machlup, this may mean many different things. Machlup examines two: 
'that the theory constitutes an internally consistent and closed system; that some of 
the assumptions are empirically empty'. Regarding the first meaning, Hutchison 
(1938: 36) himself recognises that 'pure theory' is necessarily tautological. 
Regarding the second, the assumptions that consumers and producers maximise 
expected utility and profits have been viewed as 'empirically empty' because (a) we 
cannot know whether or not agents really believe they are acting in the way which 
will maximise their returns; (b) whatever they do can be interpreted as maximising 
behaviour; and (c) 'we cannot deduce any particular way of acting from the 
assumptions standing by themselves' (p 492). Machlup contends that the issue is that 
the assumptions do not stand by themselves. When they are combined with others 
they 'may become of definite empirical significance'. 
In dealing with this second point Machlup reiterates his main criticism of Hutchison: 
Hutchison does not accept his interpretation of indirect testing. In this interpretation 
the fundamental assumption is inextricably bound up with other propositions and it is 
the consequences only of this combination which can be tested. We have already 
described Hutchison's inductivist-empiricist reasons for being sceptical about 
separating the fundamental assumption by such a long way from direct empirical 
testing. While it appears that Machlup is appealing to the (respectable) indirect 
testability hypothesis of hypothetico-deductive empiricism, he is in fact not doing so. 
Rather, as we have seen, he appeals to a conventionalist interpretation of the 
fundamental assumption as a heuristic postulate (Kaufmann, 1942), or as an 'ideal 
type'. According to Caldwell (1982: 145) this move by Machlup was unnecessary 
given the indirect testability hypothesis. The question then is why Machlup makes 
this move. In terms of our interpretation, it is because Machlup's position, contrary to 
Caldwell (1982: 165), does not represent some sort of moderate hypothetico-
deductivist empiricism (lying between the a priorists and the ultra-empiricists). 
Instead, his move is better explained in terms of Machlup's conventionalism. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter we have shown the remarkable extent to which Friedman's 
methodology follows in the tradition of Hutchison. While Friedman may not have 
been directly aware of Hutchison's (193 8) arguments, it at least seems likely he read 
of his old teacher's (Frank Knight) 1940-1 exchange with Hutchison. We have 
emphasised Friedman's criticism of various formalist tendencies in both economic 
theory and econometrics in the period before his 1953 essay. We have also attempted 
to demonstrate the extent to which Friedman's (1953) essay is compatible with 
Hutchison's position. Indeed, far from ·Hutchison being an extremist and Friedman 
adopting a moderate position, on certain points Friedman represents a more extremist 
position than Hutchison (eg economics is an 'objective' science in exactly the same 
sense as the natural sciences (1953: 4)). 
Hutchison's point of departure arises from Friedman's commitment to defend the 
neoclassical programme. He appears to believe that to do this he has to resort to his 
instrumentalist irrelevance-of-assumptions thesis. Yet, on this point Friedman has 
suffered something similar to the fate of Hutchison at the hands of Knight and 
Machlup. Blaug (1980: 111-2) has pointed out that Friedman is in fact not guilty of 
the extreme version of the irrelevance-of-assumptions thesis condemned by 
Samuelson (1963: 232-3) as the F-twist. Instead, if one reads Friedman's essay 
carefully he 'has only asserted that unrealistic assumptions are "largely" irrelevant for 
assessing the validity of a theory' (ibid). Nevertheless, it is the extent to which the 
irrelevance-of-assumptions thesis reflects Friedman's resort to instrumentalism m 
order to defend the neoclassical programme, that has most concerned his critics. 
Apart from this traditional criticism, Friedman's view that only predictions should be 
tested implies that theories can be neatly separated into different entities 
(assumptions, predictions etc). This is too methodologically naive (Blaug, 1980: 120, 
but see Caldwell, 1982: 148 for a contrary view). Machlup (1955) was thus obliged 
to step in and provide more sophisticated support for Friedman's essay. Machlup's 
intervention, we argue, simply furthered confusion surrounding the nature and 
possibility of empirical testing in economics. For example, it stands in contrast to the 
kind best exemplified in later years by Musgrave (1981) who showed that, while the 
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realism of some assumptions ( eg heuristic) is meant to be ignored, the realism of other 
kinds of assumptions ( eg domain and negligibility) cannot afford to be ignored. 
This brings us to the role of Machlup in his co-defence with Friedman of the 
neoclassical programme. Despite the fact that Machlup casts himself alongside 
Friedman in the middle of the a priorist-empiricist spectrum, we have sought to 
demonstrate in this chapter the extent to which his interventions differed 
methodologically from those of Friedman. Machlup (1978: 460) himself has accepted 
Latsis's (1976) classification of his position as conventionalist 'in the sense of one 
who accepts as meaningful and useful basic propositions that make no assertions but 
are conventions (resolutions, postulates) with regard to analytic procedure'. While we 
do not take issue with this, we have emphasised in this chapter the extent to which 
Machlup's position contains elements of a priorism, the verstehen doctrine and 
subjectivism. This supports our view that the Hutchison-Machlup exchange 
represents another round in the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. 
This contrasts with Caldwell's view of Machlup. Caldwell (1982: 163) agrees with 
Machlup' s representation of his own position as in the mi~dle between the a priorists 
and the ultra-empiricists. He points out that Machlup does not insist upon direct 
testing of the basic assumptions nor, like a priorists, does he claim that neoclassical 
theory is true by definition or everywhere applicable. We have argued that Machlup's 
position lies far closer to a priorism than Caldwell allows. In this respect Blaug's 
(1980) interpretation is more in line with our argument. For example, Blaug points 
out that 'Machlup, while urging the importance of empirical research in economics, is 
nevertheless keen to underline the inconclusiveness of all tests of economic 
hypotheses' (1980: 114). Blaug's response to these difficulties of testing in 
economics is to encourage economists to increase their efforts to surmount these 
problems: 
It implies that economists should concentrate their intellectual resources on the 
task of producing well-specified falsifiable predictions, that is, assigning less 
priority to such standard criteria of appraisal as simplicity, elegance, and 
generality, and more priority to such criteria as predictability and empirical 
.fruitfulness (1980: 115). 
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However, Blaug points out that Machlup orders his priorities the other way round. 
Indeed, he has been 'singularly ingenious in discounting' empirical tests. Yet, Blaug 
protests, there is little point in commending empirical work, as Machlup certainly 
does, 'if it never really makes a difference to the beliefs one holds (1980: 115). 
In contrast to the above interpretation of Machlup, Caldwell (1982: 158) gives 
credence to the significance of Machlup's notion of ultra-empiricism by contending 
. 
that 'empirically minded economists' who insist on testing the rationality postulate 
should be labelled ultra-empiricists. If such economists do not accept the rationality 
postulate as an untestable hypothesis, they should either 'denounce their ultra-
empiricist methodology, or reject the rationality assumption as metaphysical' (ibid). 
This is in line with Caldwell's verdict that, with respect to a priorists and positivists, 
Machlup's position is the most 'methodologically sound' (1982: 158). It should be 
clear that we do not accept such a conclusion. 
Machlup has made out Hutchison to be the 'big bad wolf naively insisting on 
extreme empiricism when, as we have argued, his methodological position is instead 
an eclectic and nuanced empiricism. In apparent reference to Hutchison, Blaug denies 
that there really ever was a big bad wolf who insisted on directly and independently 
testing the fundamental assumptions of economic theory: 
What critics of Friedman have argued is (1) that accurate predictions are not the 
only relevant test of the validity of a theory; (2) that direct evidence about 
assumptions is not necessarily more difficult to obtain than data about market 
behaviour used to test predictions; (3) that the attempt to test assumptions may 
help the interpretation of predictions; (4) that if testing theories by predictions 
only is all we can hope for, theories must be put to extremely severe tests (1980: 
110). 
Two points concerning the above passage arise for comment. First, the passage 
would be more accurate if Blaug were to substitute Machlup for Friedman since it is 
Machlup, as we have seen, who has been fielding the bulk of the criticisms. 
Moreover, the criticisms are more relevant to Machlup's than to Friedman's position. 
Second, the original and main critic of Machlup in this respect is Hutchison. Blaug's 
four points detailed above provide a far more accurate reflection of Hutchison's 
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methodological position than Machlup's attempt to represent him as an ultra-
empiricist. 
We have also pointed out that Caldwell sympathises with Machlup's 
'methodologically sound' position. It is therefore interesting to note his description of 
Machlup as 'a contemporary representative of the dominant view [up to the 1930s!] of 
the role of empirical studies' (Caldwell, 1982: 166). This role is to determine whether 
or not a theory is applicable, rather than whether or not it is falsified (1982: 168). 
Caldwell hereby casts Machlup as a modem day representative of Robbins. Such an 
interpretation directly supports our view of Machlup. In particular it supports our 
contention that Machlup incorrectly labelled Hutchison an ultra-empiricist partly by 
misleadingly representing himself as occupying the moderate methodological ground. 
Rather than Machlup' s representation of Hutchison as an ultra-empiricist, the 195 5-6 
exchange between Machlup and Hutchison should be interpreted as another round of 
the long-standing methodenstreit in economics. But, whereas before Hutchison's 
opponent Robbins explicitly presented himself as a priorist-leaning, this time 
Machlup obscured his a priorist tendencies with the cloak of a modem moderate 
empiricist stance. 
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CHAPTER6 
THE INFLUENCE OF HUTCHISON'S INTERVENTION: 
KLAPPHOLZ AND AGASSI 
. In the last two chapters we have viewed Hutchison as ranged first against Knight's, 
and then against Friedman and Machlup's, apologetic defence of orthodox economics. 
In this chapter we are mainly concerned with Hutchison's influence on the group of 
economists that attended the 'LSE Staff Seminar in Methodology, Measurement and 
Testing', or 'M2T', in the late 1950s and early 1960s. According to de Marchi (1988: 
141 ), the group, led by Lipsey and Archibald, wanted to replace Robbins' s (1932, 
1935) methodology, still dominant in economics especially in Britain. 1 We have 
already described this methodology in Chapter Two, but will briefly highlight certain 
aspects relevant to the group's response to Robbins as noted by de Marchi: the style 
of the Robbins seminar 'was the then common one of analytical dissection'; theory 
was viewed as a way of classifying the totality of possible cases; and 'models were 
examined for the realism of their assumptions and for internal consistency' (p 143).2 
On this point de Marchi quotes Harry Johnson's (1978: 158) remark about Cambridge 
in the 1950s: 'the examination of the realism or unrealism of analytical assumptions 
as a test of the validity of a theory ... provided a basic technique of British theoretical 
discourse in the 1930s and on well into the 1950s'.3 Theory was assessed in terms of 
whether or not it resulted in the shedding of light on a problem, rather than in terms of 
an empirical test requiring quantification of specific economic magnitudes. 
In their search for an alternative to Robbins's methodology, the M2T group was 
attracted to the ideas of Popper. Popper had joined the philosophy department at the 
LSE in 1946. While some members, eg Peston, indirectly picked up on Popperian 
ideas via an undergraduate logic and scientific method course given at the LSE, the 
1 Besides Archibald and Lipsey, the group included, amongst others, Klappholz, Foldes, Peston, 
Lancaster, Corry, and Steuer (de Marchi, 1988: 141). 
2 All unsupported page references in this introductory passage are to de Marchi ( 1988). 
3 Johnson presumably referred to realism in the Robbins sense of 'self-evident' or facts of everyday 
experience, or, in Lipsey's (1997: 213) description 'intuitively plausible'. 
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group as a whole was directly exposed to Popper via Agassi, a graduate student of his 
who was keen to proselytize. Agassi was introduced to the M2T group by Klappholz. 
He tutored the group and, over about a six-month period, its members 'learned, and 
came to accept, much of Popper's views on methodology' (Lipsey, quoted in de 
Marchi, 1988: 148; cf Lipsey, 2001a). It was only after this Agassian experience that 
the group adopted a more formal approach along with the M2T title (p 148). 
It is clear that the M2T group wanted to move away from Robbins's a prioristic 
approach and towards a more empirical one especially, they argued, if economics was 
to be practically applicable. Already in 1938, as we have seen, Hutchison had directly 
criticised Robbins's approach. He pointed out that the assumptions of much of 
economic theory were formulated, and interpreted, in an a priori way. As such it 
represented pure theory that was, and remained, analytical and tautological until 
joined to empirical propositions when it became applied theory. While he reserved a 
vital role for pure theory, Hutchison called for the adoption of a more empirical 
approach to economics. 
In addition to challenging Robbins's methodology, Hutchison had also introduced 
Popperian ideas to economics. As de Marchi has pointed out, he should have been 
regarded as a natural ally by the M2T group (p 146). Yet the group failed to build on 
Hutchison's early foundations. De Marchi identifies four reasons that, he argues, led 
these 'potential supporters' of Hutchison to largely neglect his intervention (pp 145 
ff). The first was the perception that Hutchison was urging some kind of naive 
inductivism and the second that his position rested on logical positivist foundations. 
The perception of Hutchison as a naive inductivist arose, according to de Marchi, due 
to his apparent concern with l.inrealistic assumptions, and his stress on using ceteris 
paribus only together with strongly verified empirical generalisations (Hutchison, 
1938: 46, 119). However, we argued in Chapter Five that Hutchison's concern with 
unrealistic assumptions was far from naively inductivist. Furthermore we have 
argued that, while Hutchison was indeed influenced by logical positivism, it was not 
central to his approach which drew more broadly both on the philosophy of science 
and on the history of the methodology of economics. This latter led him to recognise 
the significance of historical and institutional elements in economics. Consequently 
these first two reasons put forward by de Marchi are not very convincing. 
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By contrast the third and fourth reasons advanced by de Marchi carry more weight: 
Hutchison's intervention provided 'little guidance in showing how economics could 
be done in an empirical manner'; and the appearance of Friedman's 1953 essay. 
Regarding the third reason, de Marchi argues that 'Samuelson's Foundations, with its 
discussion of ways to make equilibrium propositions operational, held out a promise 
of getting beyond both Robbins and Hutchison' (p 146). It especially influenced 
Lancaster (1962) and Archibald (1961). Regarding the fourth reason, Friedman's 
1953 essay, he suggests, appeared to release the group from concern with 
assumptions: only the testing of the implications of a theory was necessary. This 
view is supported by Lipsey (1997: 217) who has remarked on how many of the M2T 
group were unhappy with the 'idea that we should argue about the plausibility of 
assumptions'. This move by Friedman was therefore not only popular, but also 
appeared to circumvent the problem of induction. 'To clinch the appeal, Friedman 
not only addressed methodological concerns, he also showed - much more so than 
Samuelson - how theory could be combined with quantification: A Theory of the 
Consumption Function [1957] was quickly embraced by the economics profession as 
an exemplar of quantitative economic analysis' (p 147). 
While these reasons put forward by de Marchi go a long way towards accounting for 
Hutchison's relative neglect by the M2T group, we want to draw attention to two 
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further factors that, we argue in this chapter, played an important role in accounting 
for his lack of influence on the M2T group. The first was Klappholz and Agassi's 
(1959) extreme, or ultra, Popperianism. In terms of their purist interpretation of 
Popper, they were against any methodological rules or prescriptions whatsoever (p 
155). They accordingly criticised Hutchison for daring to propose a methodological 
_ rule: his criterion of testability. Yet, in terms of Latsis' s ( 1972) distinction between 
those concerned with defending .orthodox economic theory and those determined to 
subject it to Popperian-inspired methodological criticism, their broad sympathy with 
Hutchison (Klappholz and Agassi, 1960: 161) was far more important than their 
disagreement on a point internal to a Popperian-oriented methodology. Instead of 
putting these matters of economics and economic methodology first, they chose to 
pursue a primarily philosophical issue. That they did so appears to reflect the fact that 
Agassi, as a philosopher, was probably more concerned with philosophical issues for 
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their own sake than for economics. Nevertheless, their criticism sent. out a misleading 
signal to the M2T group of economists directly curbing Hutchison's influence: 
When we formed the M2T seminar we discovered Popper and learned about 
him, and other methodological writings from Agassi and Klappholz. They were 
quite critical of Hutchison and for that reason I never read his [1938] book 
(Lipsey, 200la). 
As we will see later in this chapter, Archibald (1959) too, seems to have been 
influenced by Klappholz and Agassi in his critical stance towards Hutchison. It 
appears then that Klappholz and Agassi's views may have helped contribute to 
Archibald and Lipsey' s overly ambitious attempts to apply a particular philosophy of 
science (Popper's) all too directly to economics (Archibald, 1961; Lipsey, 1963) -
attempts that were abandoned after only a few years (Archibald, 1966; Lipsey, 1966). 
Had Hutchison (193 8) received a more sympathetic hearing, his moderate 
interpretation of the extent to which Popper could be applied to the subject matter of 
economics might have prevented these unfortunate results. 
The view, that much of the neglect of Hutchison by the M2T group can be traced to 
Klappholz and Agassi's (1959) influence, fits in well with our Chapter Five 
discussion. Here we concluded that the influence of Machlup (1955) accounted for 
widespread misinterpretation of Hutchison as fixated on the realism of assumptions. 
Importantly for our argument, de Marchi points to the possibility that Machlup's 
(1955) labelling of Hutchison as 'ultra-empiricist' may have influenced the way he 
was interpreted by the M2T group. Yet he does so only in a footnote (p 146, n 6). 
This, we argue, is to miss the significance of Machlup's influence on the M2T 
economists and may be due, partly, to de M8:fchi not recognising the extent to which 
Machlup misrepresented Hutchison's position. 
The second factor that affected Hutchison's influence on the M2T group (and more 
widely) concerns a much broader and more fundamental issue: the difficulty of 
empirical testing in economics. (This relates to de Marchi's point that Hutchison 
provided 'little guidance in showing how economics could be done in an empirical 
manner'.) Hutchison (1938) had argued that, if economics were to be regarded as an 
empirical scientific discipline, its finished propositions needed to be testable. But, if 
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we grant Hutchison's point, this raises the issue of just how we are supposed to 
conduct empirical testing in economics. Two separate responses to this problem may 
be distinguished. One response is to narrow the scope for empirical testing. The 
obvious example here is Friedman's dictum to test only predictions. The other 
response is to widen as far as possible the scope for empirical testing. This appears to 
be Hutchison's response. The fact that the M2T group, along with many other 
empirically-oriented economists, adopted the narrow rather than the wide approach, 
we argue, was an important factor in limiting Hutchison's influence. It also seems to 
have been a more important reason than de Marchi's view that the group were put off 
Hutchison due to perceiving his position as naively inductivist or logical positivist. 
The tendency to narrow the scope for empirical testing found its expression m 
adopting a more formal approach to economic theory, and in econometric model 
building and testing. Archibald ( 1961) reformulated monopolistic competition theory 
with the aim of making the implications explicit and thereby testable, while Lipsey 
(1960) was more concerned with the formal quantification of theory (p 155). As we 
have learnt in the foregoing chapters of this thesis, Hutchison's response to the 
difficulty of empirical testing in economics was to widen its scope as much as 
possible, that is, to test as much as possible. Testing should not be limited to 
predictions only, but should be extended to assumptions as well. It should also not be 
limited to regression and other formal econometric model building approaches. This 
response attempts to take into account the historical and institutional aspects of 
economics, and the problem of the kind of uncertainty and ignorance, in the Knightian 
and Keynesian sense, which cannot be reduced to a probability estimate and so 
incorporated into econometric analysis. It is also one that is keenly aware of the 
extent to which economic problems are interwoven with wider social and political 
problems, so that an important part of empirical testing concerns events which are 
difficurt, if not impossible, to model and test in a formal manner. 
While Klappholz and Agassi's critical stance towards Hutchison and the fact that the 
M2T group did not adopt Hutchison's response to the difficulty of empirical testing in 
economics represent important reasons for Hutchison's limite~ influence on the 
group, the group did not completely reject Hutchison's approach. As mentioned 
earlier, Klappholz and Agassi acknowledged that they broadly sympathised with, and 
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indeed respected and applauded, Hutchison's 1938 intervention (1960: 161). This 
being the case, and given the authoritative methodological position of Agassi, we 
should. expect to find methodological similarities between work that developed out of 
the M2T group and that of Hutchison. To the extent that there are such similarities, 
this would appear to lend support to our view that_ Hutchison (1938) attempted to 
introduce a more moderate empiricism into economics than has hitherto been made 
out to be the case. 
This chapter is divided into four separate sections. In the first three sections we 
develop our argument that Klappholz and Agassi's criticism of Hutchison, and the 
M2T group's response to the difficulty of empirical testing in economics, were 
important factors in limiting the influence of Hutchison's 1938 intervention in 
economics. In the first section we discuss the 1959-60 exchange between Hutchison 
and Klappholz and Agassi elaborating on our view that their intervention was overly 
cop.cerned with philosophical matters leading them to under-emphasise the 
importance of Hutchison as an ally in a common Popperian-inspired methodological 
critique of orthodox economics. 
In the second and third sections we show how the popularity of the narrow response 
to the difficulty of empirical testing in economics affected Hutchison's influence. In 
the second section we discuss Koopman's (1957) essay since this was both the main 
concern of Archibald (1959), and because Koopmans remarked on the similarities 
between his and Hutchison's methodological positions. While there appear to be 
definite similarities, it is Hutchison's response to the difficulty of empirical testing in 
economics that separates his approach from that of Koopmans who, like the M2T 
group, adopts the alternative of deliberately narrowing its scope. In the third section 
we discuss Archibald's interpretation of Hutchison. This involves both the aspects of 
Klappholz and Agassi'B criticism of Hutchison, and the difficulty of empirical testing 
in economics. Archibald (1959) shows signs of being influenced by Klappholz and 
Agassi's interpretation. He fails to give Hutchison a fair reading and lumps him 
together with the methodologically less sophisticated Oxford full cost theorists. 
Concerning the difficulty of empirical testing in economics, Archibald (1959, 1961) 
makes it clear that he favours narrowing, rather than widening, its scope. 
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In the fourth section we trace the extent to which the approach of the M2T group was, 
in fact, in broad sympathy with that of Hutchison. To this end we point to two 
instances in which there are similarities with that of Hutchison's approach, namely, 
Klappholz and Mishan (1962) and Lipsey (1963). To the extent that Hutchison's 
approach is in line with work that developed out of the M2T group, it lends support to 
our argument that he has been misrepresented as advocating extreme methodological 
views (given that the M2T group's views were not regarded as extreme). 
Furthermore, it also lends support to our view that Klappholz and Agassi's (1959) 
criticism was something of a red herring that succeeded primarily in limiting the 
influence of Hutchison's (1938) intervention, rather than in contributing to progress in 
understanding how economics could be done in a more empirical manner. 
6.1 Hutchison's 1959-1960 exchange with Klappholz and Agassi 
In this section we argue that Klappholz and Agassi's (1959) criticism of Hutchison 
arose from an overly purist interpretation of Popper. More importantly, their criticism 
was concerned more with a philosophical end (clarifying and promoting their 
interpretation of Popper) rather than with using philosophical and methodological 
concepts in order to improve the practice of economics. Their philosophical interest 
moreover, was one in the philosophy of science rather than social science. Against 
this, Hutchison (1938) represented a methodology specifically attuned to economics. 
From the philosophy of science it drew not only on Popper, but also on the· British 
empirical tradition and the writings of the Vienna Circle. In addition to the 
philosophy of science it drew on a long history of the methodological views of 
leading economists stretching back to Ricardo and Malthus thereby acknowledging 
the importance of historical and institutional considerations in economics. Although, 
as we shall s~e, Klappholz and Agassi's criticism of Hutchison dealt mainly with a 
particular philosophical issue, it unfortunately led to the impression that they were 
generally critical of his approach. 
Klappholz and Agassi (1959) review two methodological works: Schoeffler (1955) 
and Papandreou (1958). They point out that the common theme of both these books is 
the contention that lack of progress in economics can be solved by adopting some or 
other methodological rule. Claiming that their view is that of Popper (1959), 
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Klappholz and Agassi contend that it is neither possible nor desirable to adopt 
methodological rules, apart from a continuing readiness to be critical of one's work (p 
60).4 They set out to demonstrate this contention by critically examining various 
methodological rules as put forward by Robbins (1935), Hutchison (1938) and 
Friedman (1953) before turning to the two books under review. Since our concern is 
with their criticism of Hutchison, we will omit discussion of Schoeffler (1955) and 
Papandreou (1958). However, given the intimate relationship of Hutchison's essay to 
Robbins and Friedman's interventions, it will be helpful to preface Klappholz and 
Agassi' s criticism of Hutchison with a brief examination of their views on Robbins 
and Friedman. 
Klappholz and Agassi criticise two of Robbins's methodological rules. First, Robbins 
proposed, as a methodological rule, an a priori separation between economics and 
other disciplines. They reject this since it implies a decision to regard certain factors 
such as tastes and technology as outside the scope of economics, or as exogenous, and 
so represents an a priori limitation of the fi~ld of economic discussion. Second, 
Robbins denied a priori the possibility of discovering quantitative laws. For Robbins, 
scientific laws are 'universal statements known with certainty to be true' (p 61). 
These laws are derived by deduction from a series of postulates which involve 
'indisputable facts of ... everyday experience' (Robbins, 1935: 8-9). In particular, 
Robbins explicitly denied they could be derived from history or controlled experiment 
(1935: 73-4). For Klappholz and Agassi, two points follow from Robbins's view that 
'only laws guaranteed by everyday experience will be found' (p 62). First, certain 
variables, namely those not taken into account by everyday experience, will hav.e to 
be classified as exogenous (eg Robbins's view on tastes). Second, we cannot 
guarantee the existence of other laws. In this vein, Robbins claimed that we could not 
discover quantitative laws. 
Klappholz and Agassi point out that Robbins's position can be criticised 'by arguing 
that empirical statements, however well-grounded in everyday experience, are never 
indisputable' (p 62). While this might be damaging to Robbins's position, Robbins 
'could still claim that, although in principle all of economic theory is disputable, no 
4 All unsupported page references in section 6.1 are to Klappholz and Agassi (1959). 
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reasonable person would dispute such statements as the law of demand, and that this 
law, and other similarly trivial statements, can explain much more than meets the eye' 
(p 62). Klappholz and Agassi respond by pointing out that, although the law of 
demand might be indisputable, it is in the same category as the law that metals 
conduct electricity: of little scientific or intellectual interest. The significance of 
economics, and other sciences, lies in the search for new truths ( eg quantum theory in 
physics) which are controversial. They therefore choose to dissent from, rather than 
directly criticise, Robbins's position. 
From Hutchison's perspective, the central issue concerning Robbins's methodology 
does not revolve around his insistence upon methodological rules, as Klappholz and 
Agassi contend. Instead it concerns its a priorist nature. Klappholz and Agassi's 
purist interpretation of Popper (which led them to focus on arguing against 
methodological rules) prevented them from responding to the a priorist nature of 
Robbins's methodology. They thus discussed a side, rather than a central, 
methodological issue of economics. But then, they were concerned with a 
philosophical end (clarifying Popper) - using economics as an example - unlike 
Hutchison whose concern with methodology was to make economics more practically 
useful. 
Klappholz and Agassi interpret Friedman's main thesis as the argument that most 
methodological criticism of economic theory is misconceived. Yet in establishing this 
thesis 'Friedman adopts a position which impedes criticism in general' (p 66). They 
seek to show that Friedman adopts such a position by examining three of his points: 
(a) 'A hypothesis can ~e tested only by the conformity of its implications or 
predictions with observable phenomena' (Friedman, 1953: 40, emphasis added). 
Friedman's contention that empirical testing is the only valid form of criticism results 
in his dismissing theories ( eg of monopolistic competition and full-cost pricing) for 
being untestable. Instead they should be subjected to criticism so as to try to make 
them testable. (b) 'Great confidence is attached to ... [a hypothesis] if it has survived 
many opportunities for contradiction' (Friedman, 1953: 9). Klappholz and Agassi 
protest that we do not accept an hypothesis as true simply because it has survived 
attempts to refute It. That Friedman does shows he is not in full sympathy with 
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Popper's critical approach. (c) '[A new or rival theory] must have implications 
susceptible to empirical contradiction [before it can be regarded as interesting and 
important]' (Friedman, 1953: 38). One way of criticising an hypothesis is to 
formulate a rival one. Yet Friedman's view, that existing hypotheses that have 
survived attempts at refutation must command confidence, militates against attempts 
to formulate a rival hypothesis. 
Klappholz and Agassi's comments on Friedman's essay call forth two points that 
relate to the interpretation of Hutchison. Firstly, they argue that untestable theories 
can be criticised and overthrown and that this is borne out by the historical record. 
They contend that the historical record, for example, shows that, although Say's Law 
is untestable, it stands rejected today. Their choice of example is unfortunate since 
the central theme of an entire 'school' of Post Keynesians is that Say's Law is very far 
from being generally rejected today. For example, this theme would tend to be found 
in journals such as The Journal of Post Keynesian Economics.5 This failure supports 
Hutchison's emphasis on the importance of as wide a possible empirical testing of 
theories (assumptions and predictions). The second point concerns their rejection of 
Friedman's dismissal of the theories of monopolistic competition and full-cost pricing 
on the grounds that they are untestable. What needs to be done instead is to make 
such theories testable. The fact that Archibald (1961) took up this very challenge 
appears to indicate their influence. This points to their influence on Archibald's 
(1959) interpretation of Hutchison (1938). 
Klappholz and Agassi 's criticism of Hutchison 
While Klappholz and Agassi choose to dissent from, rather than directly criticise 
_ Robbins's position, they point out that Hutchison in 1938 in his 'influential book' 
took the latter option. In his appraisal of Robbins, Hutchison contended that 'the 
propositions of pure theory' and 'economic laws' described by Robbins were 
'tautologies' or 'analytic truths'. His remedy was that, for economics to be a science, 
5 We note that Kaldor (1983: 6) views Keynes's principle of effective demand as a refinement, 
rather than an overthrow, of Say's Law. 
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it should limit itself to propositions that are testable. This introduction to economics · 
of Popper's falsifiability criterion was his 'great merit' (p 63). 
However, Klappholz and Agassi take issue with Hutchison's appraisal since it is 
based on a twofold classification of all propositions that have 'scientific sense' into 
either empirical statements or tautologies. Empirical statements are conceivably 
empirically falsifiable, that is, they forbid some conceivable occurrence. Klappholz 
and Agassi argue that here Hutchison makes a mistake: it is quite possible to imagine 
a factually false statement that is irrefutable. As such it would forbid something, yet 
would not be empirically falsifiable (p 63). Hutchison (1938, Ch II, section 5) argues 
that, since it is not possible to falsify statements with unspecified ceteris paribus 
clauses, such statements are therefore to be regarded as tautological. Such an 
argument is flawed. For example, a statement might claim that, ceteris paribus, a tax 
on cigarettes will raise price, while another statement might claim that it lowers price. 
While these statements with their unspecified cet~ris paribus clauses are untestable, 
Klappholz and Agassi contend that they are not tautologies 'for they are both 
incompatible with each other' (p 64). 
According to Klappholz and Agassi, Hutchison implies that the majority of economic 
theory is tautologous. Yet Keynes (1936) 'was undoubtedly concerned with empirical 
issues' (p 64). As Hutchison himself points out (1938: 43-4), we can generally 
choose to interpret propositions as having empirical content or as being tautologous. 
'Why then, did he insist on viewing most of the propositions of pure theory as 
tautologies?' (p 64). The answer, according to Klappholz and Agassi, is that 'he was 
driven to do by the adoption of his dichotomy' (p 64). 'He regarded most 
propositions of "pure theory" as untestable and, given his dichotomy, a statement 
which appeared to be untestable could be nothing but a tautology' (p 64). 
'Hutchison adopted the dichotomy in order to propose the rule, "Do not argue about 
tautologies, but only about testable statements!'" (p 65) The problem, Klappholz and 
Agassi contend, is that Hutchison's dichotomy is false. It excludes not only 
potentially interesting statements (such as statements with unspecified ceteris paribus 
clauses) since these are clearly untestable, but also statements which do not appear to 
be testable. 'This would amount to an undesirable restriction on the range of 
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argument, especially since it is often difficult to know whether an important new idea 
is testable' (p 65). 
The reason Hutchison proposed his rule was 'to ensure adherence to the critical 
attitude' (p 65). However, such an attitude cannot be ensured by adopting rules. 
Hutchison seems to believe that enforcing the rule that restricts scientific discussion to 
testable statements guarantees that these statements would actually be tested, and 
rejected if falsified. This is because he appeared to have argued (incorrectly) that 'the 
only way to escape refutation of an empirical statement was to turn it into a tautology' 
(p 65). Whatever Hutchison's reasons, the point remains that simply insisting that 
statements must be testable does not ensure a 'critical attitude', that is, statements 
'being on the agenda for testing' (p 65). 'Professor Popper has strongly emphasised 
this point, namely, that the critical attitude demands severe and sincere attempts to 
falsify our views, and he also stated the arguments against the dichotomy' (p 65). 
Before examining Hutchison's response to Klappholz and Agassi's appraisal, a 
number of points are in order. First, Klappholz and Agassi are against any 
methodological rule (other than a general injunction to be critical). The rule they 
ascribe to Hutchison is: 'discuss only testable statements'. Presumably they have in 
mind that, while Popper's falsifiability criterion says that scientific statements must be 
falsifiable, Popper does not impose a rule limiting (scientific) discussion to only 
testable statements. However, from our Chapter Three discussion of Hutchison's 
(1938) it should be apparent that neither does Hutchison. For example, he outlines the 
use and significance of propositions of pure theory and accepts the 'invaluable' 
method of introspection as 'practically indispensable' (1938: 33-6, 142-3). While 
Hutchison, like Popper, insists that scientific statements be empirically falsifiable, he 
does not, in fact, propose the rule ascribed to him by Klappholz and Agassi. Their 
criticism that such a rule does not ensure a 'critical attitude' thus becomes redundant. 
Second, Klappholz and Agassi do not accept Hutchison's twofold classification of all 
scientific statements as being either empirically falsifiable or tautological. Hutchison 
(1960, 1960a) takes issue with their second point and we accordingly defer comment 
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on their second point until we examine Hutchison's responses. At this stage we limit 
ourselves to their first point: that they do not accept Hutchison's classification. They 
note that Popper also argued 'against the dichotomy', but do not provide a specific 
reference to his argument. Given this, we can only speculate that their reason for not 
accepting Hutchison's dichotomy is that it rules out metaphysical statements from 
scientific discussion in economics (cfLatsis, 1972: 239). Yet, as we have seen above, 
Hutchison accepts a role for the metaphysical statements regarding electrons in 
physics and in the method of introspection in economics (1938: 19, n 6 and pp 142-3). 
This may be among the reasons he emphasises that his testability principle applies 
only to the 'finished propositions of a science' (1938: 9). Klappholz and Agassi's 
mistake may stem from the fact that they misquote Hutchison on this point (1938: 26). 
They refer to his classification of propositions as having 'scientific sense' seemingly 
not noticing that Hutchison had stressed the term 'scientific' by putting only it in 
inverted commas (p 63). Like Popper he denied metaphysical statements 'scientific' 
sense, but did not (as Klappholz and Agassi seem to imply) deny that they had sense, 
or meaning. 
Third, Klappholz and Agassi ask why Hutchison insisted on 'viewing most of the 
propositions of pure theory as tautologies' (p 64). Hutchison did not view most of the 
propositions of pure theory as tautologies, he viewed all of them as such because he 
defined pure theory (but not the whole of economic theory) to consist exclusively of 
analytical or tautological statements. This third point, together with the other two, 
highlight shortcomings in Klappholz and Agassi's understanding of Hutchison's 
(1938), shortcomings which in turn limited the influence of Hutchison on members of 
the M2T seminar group, in particular, Archibald and Lipsey. 
The 1960 exchange between Hutchison, and Klappholz and Agassi 
In reply to Klappholz and Agassi (1959), Hutchison (1960: xvi) points out that his 
1938 two-fold classification of statements into testable statements and tautologies was 
put forward 'simply as convenient for the methodological analysis of statements in 
economics' (1938: 27). He accepts that 'if there was a range of important statements 
used in economics' which could not be fitted into this classification, then it would 
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'certainly be misleading and inadequate'. So far, however, there have been no 
examples of statements 'which do not fit this classification' (Hutchison, 1960: xvi). 
Hutchison proceeds to explain why he finds Klappholz and Agassi's (1959) example 
concerning statements containing unspecified ceteris paribus clauses unsatisfactory. 
Firstly, they assert that he claimed that all such statements in economics are 
tautological (p 64). Secondly, he interprets Klappholz and Agassi's ceteris paribus 
example (concerning a tax on cigarettes) as attempting to show the inadequacy of his 
classification. The example given implies that statements containing unspecified 
ceteris paribus clauses may be either empirical or tautological and so cannot be 
definitely classified as one or the other (Hutchison, 1960: xvii). 
Hutchison ( 1960a: 158) responds by pointing out that he did not say that all 
statements containing unspecified ceteris paribus clauses are tautological, but rather 
that they are frequently tautological; that they may be interpreted as either empirical 
or tautological or, indeed, in other ways; and that they are frequently 'hopelessly 
ambiguous' (1938: 41, 40, 45, and 162). However, once an attempt is made to specify 
the empirical content of such clauses, the statement so qualifi~d will be able to be 
definitely classified as one or the other (Hutchison, 1960: xvii). Hutchison accepts 
that his classification cannot deal with 'hopelessly ambiguous' statements, but 
comments that if Klappholz and Agassi wish to add a third category (that of 
hopelessly ambiguous statements) to his twofold classification, he would not object 
since this would not imply that his twofold classification was inadequate (ibid). 
Klappholz and Agassi (1960: 160) reply by pointing out that their paper was mainly 'a 
criticism of an attitude of impatience and haste which seems prevalent in 
methodological writings on economics'. Hutchison's 'view that all statements must 
be either tautological or testable supports this attitude since it justifies the impatient 
dismissal of ideas which are not yet testable' (ibid). 
They state that they tried to criticise the inadequacy of this dichotomy by pointing out 
that statements qualified by unspecified ceteris paribus clauses are untestable. This is 
because, to falsify them, one would need to observe all the variable and constant 
factors, not because they are tautologies. Hutchison accepts that statements qualified 
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by unspecified ceteris paribus clauses are untestable and that ·it follows from this and 
from his dichotomy that such statements must be tautological. 'Yet he criticises us 
for attributing this conclusion to him' (Klappholz and Agassi, 1960: 160). They 
contend that Hutchison 'now implicitly concedes that his dichotomy was inadequate 
when he says that an ambiguous statement may be neither tautological nor testable; 
which is all we endeavoured to show in this context' (ibid: 160-1 ). 
While they broadly sympathise with, and respect and applaud, Hutchison's (1938) 
book, in particular his point that economists were mistaking logic for fact, they regret 
that they find some of its 'basic tenets unacceptable and believe them to give 
unjustifiable support to the kind of impatience we sought to criticise' (ibid: 161). 
Concluding remarks 
The main point we want to emphasise about Klappholz and Agassi's comments is that 
they are concerned with philosophical issues (clarifying Popper) than with using 
philosophical concepts to aid the practice of economics. Their philosophical interest 
in testing the limits of Hutchison's dichotomy leads them to miss the point of 
Hutchison's concern with the ceteris paribus assumption/or economics. Given that 
Hutchison is saying only that ceteris paribus propositions are frequently tautological, 
or 'hopelessly ambiguous', the relevance for economics of Hutchison's criticism is 
that this favourite assumption 'should be used less often and more cautiously' (1938: 
162). Hutchison's point does not occur in an obscure footnote, but in a list of his 
leading fifteen conclusions in the chapter summary at the end of his book! That 
Hutchison is more concerned with economics than Klappholz and Agassi is indicated 
by another example. Hutchison at one point is led to say that Klappholz and Agassi's 
statement (that one can imagine factually false statements that are not empirically 
falsifiable) is not only a 'direct contradiction', but of doubtful relevance regarding 
statements in economics (1960: xxi, n 1, emphasis added). 
A number of further points merit noting. The first has been mentioned before. 
Klappholz and Agassi (1960: 160) refer to Hutchison's view 'that all statements must 
be either tautological or testable'. This is simply incorrect. Hutchison admitted a role 
for other statements ( eg the results of introspection and metaphysical ones concerning 
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electrons). His concern was with a more specific proposition, namely, that the 
'finished propositions' of economics be testable (1938: 9). A second point concerns 
the extent to which Klappholz and Agassi sympathised with, respected, and applauded 
Hutchison's (1938). When passing to their review of Papandreou (1958) and 
Schoeffler (1955) they state that these two books 'fall well below the high standards 
set' by Robbins (1935), Hutchison (1938) and Friedman (1953). Despite this, 
Hutchison's (1938) failed to directly influence key economists such as Archibald and 
Lipsey. For this unfortunate outcome, the ultra-Popperian interpretation of Hutchison 
(1938) by Klappholz and Agassi played an important role. As such, much of the 
substance of what Hutchison had to say that was relevant to the practice of economics 
was lost in a cloud of philosophical discussion. 
Thirdly, Latsis points out that if Klappholz and Agassi reject Hutchison's proposal 
that untestable propositions should be dismissed as unscientific, 'what propositions do 
we dismiss as unscientific? Klappholz and Agassi give no reply' (1972: 241 ). Their 
conclusion that methodologically all one can do is to adopt a critical attitude appears 
too idealistic. Popper himself put forward his falsifiability criterion. In this respect 
Hutchison (1938) appears to have his feet more firmly on Popper's ground. 
6.2 Koopmans's 1957 essay and Hutchison 
In this section we examine the relation between Koopmans (1957) and Hutchison 
(1938) for two main reasons. First, in his essay Koopmans explicitly drew attention 
to the similarities between his position and that of Hutchison (1938). We will show 
that while similarities certainly existed, Koopmans, like the M2T group, failed to be 
attracted to Hutchison's response to the difficulty of empirical testing in economics. 
This factor, rather than a perception of Hutchison's position as logical positivist or 
nai"vely inductivist, appears to have been the major divide. Second, Koopmans's 
essay is the main topic of Archibald (1959), another methodological piece to emerge 
from the M2T group. Hutchison's 1938 intervention is also the subject of Archibald's 
appraisal, and this appraisal - when we tum to examine it in the next section - will 
be better understood within the wider setting of his review of Koopmans' s essay. 
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Our first task is to evaluate Koopmans's claim regarding the similarity of his 
methodological position to that of Hutchison (1938). Koopmans states that as he was 
finishing his essay he 
became aware of the similarity of the point of view here adopted with some of 
the ideas expressed in somewhat stronger terms by T. W. Hutchison (1938). 
There is some difference in emphasis in that the present essay gives more 
attention to the detachability of the chains of reasoning from the interpretation 
of the postulates. In so far as there is duplication or repetition, there seems to be 
no harm done by it, since the practical consequences of the views expressed 
have not yet been generally realized or accepted (1957: 132, n 2). 
Given that Koopmans is far from being regarded as any sort of ultra-empiricist, his 
comment is significant since it appears to support our argument in Chapter Five that 
Machlup (1955, 1956) incorrectly represented Hutchison's position. However, as we 
will see in our examination of his 1957 essay, while there are similarities, there are 
also differences, particularly concerning Koopmans's greater attention 'to the 
detachability of the chains of reasoning from the interpretation of the postulates'. 
Koopmans begins his essay by pointing out that the potentialities of recent changes in 
the tools of both theoretical and empirical research should be accorded 
methodological recognition (p 130). 6 He then points out that, while progress in 
empirical sciences such as economics results from the interaction of observation and 
reasoning, in terms of Marshall's 'diplomatic style of discourse' it is 'extraordinarily 
difficult' to uncover the parts that observation and reasoning play in building the 
foundations of economic knowledge (p 131 ). While it is impossible to say which 
comes first, observation or reasoning, in this essay he will concentrate on the part of 
reasoning. He now states that to uncover the parts that observation and reasoning 
play in building the foundations of economic knowledge, it will be useful to describe 
its 'logical structure' which he sets out as follows: 
Any logically valid chain of reasoning starts from certain premises. Premises which 
are basic, that is, 'not in themselves conclusions from earlier parts of the reasoning in 
the same piece of analysis' are called 'postulates' (p 132). The postulates contain 
6 All unsupported page references in section 6.2 are to Koopmans (1957). 
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terms that are the counterparts of observable phenomena. WJ:Ule for practical 
purposes the casual meanings of the key words (consumer, commodity, probability) 
associated with these terms suffice, more formal descriptions or interpretations are 
needed in order to get down to fundamentals (p 133). Without the interpretations, the 
postulates are bare statements of relations between terms. Through the interpretations 
they become statements that specify the range of choices open to the various persons 
introduced, ·the effects of these choices, and the rules or principles from which actual 
choices are derived. 'However, from the point of view of the logic of the reasoning, 
the interpretations are detachable. Only the logical contents of the postulates matter' 
(p 133). 
At this stage, there are two points to note about the approach outlined by Koopmans 
in so far as it compares to Hutchison (1938). First, his statement that reasoning starts 
from basic premises, or postulates, not themselves earlier conclusions, and that 
contain theoretical terms which are the counterparts of observable phenomena appears 
to reflect a crude form of inductivism open to the most basic kinds of criticism. 
Elsewhere Koopmans writes of 'exhibiting the postulational basis, and thereby the 
ultimate observational evidence, on which our statements rest' (p 144). Even 
Friedman (1953) recognised that the premises of a piece of reasoning are often the 
results of an earlier hypothesis. While Hutchison leans towards an inductivist 
approach, he does not attempt an explicit description such as that of Koopmans. 
Instead he implies the validity of an inductivist approach by referring to the need to 
test assumptions. In addition, Hutchison accepts that some terms, eg electrons in 
physical science theory, will not have empirically observable counterparts (1938: 19, 
n 6). 
Second, his emphasis on the detachability of the interpretations appears to reflect his 
view that the activities of observation and reasoning need to become formally 
separated as, he claims, they are in the physical sciences. Marshall's diplomatic style 
needs to be dropped. Here Koopmans takes a decisive step away from Hutchison 
(and Friedman) who both held Marshall's method in high regard. In urging the· 
introduction of more formal methods of investigation, Koopmans is following views 
he expressed twenty years earlier. Morgan points out that Haavelmo (1944), in 
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. pioneering the probability approach to econometrics, 'in fact developed the views of 
Koopmans (193 7), who had already argued that economic data could be regarded as a 
random sample from a hypothetical probability distribution' (1998: 218). 
Given that the postulates of economic theory are not completely self-evident, and that 
the implications of such postulates are not easily testable, Koopmans argues that it 
will help if the implications can be traced to the supporting postulates. This implies 
that we view economic theory as a sequence of models that seek to express aspects of 
a more complex reality. While Koopmans foresees realism preceding rigour in the 
construction of these models, progress depends upon rigour consolidating the gains in 
realism. However, 'often we are more preoccupied with arriving at what we deem to 
be true statements or best predictions, in the light of such knowledge as we have of 
the phenomena in question, than in exhibiting the postulational basis, and thereby the 
ultimate observational evidence, on which our statements rest' (p 143). Apart from 
the difficulties of testing in economics providing reasons for making the postulates 
explicit, there are psychological reasons. For example, there is a tendency to 
overestimate the scope of the conclusions of economics. One such conclusion is the 
belief 'in the efficiency of competitive markets as a means of allocating resources in a 
world full of uncertainty' (p 146). Yet no model of resource allocation has been 
developed which deals with uncertainty (p 147). In the remainder of the essay 
Koopmans states that he will discuss some of the difficulties that arise when factors 
such as uncertainty and indivisibilities are taken into account (p 149). 
Koopmans now considers the directions in which greater realism could be introduced 
into the system of postulates underlying economic analysis starting with the factor of 
uncertainty. Here we need greater clarity on whether the class of self-evident 
postulates outlined by Robbins may perhaps be exhausted. If this is the case, then the 
previous 'casual' empiricism which in the past proved sufficient for economic 
analysis needs to be replaced by 
more systematic observation and direct or indirect testing of postulates. The 
latter view has been strongly expressed by Hutchison (1938, Ch IV) who sees in 
the recognition of uncertainty the turning point beyond which empirical 
verification of postulates should become the main preoccupation of economists 
(p 150). 
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Likewise, Koopmans points out, although the indivisibility of commodities is a basic 
fact of technology and even of human existence, and furthermore that such 
indivisibilities generate increasing returns to scale with direct implications for perfect 
competition, economic theory has hardly started to take such indivisibilities into 
account. Koopmans sets out his solution to this problem as follows: 'In a 
postulational approach, indivisible commodities can be introduced through the 
suppression of the proportionality postulate for all activities in which one of the 
commodities in question enters' (p 152). 
Professor Chamberlin's objection that this reduces the 'explanation' of 
increasing returns to a tautology misses the point. As Hutchison (1938, Ch III) 
has emphasized, all pure theory, that is, all study of the implications of given 
postulates is tautological in character. Accordingly, the reproach of tautology 
has been leveled against many propositions of economic theory (p 152). 
The point at issue, however, is that a model that omits the proportionality postulate 
appears to recognise those aspects of reality responsible for increasing returns to scale 
(p 152). As such it may prove useful in a first attempt at examining the phenomenon 
of increasing returns to scale. But so far, 'theoretical analysis still has not yet 
absorbed and digested the simplest facts establishable by the most casual observation' 
(p 154). Given that the main obstacle to progress appears to be in the form of 
mathematical difficulties, 'it may be desirable in initial attempts to select postulates 
mainly from the point of view of facilitating the analysis, in prudent disregard of the 
widespread scorn for such a procedure' (p 154). 
We are now in a position to comment once again on Koopmans' s views in so far as 
they compare to those of Hutchison's. When Koopmans complains that economists 
are often over concerned with predictions and neglect examination of assumptions, it 
---· 
appears as if he is putting forward a similar view to that of Hutchison. When he 
complains that economists overestimate the scope of their conclusions (especially that 
concerning the efficiency of competitive markets), one can see Hutchison nodding in 
agreement. Once again his calls for injecting greater realism into the system of 
postulates beginning with the factors of uncertainty and indivisibility of commodities 
sound fully in line with an approach which Hutchison would support. Regarding the 
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uncertainty factor, Koopmans appeals explicitly to Hutchison's call for the greater 
testing of postulates. But now sharp differences appear. 
Regarding the indivisibility factor, Koopmans argues this can be dealt with by 
'suppression of the proportionality postulate'. Dropping this assumption will allow 
increasing returns into the analysis and thereby incorporate the effect of 
indivisibilities. Koopmans in this case now seems to accept that assumptions should 
be selected for their theoretical tractability rather than their empirical realism, 
something that lies at the very heart of what Hutchison has been arguing against. His 
attempt to justify this move by arguing that is might prove useful in a first attempt is 
an appeal to the 'optimistic approach' so roundly condemned by Hutchison. 
Paradoxically _J(oopmans parts company with Hutchison in his attempt to introduce 
more 'realistic assumptions' into economic analysis. For Koopmans, this is done by 
formalising the theory while, for Hutchison, the very opposite is required. 
Archibald's review of Koopmans 's essay 
According to Archibald (1959), Koopmans's essay is subject to two main criticisms. 
First, where Friedman called for the testing of conclusions, Koopmans takes a step 
backwards and adopts the 'Hutchison-Oxford position', calling for the testing of 
assumptions (Archibald, 1959: 64). As we have shown above, although Koopmans 
calls for the testing of assumptions, there are significant differences betWeen his 
position and that of Hutchison so that it is not clear what meaning can be attached to 
the idea that Koopmans adopted the Hutchison-Oxford position. Archibald's term, 
the 'Hutchison-Oxford position', is also unsatisfactory. Whereas the Oxford 
economists were concerned with putting forward a particular economic theory rather 
than with economic methodology, Hutchison's primary concern was with economic 
methodology. The two parties' engaged with methodological matters at very different 
levels. For example, Hutchison had adopted much the same response as Archibald to 
introspection, a matter quite beyond the scope of the Oxford economists' concerns. 
Archibald's second main criticism of Koopmans (1957) is that it largely fails to 
clarify the major extant methodological problems: where Friedman was wrong, 
Koopmans is of little help (1959: 63). In particular it would have helped if Friedman 
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(and Koopmans) had clarified their use of the term 'assumptions' since economists 
use the term in many different senses. In an attempt at clarifying some of these 
Archibald proceeds to distinguish four separate senses. First there are assumptions 
that concern motivation; second, empirical assumptions concerning the existence and 
stability of functional relations; third, assumptions that certain things are constant; and 
fourth, assumptions 'may also be used to explain the problem to which the hypothesis 
is meant to refer' (Archibald, 1959: 65). Lipsey (1963), citing Archibald on this 
matter, was to develop and clarify the classifications offered by Archibald. 
Hutchison's emphasis on the testing of assumptions appears to have influenced both 
Archibald and Lipsey in their attempts towards greater clarity in this field. 
Finally Archibald points out that, contrary to Koopmans, there is no conflict between 
realism and rigour. He is misguided in suggesting that testing of a rigorously 
formulated theory such as von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) is difficult. 'The 
implications of a theory can be tested whether its formulation is rigorous (and 
postulates "unreal") or non-rigorous ("realistic"); if it is rigorously formulated it is, of 
course, likely to be easier to discover just what it does imply' (Archibald, 1959: 67). 
Archibald states he is puzzled by Koopmans's view that there is a conflict between 
realism and rigour. He cites Koopmans's (pp 155-61) view that von Neumann and 
Morgenstern ( 194 7) is difficult to test. He maintains a theory can be tested whether or 
not it is rigorously formulated. Indeed, it is easier to test if it is rigorously formulated. 
However, as we saw in examining Koopmans's essay, Koopmans parts company with 
Hutchison in arguing that the way to introduce the effects of uncertainty and 
indivisibilities into economic analysis is to select postulates for their mathematical 
tractability. Koopmans is at one with Archibald in moving towards the introduction 
of more formal approaches in economics. In doing so, they decisively part company 
With Hutchison. 
With this background of Archibald's appraisal of Koopmans's essay, we are now 
equipped with a useful perspective to view his interpretation of Hutchison (1938). 
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6.3 Archibald's 1959 interpretation of Hutchison 
In this section we are interested in understanding the way in which another member of 
the M2T group viewed Hutchison's approach to methodology, namely Archibald. We 
point out the extent to which his approach is more in line with Hutchison than that of 
Klappholz and Agassi's purist Popperism. While Archibald's linking of Hutchison 
with the Oxford 'full cost' economists does appear to support de Marchi's (1988: 146) 
point that the M2T group were put off by Hutchison's naive inductivism, we argue 
that the more important factor was Hutchison's response to the difficulty of empirical 
testing in economics. Archibald, as we have just seen in his comments on 
Koopmans's essay, maintained that a theory was easier to test if formulated 
rigorously. It is in developing this view, eg Archibald (1961 ), that his approach 
diverged from Hutchison's. 
Like Klappholz and Agassi, Archibald attempts a geperal Popperian-inspired critique 
of economic methodology. Accordingly, he begins with a critical look at Robbins and 
Friedman's methodological essays before turning to Hutchison's. However, 
Archibald's less extreme interpretation of Popper leads him to differ from them on a 
number of points, especially regarding his criticism of Robbins (1935) where, unlike 
Klappholz and Agassi, he implicitly accepts Hutchison's rule of empirical testing in 
economics. 
Archibald's comment on Robbins (1935) is brief. He notes the following aspects of 
Robbins's essay. According to Robbins, propositions of economic theory are 
deductions from postulates that involve indisputable facts of experience (1935: 78-9). 
Consumers' valuation of goods is explained in subjective and introspective terms 
(1935: 88). ·While generalisations (eg concerning electrons) in natural sciences 'are 
known only inferentially', in economics they are known 'to us by immediate 
acquaintance' (eg concerning ordering of individual preferences). 'It is true that we 
deduce much from definitions. But it is not true that the definitions are arbitrary' 
(1935: 105). Archibald comments on these aspects as follows: given that economic 
propositions are deductions from assumptions that are indisputable, the testability of 
such assumptions is irrelevant and unnecessary (1959: 59). 
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Compared to Klappholz and Agassi's (1959) decision to dissent from, rather than to 
directly criticise Robbins (1935), Archibald tackles Robbins head on. He gets to the 
nub of the matter: in terms of Robbins' s a priori-leaning approach, the testability and 
testing of assumptions is simply unnecessary. Archibald thereby supports our 
interpretation of Robbins's position and appears closer to adhering to Hutchison's 
emphasis on the importance of empirical testing. 
Archibald describes Friedman's (1953) essay as 'revolutionary'. By arguing that 
assilmptions were necessarily descriptively unrealistic, it represented a step towards 
escaping from this muddle surrounding the issue of the realism of assumptions. 
Friedman's essay stated some methodological principles well known in the natural 
sciences. However, applied to economics this raises serious problems concerning the 
method of, and criteria for, testing. Archibald criticises Friedman firstly for his 
'complacency' concerning what has been done in this regard in economics. 'It is 
extremely doubtful, in my opinion, if the theory of the firm has ever been the subject 
of really serious testing' (p 61).7 Secondly, he criticises Friedman for omitting to say 
anything about the criteria for a good test, or about the difficulty of testing in 
economics. In this regard there are two common problems ignored by Friedman: the 
problem of how to test a theory that is 'purely static' and so descriptively false; and 
the problem of the ceteris paribus clause. 
Archibald now turns to expand on his second criticism of Friedman: side-stepping the 
difficulties of testing in economics. In particular, he looks at the problem of the 
ceteris paribus clause. He contends that, if the 'other things' are not specified in 
advance, there is an alibi for any refutation. While the list of 'other things' is infinite, 
we need to specify which of them are taken to be constants in the hypothesis we are 
_trying to test. Moreover, it is vital that such factors are observables. Often factors in 
economics which need to be held constant are non-observables such as tastes or 
expectations. If an hypothesis contains such non-observables,. it can never be refuted. 
Archibald explains that this had been pointed out by Hutchison in his discussion of 
the ceteris paribus clause (Hutchison, 1938: 40-46). However, if the 'other things' are 
specified in advance, and are observable, 'we at least have a chance of learning from a 
7 From now on unsupported page references in section 6.3 are to Archibald (1959). 
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refutation that the hypothesis must be widened to include some. "other things" as 
variables' (pp 61-2). Archibald explains that this too had been pointed out by 
Hutchison (1938: 44). 
Here is clear evidence of the direct influence of Hutchison. Archibald recognises that 
Hutchison had long ago pointed to the problems of testing propositions with poorly 
specified ceteris paribus clauses. Archibald accepts the significance of the distinction 
between observable and non-observable factors in order to arrive at a definite test 
result. This distinction is of course central to logical positivism. The most interesting 
point, however, is that Archibald approves Hutchison's cqnclusions about the problem 
of ceteris paribus clauses. By contrast Klappholz and Agassi (1959) cited 
Hutchison's analysis of ceteris paribus clauses negatively in their criticism of 
Hutchison's twofold classification of propositions that have scientific sense. 
Archibald's interpretation of Hutchison 
Archibald begins by noting Hutchison's insistence 'that the criterion of testability be 
rigorously applied to existing economic thought' (pp 59-60). In addition, more 
attention needed to be given to 'looking at the facts in relation to theories' (p 60). 
While this represented progress compared to Robbins's position, 'Hutchison was 
unfortunately vague on the question of what we tested' (p 60). It seems as if 
Hutchison thought it was assumptions rather than predictions that needed testing. 
Archibald cites various passages from Hutchison concerning the need for testing 
assumptions (1938: 74, 83, 89, 119-120). 
Here we note that Archibald approves of the more empirical approach of Hutchison as 
compared to Robbins. For Archibald, the problem with Hutchison's empiricism is 
that he wanted to test assumptions rather than predictions. While Archibald cites 
passages in which Hutchison spoke about the need to test assumptions, this does not 
imply that Hutchison is arguing that they should be tested rather than predictions. 
Instead Hutchison emphasised the importance of a theory generating predictions . 
which are empirically testable (1938: 65-70 and 163-4). Moreover Hutchison's 
central Principle of Testability refers to the need for the 'finished propositions' to be 
testable (1938: 9). Here the predictions of a theory are a better candidate for being 
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'finished propositions' than the assumptions or initial premises of a theory. Unlike 
Friedman, Hutchison does not restrict testing to concentrating only on predictions. 
Instead one must seize opportunities for testing whenever they arise, given that such 
opportunities are so limited. While it is accurate to say of Friedman that he wanted to 
test predictions rather than assumptions, it is not accurate to say of Hutchison that he 
wanted to test assumptions rather than predictions. In any case, the main criticism of 
Hutchison, namely that by Machlup (1955), was that he thought it worthwhile to test 
assumptions at all, let alone as much as, or more than, predictions. 
Meanwhile, Archibald notes, certain Oxford economists were attempting to test the 
realism of assumptions such as the one that businessmen set price and output so as to 
maximise profits (Hall and Hitch, 1939). 
The Oxford work was, I think, undertaken before the publication of Hutchison's 
book; but it is convenient to take them together because they are alike in 
insisting, both that facts and theories be studied in close relation to one another, 
and, as I interpret them, that the role of the factual study is in checking the 
descriptive reality of the assumptions of the theory (p 60, n 2). 
The method of the Oxford economists was to use questionnaires. Their results were 
generally considered as indicating that businessmen sought a normal profit 
determined by a mark-up on fixed costs, rather than a maximum profit. This 
generated a debate on the realism of the profit maximising assumption. 
The attempt to check the realism of the postulates led only to a methodological 
schism in economics: on the one hand we had those who paraded their 'realism' 
'this is how businesses actually work' and were indifferent to the 
arguments that their theory was indeterminate and therefore irrefutable; on the 
other hand we had those who stuck to 'rational' theory, and appeared more and 
more indifferent to reality (as understood by the first group). We still suffer 
from this sterile and muddle-headed dispute (p 61). 
Archibald's linking of Hutchison with the Oxford economists is problematic. While it 
is true that, in a general way, they both stressed the importance of testing 
assumptions, in many important respects Hutchison's approach was significantly 
different from the Oxford economists, as well as being, of course, more sophisticated. 
The most obvious difference is that Hutchison sought to describe a general 
methodological approach to tackling economic problems whereas the Oxford 
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economists were concerned with one particular theory - the theory of the firm. The 
issue of testing assumptions forms just one part of Hutchison's concerns. Archibald's 
conflation of Hutchison with the Oxford economists is both inaccurate and 
misleading. For example, Archibald refers to the 'sterile' debate on the realism of 
assumptions. On the one hand, he says, were those who 'paraded their realism' and 
paid no attention to making their theories empirically 'refutable'; and on the other 
were those who paid no attention to realism of assumptions. From what Archibald 
has said it would seem as if he would classify Hutchison with those who paraded their 
realism. Yet, central to Hutchison's whole methodology, is his Principle of 
Testability, namely, the need for a theory to generate conceivably empirically 
falsifiable 'finished propositions'. This is far from calling simply for realistic 
assumptions. 
It appears that Archibald, like Machlup before him, misrepresented Hutchison's 
position. Whereas Machlup made Hutchison out to be an ultra-empiricist, Archibald 
has presented him as being on a methodological par with the Oxford economists, 
apparently fixated on testing assumptions. Yet Archibald's ( 1961) subsequent 
exchange with Chicago was to show up the limitations of his ultra-Popperian-leaning 
methodology as opposed to Hutchison's more cautious approach. In the process 
Archibald discovered that economic theory did not lend itself to Popper's refutability 
to nearly the extent he had thought. Unlike Hutchison, he had been overly ambitious 
in attempting to apply Popper to economic theory. He had tried to derive testable 
predictions from monopolistic competition by applying Samuelson's qualitative 
comparative static analysis. Contrary to Samuelson (1947: 33) he found that there are 
almost no unambiguous qualitative predictions, or predictions 'in general', when one 
is trying to assess the effect of a parameter change, if the change also alters other 
parameters (de Marchi, 1988: 156-7). 
The problem with testing was that it needed so many subsidiary assumptions that it 
was impossible to pinpoint what had gone wrong in the event of a refutation (ibid). 
One solution seemed to be to acquire more detailed quantitative information, but it 
was precisely the problems to which this gave rise that had prompted Archibald's use 
of comparative static analysis. This led Archibald (and Lipsey) to abandon the notion 
of Popperian testing which meant getting a proposition into a form in which it strictly 
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forbids something (a more general statement) (Archibald, 1966; Lipsey, 1966). 
Consequently they both became convinced that economic hypotheses must be 
expressed in statistical terms and statistical conventions substituted for Popper's 
demarcation criterion of strict refutability. Yet Popper ( 1959: 189-90) was well aware 
of this difficulty, even acknowledging that physics is based on probability statements 
(de Marchi, 1988: 158-61). The results of Archibald's attempt to apply Popper too 
closely to economics appeared to show up the wisdom of Hutchison's more selective 
drawing upon of Popper. 
6.4 Lipsey's 1963 textbook and Hutchison 
In this section we trace the extent to which the approach of the M2T group, in spite of 
the critical comments of Klappholz and Agassi (1959) and Archibald (1959), was de 
facto in line with Hutchison's methodological views. Given that the M2T group were 
not regarded as methodological extremists, to the extent that similarities prevail this 
supports our argument that Hutchison's approach was not nearly as extreme as made 
out by Knight (1940) and Machlup (1955). The two examples we choose to examine 
for such similarities from the work that developed out of the M2T group are 
Klappholz and Mishan (1962) and Lipsey (1963). 
Klappholz and Mishan (1962) begin by pointing out that a legacy of the saving-
investment controversy of the 1930s is the profusion of identities in economic models, 
coupled with the exhortation to students never to confuse identities with behaviour 
relations (1962: 117). But if identities were seen to add nothing to our understanding 
of the working of the economic system, it should be recognised that they were 
redundant in economic models, and that their presence needlessly gave rise to 
confusion. In particular, their role as the basis of economic models is untenable 
(1962: 118). 
Klappholz and Mishan first look at the logical status of an identity. A multitude of 
writers indicate that it is a relationship that is true by definition. Identities are empty 
statements. They tell us nothing about the universe and are necessarily irrefutable. If 
an identity is an empty statement, it has nothing to impart to a theory. It can, so to 
speak, evaporate without a trace (1962: 119). 
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If this is an obvious point, it has certainly not been allowed to prevail in economics. 
Instead the literature abounds with tributes to the role of the identity. Some go so Jar 
as to regard identities as 'the pith and substance of economics'. Klappholz and 
Mishan respond to this view by pointing out that, if identities were in fact examples of 
important propositions in economic theory, they should have to agree with Hutchison 
(1938) that most propositions of economic theory are indeed 'invincibly true', but 
therefore empty. They agree, of course, with Hutchison that such statements are of no 
interest in empirical economics, but they cannot agree with his view that practically 
all propositions in economic theory fall into this class of statement. 
Among those who find them the pith and substance of economics are Robertson 
(1957) and Boulding who argues that 'it is one of the principle tasks of economic and 
social analysis to detect and state them' since they express important economic truths 
which 'serve to limit the social and economic universe to a certain area of possibility' 
by defining 'the impossible' (1958: 5-6). However, this, it turns out, is only the 
linguistically impossible. In addition to Boulding, Swedish economists such as 
Myrdal, Lindahl and Hansen make liberal use of identities (Klappholz and Mishan, 
1962: 120). Indeed they are used so generally that Boulding tells his readers that 'the 
relationships which constitute a model are of two kinds, identities and behaviour 
equations. All models seem to possess them both' ( 1941: 4 7). Klappholz and Mishan 
find it baffling that so many writers admit that identities are devoid of empirical 
content and yet believe that nevertheless they are essential (1962: 121). 
Klappholz and Mishan proceed to argue, 'first, that to build economic models upon 
identities is to commit logical absurdities, and second, that the idea of identities 
serving as a guide in the construction of such models is illusory' (1962: 121). They 
describe models as 'theories on the basis of which we try to explain or predict 
economic phenomena' (1962: 121). 'A common practice, to which we have alluded, 
is the treatment of an equation of identity as though it served as a scaffolding about 
which to append empirical relationships' (1962: 122-3). 'No economic theorem 
whatever can be deduced from an equation, no matter how vigorously manipulated, 
that has been suffered to remain an identity' (1962: 124). Similarly 'no hypotheses 
whatever about equilibrium conditions can be inferred from identities' (1962: 126). 
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What we are condemning ... is the practice of, and the arguments for, the 
substitution in economic models of equations which are identities when, in fact, 
the empirical implications which economists purport to deduce from these 
models follow only if such equations are not identities but genuinely 
independent equations - equations that are, in effect, independent empirical 
statements. This erroneous practice is widespread, particularly the use of 
identities as a base on which to build simple and familiar models (1962: 126). 
The extent to which Klappholz and Mishan repeat the arguments given by Hutchison 
in 1938 is quite remarkable. They agree with Hutchison that identities are of no 
interest in empirical economics, but not with his view that most propositions in 
economics are identities. Yet they proceed to show just how many well-known 
economists make use of identities and regard them as the 'pith and substance' of 
economics and acknowledge that they find this state of affairs 'baffling'. Their 
investigation thus seems to vindicate Hutchison's view about the preponderance of 
identities in economics. They protest against treating identities as if empirical 
relationships can be derived from them. This is the same point that Hutchison had 
raised in 1938: the interpretation of statements which are pure tautologies as yielding 
propositions which have empirical and practical relevance. The statements quoted 
from their page 126 in the foregoing paragraphs repeat Hutchison's (1938) arguments 
to a surprisingly close degree. Indeed, they appear to stress the importance of 
empirical statements in economics even more than Hutchison! 
Lipsey 's introduction to positive economics 
According to de Marchi (1988: 149), Lipsey (1963) was his answer to Robbins. It 
stressed methodological awareness from the outset and, in the Popperian spirit, 
resolutely subjected established theories to criticism. Lipsey's (1963) makes it clear 
that to judge the correctness of economic theories, one should look in the empirical 
rather than the a priori direction. If reformulating theory with an eye to testing was 
Archibald's mission, quantification was Lipsey's (de Marchi, 1988: 144-5). Despite 
the numerical inconstancy of the givens of economic theory, the question to be 
addressed in the face of these difficulties is a quantitative one: how much stability is 
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there? Theory 'can have few applications to the real world without some empirical 
observations of quantitative magnitudes' (Lipsey, 1963: 161).8 
There are three major themes in Lipsey's book: (a) explaining economic theory and 
how to criticise it and so improve it; (b) elaborating the relation between theory and 
observations; and (c) clarifying the relation between economic theory and policy, and 
so the significance of distinguishing between positive and normative statements. 
Regarding (b) it is unfortunate that there is too much of a gap between theory taught 
as logical analysis only vaguely related to the world, and applied economics which 
'becomes description unenlightened by any theoretical framework' (p xii).9 
After explaining the positive-normative distinction, Lipsey proceeds to explain the 
term 'science'. He points out that, rather than appealing to authority or introspection, 
the scientist attempts to relate questions to evidence. If the scientist finds that the 
issue is framed in such terms that it is impossible to gather evidence, he will try to 
recast the question so that it becomes possible. There is no formula for such recasting 
- it is an art (p 6, n 1 ). While experimental sciences can call up evidence on demand, 
economics 'must wait for the passage of time to throw up observations which may be 
used as evidence in testing economic theories' (p 6). 
Lipsey is quite clear that the hallmark of a scientific approach is the appeal to fact. 
While Hutchison ( 193 8: 11) had noted this basic point of empiricism, he failed to give 
anything like the prominence that Lipsey accorded to it. At the beginning of Lipsey's 
book, between the contents pages and the preface, Lipsey quotes two pages from 
Beveridge's farewell address as the director of the LSE (Beveridge, 1937). Apart 
from Samuelson, Beveridge may well be the only other contender for being awarded a 
certificate of ultra-empiricism from Machlup. The sections extracted by Lipsey 
emphasise the inductivist point that science is based on fact. While Hutchison would 
of course be sympathetic to Lipsey' s quotation of Beveridge, it is unlikely that he 
would have put the matter as directly or simply as Beveridge. In citing Beveridge so 
fully, Lipsey comes across as someone at least as (if not more) sympathetic to 
8 Torr (1991) has drawn attention to the problems of talking about a 'real world'. 
9 All unsupported page references in section 6.4 are to Lipsey (1963). 
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inductivism as Hutchison. On this point, Boland (1979: 507) has d!awn attention to 
the inductivist background of the positive-normative distinction. 
The question of a social science now arises. A science of human behaviour is 
feasible, Lipsey argues, since 'predictions about the behaviour of large groups are 
made possible by the so-called "law" of large numbers' (p 8). This is derived from a 
behavioural· constant, the normal curve of error. While different people will make 
different measurements of a room, we can predict with perfect accuracy how a group 
will make its errors. If group behaviour were in fact random there could be no life 
assurance. Most people accept that there are relatively stable relations in human 
behaviour. The significant question is now a quantitative one: 'How much stability is 
shown by human behaviour and how much of behaviour appears to be random?' (p 
10). This is an empirical question. It cannot be settled by a priori arguments; it can 
only be settled by observation. 
Lipsey here implicitly follows the thesis of naturalism, or the logical positivist unity 
of science thesis. He is not as direct or extreme as Friedman on this point. Friedman 
(1953: 4) had claimed that economics can be an 'objective' science in exactly the 
same sense as the natural sciences. We have remarked that, while Hutchison adopted 
a version of the naturalistic thesis in 1938, he came increasingly to recognise the 
significance of the differences between the natural and social sciences. Lipsey's 
approach seems to be in line with Hutchison's more circumspect attachment to this 
thesis. 
Lipsey now turns to discuss the nature of scientific theories. He claims we all know 
that the natural sciences progress through the development of theories. These account 
for observed phenomena and suggest new phenomena which can then be investigated. 
He proceeds by asking three questions: 
(1) What is the use, or purpose of a theory? Theories grow up in answer to the 
question 'why?' Some sequence of events is observed in the world and someone asks . 
why this should be so. A theory attempts to explain why. Whether or not it takes us 
any nearer to an understanding of 'ultimate reality' is a very difficult philosophical 
question. Whatever may be the answer to this question, one of the main practical 
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consequences of a theory is that it enables us to predict as yet unobserved events. 
Thus, for example, national income theory predicts that a government budget deficit 
will reduce the volume of unemployment (p 11). 
Unlike Friedman, Lipsey recognises that theories aim not only at the prediction, but 
also at the explanation, of events. Hutchison (1938: 70-72) had discussed explanation 
in so far as it relates to the question of causality. In 1938 he displayed a keen 
awareness of the problems of talking about ultimate causes, so reflecting not only the 
general empiricist scepticism on the topic following Hume, but also the more logical 
positivist interventions. 
(2) What exactly is a theory and how does one test theories? A theory consists of a 
set of definitions and a set of assumptions about the way in which the world behaves. 
These can both be expressed as mathematical equations. The next step is to use a 
process of logical deduction to discover various implications of these assumptions. 
This may be carried out in words, geometry or mathematics. 'The implications which 
are deduced from the assumptions can be tested against actual empirical observations, 
and we would then conclude either that the theory is refuted by the facts, or that it is 
consistent with the facts' (pp 11-12). 
Assumptions may often seem totally unrealistic, eg 'assume that there is no 
government'. But this assumption may merely be the economist's way of saying that, 
whatever the government does, even whether or not it exists, is irrelevant for the 
purpose of this particular theory. Now, put this way, the statement becomes an 
empirical assertion, and the only way to test it is to see if the predictions which follow 
from the theory do or do not fit the facts which the theory is trying to explain. If they 
do then the theorist was correct in his assumption that the government could be 
ignored: the criticism that the theory is unrealistic because we know that there really 
is a government is completely beside the point (p 12). 
Assumptions, however, are used in economics for other purposes, particularly to 
outline the set of conditions under which a theory is meant to hold. Consider a theory 
which starts. 'Assume that the government has a balanced budget'. This may mean 
that the theorist intends his theory to apply only when there is an approximately 
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balanced budget; it may not mean that the size of the government's budget surplus or 
deficit is irrelevant to the theory. The fact that an assumption may mean different 
things in economics has often been a cause of great confusion to professional 
economists (Archibald, 1959; Friedman, 1953). Two points should be borne in mind: 
(i) what information the assumption is intended to convey. For example, that the 
world actually behaves, or is, as assumed; that the factor under consideration is 
irrelevant to the theory; that a convenient fiction is being introduced to formalise 
some quite complex piece of human behaviour. 
(ii) that it is not always appropriate to criticise the simplifying assumptions of a theory 
on the grounds that they are unrealistic. It is important to remember that all theory is 
an abstraction from reality. A good theory abstracts in a useful and significant way, a 
bad theory does not. If a student believes the theorist has assumed away something 
that is important for the problem at hand, then he must try to show that the 
conclusions of the theory are contradicted by the facts (p 12). 
In answering this second question, Lipsey appears to allow his quoted passage from 
Beveridge, which stresses the importance of induction, to pass into the background. 
Theories begin with assumptions, but it is not clear how these assumptions are arrived 
at. Instead Lipsey concentrates on explaining the different kinds of assumptions, so 
following Archibald (1959) and anticipating Musgrave (1981 ). Lipsey explains that 
some assumptions may appear unrealistic, but are not in fact so, once they are 
properly understood. He distinguishes three kinds of assumptions. To explain the 
first he gives the example of the assumption of no government. This may mean, when 
properly understood, that whatever the government does ( eg whether or not the 
government's budget is balanced) is irrelevant to the theory. Musgrave (1981) later 
terms this a negligibility assumption. Then again the assumption that the government 
had a balanced budget may mean that the theory only applies when the budget is 
balanced. Here a budget surplus or deficit is not irrelevant to the theory. Musgrave 
( 1981) later terms this a domain assumption. While a negligibility assumption says 
that the factor is irrelevant, a domain assumption says that it is relevant, to the theory. 
Thirdly, Lipsey also refers to what Musgrave (1981) later terms a heuristic 
7 
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assumption. Such an assumption, Lipsey explains, is a convenient fiction introduced 
to aid the analysis of some complex behaviour. 
Lipsey's purpose in distinguishing these different kinds of assumptions is to show that 
it is not always appropriate to criticise assumptions for being unrealistic. While it 
may be appropriate to criticise negligibility or domain assumptions, it is inappropriate 
to criticise heuristic assumptions for being unrealistic. This represents an advance on 
Friedman's generalis~tion that the realism of (all kinds of) assumptions is irrelevant. 
It probably reflects Lipsey's Popperian background as opposed to Friedman's 
instrumentalism. It also represents an advance on Hutchison, for had Hutchison 
distinguished in a similar way between different kinds of assumptions, he would have 
been able to have shown Machlup (1955) that only heuristic assumptions may be 
properly thought of as convenient fictions. 
In continuing to answer the second question, Lipsey now turns to explain the nature of 
predictions: 
A theory enables us to predict as yet unobserved events. What is the nature of a 
scientific prediction, and is it the same thing as being able to prophesy the future 
course of events? The critical thing to notice about a scientific prediction is that 
it is a conditional statement of the form: ' if you do this then such and such will 
follow'. If you mix hydrogen and oxygen under specified conditions, then 
water will be the result. If the government has a large budget deficit, then the 
volume of employment will be increased (p 13). 
Hutchison (1977: 18) cites this passage and comments: (I) what makes predictions 
scientific is not their being conditional, but rather the kind of generalisations on which 
they are based - these need to be well tested; (2) the juxtaposition of the chemical 
with the economic· prediction is unjustified because, unlike the economic prediction 
'the chemical prediction is relatively precise, quantitatively and temporally, and it is 
deduced from a precise and repeatedly well-tested generalisation or law, and from 
easily testable specific initial conditions' (p 18). Lipsey later continues the natural 
science analogy. He urges students to think of demands and supplies flowing around 
a loop [a closed loop control system] much like water in a series of pipes and tanks, or 
like electricity in an electrical circuit (p 125). 
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Finally, Lipsey turns to consider what we learn by testing 0ur theories (p 13). A 
theory can never be proved to be true because we can only make a limited number of 
observations, while the theory states that a result will always hold. Even if we have 
made a thousand observations which agree with the prediction, it is always possible 
that tomorrow someone will make an observation which refutes the theory. Thus, we 
may conclude that a theory is refuted or that it is consistent with the observations, but 
it is not possible to conclude it has been proved correct (Popper, 1959). When 
Beveridge ( 193 7) speaks of the verification of scientific theories, he would appear to 
believe that it is possible to prove a theory to be true. Unfortunately this is not 
possible. Likewise we should not speak of laws which are proved to be true, but, 
rather, of theories which have not yet been refuted (p 14, n 2). 
We mentioned earlier that Hutchison over time has increasingly recognised the 
significance of differences between the natural and social sciences. Here in 1977 he 
criticises Lipsey for adopting a too natural science view of economics. This arises in 
Lipsey through his attempting to apply Popper too directly to the concerns of a 
specific social science, economics. Hutchison also alludes to our point that Lipsey 
discusses the different kinds of assumptions, but not the appropriate grounds on which 
to base them. Finally, following Popper, he explains that theories can be refuted, but 
never verified as true, as the inductivist Beveridge implies. Similarly Hutchison, also 
influenced by Popper, explains that there is no sense 'in talking of some kind of 
"absolute" test which will "finally" decide whether a proposition is "absolutely" true 
or false' (1938: 9). 
(3) How are theories developed? Theories usually grow up to account for a set of 
empirical observations. They are often the result of creative genius of an almost 
inspired nature (Koestler, 1959). A possible theory is one which is consistent with (ie 
predicts) the already observed phenomena. However, almost any interesting theory 
that has developed to explain some set of observations will imply relations in the 
world other than the ones which the theory was specifically designed to account for. 
The theory is tested by seeing if these other implications are consistent with the facts. 
If they are not, then the theory is refuted. But in refuting the theory we will have 
learned some new facts, and the theory will have to be amended (or a totally new 
theory propounded) so that it is consistent with these new facts as well as with what 
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was previously known. Thus knowledge can progress through successive refutation 
and consequent reformulation of theories (p 14 ). 
In economics there are many observations, for example the distribution of the national 
product, for which there is at the moment no satisfactory theoretical explanation. On 
the other hand, there are many predictions (free trade equalises factor earnings) which 
no one has yet satisfactorily tested. Generally the student must expect to find not 
answers, but a set of problems which provide the agenda for further theoretical and 
empirical research. Even when he does find answers to problems, he should accept 
these answers as tentative and ask, even of the most time-honoured theory: what 
observations will refute this theory? Economics is still a very young science (p 16). 
In answering this third question, Lipsey's response draws once again on Popper. His 
reference to Koestler probably reflects Popper's view that theories begin as 
conjectures rather than from facts as Beveridge implies. Here we note an 
inconsistency in Lipsey's position. Hutchison never attempted to be as explicit as 
Lipsey and acknowledged a role both for an inductivist, and a hypothetico-deductive, 
approach. Lipsey also reflects Popper's view that knowledge grows through the 
successive refutation of theories. Here again, Lipsey's view is in line with 
Hutchison's critical stance and opposed to Friedman's apologetic defence of 
neoclassical theory. Yet, for the various reasons discussed above, Lipsey (and 
Archibald) did not accept Hutchison as a methodological ally against Friedman. 
Conclusion 
Our major organising distinction in Chapters Four, Five and in this chapter, has been 
Latsis's (1972) contrast between those concerned with an empiricist or_ Popper-
inspired methodological criticism of the neoclassical programme and those concerned 
with its apologetic defence. In 1938 Hutchison was alone and ranged against him 
were Robbins, Knight (Chapter Four), and Friedman and Machlup (Chapter Five). In 
Chapter Six we saw that Hutchison, for the first time, was joined by the Popper-
inspired methodological critics of the M2T group. Yet, instead of teaming up with 
theii fellow Popperian, some of these new critics engaged with Hutchison in a family 
quarrel that was quite as fierce as family quarrels can be. In this past chapter we have 
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put forward two factors that, we have argued, account for Hutchison's relative neglect 
by the M2T group: Klappholz and Agassi's purist Popperism, and the fact that the 
group failed to be attracted to Hutchison's response to the difficulty of empirical 
testing in economics. Indeed, the group often appeared to be more caught up with the 
problem of empirical testing in economics than with joining Hutchison in his 
methodological critici~m of orthodox economics. Nevertheless, Archibald (1961) 
mounted a powerful criticism of the Chicago economists attempts to defend orthodox 
price theory by criticising Chamberlin (1933). 
In section 6.1 we examined the 1959-60 exchange between Hutchison and Klappholz 
and Agassi. We dealt with this exchange first and separately from the remainder of 
the M2T seminar group for two reasons. First, their approach was concerned more 
with philosophical than economic issues and represented purist or ultra-Popperianism. 
Secondly, their contribution needs to be understood ahead of dealing with the M2T 
seminar group because it was through them, and Agassi in particular, that the rest of 
the group came to acquire instruction in Popperian thought (de Marchi, 1988: 141, 
148; Lipsey, 200la). 
We argued that Klappholz and Agassi's purist Popperian stance led them to a debate 
with Hutchison which was aimed, not so much at clarifying methodological issues so 
as to aid the practice of economics, but rather at promoting a philosophical end: the 
clarification of Popper's philosophy of science. They tried to show that Hutchison's 
twofold classification of statements with_ scientific sense was false. According to 
Latsis (1972) they wanted a third group to be recognised: metaphysical statements. 
According to Blaug (1980: 96) the statements they wanted recognised as a third group 
consisted of empirical propositions which were in principle untestable. We showed 
that their chief argument against his dichotomy - that propositions with unspecified 
clauses were ambiguous and could not be definitely fitted into either of Hutchison's 
categories - was not only resoundingly rebutted by Hutchison, but, more importantly, 
did not acknowledge that Hutchison was not concerned with water tight philosophical 
arguments. Rather than being concerned with a philosophical issue, Hutchison's main 
argument about ceteris paribus clauses was that they should be used 'less often and 
more cautiously' in economics (1938: 162). 
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In section 6.2 we examined Koopmans's 1957 claim that his apprpach and that of 
Hutchison (1938) were essentially similar. Examination of his 1957 essay indicated 
certain areas of similarity, but also those in which there were significant differences. 
The chief of these differences was Koopmans's decision to opt for mathematically 
tractable, rather than 'realistic', assumptions as part of his response to the difficulty of 
empirical testing in economics. Hutchison's 'wide' response to the difficulty of 
empirical testing in economics failed to influence Koopmans. Yet, to the extent that 
we found similarities between Koopmans and Hutchison, this, we argued, constituted 
evidence towards our view that Machlup (1955) had wrongly classified Hutchison as 
an ultra-empiricist. For Koopmans (1947) had famously argued against Burns and 
Mitchell's (1946) as 'unbendingly empiricist'. Now, only two years after Machlup's 
classification, he was happy to link himself explicitly to Hutehison's approach. The 
motivation for Machlup's criticism of Hutchison was not only his anti-empiricism. It 
was also his attempt to defend orthodoxy by dismissing one of its more independent 
and 'respectable' (ie not institutionalist or socialist) critics. We saw that Archibald 
(1959) adopted a critical stance towards Koopmans and accused him of adopting the 
'Hutchison-Oxford' position in calling for the testing of assumptions. Apart from his 
error in linking Hutchison and Oxford, Archibald need not have worried about 
Koopmans's apparent concern with assumptions - it was strictly secondary to his 
advocating a more formal approach in economics. 
In section 6.3 we showed how Klappholz and Agassi's (1959) criticism of Hutchison, 
and the fact that Archibald responded to the difficulty of empirical testing by seeking 
to deliberately narrow its scope, limited Hutchison's influence on Archibald. 
Nevertheless, we showed that Archibald's more moderate interpretation of Popper 
resulted in his advocating, albeit implicitly, Hutchison's view that empirical testing in 
economics had a central place and was not something to be swept aside a la Robbins 
as simply unnecessary. With regard to his appraisal of Friedman, two points should 
be noted. First, his criticism of Friedman's 'complacency' reflects his Popperian 
outlook. Second, his general acclaim for Friedman's 'revolutionary' essay can be 
read as a reflection of a broad approval of Hutchison, for, as we saw in Chapter Five, 
Friedman's essay is much more in tune with Hutchison's approach than Machlup 
(1955, 1956) made out to be the case. 
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In section 6.4 we attempted to show, by examining two examples of work that arose 
from the M2T group, the extent to which this work followed in the same broad 
empirical tradition as that of Hutchison (1938). This helps to substantiate our Chapter 
Five conclusion that Machlup (1955) misrepresented Hutchison as a methodological 
extremist. We discovered that Klappholz and Mishan (1962) took up Hutchison's 
arguments to a surprising degree. Indeed their conclusion that 'the only equations 
required in economic models are empiric in nature' appears to go beyond Hutchison 
himself (Klappholz and Mishan, 1962: 126). 
Apart from Archibald's reasons for neglecting Hutchison, we have seen how Lipsey 
had been influenced against Hutchison by Klappholz and Agassi (Lipsey, 2001a). 
Lipsey has spoken about how Robbins's methodology laid great stress on the intuitive 
plausibility of assumptions as the way to criticise a theory (Lipsey, 2001: 170, 
original emphasis). This may have been what Johnson (1978: 158) referred to as the 
emphasis on 'realistic' assumptions from the 1930s to the 1950s in British economics. 
Lipsey (1997: 213, 217) refers to the sense of a breakthrough in realising that one did 
not have to argue about he plausibility of assumptions. Instead one could look to 
predictions. These remarks indicate that Lipsey may also have been put off looking at 
Hutchison in more detail by Hutchison's talk of realistic assumptions, perhaps 
thinking it (also) involved reasonable or plausible assumptions. Nevertheless, it 
appears that it was for some such reason, rather than seriously substantive issues, that 
Lipsey side-stepped Hutchison. For, as we have shown in our examination of the 
introductory chapter of his famous textbook, Lipsey's methodological views are in 
fact similar in many ways to those of Hutchison (1938). Indeed, Lipsey (1993) 
favourably reviews Hutchison (1992) in which he continues to uphold his 1938 views 
in all important respects. And in a retrospective survey, he significantly notes 
'Hutchison's earlier exposition of a similar position' to that espoused in his famous 
textbook (Lipsey, 2001: 171). 
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CONCLUSION 
We begin our conclusion by pointing to two aspects of Hutchison's 1938 essay, 
aspects which appeared to attract the attention of most of Hutchison's critics. The 
first is Hutchison's principle of testability, or criterion of falsifiability (1960: vii, x). 
It has to do, he argues, with the same problem for which Popper (1957: 162) 
formulated his demarcation criterion for distinguishing between scientific and non-
scientific statements. According to Coats (1983: 8), while something close to this 
concept was implied at various points in Hutchison's 1938 essay, the 'first published 
reference' to Popper's demarcation criterion occurred only in Hutchison (1960). As 
we have argued in Chapter Three, Coats' s comment is somewhat misleading. For 
Hutchison had, to all intents and purposes, introduced Popper's criterion in 1938 
rather than something only closely related to it. Indeed he expressed his preference 
for distinguishing between science and non-science rather than between sense and 
nonsense so following Popper rather than the logical positivists, although not 
acknowledging Popper explicitly on this particular point (1938: 19, n 8). 
Coats's comment is only somewhat misleading because it does correctly draw 
attention to the nature of the relationship between Hutchison's ideas and those of 
Popper. While the criterion introduced by Hutchison was in substance no different 
from that of Popper, the implications for Hutchison of this criterion were different 
from those emphasised by Popper. For Hutchison, the criterion indicates whether or 
not we ,are dealing with an empirical inductive statement (ie the kind relevant for 
i 
science), whereas for Popper it was valuable as a means of indicating whether or not 
we were dealing with a scientific statement while avoiding the problem of induction. 
This may have been what Coats had in mind in describing Hutchison's criterion as 
closely related to Popper's, for a few pages later on he raises the matter of 'significant 
differences' between Hutchison's empiricism and Popper's 'rejection of inductivism' 
(1983: 10-11). 
Hutchison acknowledges that his criterion, in implying the significant distinction is 
that between science and non-science rather than the natural and social sciences, is 
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'naturalistic' (1960: xi). He contends that the main criticism of his criterion has 
stemmed from this particular implication, since it is held, notably by Knight (1940), 
that economics is concerned with purposive behaviour that cannot be empirically 
tested. He points out that on this issue his views have become 'considerably less 
"naturalist"' than in 1938. He now recognises many important differences, although 
these remain ultimately differences of degree rather than of kind (1960: xi-xii). Yet, 
we wish to point out that even in 1938 Hutchison appeared cautious about the 
applicability of the naturalistic thesis. At the end of his chapter one he explains that, 
while logical analysis may be used to remedy 'the unsatisfactory state of the 
foundations' of economic science, 'other deficiencies lie rather in the nature of the 
subject matter as compared with that of natural sciences and may never be thoroughly 
overcome in the same way' (1938: 18). On this matter it is noteworthy that he refers 
to Weber (1922) rather than a logical positivist. 
Concerning this first key aspect, Hutchison's actual criterion or rule is in practice the 
same as Popper's and certainly removed from the logical positivist criterion of 
verifiability. Regarding his conception of the nature of science to which this criterion 
applies, we have argued that Hutchison's conception differs to a significant extent 
from either that of Popper or, for that matter, from the hypothetico-deductive version 
of logical positivism and its later developments. Instead, Hutchison emphasises the 
inductivist aspects of logical positivism - those aspects which so troubled Popper. In 
terms of the strong version of our thesis, Hutchison espouses inductivism-SM more 
generally in its role as part of the inductivist-empirical-historical side of the long-
standing methodenstreit in economics. His essay is centrally concerned with support 
for this inductivist side of the methodenstreit, rather than for advancing the claims of 
logical positivism (or any other philosophy of science). 
The second aspect of his 1938 book, which drew even more criticism, is his two-fold 
classification of empirical synthetic and a priori analytic statements. Hutchison 
(1960) does not mention that his classification is supposed to be exhaustive of all 
statements that have scientific sense. In 1960 he steers clear of this general 
epistemological proposition, acknowledging instead that it may well be inadequate for 
the philosopher, or in disciplines besides economics, and that it was a reaction to 'the 
dogmatic and extreme a priorism of Professor Mises' (p xxi). Nevertheless, he 
268 
upholds the relevance of his dichotomy to economics and replies to criticisms of its 
inadequacy by calling for examples of statements in economics that fall outside this 
classification. 1 He dismisses as unsatisfactory attempts by Klappholz and Agassi 
(1959), and Machlup (1955, 1956), to provide such examples. 
This aspect of Hutchison's essay represents the section that is most clearly influenced 
by logical positivist thinking. Indeed, in Chapter Three we pointed out how 
Hutchison's view - that empirical investigation (of empirical synthetic statements) 
and logical analysis (of a priori analytic statements) is central to the business of 
science - is also central to logical positivism. We further pointed out that he 
regarded the purpose of his book as the logical analysis of the language of the science 
of economics (1938: 9). Clearly these central features of logical positivism play an 
obvious and basic role in Hutchison's methodology. Yet, we have questioned in this 
thesis just how basic much of logical positivism is to Hutchison's essay. 
We detailed in Chapter One how the logical positivist view of science is relate.d to 
their verifiability principle of meaning and, in turn, to the protocol-sentence debate. 
Yet, while Hutchison drew upon the literature surrounding in this debate, it appears 
that he did so with a limited purpose in mind, namely, that of supporting his 
methodology of economics. For instance in his chapter five (1938: 144) he draws on 
both Schlick (1936) and Carnap (1934, 1935) in sentences that follow on from each 
other, and yet does not refer to Schlick's basic disagreement in the course of the 
protocol-sentence debate with Carnap's interpretation of empiricism as 'itself framed 
by conventional and hence non-empirical choices' (Friedman, 1998: 793). This 
appears to provide some limited evidence for our (strong thesis) view that Hutchison 
was concerned first and foremost with issues related to the methodenstreit in 
economics rather than the philosophy of science. Even within the methodology of 
economics, his concern is with particular problems rather than with general issues, 
leaving such issues to 'specialist works on ... scientific method' (1938: 12). 
1 
'My one request is for a number of clear examples. After all, I think it would be agreed that one 
had only to take up a book of principles, or a textbook, and one could, without any shadow of 
ambiguity or disagreement, point immediately to numerous examples of empirical statements and of 
tautologies' (1960: xxi). 
269 
It is the above two (logical positivist) aspects that have received practically all of the 
critical attention devoted to Hutchison's 1938 essay. Yet it would be a mistake to 
suppose that this was what Hutchison's intervention was all about. In terms of sheer 
physical space, these two aspects constitute only part of the first two of Hutchison's 
six chapters of his 1938 book. In the weak version of our thesis we have drawn 
attention to the extent to which the logical positivist aspect of his intervention has 
been overemphasised and the inductivist-empirical-historical aspect overlooked. In 
stark contrast to the attention lavished upon the logical positivist aspects of 
Hutchison's essay, Hutchison's concern with over-reliance on deductive reasoning in 
economic analysis has met with little or no comment in the economics literature. This 
is despite the fact that Hutchison repeatedly details his concern throughout his essay 
devoting whole sections of the leading chapters of his book to the deficiencies, of 
what he variously terms, the hypothetical method (in his chapter two), the 'optimistic' 
approach (in his chapter three) and the 'psychological method' (in his chapter five). 
His most important chapter, his chapter four, is all about exposing the extent to which 
the deductive approach in economics relies on the implicit, but vital, assumption that 
individuals entertain expectations that tum out to be perfectly correct. Hutchison has 
recently stressed that, although Keynes (1936) and Shackle (1967) criticised this 
assumption and drew attention to the importance of uncertainty in economics, they 
failed to point out its methodological consequences - 'that there is not this one 
postulate from which so much can be deduced' - as he had done in the conclusion of 
his chapter four in 1938, the chapter he regarded as his 'least uninteresting' (Hart, 
2002). 
Hutchison's exposure of how the traditional procedure in economics depends on the 
assumption of perfect expectations not only shows up the limitations of deductivism 
in economics, but provides us with a leading example of how the institutional and 
historical aspects the subject matter of economics (such as uncertainty) are neglected 
or side-lined in terms of the deductive method. While Hutchison has come to stress 
the importance of these aspects in economics more explicitly in his writings since 
1938 (eg Hutchison, 1977, 1992, 2000), the importance with which he regards them is 
clearly evident in his 1938 work. Apart from his critici&m that the 'closed deduction' 
of the 'optimistic approach' did not allow the possibility of (historical) change and 
hence of any dynamic analysis (1938: 73-6), he drew on one of the leaders of the 
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English historical school, Cliffe Leslie (1879, 1879a), in emphasising the importance 
of uncertainty in economics. Although he cites Schmoller (1883: 979) only once -
with regard to Schmoller's contention that any worker in a chemical laboratory 
proclaiming Meng~r's conception of the exactness of scientific laws would be 
summarily ejected (1938: 59), this is most likely due to the fact that the circumstances 
of Germany in the late 1930s exacerbated the opprobrium surrounding Schmoller in 
Britain at the time (cf Hutchison, 1988). This may be why Hutchison (1938: 159) 
cited Clark ( 1931) instead in support of including the historical aspect into economics: 
Economic dynamics will, in its entirety, incorporate into itself historical 
economics. The changes that are going on in the world will in future be studied 
inductively, as well as deductively; and it is the inductive part of the work that 
falls to the historical economist. In the long run it is this part that will need to 
absorb the most scientific labour. The static laws of economics ought, 
consequently, to be known at an early date. 
A final example of the importance Hutchison attached to the institutional and 
historical aspects of economics is his contention that any fruitful economic advice to a 
policy problem cannot be purely economic, but must be fully integrated with wider 
political and sociological investigations. It was to facilitate such investigations that 
he pointed to the need to 'begin more or less from the beginning with extensive 
empirical investigation' (1938: 166) - a remark, it may be remembered from Chapter 
Five, that Machlup seized upon as evidence of Hutchison's ultra-empiricism. While 
the motto with which he pre-empted his entire book was a quotation from Pareto 
( 193 5) regarding the importance of mathematical economics, the penultimate motto 
prefacing his concluding chapter is again drawn from Pareto (1935), but this time with 
regard to the importance of taking account of the 'inextricably interconnected[ness] of 
social phenomena' by means of extensive empirical investigation: 
Until economic science is much further advanced, 'economic principles' are less 
important to the economists than the reciprocal bearings of economics and the 
results of the other social sciences. Many economists are paying no attention to 
such interrelations, for mastering them is a long and fatiguing task requiring an 
extensive knowledge of facts; whereas anyone with a little imagination, a pen, 
and a few reams of paper can relieve himself of a chat on 'principles'. 
Apart from the nature of Hutchison's 1938 intervention in economics, we have also 
been concerned with examining its influence as revealed in the journal debates 
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between 1938 and 1963, especially those that arose with Knigl_it, Machlup and 
Klappholz and Agassi. Here, Weintraub's (1989: 478) distinction between two senses 
of methodology, 'Methodology' and 'methodology' appears pertinent. Methodology 
with a capital M has the same relationship to economics as the philosophy of science 
has to science. Methodologists' perspectives are developed from 'outside' economics 
and for that reason the work of Methodologists cannot have any consequences for the 
practice of economics. By contrast, methodological views aired by practising 
economists (methodology with a small m) as well as work in the history of economic 
thought can have significant consequences 'for our understanding of practice' (1989: 
477-81). 
While some may regard Hutchison (1938) as a clear example of a Methodologist, we 
have argued throughout this thesis against such an interpretation. Hutchison did not 
so much attempt to apply logical positivism to economics as use it to support an 
empirical-inductivist-historical approach to economics. Instead Knight, Machlup and 
Klappholz and Agassi appear much better candidates for being awarded Weintraub's 
capital M. Weintraub's (1989: 481) metaphor of economists using Methodology as a 
club with which to batter others may well be applied to their criticisms of Hutchison 
(1938) as positivist, ultra-empiricist and for not adopting a purist Popperism. This 
seems especially the case with Klappholz and Agassi who were more intent on 
clarifying Popper than with methodology as a way to make economics more 
practically useful. 
While Weintraub argues that the work of Methodologists cannot have significant 
consequences for understanding the practice of economics, it appears from Chapters 
Four, Five and Six that they can have significant consequences in misleading 
economists about the work of other economic methodologists with a small m - in our 
case Hutchison. For example, this is how Ferguson (1969: 6) describes Hutchison's 
position as leader of the group of 'ultraempiricists': 
Instead of beginning with a system of axioms, the ultraempiricists presumably· 
prefer to start with a body of what they call facts. Starting with facts of course 
entails sacrificing the very simplicity that is sought. One's approach 
immediately involves all of the complexities of the real world; and he (sic) is 
deprived of the use of the single tool - model analysis - that enables him to 
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escape the morass of meaningless facts and to reach conclusions of some 
generality. 
Ferguson is clearly influenced by Machlup's (1955) misrepresentation of Hutchison's 
position. Among the many errors in the above description, we attempt to correct but 
one: in his chapter two Hutchison explained the vital use and significance of pure 
theory (1938: 21 ff). 
We argued in Chapter Five that Friedman (1953), except for his irrelevance-of-
assumptions thesis, shared very much the same methodological position as Hutchison 
(1938). Weintraub cites Friedman (1953) as an example of a small m methodologist. 
From our perspective, he might well have also cited Hutchsion (1938). As noted 
earlier in this Conclusion, Hutchison was concerned with particular problems of 
economics and shunned general issues which he left to 'specialist works on ... 
scientific method' (1938: 12). His detailed analysis in his chapter four of the 
particular way in which the traditional deductivist procedures in economics (the 
hypothetical method, the optimistic procedure and the psychological method) depend 
on the assumption of perfect expectation appears to be a good example of an 
economist practising methodology with a small m. In 1960, in replying to criticism of 
two-fold classification of scientific statements, he accepts that it may not be 
satisfactory for the philosopher, but makes it plain that he is concerned with its 
relevance to economics. In this respect he notes that examples of its inadequacy in 
economics have so far not been forthcoming (Hutchison: 1960: xxi). Finally, more 
recently Hutchison has addressed the issue pertaining to Weintraub's distinction as 
follows: 
I maintain this about the relations between economics and philosophy: the 
economists have got to make sense of what they're saying. If philosophers try 
to tell economists what they really mean they may not be right. I want to derive 
the foundations of the subject from inside the subject (Hutchison, in Hart 2002). 
Here Hutchison's statement that he wants to work inside the subject corresponds 
nicely to Weintraub' s description of this as true of methodologists with a small m as 
opposed to Methodologists with a capital M whose perspectives are developed from 
outside economics. Weintraub (1989: 492) concludes that progress in understanding 
the practice of economics requires 'not a philosopher-economist, nor a Rhetorician-
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economist, but rather an historian-economist sensitized to the importance of ideas, 
and their context'. In terms of our thesis, Hutchison stands out as an exemplar of the 
historian-economist. 
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